Francisco Rincon-Covarrubias v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 5:2013cv01733 - Document 24 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Patrick J. Walsh. The Agencys decision is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order. IT IS SO ORDERED.(See Order for further details.) (sbou)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Francisco Rincon-Covarrubias v. Carolyn W. Colvin Doc. 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 FRANCISCO RINCON-COVARRUBIAS, Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 13 14 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. ) Case No.: ED CV 13-1733-PJW ) ) ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 16 I. 17 18 19 20 INTRODUCTION Plaintiff appeals a decision by Defendant Social Security Administration (“the Agency”), denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). He claims that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred when he found that 21 Plaintiff could perform his past work as a labor supervisor. 22 For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that the 23 24 ALJ erred and remands the case to the Agency for further proceedings. 25 II. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 26 In January 2011, Plaintiff applied for DIB, alleging that 27 he had been disabled since December 2010, due to spondylitis and 28 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 a lumbosacral strain. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 154-62, 2 176.) 3 reconsideration. 4 granted a hearing before an ALJ. 5 he appeared with counsel and testified at the hearing. 6 60.) 7 (AR 24-31.) 8 denied review. The Agency denied the applications initially and on (AR 61-85.) (AR 89-92.) On May 29, 2012, (AR 36- The ALJ subsequently issued a decision denying benefits. Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council, which (AR 2-17.) He then commenced this action. III. 9 10 Plaintiff then requested and was ANALYSIS The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual 11 functional capacity to perform medium work but was restricted 12 from climbing ladders and scaffolds. 13 that Plaintiff could perform his prior job as a construction 14 labor supervisor as it is generally performed in the economy and 15 as he performed it. 16 erred in doing so. (AR 30.) (AR 27.) He concluded Plaintiff claims that the ALJ For the following reasons, the Court agrees. 17 As generally performed, the job of construction labor 18 supervisor requires occasional climbing of, among other things, 19 ladders and scaffolds. 20 No. 850.137-014 (explaining construction labor supervisor job 21 requires climbing up to one-third of the time); and The Revised 22 Handbook for Analyzing Jobs, at 12-4 (defining climbing to 23 include ascending and descending ladders and scaffolding). 24 Obviously, then, Plaintiff cannot perform the job as generally 25 performed in the economy. See Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 26 Nor can he perform the job as he did in the past because he 27 had to stand and walk for eight hours a day (AR 178) and the ALJ 28 limited him to medium work (AR 27), which requires standing and 2 1 walking for up to six hours a day. 2 83-10. 3 Plaintiff could perform the job of labor supervisor as generally 4 performed or as Plaintiff had performed it. (AR 27, 178.) See Social Security Ruling Thus, the ALJ erred in determining that The only issue that remains is whether the error was 5 6 harmless, i.e., was it inconsequential to the ultimate decision 7 that Plaintiff was not disabled. 8 Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006). 9 Agency argues that it was because the ALJ determined that See, e.g., Stout v. Comm'r, The 10 Plaintiff could perform other jobs. 11 Again, the Court disagrees. 12 testified that Plaintiff could perform other jobs, with some 13 limitations, (AR 54-59), the ALJ never mentioned those jobs in 14 his decision. 15 ALJ. 16 to the Agency for further proceedings.1 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (Joint Stip. at 16.) Though the vocational expert And the Court cannot fill in that finding for the For these reasons, the Court reluctantly remands this case 1 The Court’s reluctance is due to the fact that it appears pretty clear from the record that Plaintiff is not disabled. The best evidence of this is his testimony. As he explained at the hearing, the reason he stopped working was because he was laid off from his job when there was no more work at his company, not because he was injured. (AR 41.) Had he not been laid off, he would have kept working. (AR 41.) And, after he was laid off, he applied for and received worker’s compensation benefits (AR 41), which required him to certify that he was ready, willing, and able to work. Cal Unemp. Ins. Code § 1253(c), (e). Further, the treating records in this case are almost non-existent. They make up only 18 pages of the 237-page administrative record. Needless to say, no doctor ever concluded that Plaintiff was disabled. In fact, the only doctor who ever offered an opinion, the examining doctor, found that Plaintiff was capable of heavy work. (AR 210-14.) All that being said, the Court is not at liberty to make findings at this stage and conclude that Plaintiff could perform other jobs and, therefore, is not disabled. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 1 2 The Agency’s decision is reversed and the case is remanded 3 for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion 4 and Order. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 DATED: December 23, 2014 7 8 9 PATRICK J. WALSH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 S:\PJW\Cases-Social Security\TORRES\Memo Opinion and Order.docx 23 24 25 26 27 28 4
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
