Sheryl D. Maldonado v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 5:2013cv01062 - Document 16 (C.D. Cal. 2014)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner. (See Order for complete details) (afe)

Download PDF

Sheryl D. Maldonado v. Carolyn W. Colvin 1 Doc. 16 . 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHERYL D. MALDONADO, 12 13 14 15 16 No. EDCV 13-01062 SS Plaintiff, v. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant. 17 18 19 20 I. 21 INTRODUCTION 22 23 Plaintiff Sheryl D. Maldonado ( Plaintiff ) seeks review of 24 the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security 25 Administration (the Commissioner or the Agency ) denying her 26 application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental 27 Security Income. 28 § 636(c), to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States The parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Dockets.Justia.com 1 Magistrate Judge. 2 the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. For the reasons stated below, the decision of 3 4 II. 5 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 6 7 Plaintiff filed applications for Title II Disability 8 Insurance Benefits ( DIB ) and Title XVI Supplemental Security 9 Income ( SSI ) on April 23, 2010. (Administrative Record ( AR ) 10 137, 139). 11 onset date of December 31, 2004. 12 Plaintiff s 13 February 4, 2011, upon reconsideration, the Agency again denied 14 Plaintiff s applications. 15 Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 16 ( ALJ ). 17 hearing held before ALJ Joseph Lisiecki on October 11, 2011. 18 45). 19 medical expert, testified at the hearing. 20 November 22, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff 21 DIB and SSI. In both applications, Plaintiff alleged a disability applications (AR 106). on (Id.). August 16, 2010. (AR 95, 100). Plaintiff The Agency denied appeared (AR 88). On On April 6, 2011, and testified at a (AR Ronald Hatakeyama, a vocational expert, and Craig Rath, a (AR 46, 49, 63). On (AR 9). 22 Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ s decision, which the 23 24 Appeals Council denied on May 6, 2013. 25 filed this action on June 21, 2013. 26 \\ 27 \\ 28 \\ 2 (AR 1-4). Plaintiff 1 III. 2 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 3 4 Plaintiff was born on June 29, 1956. (AR 20). Plaintiff 5 was forty-eight years old at the time of her alleged disability 6 onset date. 7 speaks, writes, reads and understands English. 8 Plaintiff previously worked as a sandwich maker and a cashier. 9 (AR 164, (Id.). 210). 10 depression, 11 anxiety. She has an eleventh-grade education and Plaintiff panic alleges disorder, anxiety, that (AR 161, 163). she suffers agoraphobia and from social (AR 162). 12 13 A. Medical Records Of Treating Physicians 14 Plaintiff 15 from a psychiatrist ( Riverside ) California, beginning June 15, 2004.1 18 During her initial assessment, the doctor noted that Plaintiff 19 suffered from symptoms of depression and anxiety.2 20 Plaintiff asserted that she suffered abuse in her marriage, but 21 acknowledged that she had been divorced for nine years prior to 22 the date she sought treatment at Riverside. 23 Plaintiff was unemployed for a year, but had previously worked as 24 1 28 in the 17 27 Health at Department 26 Mental treatment 16 25 of received Riverside, (AR 251-343, 360-384). (AR 330). (AR 308, 330). Plaintiff received treatment in this facility with different doctors, including Dr. A. Dia. Some of the doctors names, however, are unidentifiable due to illegible signatures. 2 Plaintiff divorced her husband approximately nine years before beginning treatment at Riverside. (AR 308). Plaintiff began taking various medications, including Prozac and Xanax, a year before the divorce. (Id.). 3 1 a cashier. 2 energy and felt worthless. 3 diagnosed 4 Plaintiff abus[ed] speed once a [month], as well as Xanax which 5 she [stole] from [her] daughter. 6 2004 appointment, she informed the doctor that she was applying 7 for SSI. (AR 308) Plaintiff Plaintiff lacked motivation, displayed poor with (Id.). Additionally, the doctor amphetamine abuse, (AR 307). noting that At her August 9, (AR 308). 8 9 Plaintiff did not show for her next appointment on June 22, 10 2004. 11 Plaintiff 12 277, 283, 298, 300-301, 303-304, 308). 13 for appointments on June 22, 2004; October 19, 2004; April 29, 14 2005; June 16, 2005; October 24, 2005; February 11, 2008; July 15 23, 2008 and October 14, 2008. 16 303, 308). 17 October 5, 2004; October 20, 2004 and January 7, 2005. 18 304). (AR 308). missed Between June 22, 2004 and October 14, 2008, approximately eleven appointments. (AR 273, Plaintiff failed to show (AR 273, 277, 283, 298, 300-301, Additionally, Plaintiff cancelled appointments on (AR 303- 19 20 On September 21, 2004, Plaintiff complained about her 21 medication, Zoloft, but reported no side effects.3 22 Furthermore, although her mood initially improved, she remained 23 depressed. (Id.). Plaintiff claimed that she was (AR 305). sleeping 24 25 26 27 28 3 According to Plaintiff, she took Zoloft to treat her anxiety and depression. (AR 226). Zoloft is approved by the FDA to treat depression, obsessive compulsive disorder, panic disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and pediatric obsessive compulsive disorder. Motus v. Pfizer Inc., F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1089 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 4 1 better and panic attacks were getting better with an average 2 of one per week.4 (Id.). 3 4 On September 22, 2004, Plaintiff received individual 5 therapy. 6 that she started having panic attacks about three years ago, 7 which affected her job as a cashier. 8 agoraphobia and didn t like leaving her residence. 9 The doctor noted that Plaintiff may still be using speed on a 10 (AR 304-05). During that session, Plaintiff explained (Id.). Plaintiff developed monthly basis and taking Xanax from her daughter. (AR 304). (Id.). 11 12 Plaintiff missed her next four appointments, delaying her 13 next meeting until February 17, 2005. 14 reporting anxiety and feeling on verge of panic, Plaintiff s 15 depression was not bad and she ate and slept well. (AR 302). 16 On March 31, 2005, Plaintiff felt pretty good. (AR 301). 17 Plaintiff 18 approximately 19 appointments in April and June. had occasional once a anger week. (AR 302-304). outbursts panic attacks Plaintiff (Id.). and Despite missed (AR 300-301). 20 On July 29, 2005, the doctor noted that Plaintiff had not 21 22 visited for four months. (AR 300). Plaintiff experienced 23 increased anxiety after running out of medication about three 24 weeks ago, but felt no further panic attacks and remained sober. 25 (Id.). Plaintiff support[ed] [her]self on alimony. (Id.). 26 27 28 4 Previously, on August 9, 2004, Plaintiff complained of suffering panic attacks approximately three times a week. (AR 308). 5 1 Similarly, on September 12, 2005, Plaintiff reported experiencing 2 occasional anger and anxiety, but no panic attacks. 3 Plaintiff continued to eat[] and sleep[] well. (AR 299). (Id.). 4 5 On March 13, 2006, after a six month break in treatment, 6 Plaintiff 7 brother s death due to an accidental drug overdose. 8 On June 5, 2006, however, Plaintiff stated I m actually doing 9 well and voiced no complaints. reported feeling anxious and depressed (AR 297). after her (AR 298). Plaintiff ate and 10 slept well, and kept active doing yard work and taking walks. 11 (Id.). 12 13 Plaintiff continued to report improvement between June 5, 14 2006 15 Specifically, on September 8, 2006, Plaintiff stated she felt a 16 lot better...more energetic and motivated. 17 did not look for a job, however, and supported herself on $500.00 18 monthly 19 Plaintiff 20 reasonably well...and keeping active. and March alimony. 5, 2008. (Id.). experienced (AR 282, 288, Similarly, occasional 291, 293, (AR 296). on November anxiety but 296-297). Plaintiff 30, was 2006 doing (AR 295). 21 22 Plaintiff further voiced no complaints and reported doing 23 well, keeping active and eating and sleeping well on February 22, 24 2007, May 22, 2007 and August 27, 2007. 25 Plaintiff was upset [ . . . ] ex husband trying to cut off 26 alimony and court wants her to work. 27 2007, Plaintiff felt stressed because her landlord refused to 28 renew her lease, but otherwise she was doing pretty good and 6 (AR 291, 293-294). (AR 294). On November 19, 1 still looking for a job. 2 was 3 landlord extended her lease. doing well, and (AR 288). still On March 5, 2008, Plaintiff living in her house since her (AR 282). 4 5 On May 28, 2008, Plaintiff stated that she started feeling 6 self-conscious, anxious and sad for no clear reason. 7 Plaintiff failed to show for her next appointment on July 23, 8 2008, however, and on August 18, 2008 stated, I am feeling much 9 better. (AR 10 complained of 11 episodes two days earlier. 275, severe 277). On anxiety August attacks, 20, but (AR 280). 2008, Plaintiff reported no such (AR 274). 12 13 Plaintiff did not attend her next appointment on October 14, re-started 14 2008. 15 experiencing panic attacks after about [four years] of panic free 16 period. (AR 273). On October 21, 2008, she (AR 272). 17 18 Between November 18, 2008 and May 17, 2010 Plaintiff 19 continued to improve. 20 November 18, 2008 Plaintiff felt better, much less anxious, and 21 [had zero] panic attacks. 22 Plaintiff stated, everything is good, no further panic [and 23 occasional] anxiety. 24 had just returned from a trip to Texas and reported doing ok. 25 (AR 266). 26 exhibited a neutral mood, normal thought process and no side 27 effects from medication on April 30, 2009, February 22, 2010 and 28 May 17, 2010. (AR 256, 269, 270). (AR 270). (AR 269). Specifically, on On January 13, 2009, On March 17, 2009, Plaintiff Plaintiff similarly stated she was doing well and (AR 256-258). 7 1 On March 10, Plaintiff s 2011, depression [was] but 2 fatigue and low motivation persist[ed]. 3 2011, Plaintiff asked a nurse for additional medications because 4 she got hysterical after receiving a three-day notice to move 5 out of her house. 6 extra Xanax when [she] needed to but could not remember how 7 many extra. (AR 365). (AR 366). ok On March 28, Plaintiff reported that she took (Id.). 8 9 A Narrative Report dated May 12, 2011 indicated that 10 Plaintiff visited Riverside County Mental Health from June 15, 11 2004 to March 10, 2011. 12 Report, Plaintiff suffered from recurrent major depression, panic 13 disorder and agoraphobia. 14 insomnia, 15 (Id.). 16 According 17 sustained level of concentration, engage in repetitive tasks for 18 an extended period or adapt to new and stressful situations. 19 (Id.). 20 week without decompensating. 21 manage her own funds. 22 positive 23 which she had not yet been treated for. 24 hypothesized 25 depression and anxiety. 26 Plaintiff s use of speed or Xanax from her daughter. 27 \\ 28 \\ phobias, (AR 384). According to the Narrative (Id.). depression, Plaintiff had evidence of anxiety and panic episodes. Plaintiff s prognosis was chronic and guarded. to this report, Plaintiff could not (Id.). maintain a Plaintiff was not capable of completing a forty hour work for (Id.). attention that (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff screened deficit treatment Plaintiff could, however, hyperactivity of (Id.). 8 ADHD disorder (Id.). may help (ADHD), The Doctor [with] her The Report did not comment on 1 B. 2 Non-Examining Doctor s Opinion Regarding Plaintiff s Mental Condition 3 4 On August 3, 2010, Dr. S. Khan completed a Physical Residual 5 Functional Capacity Assessment of Plaintiff ( RFC ) based on a 6 review of Plaintiff s medical records. 7 indicated that Plaintiff had mild restrictions for activities of 8 daily living and mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, 9 persistence or pace. (AR 355). (AR 347-59). Dr. Khan also Dr. Khan found that 10 Plaintiff had no difficulties maintaining social functioning and 11 no repeated episodes of decompensation. 12 [Plaintiff] from a psychiatric standpoint appear[ed] to have 13 non-severe 14 psychiatric 15 [Plaintiff] s 16 concluded 17 (AR 359). psych MDI and symptoms do ability to that additionally not it Dr. Khan stated, appear[ed] significantly function. Plaintiff (Id.). had (AR mostly the decrease/impact 357). mild that Dr. Khan limitations. 18 19 C. Medical Expert Testimony 20 21 On October 11, 2011, medical expert Dr. Craig Rath testified 22 at Plaintiff s hearing. 23 Plaintiff suffered from a mood disorder not otherwise specified 24 and an anxiety disorder not otherwise specified. 25 Rath considered Plaintiff for a panic disorder but she did not 26 meet the frequency criteria for a 12.063.5 (AR 45, 49). Dr. Rath stated that (AR 50). (AR 50). Dr. According 27 5 28 According to the Disability Evaluation under Social Security, a 12.063 is defined as recurrent severe panic attacks 9 1 to Dr. Rath, the record reflected ratings of normal or mild for 2 anxiety, panic attacks and depression. 3 reported she was doing well on a number of occasions. 4 Plaintiff s 5 sources. 6 had to be in no more than a moderately stressful environment 7 from all sources including no stressful high production quotas, 8 no intrusive supervision. 9 part of a team where there is a lot of peer pressure for her to main limitation (AR 52). (Id.). would (AR 50-51). be Plaintiff stressed[sic] (AR 51). from all Because Plaintiff is prone to anxiety, she (Id.). Plaintiff can t really be 10 perform. Plaintiff also cannot be in charge of the 11 safety operation of others, no heights, [or] dangerous moving 12 appointment. (Id.). 13 14 D. Vocational Expert Testimony 15 16 Vocational Expert ( VE ) Ronald Hatakeyama testified about 17 the existence of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff 18 could perform given her physical limitations. 19 According to the VE, a hypothetical individual of Plaintiff s 20 vocational 21 Plaintiff s past work as a cashier or sandwich maker because she 22 would 23 Plaintiff 24 economy, however, such as an addresser in a mailroom or a linen 25 room attendant. profile have to could deal and RFC with perform would the other (AR 64-65). not public jobs be (AR 45, 63-65). able to constantly. existing in perform (AR the 64). national These jobs existed in significant 26 27 28 manifested by a sudden unpredictable onset of intense apprehension, fear, terror and sense of impending doom occurring on the average of at least once a week. 10 economy.6 1 numbers 2 hypothetical individual sharing Plaintiff s limitations could not 3 perform any job in the national economy, however, if that person 4 could not persist throughout a normal eight hour workday or 5 [forty] hour work week. in the national and local (Id.) A (AR 66). 6 7 E. Plaintiff s Daughter s Third Party Function Report 8 On July 11, 2010, Plaintiff s daughter, Aubree Maldonado 9 10 ( Aubree ), completed a 11 Report ) regarding how Plaintiff s alleged disability limited her 12 activities. Party Function Report ( TPF 13 activities included watching TV, gardening, playing with her dog 14 and cleaning. 15 and worked in the yard. 16 own meals, but she no longer prepared four course meals. 17 Plaintiff did not socialize, work, drive or go shopping anymore. 18 (AR 187, 189). 19 she talks to is her sister. 20 insomnia almost every night. 21 the bills herself, (AR 190), but hasn t paid bills or had a bank 22 account for years. 23 nearly zero. 24 the landlord visited their house. 25 felt anxious and cried whenever something changed or was out of According to Aubree, Plaintiff s daily (AR 186). (Id.). Third Plaintiff also washed dishes, did laundry (AR 188). Plaintiff could prepare her (Id.). The only person (outside of [their] house) that (AR 193). (AR 187). (AR 189). (AR 191). Plaintiff had terrible Plaintiff used to pay Plaintiff s attention span is Plaintiff also hid in her room whenever (AR 192). Further, Plaintiff 26 27 28 6 According to the VE, 3,000 regional and 68,000 national mailroom addresser jobs existed, and 2,500 regional and 350,000 national linen room attendant jobs existed. (AR 65). 11 [E]ven the smallest change of any kind causes 1 place. 2 extreme panic, anxiety, [and] sometimes anger [and] tears. 3 193). (Id.). (AR 4 5 F. Plaintiff s Function Report 6 7 On July 10, 2010, Plaintiff completed a Function Report. 8 (AR 9 activities included drinking coffee, showering, eating, watching 10 TV, feeding her dog, doing some housework, laying down, watering 11 flowers and sometimes working in the yard. 12 could no longer work, shop, socialize or cook complete meals 13 because of her illness. 14 prepare sandwiches, 15 eggs. (AR 200). 16 did 17 Plaintiff reported difficulty falling asleep, which she tried to 18 remedy with Xanax.7 198, 205). laundry, swept, Plaintiff stated (AR 199-200). frozen dinners that her typical (AR 198). daily Plaintiff Plaintiff could, however, [and] sometimes scrambled Plaintiff also regularly washed the dishes, watered flowers and pulled weeds. (Id.). (AR 199). 19 20 Plaintiff claimed that she was unable to drive and could not 21 leave her home alone because she was scared of having a panic 22 attack. 23 to 24 (AR 201-202). the (AR 201). store with She did not shop at all, but sometimes went her sister or to the lake with her mom. Plaintiff [had] a hard time talking to people. 25 26 27 28 7 According to Plaintiff, she takes Xanax to treat her anxiety and panic attacks. (AR 226). Xanax is traditionally used to treat anxiety disorders. Burger v. Astrue, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1189 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (citing The PDR Family Guide to Prescription Drugs 742 (9th ed. 2000)). 12 She [felt] stupid and [she felt] like no one [was] 1 (AR 203). 2 interested in what [she had] to say. 3 hard time reading. 4 ok I guess, but she was not sure because she had not tried to 5 do anything like that for a long time. 6 really anxious if someone want[ed] 7 phone. 8 paperwork like the Function Report because she [got] panicky 9 and needed to stop and calm down after each question. (AR 205). (Id.). (Id.). Plaintiff had a She could follow written instructions (Id.). Plaintiff got to talk to [her] on the Furthermore, Plaintiff took hours to complete (Id.). 10 Plaintiff 11 including the space between objects on her dresser, because she 12 was afraid of thing[s] being different. also needed things to be organized a certain way, (Id.). 13 14 G. Plaintiff s Testimony 15 Plaintiff testified that [she] got sick the first time when 16 17 [she] was married. (AR 56). 18 started feeling better and thought [she] was cured. 19 57). 20 six years. 21 interact with customers. 22 across the street, even though her job was only a five minute 23 walk from her house. 24 fired because my books were coming out all that, like money was 25 missing and stuff and I guess they thought I was stealing. 26 (Id.). 27 \\ 28 \\ After leaving her husband, she (AR 56- She started having panic attacks again after working for (Id.). Plaintiff could no longer do [her] job or (Id.). (AR 57). She became afraid to walk Plaintiff stated, I eventually got 13 According to Plaintiff, on good days she showers, eats and 1 rarely 2 sometimes 3 anywhere. 4 house, however, because whenever she felt overwhelmed she could 5 lock 6 sometimes goes to the market with her sister. 7 really 8 (Id.). 9 what she just read. works in the in anxious (AR 55). She [goes] She attended a baby shower at her sister s (Id.). herself yard. her sister s and room. overwhelmed (Id.). with Plaintiff (Id.). also She gets everything, however. She watches TV and reads, but at times she cannot recall (AR 55-56). When Plaintiff s mother visits, 10 they walk the dogs around a lake. 11 drive before getting sick, but no longer has a driver s license. 12 (AR 59). 13 stopped her from wanting to commit suicide. 14 helps with her anxiety and panic attacks. 15 not have any side effects from her medications except feeling 16 really tired from Xanax. (AR 58). Plaintiff used to Plaintiff s medication helped her stay out of bed and (AR 61). (Id.). Xanax also Plaintiff does (Id.). 17 18 IV. 19 THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 20 21 To qualify 22 demonstrate 23 impairment that prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful 24 activity and that is expected to result in death or to last for a 25 continuous period of at least twelve months. 26 157 27 § 423(d)(1)(A)). 28 incapable of performing the work she previously performed and F.3d a 715, for disability medically 721 The (9th benefits, determinable Cir. impairment 14 1998) must a claimant physical or must mental Reddick v. Chater, (citing render 42 the U.S.C. claimant 1 incapable of performing any other substantial gainful employment 2 that exists in the national economy. 3 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 4 5 To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ 6 conducts a five-step inquiry. 7 The steps are: 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 8 9 (1) Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial 10 gainful activity? 11 not disabled. 12 (2) If so, the claimant is found If not, proceed to step two. Is the claimant s impairment severe? 13 claimant is found not disabled. 14 If not, the to step three. 15 (3) If so, proceed Does the claimant s impairment meet or equal one 16 of 17 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? 18 the claimant is found disabled. 19 to step four. 20 (4) the specific impairments described in 20 If so, If not, proceed Is the claimant capable of performing his past 21 work? 22 If not, proceed to step five. 23 (5) If so, the claimant is found not disabled. Is the claimant able to do any other work? 24 not, the claimant is found disabled. 25 claimant is found not disabled. 26 27 28 15 If If so, the 1 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 2 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); 20 3 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)-(g)(1) & 416.920(b)-(g)(1). 4 5 The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through 6 four, and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. 7 Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54. 8 affirmative duty to assist the claimant in developing the record 9 at every step of the inquiry. Additionally, the ALJ has an (Id. at 954). If, at step four, 10 the claimant meets her burden of establishing an inability to 11 perform past work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant 12 can perform some other work that exists in significant numbers 13 in the national economy, taking into account the claimant s RFC, 14 age, education, and work experience. 15 1100; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 16 416.920(g)(1). 17 vocational 18 Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 19 (commonly known as the Grids ). 20 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). 21 (strength-related) and non-exertional limitations, the Grids are 22 inapplicable and the ALJ must take the testimony of a vocational 23 expert. 24 (citing Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988)). The Commissioner may do so by the testimony of a expert Moore Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098, v. or by Apfel, reference to the Medical-Vocational Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d When a claimant has both exertional 216 F.3d 25 26 27 28 16 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000) 1 V. 2 THE ALJ S DECISION 3 4 The ALJ employed the five-step sequential evaluation process 5 and concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning 6 of the Social Security Act. 7 that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 8 because her alleged disability onset date of December 31, 2004. 9 (AR 14). (AR 22). At step one, the ALJ found At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the 10 severe impairments of mood disorder and anxiety disorder that 11 cause significant limitation in [Plaintiff s] ability to perform 12 basic work activities. 13 that all other alleged impairments were not severe under Social 14 Security Administration regulations. (AR 14-15). The ALJ found, however, (AR 15). 15 16 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an 17 impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically 18 equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 19 Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 had 21 social functioning, and with regard to concentration, persistence 22 or pace, which do not satisfy the paragraph B criteria. 23 15-16). moderate (AR 15). difficulties in The ALJ stated that Plaintiff activities of daily living and (AR 24 25 Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual 26 functional capacity to perform work at all exertional levels, but 27 with 28 moderately stressful environment; no high production quotas or nonexertional limitations 17 including: no more than a 1 intrusive supervision; no team type of work; should not be in 2 charge of the safety of others; and should not be around heights 3 or dangerous machinery. 4 (AR 16-17). 5 6 The ALJ found that [Plaintiff s] statements concerning the 7 intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms 8 [were] not credible to the extent they [were] inconsistent with 9 the above [RFC] assessment. (AR 19). 10 Plaintiff s been 11 conservative in nature; Plaintiff had not been hospitalized, did 12 not 13 medications 14 evidence 15 actually been successful in controlling the symptoms overall. 16 (Id.). 17 Dr. Khan s opinions. 18 opinions were consistent with the determination that Plaintiff s 19 conditions were not severe enough to significantly decrease or 20 impact Plaintiff s ability to work. treatment receive [had] regular, remained of individual stable. continued (AR treatment, The ALJ stated that essentially or group 18). routine therapy, and Furthermore, Plaintiff s and her despite treatment had The ALJ also gave considerable weight to Dr. Rath s and (AR 19-20). According to the ALJ, their (AR 19). 21 The 22 ALJ gave little psychiatrist s weight to the TPF Report and the 23 Riverside 24 inconsistencies between the Riverside psychiatrist s opinions and 25 treatment notes throughout Plaintiff s treatment period.8 26 20). opinions. (AR 20). The ALJ found (AR Specifically, the psychiatrist noted that Plaintiff had 27 8 28 The ALJ did not identify the Riverside referred instead to a psychiatrist generally. 18 psychiatrist (AR 20). but nearly all of Plaintiff s treatment 1 impaired 2 notes categorized her judgment as within normal limits. 3 20). 4 believed the other evidence in the record did not support them. 5 (Id.). 6 discussion of Plaintiff s daily activities in the TPF report. 7 (Id.). 8 testimony, 9 medical source and did not observe [Plaintiff] in a professional 10 capacity the ALJ found the statements to be of little value. 11 (Id.). judgment, but (AR Thus, the ALJ considered the psychiatrist s opinions, but The ALJ The ALJ also considered noted however, that because this the Plaintiff s did daughter s corroborate Plaintiff s daughter Plaintiff s was not a 12 The ALJ noted that Plaintiff s self-reported activities of 13 14 daily 15 disability. (AR 18). 16 Plaintiff s continuing 17 medical impairments because Plaintiff worked only sporadically 18 prior to the alleged disability onset date. 19 noted 20 unrelated to the allegedly disabling impairments, including her 21 alimony payments and lack of transportation. living [were] evidence that inconsistent with her allegations of Furthermore, the ALJ questioned whether unemployment Plaintiff was [was] not actually (Id.). working for due to The ALJ reasons (AR 19). 22 23 At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not 24 perform her past relevant work as a sandwich maker and cashier. 25 (AR 20). At step five, the ALJ considered Plaintiff s age, 26 education, work 27 Plaintiff s past relevant work was unskilled, the transferability 28 of job skills was not an issue. experience, and 19 RFC. (Id.). (AR 20-21). Because 1 2 Based on the VE s testimony, the ALJ found that, considering 3 Plaintiff s age, education, work experience and RFC, there were 4 jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that 5 Plaintiff 6 Plaintiff could perform work at all exertional levels but with 7 some nonexertional limitations. 8 included an addresser in a mail room and a linen room attendant. 9 (Id.). could perform. (AR 21). (Id.). The ALJ concluded that Potential available jobs The ALJ further determined that such jobs existed in 10 significant 11 (Id.). numbers in both the local and national economy. 12 13 VI. 14 STANDARD OF REVIEW 15 16 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 17 Commissioner s decision to deny benefits. The court may set 18 aside the Commissioner s decision when the ALJ s findings are 19 based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence 20 in the record as a whole. 21 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097); Smolen 22 v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Fair v. 23 Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989)); See also Simon v. 24 Colvin, 749 F.3d 1106, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Smolen 80 25 F.3d 1273, 1279). Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 26 27 28 Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (citing Jamerson 20 1 v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)). 2 evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to 3 support a conclusion. 4 Smolen, 5 evidence supports a finding, the court must consider the record 6 as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence 7 that detracts from the [Commissioner s] conclusion. 8 257 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th 9 Cir. 80 F.3d 1993)). at If (Id.) (citing Jamerson, 112 F.3d at 1066; 1279). the It is relevant To evidence determine can whether reasonably substantial Aukland, support either 10 affirming 11 substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. 12 157 F.3d at 720-21 (citing Flaten v. Sec y, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 13 (9th Cir. 1995)). or reversing that conclusion, the court may not Reddick, 14 15 VII. 16 DISCUSSION 17 18 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by improperly finding 19 Plaintiff s testimony less than credible. 20 of Plaintiff s Complaint ( MSPC ) at 2-7). 21 For the reasons discussed below, the ALJ s decision is AFFIRMED. 22 \\ 23 \\ 24 \\ 25 \\ 26 \\ 27 \\ 28 21 (Memorandum in Support The Court disagrees. 1 2 A. The ALJ Provided Clear And Convincing Reasons For Rejecting Plaintiff s Subjective Testimony 3 4 1. Legal Standard 5 6 When assessing a claimant s credibility, the ALJ must engage 7 in a two-step analysis. 8 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Vazquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th 9 Cir. 2009)). Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 First, the ALJ must determine if there is medical 10 evidence 11 symptoms alleged. 12 the testimony, the ALJ must make specific credibility findings. 13 (Id.). 14 and deny disability benefits solely because the degree of pain 15 alleged by the claimant is not supported by objective medical 16 evidence. 17 Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346-47 (9th Cir. 1991). of an impairment (Id.). that could reasonably produce the Then, If there is, in order to reject The ALJ may not discredit a claimant s testimony of pain Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005); 18 19 20 21 In assessing the claimant s testimony, the ALJ may consider many factors, including: (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such 22 as 23 inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and 24 other testimony by the claimant that appears less 25 than candid; 26 (2) the claimant's unexplained or reputation inadequately for lying, explained prior failure to 27 seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of 28 treatment; and 22 1 (3) the claimant s daily activities. 2 3 Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. 4 claimant s testimony where his normal activities can transfer to 5 the work setting. 6 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999); See also Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 7 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). Additionally, the ALJ may discredit the Morgan v. Comm r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 8 9 Here, the ALJ provided sufficient reasons for rejecting 10 Plaintiff s testimony. 11 for 12 credible: 13 evidence; (2) Plaintiff s symptoms improved through medication; 14 (3) Plaintiff s daily activities demonstrated an ability to work; 15 and 16 working. finding (4) The ALJ stated four specific explanations Plaintiff s subjective testimony (1) Plaintiff s Plaintiff had testimony possible less contradicted alternative than the reasons fully medical for not 17 18 2. Medical Evidence 19 20 First, the ALJ considered the fact that Plaintiff s 21 treatment [had] been essentially routine and conservative in 22 nature. 23 mental impairments that caused difficulty, [she] ha[d] not been 24 hospitalized, ha[d] not engaged in regular individual or group 25 therapy, and her medications ha[d] been fairly stable. 26 The 27 treatment 28 Shalala, Court (AR 18). agrees The ALJ noted that, although Plaintiff had that undermines 60 F.3d the conservative Plaintiff s 1428, 1434 testimony. (9th 23 nature Cir. 1995) of See (Id.). Plaintiff s Johnson (stating v. that 1 conservative or infrequent treatment may be used by the ALJ to 2 discredit Plaintiff s subjective pain testimony); Tomasetti v. 3 Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that 4 conservative 5 regarding severity of an impairment). treatment may undermine a claimant s reports 6 7 Furthermore, the ALJ found that the medical evidence does 8 not support Plaintiff s subjective testimony. 9 example, Plaintiff claimed that she suffered (AR 18-19). disabling For panic 10 attacks, but the medical records routinely show that while she 11 may have experienced panic attacks, she would often report that 12 she [was] doing well. 13 that Xanax effectively controll[ed] her panic attacks. 14 As such, the ALJ properly gave substantial weight to the opinions 15 of Dr. Rath and Dr. Khan, and rejecting Plaintiff s testimony on 16 her subjective symptoms. 17 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that [w]hile subjective 18 pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is 19 not 20 evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity 21 of the claimant s pain and its disabling effects ). fully corroborated (AR 18). (AR 19). by Further, Plaintiff reported (Id.). See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 objective evidence, the medical 22 23 In assessing credibility, the ALJ may examine testimony from 24 physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity and 25 effect of the symptoms of which Plaintiff complains. 26 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). 27 that Plaintiff had a mood and anxiety disorder not otherwise 28 specified, but Plaintiff s ratings were essentially normal or 24 Thomas v. Dr. Rath found 1 mild throughout the entire record. 2 found that Plaintiff s limitations [were] not severe and [did] 3 not significantly decrease or impact her ability to work. 4 19). 5 though Dr. Khan and Dr. Rath were non-examining doctors, they had 6 greater expertise in the Social Security Act and regulations, 7 including all pertinent definitions and procedures utilized by 8 the 9 individual is entitled to disability insurance benefits under (AR 19). Dr. Khan similarly (AR The ALJ gave more weight to these opinions because, even Social Security and Administration supplemental in security determining income under whether Title an XVI. 10 Title 11 (Id.). 12 evidence in discrediting Plaintiff s subjective pain testimony II Therefore, the ALJ properly considered the medical 13 14 3. Successful Control Of Symptoms Through Medication 15 16 Second, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff s treatment had been 17 generally 18 (AR 18). 19 report[ed] 20 Specifically, 21 304); felt pretty good on March 31, 2005 (AR 301); felt no 22 panic on September 12, 2005 (AR 299); was doing well [...] and 23 voic[ed] no complaints on June 5, 2006 and August 27, 2007 (AR 24 291, 297); felt a lot better with more energy and motivation on 25 September 8, 2006 (AR 296); felt much better on August 18, 2008 26 (AR 275); 27 attacks on November 18, 2008 (AR 270) and was doing well successful in controlling the disabling symptoms. Plaintiff s medical records reflect that she routinely that she Plaintiff felt better, [was] felt much doing better less 28 25 well. on October anxious, and (AR 5, 18). 2004 [zero] (AR panic 1 November 30, 2009, February 22, 2010 and May 17, 2010 (AR 256- 2 258). 3 The 4 ALJ also noted that the side effects from 5 medications are either nonexistent or mild. 6 September 2004 through May 2010, Plaintiff regularly reported no 7 side effects from her medication. 8 272, 275, 280, 282, 288, 291, 293-297, 299, 301, 305). 9 result, the successful treatment of Plaintiff s condition through 10 medication undermined the assertion that her disability would not 11 allow her to work. 12 Cir. 1995) (stating that effectiveness or adverse side effects 13 of any pain medication may be used by the ALJ in making a 14 credibility determination); Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1040 (stating 15 a 16 medication, may undermine a claimant s assertions). favorable (AR 18). her From (AR 256-259, 266, 269, 270, As a See Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th response to conservative treatment, including 17 18 4. Daily Activities 19 20 Third, in rejecting Plaintiff s subjective pain testimony, 21 the ALJ noted that Plaintiff s self-reported activities of daily 22 living 23 (AR 18). 24 reported keep[ing] active, do[ing] yard work, read[ing, and] 25 go[ing] to[sic] walks on June 5, 2006 (AR 297); dieting, keeping 26 active, and losing weight on September 8, 2006 and November 30, 27 2006 (AR 295-296); going for long walks and looking for jobs on 28 August 27, 2007 (AR 291); keeping active on March 5, 2008 (AR are inconsistent with her allegations of disability. Plaintiff s Riverside medical records indicate that she 26 1 282); travelling to Texas on March 17, 2009 (AR 266) and taking 2 care of her mother, who potentially had Alzheimer s, on February 3 22, 2010 (AR 257). 4 Function Report that she did housework and yard work, took care 5 of her dog, prepared meals and sometimes went to the store with 6 her sister. 7 ALJ on October 11, 2011, Plaintiff testified that she did yard 8 work, occasionally went to the market with her sister and walked 9 dogs when her mother visited. Plaintiff also reported on her July 10, 2010 (AR 198-202). Further, at the hearing before the (AR 55-56, 58). 10 11 The ALJ appropriately considered Plaintiff s daily 12 activities when making his credibility determination. 13 Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600 (the ALJ may discredit the claimant s 14 testimony where his normal activities can transfer to the work 15 setting); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996) 16 (to determine whether the plaintiff s testimony regarding the 17 severity of his symptoms is credible, the ALJ may consider the 18 claimant s daily activities); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 19 (9th Cir. 1989) (if the plaintiff can perform household chores 20 and daily activities that involve similar physical tasks as a 21 particular type of job, and ALJ could conclude that the alleged 22 disability 23 Consequently, the Court finds that remand is not required. does not prevent the 24 25 26 27 28 27 [plaintiff] from See, e.g., working. ) 1 5. Other Possible Explanations 2 3 Finally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff s continued 4 unemployment could be due to reasons unrelated to her medical 5 impairments. 6 that she supported herself on alimony. 7 8, 2006, Plaintiff reported that she was not looking for a job 8 and continued to support herself on alimony. 9 November 30, 2006, Plaintiff considered working but asserted that (AR 18-19). On June 29, 2005, Plaintiff reported (AR 300). On September (AR 296). On 10 she lacked transportation. 11 was looking for a job per court request, however, she still 12 received alimony. (AR 293). 13 that looking 14 November 19, 2007. 15 that Plaintiff looked for work and claimed other reasons for not 16 working, the ALJ properly concluded that Plaintiff s unemployment 17 may 18 Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001) (the ALJ properly 19 considered other possible explanations for lack of work unrelated 20 to plaintiff s medical condition). she be continued unrelated (AR 295). Furthermore, Plaintiff reported for jobs (AR 288, 291). to her On May 22, 2007, Plaintiff medical 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 on August 27, 2007 and Thus, considering evidence conditions. See Bruton v. 1 In sum, by the ALJ offered substantial clear evidence and for convincing 2 supported finding 3 reasons Plaintiff s subjective testimony less than fully credible. 4 5 VIII. 6 CONCLUSION 7 8 Consistent with the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment 9 be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner. The Clerk 10 of the Court shall serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on 11 counsel for both parties. 12 13 DATED: September 26, 2014 /S/ SUZANNE H. SEGAL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN LEXIS, WESTLAW OR OTHER LEGAL DATABASE. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.