Murad Haamid v. Michael J. Astrue, No. 5:2010cv00710 - Document 17 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Rosalyn M. Chapman; IT IS ORDERED that: (1) plaintiffs request for relief is denied; and (2) the Commissioners decision is affirmed, and Judgment shall be entered in favor of defendant. See order for further details. (jy)
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Murad Haamid v. Michael J. Astrue Doc. 17 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 MURAD HAAMID, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________) No. EDCV 10-0710-RC OPINION AND ORDER 17 18 Plaintiff Murad Haamid filed a complaint on May 18, 2010, seeking 19 review of the Commissioner’s decision denying his application for 20 disability benefits. 21 answer to the complaint, and the parties filed a joint stipulation on 22 November 16, 2010. On October 1, 2010, the Commissioner filed an 23 24 25 BACKGROUND On July 28, 2008, plaintiff, who was born on December 14, 1950, 26 applied for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security 27 Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 423, claiming an inability to work since 28 January 1, 2008, due to anxiety, hepatitis C and degenerative disc Dockets.Justia.com 1 disease.1 2 denied on September 26, 2008, and was denied again on November 7, 3 2008, following reconsideration. 4 requested an administrative hearing, which was held before 5 Administrative Law Judge Sharilyn Hopson (“the ALJ”) on December 17, 6 2009. 7 finding plaintiff is not disabled. 8 this decision to the Appeals Council, which denied review on March 24, 9 2010. A.R. 74-76, 104. A.R. 16-37, 52. The plaintiff’s application was initially A.R. 40-50. The plaintiff then On January 22, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision A.R. 6-15. The plaintiff appealed A.R. 1-5. 10 11 DISCUSSION 12 I 13 The Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), has the authority to 14 review the decision denying plaintiff disability benefits to determine 15 if his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the 16 Commissioner used the proper legal standards in reaching his decision. 17 Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009); Vernoff v. 18 Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009). 19 the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, 20 [this Court] must review the administrative record as a whole, 21 weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 22 detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion.” 23 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 24 1201 (9th Cir. 2001). 25 either affirming or reversing the decision, [this Court] may not “In determining whether Reddick v. Chater, 157 “Where the evidence can reasonably support 26 1 27 28 The plaintiff also applied for benefits under the Supplemental Security Income program of Title XVI of the Act, A.R. 70-73, but the matter proceeded as a Title II case. 2 1 substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Parra v. 2 Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1141 3 (2008); Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591. 4 5 The claimant is “disabled” for the purpose of receiving benefits 6 under the Act if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful 7 activity due to an impairment which has lasted, or is expected to 8 last, for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 9 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). 42 U.S.C. § “The claimant bears the burden 10 of establishing a prima facie case of disability.” Roberts v. 11 Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1122 12 (1996); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996). 13 14 The Commissioner has promulgated regulations establishing a five- 15 step sequential evaluation process for the ALJ to follow in a 16 disability case. 17 must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in 18 substantial gainful activity. 19 the Second Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a 20 severe impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting 21 him from performing basic work activities. 22 If so, in the Third Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 23 has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals 24 the requirements of the Listing of Impairments (“Listing”), 20 C.F.R. 25 § 404, Subpart P, App. 1. 26 Fourth Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 27 sufficient residual functional capacity despite the impairment or 28 various limitations to perform his past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. In the First Step, the ALJ 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). 3 If not, in If not, in the 20 C.F.R. 1 § 404.1520(f). If not, in Step Five, the burden shifts to the 2 Commissioner to show the claimant can perform other work that exists 3 in significant numbers in the national economy. 4 404.1520(g). 20 C.F.R. § 5 6 Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 7 found plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 8 January 1, 2008, his alleged onset date. 9 found plaintiff has the following severe impairments: (Step One). The ALJ then “degenerative 10 disc disease of the lumbar spine and hepatitis C” (Step Two); however, 11 plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments 12 that meets or equals a listed impairment. 13 ALJ determined plaintiff is able to perform his past relevant work as 14 a warehouse worker, bus driver, and housekeeper; therefore, he is not 15 disabled. (Step Three). Finally, the (Step Four). 16 17 18 II A claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is what he can 19 still do despite his physical, mental, nonexertional and other 20 limitations. 21 see also Valentine v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th 22 Cir. 2009) (RFC is “a summary of what the claimant is capable of doing 23 (for example, how much weight he can lift).”). 24 plaintiff has the RFC to perform the full range of medium work.2 Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 2001); Here, the ALJ found 25 26 2 27 28 Under Social Security regulations, “[m]edium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c). 4 A.R. 1 12. However, the plaintiff contends the ALJ’s decision is not 2 supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ erroneously rejected 3 the opinions of John Byrne, D.O., plaintiff’s treating physician,3 and 4 failed to properly consider a statement by Vandellian Pearson, 5 plaintiff’s wife. 6 7 A. 8 Since at least 2001, plaintiff has received medical treatment at 9 Treating Physician’s Opinion: the Loma Linda Veterans’ Administration Medical Center (“VA”) for a 10 variety of conditions, including allergies, hepatitis C, alcohol 11 abuse, hypercholesterolemia, ankle and foot pain, degenerative disc 12 disease and anxiety. 13 plaintiff underwent a lumbar spine MRI, which showed a narrowed disc 14 space, sclerosis and spurring at L4-L5 and unspecified degenerative 15 joint disease of the spine with narrowing and 2-3 cm. disc bulging. 16 A.R. 144, 173. 17 that plaintiff suffers several medical conditions, including hepatitis 18 C, dyslipidemia, degenerative disc disease, anxiety and colonic 19 polyps, and Dr. Byrne further opined that “is unemployable.” 20 292. A.R. 143-93, 229-78, 292. On May 18, 2005, On December 2, 2009, Dr. Byrne, a VA physician, opined A.R. 21 22 23 The medical opinions of treating physicians are entitled to special weight. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725; Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 24 25 26 27 28 3 Although plaintiff describes Dr. Byrne as a treating physician, see Jt. Stip. at 3:7-8, he cites no evidence in the record showing Dr. Byrne ever treated plaintiff. See A.R. 14393, 229-78, 292. Nevertheless, the Court will assume Dr. Byrne is plaintiff’s treating physician for purposes of this opinion. See A.R. 143, 229 (identifying Dr. Byrne as “PCMM Provider”). 5 1 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988). This is because the treating physician “is 2 employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the 3 patient as an individual.” 4 Cir. 1987); Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 5 600 (9th Cir. 1999). 6 convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontroverted opinion of a 7 treating physician, Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 8 (9th Cir. 2008); Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725, and “[e]ven if [a] treating 9 doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may not Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Therefore, the ALJ must provide clear and 10 reject this opinion without providing ‘specific and legitimate 11 reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record.” 12 157 F.3d at 725; Valentine, 574 F.3d at 692. Reddick, 13 14 Here, the ALJ gave Dr. Byrne’s opinion no weight because Dr. 15 Byrne “simply lists the [plaintiff’s] medical impairments with no 16 explanation of how he arrived at his opinion” and “his opinion [is] 17 unsupported.” 18 rejecting Dr. Byrne’s opinion since “[t]he mere diagnosis of an 19 impairment . . . is not sufficient to sustain a finding of 20 disability[,]” Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990); 21 see also Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The 22 mere existence of an impairment is insufficient proof of a 23 disability.”); Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988) (per 24 curiam) (“The mere diagnosis of [an ailment] . . . says nothing about 25 the severity of the condition.”), and “[t]he ALJ need not accept the 26 opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that 27 opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical 28 findings.” A.R. 14. This is a specific and legitimate reason for Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); 6 1 Batson v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th 2 Cir. 2004). 3 4 The ALJ also rejected Dr. Byrne’s opinions because they were 5 inconsistent with the opinions of examining physicians William C. 6 Boeck, Jr., M.D.,4 an orthopedic surgeon, and Romualdo R. Rodriguez, 7 M.D.,5 a psychiatrist, and nonexamining physicians G. Spellman, M.D.,6 8 // 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 Dr. Boeck examined plaintiff on September 16, 2008, and opined plaintiff can lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently, can stand and walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour day, and can sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour day. A.R. 216-20. 5 Dr. Rodriguez examined plaintiff on September 7, 2008, diagnosed plaintiff as having a major depressive disorder and alcohol dependence in early full remission, determined plaintiff’s Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) was 65 (A GAF of 61-70 indicates “[s]ome mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia) or some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional truancy, or theft within the household), but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful interpersonal relationships.” American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 34 (4th ed. (Text Revision) 2000)), and opined plaintiff is minimally limited in his ability to: relate and interact with supervisors, coworkers and the public; maintain concentration, attention, persistence and pace; associate with day-to-day work activity, including attendance and safety; adapt to the stresses common to a normal work environment; maintain regular attendance in the work place and perform work activities on a consistent basis; and perform work activities without special or additional supervision; but he can understand, remember and carry out simple as well as detailed and complex instructions. A.R. 194-200. 6 On September 24, 2008, Dr. Spellman opined plaintiff can lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently, can sit for about 6 hours in an 8-hour day, can frequently climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl, and can never climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds. A.R. 223-27. 7 1 and K. Loomis, M.D.,7 –- all of whom concluded plaintiff is not 2 disabled. 3 opinions of [the examining and nonexamining physicians] serve as . . . 4 specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions of [the 5 claimant’s treating physician], and provide assurance that the record 6 was sufficiently developed with regard to the issue of [plaintiff’s] 7 impairment.” 8 2001); Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195. A.R. 14, 194-200, 202-12, 216-20, 223-27. “The contrary Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 9 10 Nevertheless, plaintiff contends the ALJ had a duty to contact 11 Dr. Byrne to obtain further explanation from him to support his 12 opinions. 13 duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the 14 claimant’s interests are considered[,]’” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288 15 (citation omitted); Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 16 2006), here “[t]he record before the ALJ was neither ambiguous nor 17 inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” 18 276 F.3d at 460; see also Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150 (“Ambiguous 19 evidence, or the ALJ’s own finding that the record is inadequate to 20 allow for proper evaluation of the evidence, triggers the ALJ’s duty 21 to ‘conduct an appropriate inquiry.’”). 22 fail to properly develop the medical record. 23 1149; see also Wright v. Astrue, 2009 WL 2849006, *7 (C.D. Cal.) (“The 24 ALJ found that [the physician’s] report was conclusory and Jt. Stip. at 5:28-8:18. Although “‘the ALJ has a special Mayes, Therefore, the ALJ did not Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 25 26 27 28 7 Dr. Loomis opined plaintiff’s mental impairment is not severe and he has no restrictions in his activities of daily living, mild difficulties maintaining social functioning and concentration, persistence or pace, and has not experienced any episodes of decompensation. A.R. 202-12. 8 1 unsupported, not ambiguous or inadequate to allow for a proper 2 evaluation. 3 was ambiguous or inadequate. 4 to develop the record further.” (citation omitted)). Nor did any physician render an opinion that the record Based on the record, the ALJ had no duty 5 6 B. Lay Witness Statement: 7 “Lay testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms is competent evidence 8 that an ALJ must take into account, unless he or she expressly 9 determines to disregard such testimony and gives reasons germane to 10 each witness for doing so.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th 11 Cir. 2001); Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694. 12 statement is competent evidence, and “an important source of 13 information about a claimant’s impairments[.]” 14 of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1999); 15 Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 975 (9th 16 Cir. 2000). Thus, a third party’s Regennitter v. Comm’r 17 18 Here, plaintiff’s wife, Vandellian Pearson, on August 14, 2008, 19 stated plaintiff is not very active anymore and he spends his day 20 resting and taking pain medication. 21 noted plaintiff has stiffness in his body each morning and needs help 22 washing his back and combing his hair. 23 plaintiff’s condition affects his ability to lift, squat, bend, stand, 24 reach, walk, sit, kneel, climb stairs, complete tasks and concentrate, 25 but did not explain how these abilities are affected. 26 However, in responding to a question about how plaintiff’s illness 27 affects his abilities, Ms. Pearson simply responded “[n]ot very far.” 28 Id. A.R. 91-98. A.R. 92. Ms. Pearson also Ms. Pearson stated A.R. 96. Further, Ms. Pearson indicated plaintiff can drive, handle money, 9 1 pay attention for “a good amount of time,” follow spoken instructions 2 reasonably well, has no problem getting along with family, friends, or 3 others, gets along with authority figures very well, and can handle 4 changes in routine “sort of good[,]” but is not that good with written 5 instructions and at handling stress. A.R. 94-97. 6 The ALJ did not specifically address Ms. Pearson’s statement, 7 8 A.R. 13, and this was clear legal error, Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. 9 Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006); Schneider, 223 F.3d at 10 975, as the Commissioner acknowledges. Jt. Stip. at 16:4-5. However, 11 the ALJ’s error was harmless since nothing in Ms. Pearson’s statement 12 is necessarily inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC determination or 13 demonstrates plaintiff is disabled. 14 Admin., __ Fed. Appx. __, 2010 WL 3258572, *2 (9th Cir. (Or.); Hart v. 15 Astrue, 349 Fed. Appx. 175, 177 (9th Cir. 2009); Sabin v. Astrue, 337 16 Fed. Appx. 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2009). 17 reverse an ALJ’s decision for harmless error, which exists when it is 18 clear from the record that the ALJ’s error was inconsequential to the 19 ultimate nondisability determination[,]” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 20 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation 21 marks omitted); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005), 22 there is no merit to plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ’s error requires 23 reversal. Lockwood v. Comm’s Soc. Sec. Since “[t]he court will not 24 25 ORDER 26 IT IS ORDERED that: (1) plaintiff’s request for relief is denied; 27 // 28 // 10 1 and (2) the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed, and Judgment shall be 2 entered in favor of defendant. 3 4 DATE: November 22, 2010 5 6 /S/ ROSALYN M. CHAPMAN ROSALYN M. CHAPMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE R&R-MDO\10-0710.mdo 11/22/10 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11
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