Barbara Colquitt v. Michael J. Astrue, No. 5:2009cv02099 - Document 17 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Rosalyn M. Chapman; IT IS ORDERED that: (1) plaintiffs request for relief is granted and defendants request for relief is denied; and (2) the Commissioners decision is reversed, and the action is remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and Judgment shall be entered accordingly. See order for further details. (jy)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Barbara Colquitt v. Michael J. Astrue Doc. 17 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 BARBARA COLQUITT, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________) No. EDCV 09-2099-RC OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Barbara Colquitt filed a complaint on November 19, 17 2009, seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision denying her 18 applications for disability benefits. 19 Commissioner answered the complaint, and the parties filed a joint 20 stipulation on May 25, 2010. On April 16, 2010, the 21 22 BACKGROUND 23 On February 6, 2007, plaintiff, who was born on December 17, 24 1948, applied for disability benefits under Title II of the Social 25 Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 423, and the Supplemental Security 26 Income program (“SSI”) of Title XVI of the Act, claiming an inability 27 to work since August 12, 2006,1 due to cardiovascular disease, 28 1 The plaintiff claims in her SSI application that her disability began on August 12, 2006, A.R. 163; however, she Dockets.Justia.com 1 diabetes and depression. A.R. 47-54, 60, 163-66. The plaintiff’s 2 applications were initially denied on August 23, 2007, and were denied 3 again on January 24, 2008, following reconsideration. 4 43. 5 held before Administrative Law Judge Michael D. Radensky (“the ALJ”) 6 on April 29, 2009. 7 a decision finding plaintiff is not disabled. 8 plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appeals Council, which denied 9 review on September 25, 2009. A.R. 31-35, 38- The plaintiff then requested an administrative hearing, which was A.R. 44, 167-92. On July 20, 2009, the ALJ issued A.R. 7-15. The A.R. 4-6, 26. 10 11 DISCUSSION 12 I 13 The Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), has the authority to 14 review the decision denying plaintiff disability benefits to determine 15 if his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the 16 Commissioner used the proper legal standards in reaching his decision. 17 Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009); Vernoff v. 18 Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009). 19 20 The claimant is “disabled” for the purpose of receiving benefits 21 under the Act if she is unable to engage in any substantial gainful 22 activity due to an impairment which has lasted, or is expected to 23 last, for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 24 §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). 42 U.S.C. 25 26 27 28 claims in her Title II application that she became unable to work on September 1, 2006. A.R. 47. In 2006, plaintiff was granted a closed period of disability benefits for her heart problems and diabetes. A.R. 14, 176-77. 2 1 “The claimant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of 2 disability.” 3 cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1122 (1996); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 4 1289 (9th Cir. 1996). Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1995), 5 6 The Commissioner has promulgated regulations establishing a five- 7 step sequential evaluation process for the ALJ to follow in a 8 disability case. 9 the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. In the First Step, 10 substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). 11 If not, in the Second Step, the ALJ must determine whether the 12 claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments 13 significantly limiting her from performing basic work activities. 14 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). 15 must determine whether the claimant has an impairment or combination 16 of impairments that meets or equals the requirements of the Listing of 17 Impairments (“Listing”), 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. 1. 18 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). 19 ALJ must determine whether the claimant has sufficient residual 20 functional capacity despite the impairment or various limitations to 21 perform her past work. 22 in Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show the 23 claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in 24 the national economy. 20 If so, in the Third Step, the ALJ 20 If not, in the Fourth Step, the 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If not, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). 25 26 Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 27 found plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 28 her alleged onset date, and regarding plaintiff’s Title II claim, the 3 1 ALJ found plaintiff meets the insured status requirements through 2 March 31, 2011. 3 has the following severe impairments: 4 diabetes mellitus, hypertension, GED [gastroesophageal reflux 5 disease], and mild obesity” (Step Two); however, she does not have an 6 impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals a listed 7 impairment. 8 perform her past relevant work as a telemarketer and group home 9 manager; therefore, she is not disabled. A.R. 12. (Step Three). (Step One). The ALJ then found plaintiff “coronary artery disease, Finally, the ALJ determined plaintiff can (Step Four). 10 11 II 12 A claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is what she can 13 still do despite her physical, mental, nonexertional, and other 14 limitations. 15 see also Valentine v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th 16 Cir. 2009) (RFC is “a summary of what the claimant is capable of doing 17 (for example, how much weight he can lift).”). 18 plaintiff has the RFC to perform the full range of light work.2 19 13. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 2001); Here, the ALJ found A.R. However, plaintiff contends the ALJ’s decision is not supported 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 Under Social Security regulations, “[l]ight work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, [the claimant] must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b). “[T]he full range of light work requires standing or walking for up to two-thirds of the workday.” Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1454 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984); SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, *6. 4 1 by substantial evidence because he erroneously determined she was not 2 an entirely credible witness and failed to properly consider the 3 opinions of her treating physician. 4 5 The plaintiff testified at the administrative hearing that she is 6 unable to work due to cardiovascular disease, uncontrolled diabetes, 7 and because she is weak and cannot deal with a lot of frustration. 8 A.R. 173, 178, 186-87. 9 chest pains, gets anxious, and has to rest if she does too much. She also stated she has heart palpitations and A.R. 10 175-76. Further, plaintiff reported her right leg goes numb and gives 11 out on her sometimes due to her diabetes. 12 testified she can sit for at least 30 minutes before she has to get up 13 and walk for 5 minutes due to her leg problems, and can stand for 14 approximately 5 minutes before getting dizzy and having to sit down 15 for approximately 30 minutes. 16 cannot work an 8-hour day, but only three-and-a-half or four hours 17 before she needs to lie down for about three hours. 18 can walk approximately half a block before needing to rest for 5-15 19 minutes, and she cannot climb stairs. A.R. 178. A.R. 179-80. The plaintiff The plaintiff stated she A.R. 180-81. She A.R. 79, 185. 20 21 Once a claimant has presented objective evidence that she suffers 22 from an impairment that could cause pain or other nonexertional 23 limitations,3 the ALJ may not discredit the claimant’s testimony 24 “solely because the degree of pain alleged by the claimant is not 25 26 27 28 3 “While most cases discuss excess pain testimony rather than excess symptom testimony, rules developed to assure proper consideration of excess pain apply equally to other medically related symptoms.” Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687-88 (9th Cir. 1989). 5 1 supported by objective medical evidence.” Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 2 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 3 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004). 4 subjective complaints are not credible, he “‘must provide specific, 5 cogent reasons for the disbelief.’” 6 972 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 7 635 (9th Cir. 2007). 8 claimant’s credibility include reputation for truthfulness, 9 inconsistencies in testimony or between testimony and conduct, daily Thus, if the ALJ finds the claimant’s Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, “Factors that an ALJ may consider in weighing a 10 activities, and ‘unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to 11 seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment.’” 12 F.3d at 636 (citations omitted); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 13 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). 14 establishing an objective basis for some degree of pain and related 15 symptoms, and no evidence affirmatively suggesting that the claimant 16 is malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the claimant's 17 testimony must be “clear and convincing.” 18 Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Vasquez, 572 F.3d 19 at 591. Orn, 495 Furthermore, if there is medical evidence Morgan v. Comm’r of the 20 21 Here, the ALJ found plaintiff’s “statements concerning the 22 intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not 23 credible to the extent they are inconsistent” with her RFC because she 24 “cooks, drives, attends church regularly, reads the bible daily, and 25 goes for walks with her grandchildren.” 26 “many home activities are not easily transferable to what may be the 27 more grueling environment of the workplace, where it might be 28 impossible to periodically rest or take medication[,]” Fair v. Bowen, 6 A.R. 14. However, because 1 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989), in order to make an adverse 2 credibility determination based on a claimant’s daily activities, the 3 ALJ must make a specific finding that the claimant “‘is able to spend 4 a substantial part of [her] day engaged in pursuits involving the 5 performance of physical functions that are transferable to a work 6 setting. . . .’” 7 2001) (quoting Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600; emphasis in original); see 8 also Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1990) (If 9 daily activity evidence is used to rebut claims of nonexertional Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 10 limitations, the ALJ must find “the ability to perform those daily 11 activities translate[s] into the ability to perform appropriate 12 work.”). 13 spends a substantial part of her day engaged in activities that are 14 transferrable to work, and plaintiff’s testimony about her daily 15 activities shows such activities are quite limited. 16 plaintiff’s cooking involves making “oatmeal, wheat toast, orange 17 juice, bake[d] chicken, sandwiches, fried fish, [and boiled] mixed 18 vegetable[s][,]” A.R. 75, 184, and, although she can drive, she does 19 not drive and her daughters take her where she needs to go. 20 Additionally, plaintiff testified that her daughters help her do the 21 laundry and go grocery shopping, and she sometimes goes “for a walk 22 with [her] grandkids to the pool and stuff like that.” 23 86. 24 cannot read more because she gets frustrated and anxious and loses 25 focus, and she attends church almost every Sunday, but she is unable 26 to attend Bible study or take her grandchildren to the movies. 27 These limited daily activities do not support a negative credibility 28 determination. Here, the ALJ did not specifically find that plaintiff For instance, A.R. 184. A.R. 77, 185- Plaintiff reads her Bible daily for about an hour a day, but Ibid. See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 7 1 2004) (ALJ erred in relying on claimant’s daily activities to 2 discredit her pain testimony when such activities were “quite limited 3 and carried out with difficulty”); Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049-50 4 (claimant’s ability to go grocery shopping with assistance, walk an 5 hour in the malls, get together with friends, play cards, swim, watch 6 television, read, take physical therapy, and exercise at home did not 7 constitute a clear and convincing reason for rejecting her pain 8 testimony); Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) 9 (“[E]vidence that [plaintiff] could assist with some household chores 10 was not determinative of disability. ‘Disability does not mean that a 11 claimant must vegetate in a dark room excluded from all forms of human 12 and social activity.’” (citation omitted)). 13 14 The ALJ also rejected plaintiff’s testimony as contrary to the 15 medical record. A.R. 14. However, “[i]t is improper as a matter of 16 law to discredit excess pain testimony solely on the ground that it is 17 not fully corroborated by objective medical findings.” 18 Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986); Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 19 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). Cotton v. 20 21 For these reasons, the ALJ’s discounting of plaintiff’s 22 credibility was improper, and “his findings were unsupported by 23 substantial evidence based on the record as a whole.” 24 Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 724 (9th Cir. 1998). 25 provide clear and convincing reasons for excluding claimant’s pain and 26 symptoms from his assessment of claimant’s RFC, substantial evidence 27 does not support the assessment.” 28 Nor does substantial evidence support the ALJ’s Step Four Reddick v. “Because the ALJ did not Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040. 8 1 determination that plaintiff can perform her past relevant work, which 2 was based on his erroneous RFC assessment. 3 Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2006); Moisa, 367 F.3d at 4 886. Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. 5 6 III 7 When the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial 8 evidence, the Court has authority to affirm, modify, or reverse the 9 Commissioner’s decision “with or without remanding the cause for 10 rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 11 1076 (9th Cir. 2002). 12 is appropriate if enhancement of the record would be useful.” 13 Benecke, 379 F.3d at 593. 14 to whether [plaintiff’s] testimony should be credited as true,” remand 15 is the appropriate remedy. 16 (9th Cir. 2003); Bunnell v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 17 2003). “Remand for further administrative proceedings Since there are “insufficient findings as Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 18 19 ORDER 20 IT IS ORDERED that: (1) plaintiff’s request for relief is granted 21 and defendant’s request for relief is denied; and (2) the 22 Commissioner’s decision is reversed, and the action is remanded to the 23 Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with 24 this Opinion and Order, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 25 § 405(g), and Judgment shall be entered accordingly. 26 DATE: November 15, 2010 27 /S/ ROSALYN M. CHAPMAN ROSALYN M. CHAPMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE R&R-MDO\09-2099.mdo 28 11/15/10 9
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
