Luis Chavez v. Michael J Astrue, No. 5:2009cv01591 - Document 30 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Marc L. Goldman, GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR EAJA ATTORNEY FEES 27 : (See document for details.) III. Conclusion: Plaintiff's motion for EAJA fees is GRANTED IN PART. It is ordered that Plaintiff's counsel be awarded fees in the amount of $4,321.52. (rla) Modified on 7/21/2010 (rla).
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Luis Chavez v. Michael J Astrue Doc. 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 EASTERN DIVISION 9 10 LUIS CHAVEZ, Plaintiff, 11 12 13 14 v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 15 Defendant. 16 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. EDCV 09-1591-MLG MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF S MOTION FOR EAJA ATTORNEY FEES 17 18 On April 27, 2010, the Court entered an Opinion and Order reversing 19 the Commissioner s decision denying Plaintiff s applications for Social 20 Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income benefits 21 and remanding the case for further administrative proceedings. On June 22 15, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion for award of attorney fees pursuant 23 to the Equal Access to Justice Act ( EAJA ), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 et. seq. 24 Plaintiff seeks an award in a total amount of $6,440.65, which 25 consists of the following: (1) $5,479.14 for work on the merits of the 26 case, representing 29.08 hours of attorney time at $172.24 per hour and 27 3.91 hours of paralegal time at $120 per hour; (2) $961.51 for counsel s 28 work on the fee litigation, which represents 4.83 hours of attorney time Dockets.Justia.com 1 and 1.08 hours of paralegal time; and (3) $1,274.96 for preparation of 2 the reply memorandum, representing 7.17 hours of attorney time and .3 3 hours of paralegal time. The total number of hours for which Plaintiff 4 is seeking attorney fees is 46.37 (41.08 attorney hours and 5.29 5 paralegal hours). 6 Defendant opposes Plaintiff s application for attorney fees, 7 arguing that the government s position was substantially justified, 8 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), precluding any award of fees, and 9 alternatively, that the hours incurred are excessive. (Def. s Opp. at 1- 10 2.) 11 Having considered the motion for attorney fees, Defendant s 12 opposition, and the reply, as well as the records and pleadings, the 13 Court 14 administrative hearing constitutes a favorable decision and that the 15 Commissioner s position was not substantially justified. Accordingly, 16 Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees. However, 17 the Court concludes that the number of hours for which counsel seeks 18 reimbursement is excessive, and shall therefore be reduced. finds that the remand of Plaintiff s claim for a new 19 20 21 II. Discussion A. Plaintiff Is Entitled to Attorney Fees As the Prevailing Party 22 Because 23 Justified the Government s Position Was Not Substantially 24 The EAJA provides that a court may award reasonable attorney fees, 25 court costs and other expenses to the prevailing party unless the court 26 finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified 27 or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 28 2412(d)(1)(A); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988); Lewis v. 2 1 Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002). The term position of 2 the United States means, in addition to the position taken by the 3 United States in the civil action, the action or failure to act by the 4 agency upon which the civil action is based. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D). 5 A position is substantially justified if it has a reasonable basis in 6 law and fact. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565. The government has the burden of 7 proving its positions were substantially justified. Flores v. Shalala, 8 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9th Cir. 1995). However, the mere fact that a court 9 reversed and remanded a case for further proceedings does not raise a 10 presumption that [the government s] position was not substantially 11 justified. Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 335 (9th Cir. 1988.) 12 Here, judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff, remanding the 13 case for further administrative proceedings because the Administrative 14 Law Judge ( ALJ ) failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 15 finding Plaintiff not fully credible. The Court found that the ALJ s 16 reasons for rejecting Plaintiff s subjective pain and symptom testimony, 17 a single notation in Plaintiff s medical records that he had worked in 18 maintenance the previous week and the fact that Plaintiff had postponed 19 surgery in order to go to school, were not supported by substantial 20 evidence in the record. Defendant argued that these were sufficient 21 reasons to discredit Plaintiff s subjective testimony, a position which 22 was not substantially justified, Flores, 49 F.3d at 570. Accordingly, 23 Plaintiff is entitled to an award of EAJA fees. 24 B. 25 Defendant contends that the amount of time Plaintiff s counsel 26 claims that she spent on the case is excessive and requests that the 27 fees be reduced accordingly. This Court has the discretion to evaluate 28 the reasonableness of the number of hours claimed by a prevailing party. The Hours Claimed by Plaintiff Are Excessive 3 1 Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001); Gates v. 2 Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992). The court should 3 exclude hours that were not reasonably expended. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 4 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). In determining reasonableness, the court must 5 consider, among other factors, the complexity of the case or the novelty 6 of the issues, the skill required to perform the service adequately, the 7 customary time expended in similar cases, as well as the attorney s 8 expertise and experience.1 Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F.3d 1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 9 1998); Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 10 1975). In reducing a fee award, the court must provide a reasonable 11 explanation of how it arrived at the number of compensable hours in 12 determining the appropriate fee. Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1145; Hensley, 13 461 U.S. at 437. 14 The amount of time required to litigate any case can be highly 15 variable and is the subject of much debate. In similar cases decided in 16 this district, courts generally approve time expenditures of between 17 approximately 18 to 27 hours, although of course some courts have 18 approved a fewer or greater number of hours. See, e.g., Rodelo v. 19 Astrue, 2009 WL 1774279 (C.D.Cal. 2009) (18.5 hours); Montellano v. 20 Astrue, 2009 WL 3074402 (C.D.Cal. 2009) (17.6 hours); Barrera v. Astrue, 21 2009 WL 1916488 (C.D.Cal. 2009) (17 hours); Rickel v. Astrue, 2009 WL 22 1774305 (C.D.Cal. 2009) (24.7 hours); Smith v. Astrue, 2009 WL 649192 23 (26.5 hours). 24 After reviewing the time records Plaintiff s counsel submitted and 25 the pleadings in this matter, the Court finds that the requested time, 26 27 28 1 Of the 12 factors used to evaluate attorney-fee claims, the articulated factors relate to the reasonableness of the time expended. 4 1 46.7 hours total, is excessive. The case presented five routine issues 2 that are commonly raised in social security cases, which, although well 3 written and presented, should not have required the amount of time 4 sought. Counsel spent 29 hours and 5 minutes and the paralegal spent 5 three hours and 55 minutes on the settlement statement and joint 6 stipulation, both of which argued common issues. Counsel s request is 7 simply unreasonable. 8 9 Further, Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney fees for positions he challenged but which the Court did not decide when 10 reversing the decision of the Commissioner. Hardisty v. Astrue, 592 F.3d 11 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. January 25, 2010). Plaintiff argues that Hardisty 12 does not bar recovery for EAJA fees on the four issues that the Court 13 did not address because Hardisty is not valid precedent. Pl. s Reply 14 at 7. Rather, Plaintiff argues that Hensley controls, and that Hensley 15 holds that a plaintiff is entitled to recover fees for time expended on 16 issues not reached. The Court rejects this argument because Hensley 17 involved the availability of attorney fees for civil rights litigants 18 under 28 U.S.C. § 1988, not a request for attorney fees under the EAJA. 19 461 U.S. at 429. Accordingly, Hardisty is binding precedent which 20 prohibits awarding attorney fees for issues not considered by the court. 21 Based upon the Court s review of the record, taking into account 22 the length of the briefs, the Court concludes that 20 hours of attorney 23 time and two hours of paralegal time, for a total of 22 hours, is a 24 reasonable time on the merits of the case. Indeed, this is generous in 25 light of the one issue decided by the Court. Plaintiff is therefore 26 entitled to 20 hours of attorney time (20 hours x $172.24 = $3444.80) 27 and two hours of paralegal time (2 hours x $120 = $240.00), for a total 28 of $3684.80. In addition, the Court will award fees for the fee 5 1 litigation and the reply in the amount of three hours of attorney time 2 (3 hours x $172.24 = 516.72) and one hour of paralegal time (1 hour x 3 $120.00 = $120.00), for a total of $636.72. This award is more than fair 4 given the routine nature of the issues raised in this case, and it falls 5 in line with time expenditures approved by this and other courts for 6 this type of work.2 The Court further finds that the hourly rate 7 requested by counsel, $172.24, is authorized. Plaintiff is therefore 8 entitled to a total amount of $4,321.52 ($3684.80 for merits litigation 9 + $636.72 for fee litigation) in EAJA fees. 10 Further, because it appears that Plaintiff has validly assigned his 11 EAJA fees to counsel, see Pl. s Pet., Ex. 3, the fees should be paid to 12 Plaintiff s attorney, as Plaintiff s assignee. 13 14 15 16 III. Conclusion Plaintiff s motion for EAJA fees is GRANTED IN PART. It is ordered that Plaintiff s counsel be awarded fees in the amount of $4,321.52. 17 18 19 DATED: July 20, 2010 20 21 ______________________________ Marc L. Goldman United States Magistrate Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 The Court notes that it is not rejecting counsel s assertions that she spent the amount of time alleged. Rather, the Court is simply concluding that the amount of time spent was unreasonable under the circumstances. Lawyers work at different paces and speeds. A nonprevailing party should not be penalized in a fee-shifting context because a lawyer s style of working results in greater than reasonable time being spent on preparing a pleading. 6
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