Charles S Mason v. Michael J Astrue, No. 5:2008cv00240 - Document 19 (C.D. Cal. 2008)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. (sp)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 CHARLES S. MASON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER ) OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ) ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________) NO. ED CV 08-240-E MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 18 PROCEEDINGS 19 20 Plaintiff filed a complaint on February 28, 2008, seeking 21 review of the Commissioner s denial of benefits. The parties filed a 22 Consent to Proceed Before a United States Magistrate Judge on 23 June 30, 2008. 24 August 7, 2008. 25 September 8, 2008. 26 without oral argument. 27 2008. 28 /// Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on The Court has taken both motions under submission See L.R. 7-15; Order, filed February 29, 1 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 2 3 Plaintiff asserted disability based primarily on alleged 4 chronic fatigue syndrome and alleged depression (Administrative Record 5 ( A.R. ) 11-708). 6 Law Judge ( ALJ ) examined the record and heard testimony from 7 Plaintiff and from a vocational expert (A.R. 617-708). Following two previous remands, the Administrative 8 9 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has an extremely 10 questionably severe physical impairment from a diagnosis of chronic 11 fatigue syndrome and depressive disorder, but retains the residual 12 functional capacity to perform sedentary work except he must be able 13 to lie down during lunch break. 14 simple, repetitive tasks with no hypervigilence and no fast-paced 15 work (A.R. 619-20). 16 expert, the ALJ concluded there exist significant numbers of jobs 17 Plaintiff can perform (A.R. 624-25). 18 reference the two prior administrative decisions and supplemented 19 those decisions with seven pages of findings and analyses (A.R. 619- 20 25). The claimant is able to perform In reliance on the testimony of a vocational The ALJ incorporated by 21 22 SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF S CONTENTIONS 23 24 Plaintiff contends: 25 26 (1) The ALJ erred by failing to properly consider the lay 27 witness testimony of Plaintiff s wife (Plaintiff s Motion 28 at 2); and 2 1 (2) The ALJ erred by failing to pose a complete hypothetical 2 question to the vocational expert (Plaintiff s Motion at 4). 3 4 STANDARD OF REVIEW 5 6 Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the 7 Administration s decision to determine if: (1) the Administration s 8 findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the 9 Administration used proper legal standards. See DeLorme v. Sullivan, 10 924 F.2d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 1991); Swanson v. Secretary of Health and 11 Human Serv., 763 F.2d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 1985). 12 evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 13 as adequate to support a conclusion. 14 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted). Substantial Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 15 16 This Court may not affirm [the Administration s] decision 17 simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence, but 18 must also consider evidence that detracts from [the Administration s] 19 conclusion. 20 (citation and quotations omitted). 21 findings supported by substantial evidence, even though there may 22 exist other evidence supporting Plaintiff s claim. 23 Richardson, 484 F.2d 59, 60 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 24 933 (1974); Harvey v. Richardson, 451 F.2d 589, 590 (9th Cir. 1971). 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// Ray v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 914, 915 (9th Cir. 1987) However, the Court cannot disturb 3 See Torske v. DISCUSSION 1 2 After consideration of the record as a whole, Defendant s 3 4 motion is granted and Plaintiff s motion is denied. The 5 Administration s findings are supported by substantial evidence and 6 are free from material1 legal error. 7 8 I. The ALJ Did Not Commit Material Error in Relation to the 9 Statements of Plaintiff s Wife. 10 11 Plaintiff s wife made certain written statements concerning her 12 observations of Plaintiff s activities or lack thereof (A.R. 454-62). 13 Plaintiff contends that the present ALJ and the prior ALJ both failed 14 to review these statements, and that such failure was not harmless 15 (Plaintiff s Motion at 2-3). Plaintiff s contentions lack merit. 16 17 One of the prior ALJ s decisions specifically discusses the 18 written statements made by Plaintiff s wife (A.R. 377). The present 19 ALJ incorporated by reference the prior ALJ s decisions. 20 Plaintiff s assertion, there is nothing per se improper about 21 incorporating prior administrative decisions by reference. 22 Musall v. Chater, 1996 WL 200415, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1996). 23 /// 24 /// Contrary to See, e.g., 25 26 27 28 1 The harmless error rule applies to the review administrative decisions regarding disability. See Curry Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Batson Commissioner, 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004); Tonapetyan Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). 4 of v. v. v. 1 Plaintiff is correct that the Administration must consider lay 2 witnesses reported observations of a claimant and can reject the 3 alleged observations only by giving reasons germane to the lay 4 witness whose observations the Administration rejects. 5 Regennitter v. Commissioner, 166 F.3d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1999); 6 Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996). 7 the medical evidence, for example, can be a germane reason to reject 8 the observations of a lay witness. 9 (9th Cir. 2001). See A conflict with See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503 10 11 The prior ALJ properly rejected the wife s observations to the 12 extent the claimant contended that the observations reflected 13 disability (A.R. 377). 14 observations, but reasonably determined that the record, including the 15 record of Plaintiff s activities, did not support the conclusion 16 Plaintiff cannot work when he is motivated to do so (A.R. 377). 17 This determination was reasonable. 18 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995) (where the evidence admits of 19 more than one rational interpretation, the Court must uphold the 20 administrative decision). The prior ALJ discussed the wife s See generally Andrews v. Shalala, 21 22 Alternatively, any error in connection with the wife s 23 statements was harmless. Even fully crediting the wife s statements 24 would not cause a reasonable ALJ to reach a different disability 25 determination on the present record. 26 Commissioner, 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing harmless 27 error standard applicable to the evaluation of lay witness testimony). 28 The wife s statements concern her observations of Plaintiff s 5 See generally Stout v. 1 activities or lack thereof. 2 Administration was not whether Plaintiff had adopted an inactive 3 lifestyle in some respects, but rather whether Plaintiff s extremely 4 questionably severe chronic fatigue syndrome and depressive disorder 5 compelled him to do so. 6 Plaintiff s activities or lack thereof were not particularly probative 7 of the essential question before the Administration. 8 ALJ put it, assertions of lying down almost all day may be the 9 lifestyle adopted by the claimant but it is not required by any 10 The essential question before the The wife s observations concerning As the former impairment documented in this record . . . (A.R. 16). 11 12 II. 13 The ALJ Did Not Err in the Hypothetical Questioning of the Vocational Expert. 14 15 Plaintiff appears to argue that the hypothetical questioning 16 should have included more significant fatigue-related limitations than 17 the limitations included in the questioning. 18 merit. This argument lacks 19 20 Hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert need not 21 include all conceivable limitations that a favorable interpretation of 22 the record might suggest to exist only those limitations the ALJ 23 finds to exist. 24 18 (9th Cir. 2005); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 25 2001); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1989); 26 Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1986). 27 hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert included all 28 limitations the ALJ found to exist (A.R. 620, 706). See, e.g., Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217- 6 Here, the No material error 1 occurred.2 2 3 CONCLUSION 4 5 For all of the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff s motion for 6 summary judgment is denied and Defendant s motion for summary judgment 7 is granted. 8 9 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 10 11 DATED: September 11, 2008. 12 13 _____________/S/_________________ CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 To the extent Plaintiff questions why the ALJ included a need to lie down during a lunch break in the hypothetical questioning, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any material error. As Defendant aptly states, [s]uch a limitation did not prejudice Plaintiff, and as the ALJ explained, Plaintiff s RFC was meant to generously consider Plaintiff s alleged symptoms within the delineated residual functional capacity (Defendant s Motion at 6). 7
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