Oscar E. Vargas v. A. Villanueva, No. 2:2022cv00385 - Document 52 (C.D. Cal. 2023)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION AND ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE by Magistrate Judge Jean P. Rosenbluth, re Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2254) 1 , NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 17 . IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that Respondents Motion to Dismiss is granted and the Petition and this action are dismissed without prejudice to Petitioners timely filing a federal habeas petition once his state-court proceedings become final. (es)
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Oscar E. Vargas v. A. Villanueva Doc. 52 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 OSCAR E. VARGAS, Petitioner, 12 v. 13 14 ROBERT LUNA,1 Respondent. 15 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 22-0385-JPR MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION AND ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE 16 17 18 PROCEEDINGS On January 14, 2022, Petitioner filed pro se a Petition for 19 Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody under 28 20 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging an ongoing criminal prosecution 21 against him. 22 Petition under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and because 23 its claims had not been exhausted in state court. 24 opposed on April 15 and May 31, 2022. 25 On March 22, 2022, Respondent moved to dismiss the Petitioner Meanwhile, on May 10, 2022, the Court appointed advisory 26 27 28 1 Robert Luna is the Sheriff of Los Angeles County and is substituted in under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) as the proper Respondent. 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 counsel to Petitioner and stayed the proceedings until the state 2 court had resolved the issue of his competency, which Respondent 3 had raised in a May 6 status report. 4 competent on July 11, 2022, by the state court. 5 20 Status Rep., ECF No. 35 at 4.)2 6 and relieved advisory counsel on August 2, 2022. 7 2022, Petitioner filed a request that Respondent be made to 8 produce evidence proving the charges against him; he also 9 repeated some of the arguments from his earlier oppositions and 10 11 Petitioner was declared (Resp’t’s July This Court lifted the stay On August 10, requested an evidentiary hearing. On August 23, 2022, Respondent replied to Petitioner’s 12 oppositions. Petitioner filed an unauthorized disguised surreply 13 on September 8, 2022, and it was stricken on September 15.3 14 November 16, 2022, Petitioner requested an update on the status 15 of his case, indicating that he had recently allegedly been 16 coerced into pleading no contest to avoid being subjected to more 17 mental-health treatment, had since moved to withdraw his plea, 18 and was arrested on new charges six days after his release. 19 (Pet’r’s Req. Status Update, ECF No. 48 at 3-4.)4 On 20 2 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Throughout, the Court uses the pagination generated by its Case Management/Electronic Case Filing system. 3 This document largely simply repeated arguments from his earlier oppositions. As Respondent points out (Consolidated Reply to Opp’n, Mem. P. & A., ECF No. 42 at 10 n.2), Petitioner filed his first two oppositions during the period when the state court had adjudged him to be incompetent. Because he repeated those arguments in filings after he was restored to competency, the Court nonetheless considers them. 4 Any claims relating to new charges and any subsequent conviction must be raised in a separate federal habeas petition filed only once any such conviction becomes final. 2 1 For the reasons discussed below, Respondent’s Motion to 2 Dismiss is granted and the Petition and this action are dismissed 3 without prejudice. 4 5 BACKGROUND On December 30, 2020, Petitioner was charged in Los Angeles 6 County Superior Court with criminal threats, assault with a 7 deadly weapon, two counts of resisting arrest — all felonies — 8 and misdemeanor elder abuse. 9 No. 17 at 8-9; Lodged Docs., Ex. 1, ECF No. 17-1 at 5.) (Mot. Dismiss, Mem. P. & A., ECF He was 10 appointed counsel, was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty to all 11 charges. 12 preliminary hearing, on February 11, 2021, he was allowed to 13 represent himself, and the hearing was continued. (Lodged Docs., Ex. 1, ECF No. 17-1 at 5-6.) At his (Id. at 7-8.) 14 At the hearing on April 20, 2021, the “court found 15 insufficient cause” for one count of resisting an officer and 16 granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss that count and add 17 one for misdemeanor resisting, delaying, or obstructing that 18 officer. 19 ECF No. 31 at 16.) 20 Petitioner was arraigned, he waived counsel under Faretta v. 21 California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and the court granted his motion 22 to continue representing himself. 23 17-1 at 11.) 24 25 (Id. at 9; see id. at 10; see also Suppl. Opp’n, Ex. A, On May 4, 2021, an information was filed, (Lodged Docs., Ex. 1, ECF No. On June 28, 2021, Petitioner moved the state court to dismiss the charges under Penal Code section 995.5 (Lodged 26 27 28 5 This section describes conditions when a court must set aside an indictment or information on which a defendant was arraigned. 3 1 Docs., Ex. 2, ECF No. 17-1 at 32.) The court instead “declare[d] 2 a doubt as to [Petitioner’s] mental competency,” “criminal 3 proceedings [we]re adjourned,” and he was transferred to the 4 mental-health division for examination. 5 ECF No. 17-1 at 76.) 6 appointed counsel, he filed pro se a habeas petition in the court 7 of appeal. 8 court denied the petition on July 29, 2021 (Lodged Docs., Ex. 3, 9 ECF No. 17-1 at 42), and that same day he filed another petition (Lodged Docs., Ex. 6, On July 19, 2021, after Petitioner had been (Lodged Docs., Ex. 3, ECF No. 17-1 at 37-40.) That 10 in the same court (Lodged Docs., Ex. 4, ECF No. 17-1 at 44-51). 11 On August 5, 2021, that court “dismissed without prejudice to 12 petitioner’s filing a petition through his appointed counsel,” 13 (id. at 53), and Petitioner appealed (Lodged Docs., Ex. 6, ECF 14 No. 17-1 at 60-61). 15 On August 30, 2021, the trial court noted an August 24 16 minute order from the mental-health court, “which indicate[d] 17 [Petitioner] was found mentally incompetent to stand trial.” 18 (Lodged Docs., Ex. 1, ECF No. 17-1 at 26.) 19 petition in the supreme court on September 29, 2021. 20 Docs., Ex. 7, ECF No. 17-1 at 91-100.) 21 November 17, 2021, noting that habeas petitions “must include 22 copies of reasonably available document[s]” and “allege 23 sufficient facts with particularity.” 24 He filed a habeas (See Lodged That court denied it on (Id. at 101.) On January 27, 2022, the court of appeal appointed counsel 25 for Petitioner. (Lodged Docs., Ex. 6, ECF No. 17-1 at 59; see 26 Consolidated Reply to Opp’n, Mem. P. & A., ECF No. 42 at 18-19 27 n.5 (counsel appointed for limited purpose of contesting judgment 28 of mental incompetency and related order of commitment).) 4 1 Appointed counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 2 436 (1979), on February 7, 2022.6 3 17-1 at 80-89.) 4 App. Cts. Case Info., http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/ 5 (search for case No. B314912 in second appellate district) (last 6 visited Jan. 19, 2023); (Consolidated Reply to Opp’n, Mem. P. & 7 A., ECF No. 42 at 18-19 n.5). The court affirmed on March 30, 2022. See Cal. On May 2, 2022, Petitioner filed a petition for review in 8 9 (Lodged Docs., Ex. 6, ECF No. the state supreme court, and it was denied on June 15. See Cal. 10 App. Cts. Case Info., http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/ 11 (search for case No. S274325 in supreme court) (last visited Jan. 12 19, 2023); (Consolidated Reply to Opp’n, Mem. P. & A., ECF No. 42 13 at 18-19 n.5). 14 12, 2022, because he had been “found mentally competent” by the 15 mental-health court the day before. 16 Rep., ECF No. 35 at 4.) Petitioner “returned to [the] courtroom” on July (Resp’t’s July 20 Status Criminal proceedings resumed. (Id.) On September 24, 2022, Petitioner apparently “pled out due 17 18 to prosecutorial duress” but then “filed a motion to take back 19 [his] plea.” 20 (Pet’r’s Req. Status Update, ECF No. 48 at 3-4.) DISCUSSION As a general proposition, a federal court will not intervene 21 22 in a pending state criminal proceeding absent extraordinary 23 circumstances involving great and immediate danger of irreparable 24 harm. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 45-46; see also Fort Belknap 25 26 27 28 6 Under People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436, 441-42 (1979), counsel may file a brief summarizing the history of the case, raising no specific issue on appeal, and asking the court of appeal to conduct an independent review of the record for error. 5 1 Indian Cmty. v. Mazurek, 43 F.3d 428, 431 (9th Cir. 1994). 2 “[O]nly in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant entitled 3 to have federal interposition by way of injunction or habeas 4 corpus until after the jury comes in, judgment has been appealed 5 from and the case concluded in the state courts.” 6 457 F.2d 764, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). 7 Drury v. Cox, Younger abstention is appropriate if three criteria are met: 8 the state proceedings (1) are ongoing, (2) implicate important 9 state interests, and (3) provide an adequate opportunity to 10 litigate the petitioner’s federal constitutional claims. See 11 Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 12 423, 432 (1982). 13 criterion: that the requested relief would “enjoin” the state 14 proceeding “or ha[ve] ‘the practical effect’” of doing so. 15 Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation 16 omitted). The Ninth Circuit has articulated a fourth 17 Even when the Younger abstention criteria are satisfied, a 18 federal court may intervene when a petitioner shows “bad faith, 19 harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would 20 make abstention inappropriate.” 21 “[E]xtraordinary circumstances” are limited to “cases of proven 22 harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad 23 faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction,” or “where 24 irreparable injury can be shown.” 25 903 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 26 create a “pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief, 27 not merely in the sense of presenting a highly unusual factual 28 situation.” Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435. Brown v. Ahern, 676 F.3d 899, The circumstances must Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125 (1975). 6 1 Here, all criteria for abstention are satisfied. First, the 2 Petition was filed during “pre-trial criminal proceedings.” 3 (Pet. at 2.) 4 Cir. 1988) (as amended Mar. 30, 1989) (ongoing status of state 5 proceedings for Younger analysis is determined “at the time the 6 federal action was filed”). 7 pending in the trial court, and the next hearing is scheduled for 8 January 19, 2023. 9 of L.A., http://www.lacourt.org/criminalcasesummary/ui (search See Beltran v. California, 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Moreover, Petitioner’s case remains See Online Servs., Super. Ct. of Cal., Cnty. 10 for case number LA094005) (last visited Jan. 19, 2023). 11 as here, ‘no final judgment has been entered’ in state court, the 12 state court proceeding is ‘plainly ongoing’ for purposes of 13 Younger.” 14 (quoting San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Com. Pol. Action 15 Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2008)); 16 see also Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983) 17 (petitioner must wait until his convictions and sentence are 18 final before filing federal habeas petition). 19 “Where, Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 2019) Second, the state has a well-established strong interest in 20 the prosecution of criminal charges and the defense of its 21 convictions and sentences. 22 (finding that state must be permitted to “enforc[e] . . . laws 23 against socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good 24 faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution”). 25 See, e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. at 51-52 Third, nothing indicates that Petitioner would not have an 26 adequate opportunity to raise his claims in the state 27 proceedings. 28 a habeas petition in the supreme court, raising some of the same Indeed, he already filed a petition for review and 7 1 claims he raises here. 2 Ex. 7, ECF No. 17-1 at 94-95; see also Consolidated Reply to 3 Opp’n, Mem. P. & A., ECF No. 42 at 18-19 n.5); see Middlesex, 457 4 U.S. at 432 (“federal court should abstain ‘unless state law 5 clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims’” 6 (quoting Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 426 (1979))); Gilbertson v. 7 Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 978 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (inquiry is 8 whether petitioner is “barred from litigating federal 9 constitutional issues in [state] proceeding”). 10 (Compare Pet. at 3-4, with Lodged Docs., Fourth, Petitioner seeks federal-court relief that would 11 “enjoin” the ongoing state proceedings. 12 “illegal criminal prosecution” against him (Pet. at 2) and asks 13 the Court to “[r]elease the petitioner from this illegal 14 incarceration” (Suppl. Opp’n, ECF No. 31 at 5). 15 F.3d at 766 (Younger abstention is appropriate when the petition 16 raises issues that are not “distinct from the underlying criminal 17 prosecution” and would “interfere with it”). 18 Indeed, he has alleged Moreover, no exception to Younger applies. See Arevalo, 882 Petitioner has 19 not sufficiently alleged bad faith or harassment by state 20 officials, and nothing in the Petition explains why he is in 21 immediate need of federal equitable relief or points to any 22 circumstance that could be construed as “extraordinary.” 23 Brown, 676 F.3d at 902-03 (affirming district court’s dismissal 24 of habeas petition under Younger for failure to identify 25 extraordinary circumstance warranting federal intervention). 26 27 28 8 See 1 Petitioner alleges “false 911 calls,”7 “excessive use of 2 force,” “false arrest,” “illegal incarceration,” and “malicious 3 prosecution behind false charges,” all during a “deadly pandemic 4 and state of emergency.” 5 (alleging “illegal search and seizure,” “crual [sic] and unusual 6 punishment,” and “violation of due process”); Opp’n, ECF No. 23 7 at 4-5; Suppl. Opp’n, ECF No. 31 at 3-4.) 8 the trial judge was biased against him and “tactically sided with 9 the people.” (Pet at 4.) (Pet. at 3; see also id. at 11 He also alleges that But he offers no facts to support his 10 conclusory claims. See Brown, 676 F.3d at 901 (requiring 11 “proven” instances of bad faith (citing Carden v. Montana, 626 12 F.2d 82, 84 (9th Cir. 1980))). 13 dismissed a felony charge for “insufficient cause” (Lodged Docs., 14 Ex. 1, ECF No. 17-1 at 9) and the police included the victim’s 15 recantation in their report (Pet. at 8 (excerpt of police 16 report)) undermine claims of harassment and bad faith. 17 Carden, 626 F.2d at 84 (charging petitioners with 13 unnecessary 18 counts that were subsequently dropped did not constitute 19 harassment). 20 faith ‘generally means that a prosecution has been brought 21 without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid 22 conviction.’” Indeed, that the trial court See Further, “[i]n the Younger abstention context, bad Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 Petitioner repeatedly claims that the charges against him are “false” because his mother subsequently recanted her statement that he had held a knife against her throat. (See, e.g., Suppl. Opp’n, Ex. B, ECF No. 31 at 28; Pet. at 3, 8.) But of course victims routinely recant earlier statements to the police for all sorts of reasons — fear, hardship when the defendant supports them and can’t do so if incarcerated, and a desire to avoid further hassle among them — unrelated to the truth of the allegations. 9 1 621 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kugler, 421 U.S. at 126 n.6). 2 petitioner apparently has been convicted after pleading no 3 contest. 4 Here, Nor does a claimed speedy-trial violation “suffice[ ] in and 5 of itself as an independent ‘extraordinary circumstance’ 6 necessitating pre-trial habeas consideration.” 7 at 901; see Page, 932 F.3d at 903 (“[E]ven if [petitioner] could 8 establish that the delay in bringing him to trial would support a 9 speedy trial defense . . . it does not follow that the delay is Brown, 676 F.3d 10 an extraordinary circumstance in the meaning of Younger.”). 11 petitioner seeking “only to demand enforcement of the 12 [government's] affirmative constitutional obligation to bring him 13 promptly to trial” and who has exhausted state remedies toward 14 that end may go forward with a federal habeas petition, however. 15 Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973). 16 A Here, Petitioner claims violation of his right to a speedy 17 trial. (See Pet. at 3-4, 11.) But he has apparently pleaded no 18 contest, so relief under Braden is inappropriate. 19 extent he seeks dismissal of this action on speedy-trial grounds, 20 “Younger principles preclude the adjudication of constitutional 21 speedy trial claims . . . when a petitioner raises ‘a Speedy 22 Trial claim as an affirmative defense to state prosecution.’” 23 Coleman v. Ahlin, 542 F. App’x 549, 551 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 24 Brown, 676 F.3d at 900); Wright v. Volland, 331 F. App’x 496, 498 25 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that “no case ‘permit[s] the derailment 26 of a pending state proceeding by an attempt to litigate 27 constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court’” (quoting 28 Braden, 410 U.S. at 493)). 10 And to the 1 Lastly, Petitioner alleges “[i]llegal appointment of counsel 2 for Mental Health court competency hearing” in violation of his 3 Faretta rights.8 4 start, a Faretta claim is not an extraordinary circumstance 5 involving irreparable injury or otherwise warranting intervention 6 before a conviction has become final because “California courts 7 routinely consider federal constitutional claims arising from an 8 alleged Faretta violation as part of the criminal appellate 9 process.” (Pet. at 4; see Opp’n, ECF No. 23 at 2-3.) To Jackson v. Villanueva, No. CV 18-6721 TJH(JC), 2019 WL 10 2870875, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 22, 2019) (citing People v. 11 Buenrosto, 6 Cal. 5th 367, 425-28 (2018)), accepted by 2019 WL 12 2868955 (C.D. Cal. July 3, 2019). 13 in the state appellate courts the judgment of his mental 14 incompetence and order for commitment.9 15 to Opp’n, Mem. P. & A., ECF No. 42 at 18-19 n.5; see also Lodged 16 Docs., Ex. 6, ECF No. 17-1 at 83-86). 17 found competent, so his request to be relieved of appointed Indeed, Petitioner challenged (See Consolidated Reply But he has since been 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 Petitioner is wrong that there is “[n]o standing U.S. Supreme Court precedent or Landmark case wich [sic] precludes one from exercising one’s Feretta [sic] rights.” (Pet. at 4.) In Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171 (2008), the Supreme Court stated that “Faretta itself and later cases have made clear that the right of self-representation is not absolute.” And it held that the right may be abridged when the defendant has sufficiently severe mental-health issues. See id. at 177-78. 9 Although the Ninth Circuit held in Bean v. Matteucci, 986 F.3d 1128, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2021), that the irreparable-harm exception to Younger abstention may apply in cases of involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication, Petitioner has not raised that issue. (See Pet. at 3-4.) Indeed, in none of his many filings has he even mentioned the state court’s August 24, 2021 order that he be involuntarily medicated with psychotropic drugs. (See Lodged Docs., Ex. 6, ECF No. 17-1 at 83.) 11 1 counsel for his competency hearing is moot.10 2 Status Rep., ECF No. 35 at 4); see McCullough v. Graber, 726 F.3d 3 1057, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2013) (as amended) (petition is moot when 4 relief sought is no longer available). (Resp’t’s July 20 5 In sum, the Younger abstention criteria are met and 6 Petitioner has not demonstrated any extraordinary circumstance 7 making abstention inappropriate. 8 437. 9 Beltran, 871 F.2d at 782 (“Younger abstention requires dismissal 10 The Petition and the action must be dismissed. See of the federal action.” (emphasis in original)).11 11 12 See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432, ORDER IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss 13 is granted and the Petition and this action are dismissed without 14 prejudice to Petitioner’s timely filing a federal habeas petition 15 once his state-court proceedings become final. 16 17 DATED: -DQXDU\ 18 JEAN J JE AN ROSENBLUTH U S MAGISTRATE JUDGE JUD U.S. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10 Similarly, to the extent the stay of his state-court proceedings during his competency evaluation can be analogized to the complete absence of proceedings in Braden, see 410 U.S. at 490, any such speedy-trial concern is also now moot because his prosecution has resumed. 11 Because this case must be dismissed under Younger, the Court need not reach Respondent’s exhaustion argument. In any event, as Sherwood makes clear, a petitioner must wait until his convictions and sentence are final before bringing a federal habeas petition, “even where the issue to be challenged in the writ of habeas corpus has been finally settled in the state courts.” 716 F.2d at 634. 12
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