Victor Aranda Jr. v. Kilolo Kijakazi, No. 2:2021cv07482 - Document 22 (C.D. Cal. 2023)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Gail J. Standish, For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner finding Plaintiff not disabled is AFFIRMED. See document for details. (es)
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Victor Aranda Jr. v. Kilolo Kijakazi Doc. 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 VICTOR A.,1 11 Case No. 2:21-cv-07482-GJS Plaintiff 12 v. 13 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 14 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Defendant. 16 17 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 18 Plaintiff Victor A. (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint seeking review of the 19 decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his applications for 20 Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). 21 The parties filed consents to proceed before the undersigned United States 22 Magistrate Judge [Dkts. 11 and 17] and briefs [Dkts. 15 (“Pl. Br.”), 20 (“Def. Br.”) 23 & 21 (“Reply”)] addressing disputed issues in the case. The matter is now ready for 24 decision. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that this matter should be 25 affirmed. 26 27 1 28 In the interest of privacy, this Order uses only the first name and the initial of the last name of the non-governmental party in this case. Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 II. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION UNDER REVIEW Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI on December 5, 2019, alleging 3 disability beginning October 18, 2019. [Dkt. 13, Administrative Record (“AR”) 36, 4 154-59, 208-09.] Plaintiff’s applications were denied at the initial level of review 5 and on reconsideration. [AR 36, 117-21, 124-36.] A telephone hearing was held 6 before Administrative Law Judge James Carberry (“the ALJ”) on December 17, 7 2020. [AR 36, 50-68.] 8 On January 6, 2021, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision applying the 9 five-step sequential evaluation process for assessing disability. [AR 36-43.] See 20 10 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)-(g)(1), 416.920(b)-(g)(1). At step one, the ALJ determined 11 that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 18, 2019, 12 the alleged onset date. [AR 38.] At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has 13 the following severe impairments: coronary artery disease; congestive heart failure; 14 and diabetes mellitus. [AR 39.] At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 15 does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically 16 equals the severity of one of the impairments listed in Appendix I of the 17 Regulations. [AR 39.] See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. The ALJ found that 18 Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work, as 19 defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a), except he is precluded from 20 climbing ladders, ropes and scaffolds and working around unprotected heights and 21 dangerous machinery and he is limited to lifting and carrying 10 pounds 22 occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently, standing and/or walking 2 out of 8 23 hours, sitting 6 out of 8 hours, and occasionally balancing, stooping, kneeling, 24 crouching, crawling, and climbing of ramps and stairs. [AR 40.] At step four, the 25 ALJ determined that Plaintiff is able to perform his past relevant work as a 26 telephone solicitor, as actually and generally performed. [AR 42-43.] Based on 27 these findings, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled from the alleged 28 onset date, October 18, 2019, through the date of the decision, January 6, 2021. 2 1 2 3 4 5 [AR 43.] The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision on July 26, 2021. [AR 1-7.] This action followed. Plaintiff raises the following issues challenging the ALJ’s findings and determination of non-disability: 6 1. The ALJ failed to obtain and evaluate the complete medical record. 7 2. The Appeals Council failed to consider new and material evidence. 8 3. The ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff’s RFC. 9 The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 10 evidence and should be affirmed. 11 12 13 III. GOVERNING STANDARD Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 14 determine if: (1) the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial 15 evidence; and (2) the Commissioner used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. 16 Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Brewes v. Comm’r 17 Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence … is 18 ‘more than a mere scintilla’ … [i]t means – and only means – ‘such relevant 19 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” 20 Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citations omitted); Gutierrez v. 21 Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 522 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[s]ubstantial evidence is 22 more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance”) (internal quotation marks 23 and citation omitted). 24 The Court will uphold the Commissioner’s decision when “‘the evidence is 25 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.’” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 26 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 27 1989)). However, the Court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in the 28 decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” 3 1 Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court will not reverse the 2 Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error, which exists if the error is 3 “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination, or that, despite the 4 error, the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 5 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 6 IV. 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 A. DISCUSSION New Evidence before the Appeals Council Plaintiff contends that remand for further proceedings is required because the Appeals Council failed to properly “consider” and designate as exhibits certain new medical evidence that Plaintiff submitted after the ALJ rendered his decision. [Pl. Br. at 11-12; AR 1698-1713.] The Regulations govern when the Appeals Council is obligated to review additional evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970, 416.1470 (effective January 17, 2017). The Appeals Council “will review a case if ... the Appeals Council receives additional evidence that is new, material, and relates to the period on or before the date of the hearing decision, [ ] there is a reasonable probability that the additional evidence would change the outcome of the decision,” and there is “good cause” for not submitting the new evidence earlier. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(a)(5), (b), 416.1470(a)(5), (b). When the Appeals Council fails to “consider” additional evidence that satisfies the requirements of Section 404.970 or Section 416.1470, a remand for further administrative proceedings is appropriate. See Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011). A claimant has the burden to demonstrate the new evidence should have been considered for the first time by the Appeals Council. See Garcia v. Saul, No. 1:19-CV-1103-JLT, 2021 WL 223205, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2021). The Ninth Circuit has distinguished between evidence the Appeals Council 4 1 “considered” and evidence the Appeals Council merely “looked at” to determine 2 whether the additional evidence was incorporated into the record. Evidence 3 “considered” by the Appeals Council becomes part of the administrative record, as 4 “evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based.” Brewes 5 v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2012). But if “the 6 Appeals Council only looked at the evidence ... the new evidence [does] not become 7 part of the record” and the Court “may not consider it.” Amor v. Berryhill, 743 F. 8 App’x 145, 146 (9th Cir. 2018); de Orozco v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:18-CV- 9 00817-SAB, 2019 WL 2641490, at *11 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2019) (observing that 10 the Ninth Circuit distinguished between instances where the Appeals Council 11 formally considered evidence and made it part of the administrative record with 12 instances where the Appeals Council only looked at the evidence). 13 Plaintiff was represented by an attorney at the hearing on December 17, 2020. 14 [AR 36, 50-68.] After the ALJ issued the decision on January 6, 2021, Plaintiff 15 requested Appeals Council review and retained new counsel. [AR 49, 206-07, 356- 16 57.] Plaintiff submitted to the Appeals Council a brief and three Los Angeles 17 County/USC Medical Center records, including cardiology reports dated October 18 21, 2020 and March 3, 2021, and a primary care provider report of a telephone visit 19 dated December 2, 2020. [AR 356-57, 1698-1711.] 20 On July 26, 2021, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. 21 [AR 1-7.] The Notice of Appeals Council Action states that it considered the 22 reasons why Plaintiff disagreed with the ALJ’s decision and exhibited them on the 23 Order of the Appeals Council, but it concluded that “the reasons did not provide a 24 basis for changing the [ALJ’s] decision.” [AR 1.] The Appeals Council also 25 acknowledged the submission of the three additional medical records, but it did not 26 designate the records as exhibits. [AR 2, 5.] The Appeals Council explained that 27 the new medical evidence did not provide a basis for reviewing the ALJ’s decision, 28 as follows: 5 1 You submitted treatment records from USC Cardiology, dated October 21, 2020 through December 2, 2020 (6 pages). We find this evidence does not show a reasonable probability that it would change the outcome of the decision. We did not exhibit this evidence. 2 3 4 You submitted Medical Records from USC Cardiology, dated March 3, 2021 (10 pages). The Administrative Law Judge decided your case through January 6, 2021. This additional evidence does not relate to the period at issue. Therefore, it does not affect the decision about whether you were disabled beginning on or before January 6, 2021. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 [AR 2.] The Notice of Appeals Council Action indicates that the Appeals Council “looked” at the new medical records in concluding that it was not likely to affect the ALJ’s decision, but it did not “consider” the new records or make them part of the record. See Amor, 743 F. App’x at 146; see Garcia, 2021 WL 223205, at *4 (finding no error by the Appeals Council “in merely looking at the evidence and not incorporating it as exhibits into the administrative record”); Matias v. Saul, No. CV 19-00575 LEK-KJM, 2021 WL 531238, at *5 (D. Haw. Feb. 12, 2021) (construing the Appeals Councils statement that it did not “exhibit” newly submitted medical evidence because it did “not show a reasonable probability that it would change the outcome of the decision,” as indicating that the Appeals Council merely “looked at” the additional medical evidence but did not “consider” it). Although the new medical records were listed in the Court Transcript Index, they did not become part of the record, as the Appeals Council did not exhibit them or list them in the Appeals Council’s Exhibit List. [AR 5.] See Guzman v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-CV0514 JLT, 2021 WL 6062645, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2021) (interpreting Appeals Council statement that it “did not exhibit this evidence” to mean the Council “did not consider the evidence but merely looked at it”). Plaintiff asserts that the Appeals Council’s failure to consider the additional 28 6 1 medical evidence requires remand for further proceedings. He argues that the new 2 medical records show “the extent of Plaintiff’s cardiac decompensation prior to the 3 ALJ hearing and continuing after the hearing” and there is “a reasonable 4 probability” the newly submitted evidence would “change the outcome of the case 5 when considered.” [Pl. Br. at 12; Reply at 5.] Plaintiff points out that the two new 6 cardiology reports (dated October 21, 2020 and March 1, 2021) reflect that Plaintiff 7 underwent a transthoracic echocardiogram on October 1, 2020 and his ejection 8 fraction2 was estimated at 20 percent. [AR 1699, 1711.] 9 Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of showing that the new evidence should 10 have been considered by the Appeals Council. See Garcia, 2021 WL 223205, at *4. 11 Significantly, the new cardiology reports indicate that Plaintiff’s October 1, 2020 12 echocardiogram showed “no appreciable changes,” as compared to Plaintiff’s prior 13 study. [AR 1699, 1711.] Indeed, Plaintiff’s echocardiogram from October 1, 2020, 14 like his echocardiogram from November 26, 2019, indicate that Plaintiff had an 15 estimated ejection fraction of 20 percent, left ventricle with moderately increased 16 cavity size, severe diffuse hypokinesis, grade III diastolic function, right ventricle 17 with severely reduced systolic function, left atrium moderately dilated, right atrium 18 severely dilated, aortic valve with trivial regurgitation, mitral valve with mild 19 regurgitation, and tricuspid valve with mild-moderate regurgitation. [AR 428, 20 1711.] Thus, Plaintiff has failed to show there is a “reasonable probability that the 21 additional evidence would change the outcome of the decision.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 22 404.970(a)(5), 416.1470(a)(5). 23 Further, the record does not contain any evidence that Plaintiff satisfied his 24 burden of showing good cause for the failure to present the additional medical 25 evidence earlier. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(b), 416.1470(b). 26 27 28 2 Ejection fraction refers to the percentage of blood pumped out of the heart with each contraction. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 4.00D(1)(a)(i). 7 1 2 Accordingly, the Appeals Council did not err in failing to remand the case for further proceedings. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970, 416.1470. 3 B. 4 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to fully develop the record by obtaining 5 6 Development of the Medical Record all of Plaintiff’s treatment records. [Pl. Br. at 9-11.] According to Plaintiff, his October 1, 2020 echocardiogram, as documented in 7 the October 21, 2020 cardiology report that was submitted to the Appeals Council, 8 establishes that he meets the requirements of Listing 4.02 for chronic heart failure. 9 [Pl. Br. at 9-11; AR 1711.] Plaintiff claims that he has “listing level systolic 10 failure,” as his estimated ejection fraction was “20% during a period of stability.” 11 [Pl. Br. at 10.] Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have known that this “critical 12 medical information was missing,” because a June 2020 treatment note indicated 13 that Plaintiff had a reduced ejection fraction and could be reevaluated after 14 September 30, 2020. [Pl. Br. at 10 (citing AR 1622).] 15 “[T]he ALJ has a special duty to develop the record fully and fairly and 16 ensure that the claimant’s interests are considered.” Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 17 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001). However, “[a]n ALJ’s duty to develop the record further 18 is triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate 19 to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” Id. at 459-60. 20 Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the record was ambiguous or 21 inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of his claim. The ALJ obtained and 22 reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records but found no ambiguities, inadequacies, or 23 conflicts in the record that had to be resolved. The ALJ even asked Plaintiff’s 24 counsel about medical records documenting Plaintiff’s ejection fraction at the 25 hearing. [AR 53-54, 62.] Plaintiff’s counsel failed to inform the ALJ that any 26 medical records were missing. Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ should have known 27 medical records were missing is conclusory and not supported by the record. 28 Further, even if the ALJ erred by failing to develop the record, any error was 8 1 harmless. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492; Garcia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 768 2 F.3d 925, 932 n.10 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that legal error in failing to develop the 3 record is subject to the traditional harmless error analysis). As noted above, 4 Plaintiff’s October 1, 2020 echocardiogram showed “no appreciable changes 5 compared to [his] prior study.” [AR 1711.] Plaintiff’s echocardiogram in October 6 2020, like his echocardiogram in November 2019 showed an estimated ejection 7 fraction of 20 percent. [AR 428, 1711.] The ALJ acknowledged at the hearing and 8 in the decision that Plaintiff’s had an estimated ejection fraction of just 20 percent in 9 November 2019. [AR 41, 53-54, 61-62.] 10 Moreover, evidence of a low ejection fraction, without more, does not satisfy 11 the requirements of Listing 4.02 for chronic heart failure. To be disabled under 12 Listing 4.02, a claimant must satisfy one set of criteria in Paragraph A of Listing 13 4.02 (requiring medical evidence of systolic or diastolic failure) and one set of 14 criteria Paragraph B of Listing 4.02 (describing symptoms and signs of heart 15 failure), while on a regimen of prescribed treatment. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 16 Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 4.02. Paragraph A of Listing 4.02 requires medically 17 documented evidence of either: 1) Systolic failure “with left ventricular end 18 diastolic dimensions greater than 6.0 cm or ejection fraction of 30 percent or less 19 during a period of stability (not during an episode of acute heart failure)” or 2) 20 Diastolic failure, “with left ventricular posterior wall plus septal thickness totaling 21 2.5 cm or greater on imaging, with an enlarged left atrium greater than or equal to 22 4.5 cm, with normal or elevated ejection fraction during a period of stability (not 23 during an episode of acute heart failure).” Id. Paragraph B of Listing 4.02 requires 24 one of the following: 1) “Persistent symptoms of heart failure which very seriously 25 limit the ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities of daily 26 living in an individual for whom an MC [medical consultant], …, has concluded that 27 the performance of an exercise test would present a significant risk to the 28 individual;” or 2) “Three or more separate episodes of acute congestive heart failure 9 1 within a consecutive 12-month period, … with evidence of fluid retention …, 2 requiring acute extended physician intervention…;” or 3) “Inability to perform an 3 exercise tolerance test at a workload equivalent to 5 METs (metabolic equivalents) 4 or less due to: a. Dyspnea, fatigue, palpitations, or chest discomfort; or b. Three or 5 more consecutive premature ventricular contractions (ventricular tachycardia), or 6 increasing frequency of ventricular ectopy with at least 6 premature ventricular 7 contractions per minute; or c. Decrease of 10 mm Hg or more in systolic pressure 8 below the baseline systolic blood pressure or the preceding systolic pressure 9 measured during exercise … due to left ventricular dysfunction, despite an increase 10 in workload; or d. Signs attributable to inadequate cerebral perfusion, such as ataxic 11 gait or mental confusion.” Id. 12 Here, even if Plaintiff’s estimated ejection fraction of 20 percent establishes 13 systolic failure as described in Paragraph A of Listing 4.02, there is no evidence that 14 any of the Paragraph B criteria in Listing 4.02 are satisfied. Plaintiff cites no 15 evidence that a medical consultant opined Plaintiff could not perform an exercise 16 test, Plaintiff had three or more separate episodes of acute congestive heart failure in 17 a 12-month period, or Plaintiff could not perform an exercise tolerance test at a 18 workload equivalent to five METs or less. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 19 Appendix 1, § 4.02B. Although Plaintiff claims that the ALJ ignored his complaints 20 of “dizziness and brain fog,” Plaintiff’s subjective complaints do not satisfy the 21 criteria in Paragraph B of Listing 4.02. Because Plaintiff has failed to show how the 22 missing medical evidence would have affected the ALJ’s determination, any error in 23 the ALJ’s failure to develop the record was harmless. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d 24 at 492; Garcia, 768 F.3d at 932 n.10. 25 C. The ALJ’s RFC Determination 26 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly ALJ ignored his subjective 27 complaints in assessing his RFC and, consequently, posed an incomplete 28 hypothetical question to the vocational expert. [Pl. Br. at 13-15.] 10 1 An RFC is “an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work- 2 related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing 3 basis.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-9p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (S.S.A. 4 1996). An RFC reflects the most a claimant can do despite his limitations. See 5 Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996). 6 “The hypothetical an ALJ poses to a vocational expert, which derives from 7 the RFC, ‘must set out all the limitations and restrictions of the particular 8 claimant.’” Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 9 2009) (quoting Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)). 10 At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that he experiences shortness of breath, 11 fatigue, and brain fog. [AR 63-64.] He stated that he needs to take a break after 10 12 to 15 minutes of activity and he cannot work because his circulatory system would 13 fail. [AR 64-65.] In an Exertion Questionnaire, Plaintiff reported that he struggles 14 with dizziness from his medication, shortness of breath, and water retention. [AR 15 254-56.] Plaintiff also stated that he can climb four stairs, walk 20 to 30 minutes to 16 the store with rests, and clean his home with rests. [AR 254-55.] 17 The ALJ assessed Plaintiff with an RFC for a limited range of sedentary 18 work. [AR 40.] This RFC assessment reflects all of Plaintiff’s limitations that the 19 ALJ found to exist. [AR 40.] In making this determination, the ALJ provided 20 legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of dizziness, 21 brain fog, and other symptoms. [AR 39-40.] 22 The evaluation of a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony requires a two- 23 step analysis. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007); 24 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. “First, the ALJ must determine whether the 25 claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, 26 ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 27 alleged.’” Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 28 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). Second, if the claimant meets the first step and 11 1 there is no evidence of malingering, “‘the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony 2 about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing 3 reasons for doing so.’” Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 4 1281). “The ALJ must state specifically which symptom testimony is not credible 5 and what facts in the record lead to that conclusion.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; see 6 also SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, *4 (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017) (explaining that the 7 ALJ must “evaluate the intensity and persistence of [the] individual’s symptoms ... 8 and determine the extent to which [those] symptoms limit [his] ... ability to perform 9 work-related activities”). 10 Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling symptoms and 11 limitations were unsupported by the medical evidence of record. [AR 40-42.] The 12 ALJ may consider objective medical evidence when assessing a claimant’s 13 testimony. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2) (“Objective medical evidence … is a 14 useful indicator to assist us in making reasonable conclusions about the intensity and 15 persistence of your symptoms and the effect those symptoms, such as pain, may 16 have on your ability to work…”), 416.929(c)(2) (same); Burch, 400 F.3d at 681 17 (“Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain 18 testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.”). 19 While Plaintiff produced objective medical evidence to support some degree of pain 20 and other symptoms, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s treatment records revealed 21 generally unremarkable physical exams after he began receiving regular treatment 22 for his cardiac condition. [AR 42, 427, 835, 931, 936, 946, 1494.] The ALJ noted 23 that Plaintiff denied shortness of breath on multiple occasions and the medical 24 records did not support Plaintiff’s allegations of dizziness, brain fog or side effects 25 from medications. [AR 42, 427, 931, 936, 946, 1494.] The ALJ properly 26 considered the medical reports and clinical findings (or a lack thereof) to conclude 27 that Plaintiff did not exhibit the limitations and symptoms consistent with his 28 subjective complaints. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c)(2). Although 12 1 the medical evidence could give rise to inferences more favorable to Plaintiff, the 2 ALJ’s interpretation was rational and should be upheld. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 680. 3 The ALJ also found Plaintiff’s admitted activities of daily living were 4 inconsistent with his allegations of disability. [AR 41-42.] One of the factors that 5 an ALJ may consider in weighing a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony is the 6 inconsistency between the testimony and the claimant’s statements to others. See 7 Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599-600 (9th Cir. 8 1999). The ALJ noted that in November 2019, Plaintiff reported to his doctor that 9 he was able to perform his daily activities “without much issue” and could walk up 10 to two miles without shortness of breath. [AR 41, 427.] In January 2020, Plaintiff 11 stated that he was still working full-time as a driver. [AR 41, 931.] Plaintiff also 12 reported that he was able to walk three to four blocks without shortness of breath in 13 January, April, and July of 2020. [AR 41-42, 931, 936, 1494.] In his Exertion 14 Questionnaire, Plaintiff stated that he was able to clean his home, which included 15 mopping, sweeping, and cleaning the shower, with rest periods. [AR 40-41, 254- 16 55.] Thus, the ALJ properly considered the extent of Plaintiff’s daily activities in 17 discounting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. [AR 40-42]; Morgan, 169 18 F.3d at 599-600. Because the ALJ gave legally sufficient reasons for disregarding Plaintiff’s 19 20 subjective complaints, the ALJ did not err in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC or by posing 21 a hypothetical question to the vocational expert that did not include Plaintiff’s 22 complaints of dizziness, brain fog, and other symptoms. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 23 1291. 24 Next, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s RFC assessment was erroneous 25 because the ALJ failed to assess Plaintiff’s limitations on a function-by-function 26 basis pursuant to SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). [Pl. Br. at 27 13.] Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit, as the ALJ set forth a function-by-function 28 analysis of Plaintiff’s abilities in the decision. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff 13 1 can perform sedentary work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a), 2 except he is precluded from climbing ladders, ropes and scaffolds and working 3 around unprotected heights and dangerous machinery and he is limited to lifting and 4 carrying 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently, standing and/or 5 walking 2 out of 8 hours, sitting 6 out of 8 hours, and occasionally balancing, 6 stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and climbing of ramps and stairs. [AR 40.] 7 The ALJ was not required to prepare “a function-by-function analysis for medical 8 conditions or impairments that the ALJ found neither credible nor supported by the 9 record.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); Buckner-Larkin 10 v. Astrue, 450 F. App’x 626, 627 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding ALJ’s determination that 11 claimant had an RFC to perform “sedentary work” pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 12 404.1567(a) was a sufficient function-by-function assessment, as the definition of 13 “sedentary [work] ... includes well-defined function-by-function parameters”). 14 Plaintiff also challenges the vocational expert’s testimony that Plaintiff could 15 perform his past work as a telephone solicitor. [Pl. Br. at 13-14.] Plaintiff argues 16 that “[t]here is no detailed information or questioning in the record that describes 17 how Plaintiff actually performed” his prior job or about “the actual job 18 requirements,” such as information about quotas, pace, and rest periods. [Pl. Br. at 19 14.] However, it was Plaintiff’s burden at step four to establish that he could no 20 longer perform his past work. See Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 21 2001). Moreover, Plaintiff’s testimony and work history report provided significant 22 evidence as to how Plaintiff actually performed his past job. At the hearing, 23 Plaintiff labeled his prior work as a “call center representative” for Direct TV and 24 described his job as follows: “clients would contact the call center for other 25 programming[,] for the costs and billings and … for removal of the programming.” 26 [AR 54-55.] In his work history report, Plaintiff described the duties of the call 27 center job as: satellite service calls; offers for HBO, Starz, Cinemax, and special 28 programs; accepting payments; discontinuing service; and equipment exchanges. 14 1 [AR 243.] Plaintiff reported that the job involved eight hours of sitting, reaching, 2 writing, typing, or handling small objects and lifting less than 10 pounds. [AR 243.] 3 The vocational expert classified Plaintiff’s past job as “telephone solicitor,” number 4 299.357-014 in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) and testified that a 5 person with Plaintiff’s RFC could perform that job as actually performed by 6 Plaintiff at the sedentary level. [AR 55, 61.] Thus, substantial evidence supported 7 the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could perform his past work as actually 8 performed. 9 Further, any asserted error in determining that Plaintiff could perform his past 10 work as actually performed was harmless, as substantial evidence supports the 11 ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could perform his past work as a telephone 12 solicitor as it is generally performed in the national economy. [AR 43, 61]; see 13 Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492; SSR 82-62, *3 (S.S.A. 1982) (“The RFC to meet 14 the physical and mental demands of a job a claimant has performed in the past 15 (either the specific job a claimant performed or the same kind of work as it is 16 customarily performed throughout the economy) is generally a sufficient basis for a 17 finding of ‘not disabled.’”). 18 19 V. CONCLUSION 20 For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the 21 Commissioner finding Plaintiff not disabled is AFFIRMED 22 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 26 27 DATED: March 23, 2023 ___________________________________ GAIL J. STANDISH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28 15
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