California Grocers Association v. City of Long Beach, No. 2:2021cv00524 - Document 58 (C.D. Cal. 2021)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS 51 , 52 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II: Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED. As the Court finds that any amendment would be futile, Plaintiff California Grocers Association's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court will issue Judgment. (lc)
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California Grocers Association v. City of Long Beach Doc. 58 Case 2:21-cv-00524-ODW-AS Document 58 Filed 08/09/21 Page 1 of 12 Page ID #:1204 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 United States District Court Central District of California 9 10 11 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Case 2:21-cv-00524-ODW (ASx) CALIFORNIA GROCERS ASSOCIATION, ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS [51] [52] v. CITY OF LONG BEACH, Defendant. UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 324, Intervenor. 20 21 I. INTRODUCTION 22 On January 20, 2021, Plaintiff California Grocers Association (“CGA”) 23 initiated this action against Defendant City of Long Beach (“City”) arguing the 24 Premium Pay for Grocery Workers Ordinance (“Ordinance”) is invalid under federal 25 and state constitutional law. (Compl., ECF No. 2.) The parties stipulated for United 26 Food & Commercial Workers Local 324 (“UFCW324”) to intervene as a Defendant, 27 as it sponsored the Ordinance’s passing. 28 No. 36.) On February 25, 2021, the Court denied CGA’s request for a preliminary (Order Granting Mot. Intervene, ECF Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:21-cv-00524-ODW-AS Document 58 Filed 08/09/21 Page 2 of 12 Page ID #:1205 1 injunction. (Order Den. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 41.) 2 amended its complaint and the City and UFCW324 each move to dismiss. (See First 3 Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 47; UFCW324 Mot. Dismiss (“UFCW324 Mot.”), 4 ECF No. 51; City Mot. Dismiss (“City Mot.”), ECF No. 52.) The matter is fully 5 briefed. (See Opp’n, ECF No. 53; UFCW324 Reply, ECF No. 54; City Reply, ECF 6 No. 55.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the Motions.1 II. 7 On March 10, 2021, CGA BACKGROUND 8 On January 19, 2021, the City enacted the Ordinance mandating that all grocery 9 workers in the area must be paid four dollars ($4.00) more than their hourly wage for 10 a period of at least 120 days. (FAC ¶¶ 18–19.) To combat the effects of the global 11 COVID-19 pandemic, the Ordinance “aims to protect and promote the public health, 12 safety, and welfare . . . by requiring grocery stores to provide premium pay for 13 grocery workers performing work in Long Beach.” (Compl. Ex. A (“Ordinance”) 14 § 5.91.005, ECF No. 2.) The Ordinance also states that “premium pay better ensures 15 the retention of these essential workers who are on the frontlines of this pandemic 16 providing essential services” and “[a]s such, they are deserving of fair and equitable 17 compensation for their work.” (Id.) 18 In pertinent part, the Ordinance provides: 19 “Hiring entities shall provide each grocery worker with premium pay 20 consisting of an additional Four Dollars ($4.00) per hour for each hour 21 worked.” (Id. § 5.91.050(A).) 22 “Hiring entities shall provide the [$4.00 premium pay] for a minimum of one 23 hundred twenty (120) days from the effective date of th[e] Ordinance.” (Id. 24 § 5.91.050(B); see also id. § 5.91.050(C) (“Unless extended by City 25 Council, this ordinance shall expire in one hundred twenty (120) days.”).) 26 27 28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motions, the Court deemed the matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 2 Case 2:21-cv-00524-ODW-AS Document 58 Filed 08/09/21 Page 3 of 12 Page ID #:1206 1 “No hiring entity shall, as a result of this Ordinance going into effect . . . 2 [1] Reduce a grocery worker’s compensation; [or 2] Limit a grocery 3 worker’s earning capacity.” (Id. § 5.91.060(A).) 4 “‘Grocery worker’ means a worker employed directly by a hiring entity at a 5 grocery store. Grocery worker does not include managers, supervisors[,] or 6 confidential employees.” (Id. § 5.91.020.) 7 “‘Grocery store’ means a store that devotes seventy percent (70%) or more 8 of its business to retailing a general range of food products, which may be 9 fresh or packaged.” (Id.) 10 “‘Hiring entity’ means a grocery store that employs over three hundred (300) 11 grocery workers nationally and employs more than fifteen (15) employees 12 per grocery store in the City of Long Beach.” (Id.) 13 “The provisions of this Ordinance are declared to be separate and severable. 14 If any clause, sentence, paragraph, subdivision, section, subsection, or 15 portion . . . , or the application thereof . . . is held to be invalid, it shall not 16 affect the validity of the remainder of this Ordinance, or the validity of its 17 application to other persons or circumstances.” (Id. § 5.91.150.) 18 CGA contends the Ordinance “picks winners and losers” because it targets only 19 large grocery employers, without justifying the exclusion of other essential worker 20 employers. 21 (1) National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) Preemption, (2) violation of the Equal 22 Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and (3) California Constitution, 23 and (4) violation of the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution and 24 (5) California Constitution. (FAC ¶¶ 22–49.) Defendants move to dismiss the FAC 25 arguing that CGA fails to state a claim. (See generally City Mot.; UFCW324 Mot.) 26 (FAC ¶ 17.) On that basis, CGA asserts five causes of action, for III. LEGAL STANDARD 27 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable 28 legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal 3 Case 2:21-cv-00524-ODW-AS Document 58 Filed 08/09/21 Page 4 of 12 Page ID #:1207 1 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). “To 2 survive a motion to dismiss . . . under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint generally must 3 satisfy only the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)”—a short and 4 plain statement of the claim. Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The 5 “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 6 level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint must 7 contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 8 plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation 9 marks omitted). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic 10 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 11 550 U.S. at 555). 12 Whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a “context-specific 13 task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 14 sense.” Id. at 679. A court is generally limited to the pleadings, judicially noticeable 15 facts, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint; it must construe all 16 “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as true and . . . in the light most 17 favorable” to the plaintiff. 18 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, 19 unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden 20 State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679, 688 IV. 21 DISCUSSION 22 Defendants move to dismiss each of CGA’s causes of action pursuant to Federal 23 Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), on the basis that CGA fails to state a claim 24 for NLRA preemption, violation of the Contract Clause of the California and United 25 States Constitutions, and violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the California 26 and United States Constitutions.2 27 2 28 In discussing the Equal Protection and Contract Clauses, the Court focuses on the relevant federal standards, as analysis of the California and federal Constitutions on these points of law does not differ. See Campanelli v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 1086, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating 4 Case 2:21-cv-00524-ODW-AS Document 58 Filed 08/09/21 Page 5 of 12 Page ID #:1208 1 A. NLRA Preemption 2 CGA argues that the NLRA preempts the Ordinance, as the Ordinance’s 3 operation impermissibly nullifies collective bargaining mechanics and dictates 4 any outcome. 5 substantive labor standard that still allows for effective bargaining, so there is no 6 preemption and CGA fails to state a claim. (City Mot. 5–15; UFCW 324 Mot. 5–16.) (Opp’n 6–13.) Defendants claim the Ordinance is merely a 7 “The NLRA—the federal architecture that governs relations between labor and 8 management . . .—has no express preemption provision. Nonetheless, the 9 Supreme Court has recognized two implicit preemption mandates: Garmon 10 preemption and Machinists preemption.” Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n v. City of 11 Los Angeles, 834 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). In this case, 12 CGA relies solely on a Machinists preemption theory, which “prohibits states 13 from restricting a ‘weapon of self-help,’ such as a strike or lock-out.” Id. 14 (quoting Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp. Rels. Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 146 15 (1976)). 16 unregulated to allow tactical bargaining decisions ‘to be controlled by the free 17 play of economic forces.’” Id. (quoting Machininsts, 427 U.S. at 140). Machinists preemption ensures that “these self-help tools [are] 18 The NLRA primarily protects the collective bargaining process, rather 19 than dictates bargained-for substantive terms. Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. 20 Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 20 (1987). “[T]he mere fact that a state statute pertains to 21 matters over which the parties are free to bargain cannot support a claim of 22 pre-emption . . . .” 23 governments can pass minimum labor standards pursuant to their police power 24 without running afoul of federal labor law.” Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n v. City 25 of Los Angeles, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 834 F.3d Id. at 21. As such, there is a “general principle that 26 27 28 California follows federal analysis for Contract Clause); RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137, 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating California follows federal analysis for Equal Protection Clause). 5 Case 2:21-cv-00524-ODW-AS Document 58 Filed 08/09/21 Page 6 of 12 Page ID #:1209 1 958. “The question then becomes the extent of the substantive requirements that 2 a state may impose on the bargaining process.” Chamber of Com. v. Bragdon, 3 64 F.3d 497, 501–02 (9th Cir. 1995). As such, “a minimum labor standard that 4 simply ‘alters the playing field’ does not compel preemption; but when a 5 minimum labor standard not only ‘alters the playing field’ but also ‘forces the 6 hand’ of one or both parties, then Machinists preemption applies.” Am. Hotel, 7 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1187. Further, “pre-emption should not be lightly inferred in 8 this area, since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional 9 police power of the State.”3 Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 21. 10 The Ordinance at issue here is a minimum labor standard, not normally 11 subject to preemption. The Ordinance sets a minimum for “premium pay,” 12 requires its payment for 120 days, encourages more generous policies, and 13 provides certain protections to ensure that employees receive the minimum 14 benefit and employers do not implement an offset. (See Ordinance §§ 5.91.050, 15 .060, .130.) The Ordinance “affect[s] union and nonunion employees equally, 16 and neither encourage[s] nor discourage[s] the collective-bargaining processes.” 17 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 755 (1985). The Ordinance 18 does “technically interfere with labor-management relations” but it does “not 19 ‘regulate the mechanics of labor dispute resolution.’” 20 at 963 (quoting Concerned Home Care Providers, Inc. v. Cuomo, 783 F.3d 77, 21 86 (2d Cir. 2015)). As such, the Ordinance is a clear example of a minimum 22 labor standard not subject to Machinists preemption, because it does not impinge 23 collective bargaining mechanisms. Am. Hotel, 834 F.3d Despite this, CGA contends that the 24 25 26 27 28 3 CGA disputes the existence of any presumption against pre-emption for labor standards. (Opp’n 4–6.) However, such a presumption in the context of the NLRA is well-established. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 224 (1993) (“We are reluctant to infer pre-emption.”); Interpipe Contracting, Inc. v. Becerra, 898 F.3d 879, 891 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2744 (2019), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2767 (2019) (“[Law] therefore falls into the category of state labor laws typically saved from preemption, and so the presumption against preemption applies with particular force.”). 6 Case 2:21-cv-00524-ODW-AS Document 58 Filed 08/09/21 Page 7 of 12 Page ID #:1210 1 Ordinance’s protections prevent any meaningful bargaining and the Ordinance 2 dictates bargaining results to such a degree that it conflicts with the NLRA. 3 CGA’s argument relies on an overly broad interpretation of the Ordinance. 4 As this Court previously noted, “[i]f the drafters . . . meant to prohibit employers 5 from offsetting labor costs by lowering any form of compensation ‘in any 6 way’ . . . they could have said so in the Ordinance.” (Order Den. Prelim. Inj. 8.) 7 Additionally, while the term “compensation” is not defined, the Ordinance does 8 provide contextual clues suggesting a narrower interpretation. 9 definition of “adverse action,” a term which is mysteriously absent elsewhere 10 despite deserving definition, “compensation” appears at the forefront of a list of 11 typically bargained-for items, including gratuities, access to work, incentives, 12 bonuses, and more. (See Ordinance § 5.91.020.) Additionally, within the listed 13 remedies for Ordinance violations, there are multiple mentions of “unpaid 14 compensation” which suggest a synonymous reading as “unpaid wages. (Id. 15 § 5.91.110.) The Ordinance also requires the retention of compliance records, 16 suggesting other bargained-for terms can be reduced for other reasons. (See id. 17 § 5.91.080.) As such, the Court finds the Ordinance is not subject to CGA’s 18 broad interpretation and allows labor negotiations to proceed with the Ordinance 19 as a backdrop. Within the 20 CGA also argues that the Ordinance dictates bargaining results, in similar 21 fashion to the law at issue in Bragdon, 64 F.3d 497 (9th Cir. 1995), but this 22 overstates the Ordinance’s substantive requirements. 23 Bragdon required employers to pay “prevailing wages [that] were defined as the 24 per diem wages set by the state for public works projects, which in turn were 25 based on the wages in local collective bargaining agreements, effectively forcing 26 nonunion employers to pay what amounted to a union wage.” Am. Hotel, 27 834 F.3d at 965 n.5. The Bragdon court found those substantive requirements to 28 be so “invasive and detailed” that it “substitute[d] the free-play of political 7 The law at issue in Case 2:21-cv-00524-ODW-AS Document 58 Filed 08/09/21 Page 8 of 12 Page ID #:1211 1 forces for the free-play of economic forces that was intended by the NLRA.” 2 Bragdon, 64 F.3d at 502, 504. 3 because, unlike Bragdon, it still allows for bargaining to occur so long as 4 employers do not undercut the premium pay benefit by reducing compensation 5 or limiting earning capacity. Instead, the Ordinance more closely resembles the 6 law at issue in National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 70 F.3d 69, 71 7 (9th Cir. 1995), which established an overtime minimum benefit protection. 8 Like the Ordinance here, the National Broadcasting law allowed for the parties 9 to negotiate a different premium pay rate but required that rate to be at least one 10 dollar above the minimum wage. Id. As such, the principles guiding Bragdon 11 are too far afield to be applicable here. The Ordinance does not share that quality As the NLRA does not preempt the Ordinance, CGA’s first cause of action 12 13 is DISMISSED. 14 B. The Contract Clause 15 CGA claims the Ordinance violates the Contract Clause because it substantially 16 impairs existing collective bargaining agreements and does not serve a significant or 17 legitimate public purpose. 18 represents foreseeable state regulation and a valid use of police powers, and that 19 giving grocery workers premium pay furthers a significant and legitimate public 20 purpose. (City Mot. 16–20; UFCW324 Mot. 17–21.) (Opp’n 13–15.) Defendants argue the Ordinance 21 The Contract Clause “does not prevent the [city] from exercising such powers 22 as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the 23 general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between 24 individuals may thereby be affected.” 25 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978). There are three steps for assessing alleged Contract Clause 26 violations: first, whether the law causes a substantial impairment of a contractual 27 relationship, with more severe or unforeseeable impairments receiving heightened 28 scrutiny; second, whether the city can provide a significant and legitimate public Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 8 Case 2:21-cv-00524-ODW-AS Document 58 Filed 08/09/21 Page 9 of 12 Page ID #:1212 1 purpose as justification, to guarantee the city is properly exercising its police power 2 rather than serving special interests; and third, whether adjusting the contractual rights 3 and responsibilities of private parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a 4 character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the legislation’s adoption. 5 Energy Rsrvs. Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983). 6 CGA fails to establish a Contracts Clause violation. CGA cannot hurdle even 7 the first step, which has three subcomponents: “whether there is a contractual 8 relationship, whether a change in law impairs that contractual relationship, and 9 whether the impairment is substantial.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 10 186 (1992). The test for a contractual relationship asks more than whether there was a 11 contract, instead asking whether there exists a “contractual agreement regarding the 12 specific . . . terms allegedly at issue.” Id. at 187. Here, CGA merely argues that it 13 “pleads adequate facts demonstrating that its members have existing collective 14 bargaining agreements with employees governing crucial terms, such as the 15 employees’ wages.” (Opp’n 13.) It is not clear to the Court that the Ordinance 16 affected those ‘crucial terms.’ See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp., 503 U.S. at 190 (“The 17 parties still have the same ability to enforce the bargained-for terms of the 18 employment contracts that they did before the . . . statute was enacted.”). 19 Even assuming there is a specific term that the Ordinance impairs, CGA fails to 20 show any substantial impairment or disprove any legitimate purpose. While CGA 21 need not show “[t]otal destruction of contractual expectations” to prove the City 22 violated the Contracts Clause, the law recognizes that prior industry regulation and 23 “regulation that restricts a party to gains it reasonably expected from the contract does 24 not necessarily constitute a substantial impairment.” Energy Rsrvs. Grp., 459 U.S. 25 at 411. Other minimum labor standards impact the grocery industry and the parties 26 could have foreseen additional regulation; the “premium pay” the Ordinance requires 27 is not so dissimilar from other mandated benefits that it necessarily creates a 28 substantial impairment. Further, the Ordinance is a valid exercise of the police powers 9 Case 2:21-cv-00524-ODW-AS Document 58 Filed 08/09/21 Page 10 of 12 Page ID #:1213 1 to serve a significant and legitimate public purpose. See U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New 2 Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1977) (“As is customary in reviewing economic and social 3 regulation, however, courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity 4 and reasonableness of a particular measure.”). The pandemic thrust grocers into an 5 essential and hazardous position, and the City designed the Ordinance to “protect[] 6 public health, support[] stable incomes, and promote[] job retention.” (Ordinance 7 Preamble 3–4.) As such, the Court finds that CGA’s Contract Clause claims fail. 8 Based on the foregoing, CGA’s fourth and fifth causes of action for violation of 9 the Contract Clause of the United States and California Constitutions are 10 DISMISSED. 11 C. The Equal Protection Clause 12 CGA argues the Ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause because it 13 burdens fundamental rights, cannot pass strict scrutiny, and has no rational basis. 14 (Opp’n 15–19.) Defendants contend the Ordinance is an economic regulation that 15 easily passes rational basis review, and that strict scrutiny does not apply. (City 16 Mot. 20–25; UFCW324 Mot. 21–25.) 17 “The Equal Protection Clause directs that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced 18 shall be treated alike.’” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster 19 Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). Courts apply one of three levels of 20 scrutiny in assessing alleged equal protection clause violations: strict scrutiny, 21 intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. 22 379 F.3d 531, 543 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, CGA contends strict scrutiny applies because 23 the Ordinance interferes with a fundamental right, specifically the right to contract 24 under the Contract Clause. However, “courts have routinely applied rational basis 25 review to regulations implicating economic relationships and, by extension, 26 contracts.” Nw. Grocery Ass’n v. City of Seattle, No. C21-0142-JCC, --- F. Supp. 27 3d. ---, 2021 WL 1055994, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 18, 2021) (collecting cases), 28 appeal filed, No. 21-35205 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2021). If the Court were to adopt CGA’s 10 Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, Case 2:21-cv-00524-ODW-AS Document 58 Filed 08/09/21 Page 11 of 12 Page ID #:1214 1 position that the Contract Clause is a fundamental right, subject to heightened 2 protection under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court would have to discard nearly 3 ninety years of precedent running counter to the idea of “freedom to contract.” See W. 4 Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391–93 (1937) (“The Constitution does not 5 speak of freedom of contract. . . . This power under the Constitution to restrict 6 freedom of contract has had many illustrations. That it may be exercised in the public 7 interest with respect to contracts between employer and employee is undeniable.” 8 (footnote omitted)). As such, the Court must analyze the Ordinance under rational 9 basis review. 10 Under rational basis review, the Court affords the Ordinance “a strong 11 presumption of validity, and those attacking the rationality of the legislative 12 classification have the burden to negative every conceivable basis which might 13 support it.” F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993) (internal 14 quotation marks and citations omitted). This means that “[w]here there are plausible 15 reasons for legislative action, our inquiry is at an end.” 16 --- F. Supp. 3d. ---, 2021 WL 1055994, at *6 (quoting RUI One Corp., 371 F.3d 17 at 1154) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Here, CGA cannot show no 18 plausible reason exists. CGA recognizes the Ordinance’s “purported purposes” are to 19 “protect and promote the public health, safety, and welfare” but argues it fails to 20 accomplish any of those goals. (Opp’n 19 (quoting Ordinance § 5.91.005).) CGA 21 ignores that the Ordinance states, mere sentences later, that “[g]rocery workers face 22 magnified risks of catching or spreading the COVID-19 disease because . . . their 23 work involves close contact with the public” and “[t]he provision of premium pay 24 better ensures the retention of these essential workers . . . who are needed throughout 25 the duration of the COVID-19 emergency.” (Ordinance § 5.91.005.) In this way, the 26 Ordinance not only benefits grocery workers but also benefits the public, enabling 27 society to continue relying on their essential services. 28 survives rational basis review and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 11 Nw. Grocery Ass’n, As such, the Ordinance Case 2:21-cv-00524-ODW-AS Document 58 Filed 08/09/21 Page 12 of 12 Page ID #:1215 1 Based on the foregoing, CGA’s second and third causes of action for violation 2 of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and California Constitutions are 3 DISMISSED. V. 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED. 6 (ECF No. 51; ECF No. 52.) As the Court finds that any amendment would be futile, 7 CGA’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 8 Judgment. The Court will issue 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 12 13 14 August 9, 2021 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12
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