Brian Whitaker v. Motel 6 Operating L.P. et al, No. 2:2020cv10624 - Document 27 (C.D. Cal. 2021)

Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 21 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II: The Court GRANTS Motel 6's Motion to Dismiss. The Court DISMISSES the ADA claim and the ADA derivative Unruh Act claim WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND and WITH PREJUDICE . The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the independent, non-ADA-derivative aspect of the Unruh Act claim and DISMISSES that claim WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND and WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court will issue Judgment consistent with this Order. (lc)

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Brian Whitaker v. Motel 6 Operating L.P. et al Doc. 27 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 United States District Court Central District of California 9 10 11 Case 2:20-cv-10624-ODW (PDx) BRIAN WHITAKER, 12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS [21] v. 14 MOTEL 6 OPERATING L.P., 15 Defendant. 16 I. 17 INTRODUCTION 18 On September 25, 2020, Plaintiff Brian Whitaker brought this suit against 19 Defendant Motel 6 Operating L.P. in the Superior Court of California, County of Los 20 Angeles. On November 20, 2020, Defendant removed the case to the Central District 21 of California on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. (Not. Removal (“NOR”) ¶ 5, 22 ECF No. 1.) Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state 23 a claim. (Mot. Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 21.) For the reasons discussed below, the 24 Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion.1 25 26 27 28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. Dockets.Justia.com II. 1 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 2 Whitaker has physical disabilities and uses a wheelchair for mobility. (First Am. 3 Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 20.) On September 11, 2020, Whitaker went online to 4 book a room at the Motel 6 at 5101 West Century Boulevard in Inglewood, California 5 (“Inglewood Motel 6”), intending to make a trip to Inglewood sometime in October 6 2020. (FAC ¶¶ 12, 16.) While trying to book an accessible room for the trip, Whitaker 7 found the information about accessibility at the Inglewood Motel 6 to be insufficient 8 and was unable to make a reservation. (FAC ¶¶ 18–19, 21, 27–30.) 9 Based on these allegations, Whitaker asserts two causes of action: (1) violation 10 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and (2) violation of the Unruh Civil 11 Rights Act (“Unruh Act”). Motel 6 seeks dismissal of both claims pursuant to Federal 12 Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). III. 13 LEGAL STANDARD 14 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable 15 legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal 16 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To 17 survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint generally must satisfy only the minimal notice 18 pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only that the complaint 19 include ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 20 relief.’” Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). Under this standard, the 21 plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 22 speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The 23 “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 24 relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 25 quotation marks omitted). 26 27 28 2 All factual references derive from the Complaint or attached exhibits, unless otherwise noted, and well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes of this Motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 2 1 Determining whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a “context- 2 specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 3 common sense.” Id. at 679. A court is generally limited to the pleadings and must 4 construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as true and . . . in the light 5 most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 6 2001). However, a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted 7 deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 8 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Ultimately, there must be “sufficient allegations of 9 underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself 10 effectively,” and the “factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest 11 an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be 12 subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 13 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 14 Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide 15 leave to amend unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. 16 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 17 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Leave to amend may be denied when “the court determines that 18 the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly 19 cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 20 1401 (9th Cir. 1986); Carrico v. City & County of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 21 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[Leave] is properly denied . . . if amendment would be futile.”). 22 IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE AND INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE 23 “[A] court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute 24 because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or 25 (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 26 reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). In connection with its Motion, Motel 27 6 requests the Court take judicial notice of (1) the consent decree entered in United 28 States v. Hilton Worldwide Inc., No. 10-1924, Dkt. 5 (D. D.C. Nov. 29, 2010); 3 1 (2) several recent complaints similar to Whitaker’s; and (3) printouts from two parts of 2 Motel 6’s website showing the accessibility information the website provides. (RJN, 3 ECF No. 21-2; Id. Exs. 1–4, ECF Nos. 21-3 to 21-6.) 4 The first of these, the consent decree, is a “matter of public record” and an 5 appropriate subject of judicial notice. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 6 (9th Cir. 2001). “[W]here a court takes judicial notice of another court’s opinion . . . , 7 it may do so not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the 8 opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute.” S.B. by and through Kristina B. v. 9 Cal. Dept. of Educ., 327 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1228 n.1 (E.D. Cal. 2018). The Court grants 10 11 12 judicial notice of the consent decree subject to this limitation. The Court does not rely on the second item (the similar complaints) in ruling on this motion, and Motel 6’s second request is therefore denied as moot. 13 The third request (for recognition of printouts from Motel 6’s website) is more 14 appropriate for incorporation by reference. “Even if a document is not attached to a 15 complaint, it may be incorporated by reference into a complaint if the plaintiff refers 16 extensively to the document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claims.” 17 United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Then, “the defendant may 18 offer such a document, and the district court may treat such document as part of the 19 complaint, and thus may assume that its contents are true for purposes of a motion to 20 dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id.; see Garcia v. Best W. Norwalk Inn, LLC, No. CV 21- 21 2025 DSF (JDEx), 2021 WL 4260406, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2021) (recognizing 22 screenshots of hotel website through incorporation by reference); see also Daniels-Hall 23 v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Plaintiffs directly quoted the 24 material posted on these web pages, thereby incorporating them into the Complaint.”). 25 Moreover, Whitaker does not dispute the authenticity of the printed website materials. 26 The Court therefore recognizes the printed website materials as incorporated by 27 reference into the Complaint. 28 4 V. 1 DISCUSSION 2 Whitaker asserts two causes of action against Motel 6: for violation of 28 C.F.R. 3 § 36.302(e) (“Reservations Rule”) under the ADA, and for violation of the Unruh Act. 4 (See FAC ¶¶ 33–40.) As discussed below, Whitaker fails to state a claim against Motel 5 6 for violation of the Reservations Rule, warranting dismissal of most of the action on 6 substantive grounds and the remainder of the action on procedural grounds. 7 A. Americans with Disabilities Act (Claim One) 8 Whitaker contends Motel 6’s reservation system violates the Reservations Rule 9 by failing to provide sufficiently specific accessibility information to allow him to make 10 an informed choice about whether the room suits his needs. (See FAC ¶ 21.) Under the 11 Reservations Rule, a hotel must, among other things, “[i]dentify and describe accessible 12 features in the hotels and guest rooms offered through its reservations service in enough 13 detail to reasonably permit individuals with disabilities to assess independently whether 14 a given hotel or guest room meets his or her accessibility needs.” 15 § 36.302(e)(1)(ii). Whitaker argues the Motel 6 website violates this provision because 16 it lacks sufficient information regarding three specific areas of inquiry: the existence of 17 grab bars, (FAC ¶ 22), the knee clearance and plumbing insulation under the lavatory 18 sink, (FAC ¶ 23), and the clear space next to the bed, (FAC ¶ 24). 28 C.F.R. 19 Whitaker’s claim fails for two reasons. First, he has no standing because he has 20 not alleged that Motel 6 violated his rights under the ADA. Second, and more generally, 21 the claim fails because Motel 6’s website in this case contains all the accessibility 22 information required by the ADA. 23 1. Whitaker’s ADA Rights 24 Both Article III standing and standing under the ADA require that a plaintiff 25 bringing suit “have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm” from the 26 defendant’s actions. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 27 2011) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996)). Here, Whitaker has not 28 suffered actual harm because the website does in fact provide him with all the 5 1 information he alleges he sought, and in that sense, his rights under the ADA have not 2 been violated. 3 The website in this case indicates that each of its ADA rooms is a “Mobility 4 Accessible Room With A Bathtub And Shower Combo With Grab Bars.” (RJN Ex. 4 5 (“ADA Room List”), ECF No. 21-6.) “Accessible” is a term of art that has a specific 6 meaning under the ADA. A place of accommodation, or an aspect thereof, is accessible 7 if it complies with either the 1991 or the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design. 8 28 C.F.R. § 36.406; see also Brooklyn Ctr. for Indep. of Disabled v. Bloomberg, 980 F. 9 Supp. 2d 588, 598 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“‘Accessible’ is a term of art in the context of 10 addressing the needs of people with disabilities. . . . [R]egulations issued pursuant to 11 the ADA by the United States Department of Justice provide standards for determining 12 whether a particular facility or service is accessible to people with disabilities.”) 13 Because “accessible” is a term with a specific meaning under the ADA, a guest reading 14 a listing indicating a room is “accessible” knows that the room in question complies 15 with the regulations issued pursuant to the ADA. 16 Applying this principle to the case at hand, one of Whitaker’s complaints is that 17 the website did not contain sufficient information about clearance space under the 18 bathroom sink. (FAC ¶ 23.) But the 2010 Standards set forth a detailed set of 19 regulations regarding the amount of knee and toe clearance that is required under sinks. 20 See 36 C.F.R. Part 1191, Appendix D (2009) (“2010 Standards”); id. §§ 306.2 (toe 21 clearance), 306.3 (knee clearance). Therefore, by using the word “accessible” to 22 describe one of its rooms, Motel 6 has properly communicated that ADA-compliant 23 knee and toe clearance exists at the bathroom sink in that room. In this sense, Motel 24 6’s website does indeed provide Whitaker with the information he sought regarding 25 bathroom sink clearance space. 26 The same analysis applies to Whitaker’s allegation that the website lacks 27 sufficient information about grab bars, (FAC ¶ 22), and clear space around the bed, 28 (FAC ¶ 24). 6 1 Whitaker argues that the term “accessible” is conclusory in this context and 2 earnestly argues that the Reservations Rule’s drafters could not have meant to pass a 3 regulation that could be complied with so easily. (Opp’n Mot. Dismiss (“Opp’n”) 4 18–19, ECF No. 22.) But as another district court aptly observed, a proprietor’s “use 5 of the term ‘accessible’ is not merely conclusory, it means that the features in the hotel 6 defined by [the proprietor] as ‘accessible’ comply with the” ADA. Garcia v. Chamber 7 Maid L.P. et al., No. 2:20-cv-11699-PA (PDx), 2021 WL 3557832, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 8 Mar. 15, 2021); see also Garcia v. Gateway Hotel, No. CV 20-10752-PA (GJSx), 9 2021 WL 936176 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2021) (collecting cases and making the same 10 observation). 11 The parties remain sharply divided on this issue despite the growing chorus of 12 district courts finding in favor of the hotels on this point. This Court need not repeat 13 the refrain but will instead add its own short verse. The conflict appears to stem from 14 an unrecognized disagreement about the difference between a defined term and a legal 15 conclusion. In law school, attorneys-to-be are trained to dutifully avoid “conclusory” 16 terms because such terms are generally devoid of meaning and do little to advance the 17 substance of an argument. On the other hand, attorneys can and indeed necessarily do 18 use defined terms on a regular basis in legal writing and speaking. 19 The key difference between a legal conclusion and a defined term is this: one can 20 reach a conclusion in many ways, whereas a thing typically meets a definition in only 21 one way or in a limited number of ways. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “conclusion” 22 as, among other things, “an inferential statement,” and there is no requirement that the 23 inferences used to reach said inferential statement be the only set of inferences that can 24 possibly lead to the inferential statement. Conclusion, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th 25 ed. 2019). On the other hand, Black’s notes that “the aim of every definition is to enable 26 specified objects to be recognized by means of a word,” reinforcing the idea that using 27 a defined term to describe something typically limits the thing described to the criteria 28 provided by the term’s definition. Definition, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) 7 1 (quoting 13 Pierre de Tourtoulon, Philosophy in the Development of Law § 1, at 329– 2 30 (Martha McC. Read trans., 1922)).) 3 As a simple example, the assertion “Defendant was negligent” is conclusory and 4 generally devoid of meaning because there are countless ways for a defendant to be 5 negligent, and merely labelling the act or omission with a conclusion tells the reader 6 nothing about the defendant’s actual activity. By contrast, when one uses a defined 7 term to describe something, one communicates definite meaning, because one has 8 asserted that the thing possesses all the qualities provided in the definition of the term. 9 Otherwise, the thing does not meet the definition. 10 Here, “accessible” is a defined term, not a conclusion. There is not a multiplicity 11 of ways for a hotel room to be accessible. Instead, there is exactly one way for a hotel 12 room to be accessible: it must comply with the standards set forth by the ADA Standards 13 for Accessible Design. Thus, when Whitaker read on the website that the room was 14 “accessible,” he could properly conclude that (1) the bathroom had grab bars in the 15 required locations, (2) the sink had proper clearance or insulation; and (3) there was 16 sufficient clear space next to the bed. Motel 6’s website therefore provided Whitaker 17 with all the information he alleges he is entitled to under the ADA. In this sense, 18 Whitaker’s rights under the ADA were not violated, and he has not suffered any 19 actionable harm. 20 2. Sufficiency of Information on Website 21 In addition to the lack of harm to Whitaker, Motel 6 contends its website 22 complies with the ADA, as interpreted by the Department of Justice’s 2010 guidance 23 (“DOJ 2010 Guidance”). (Mot. 6–21.) Motel 6 is correct. 24 In its 2010 Guidance, the DOJ provided: 25 A reservations system is not intended to be an accessibility survey. . . . Because of the wide variations in the level of accessibility that travelers will encounter, . . . it may be sufficient to specify that the hotel is accessible and, for each accessible room, to describe the general type of room (e.g., 26 27 28 8 1 deluxe executive suite), the size and number of beds (e.g., two queen beds), [and] the type of accessible bathing facility (e.g., roll-in shower). 2 3 28 C.F.R. § Pt. 36, App. A, Section 36.302(e) Hotel Reservations. “The DOJ’s 4 interpretation of its ADA implementing regulations is entitled to controlling weight 5 unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Fortyune v. City of 6 Lomita, 766 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 2014). This Court joins the many courts in the 7 Central District and elsewhere that have found the DOJ 2010 Guidance to be consistent 8 with the underlying regulation and therefore deserving of controlling weight. See, e.g., 9 Arroyo v. AJU Hotel Silicon Valley LLC, et al., No. 4:20-cv-08218-JSW, 2021 WL 10 2350813, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2021) (giving DOJ 1010 Guidance “substantial 11 deference”). 12 Here, Motel 6’s reservation website provides information regarding the features, 13 facilities, and common areas of the hotel that are accessible. (RJN Ex. 3 (“Motel 14 Accessibility List”), ECF No. 25.). 15 information for the various types of ADA rooms at the hotel. (See ADA Room List.) 16 The reservation website describes the accessible rooms as “Mobility Accessible” with 17 a “Bathtub And Shower Combo With Grab Bars.” (Id.) The ADA Room List indicates 18 the type of each room and the size and number of beds. (Id.) Thus, based on the 19 allegations in Whitaker’s Complaint and the website printouts that are incorporated by 20 reference, and making all reasonable inferences in Whitaker’s favor, Motel 6’s website 21 complies with the Reservations Rule, both as written and as qualified by the 2010 DOJ 22 Guidance. Accordingly, Whitaker has not alleged plausible entitlement to relief. Iqbal, 23 556 U.S. at 678. The website provides further accessibility 24 Whitaker attempts to reduce the 2010 DOJ Guidance to “some musings” made in 25 the context of a “might/might not sort of discussion.” (Opp’n 6.) The Court will not 26 presume the DOJ publishes empty musings and rejects this reading of the 2010 DOJ 27 Guidance. The DOJ would not have published a detailed example of what “may” be 28 9 1 compliant unless its example of compliance was actually compliant in a material 2 number of cases. 3 In this sense, the 2010 DOJ Guidance is somewhere between an empty musing, 4 as Whitaker urges, and an exhaustive checklist of requirements, as some Reservations 5 Rule defendants have urged. The 2010 DOJ Guidance provides an example of what is 6 enough for the typical “hotel[] that w[as] built in compliance with the 1991 Standards.” 7 (2010 DOJ Guidance.) When, as here, the defendant has provided on its website the 8 information listed in the DOJ Guidance’s example, it falls to the plaintiff to plead and 9 argue why his or her case is exceptional and why more information is required. 10 Whitaker has not done so in this case; Motel 6’s website sufficiently tracks the 2010 11 DOJ Guidance, and nothing about this case suggests more should be required. 12 Finally, as for Whitaker’s suggestion that the problem is that hotels advertise their 13 ADA rooms as accessible when they are not in fact so, this is neither the theory of 14 Whitaker’s case nor the harm he is alleging in this instance. (Opp’n 3–4.) 15 Accordingly, the Court concludes that Motel 6’s website complies with the ADA 16 and the Reservations Rule as a matter of law, and Whitaker therefore fails to state a 17 claim for violation of the ADA. As the Court finds Motel 6’s website ADA-compliant, 18 any amendment would be futile, and the Court therefore DISMISSES the ADA claim 19 without leave to amend and with prejudice. 20 B. Unruh Civil Rights Act (Claim Two) 21 California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act guarantees that persons with disabilities are 22 entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services 23 in all business establishments in the state. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). A California business 24 establishment violates the Unruh Act when it “denies” or “makes any discrimination or 25 distinction contrary” to this guarantee. Id. § 52(a). Separate and apart from this 26 statutory language, a business establishment’s violation of the ADA constitutes a per se 27 violation of the Unruh Act. Id. § 51(f). Here, it appears Whitaker’s Unruh Act claim is 28 based on both an underlying ADA violation, (FAC ¶ 38), and an independent Unruh Act 10 1 violation, (FAC ¶ 37). 2 When an ADA claim fails as a matter of law, so to does the analogous ADA- 3 predicated Unruh Act claim. Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 600 F. App’x 508, 509 (9th Cir. 4 2015). Therefore, to the extent Whitaker’s Unruh claim is predicated on the ADA, it is 5 likewise DISMISSED without leave to amend and with prejudice. 6 This leaves the portion of the Unruh Act claim that arises directly from the 7 California statute. A district court “‘may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ 8 if it ‘has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” Sanford v. 9 MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). 10 “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the 11 balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial 12 economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise 13 jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 14 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); Wade v. Reg’l Credit Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 15 1996) (“Where a district court dismisses a federal claim, leaving only state claims for 16 resolution, it should decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without 17 prejudice.”). 18 Whitaker’s ADA claim provided the only basis for original jurisdiction. As the 19 Court has dismissed Whitaker’s ADA claim, it declines to exercise supplemental 20 jurisdiction over what remains of his state law claim. Accordingly, the independent, 21 non-ADA-derivative aspect of Whitaker’s Unruh Act claim is DISMISSED without 22 leave to amend and without prejudice. 23 VI. CONCLUSION 24 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Motel 6’s Motion to 25 Dismiss. (ECF No. 21.) The Court DISMISSES the ADA claim and the ADA- 26 derivative Unruh Act claim WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND and WITH 27 PREJUDICE. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 28 independent, non-ADA-derivative aspect of the Unruh Act claim and DISMISSES that 11 1 claim WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND and WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court 2 will issue Judgment consistent with this Order. 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 October 14, 2021 7 8 9 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12

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