Tiffany Mejia v. Inglewood Sportservice, Inc. et al, No. 2:2020cv09564 - Document 37 (C.D. Cal. 2022)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT 22 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II. The Court GRANTS Sportservice's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Mejias Third, Fourth, and Sixth Claims, and DENIES the Mot ion as to all other claims. Additionally, on August 11, 2022, the parties filed a Stipulation to continue the trial and related dates because the Court had not yet resolved the Motion 36 .As the Court has now resolved the Motion, the Court DENIES as MOOT the parties Stipulation. (lc) Modified on 8/15/2022 (lc).
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Tiffany Mejia v. Inglewood Sportservice, Inc. et al Doc. 37 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 United States District Court Central District of California 9 10 11 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 Case 2:20-cv-09564-ODW (MRWx) TIFFANY MEJIA, v. INGLEWOOD SPORTSERVICE, INC., et al., ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [22] Defendants. 16 17 I. 18 INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiff Tiffany Mejia brings this suit against her employers, Defendants 20 Inglewood Sportservice, Inc. and Delaware North Companies, Incorporated (together, 21 “Sportservice”), for alleged wage-and-hour violations committed in connection with 22 pre-entry security checks. Sportservice moves for summary judgment on all seven of 23 Mejia’s claims. (Mot. Summ. J. (“Mot.” or “Motion”), ECF No. 22.) The Motion is 24 fully briefed. (See Opp’n, ECF No. 28; Reply, ECF No. 29.) For the following 25 reasons, the Court GRANTS in PART and DENIES in PART the Motion.1 26 27 28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motions, the Court deemed the matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. Dockets.Justia.com 1 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 The following allegations and facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted. 3 Sportservice is a food service and hospitality company. It provides concessions and 4 other services at events held at The Forum, a concert venue owned and operated by a 5 third party. (Defs.’ Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (“DSUF”) 1–2, ECF No. 22- 6 3.) On January 7, 2019, Mejia commenced her employment, and remains employed, 7 with Sportservice. (DSUF 73, 74.) 8 The Forum requires security checks for all employees and guests entering The 9 Forum for any reason. (DSUF 11–13, 15.) Pursuant to this requirement, Mejia was 10 required to undergo said security checks before entering The Forum and clocking in 11 for work, but Sportservice did not compensate Mejia for the time spent undergoing 12 these checks. (Pl.’s Statement of Genuine Disputes (“PSGD”) & Additional Material 13 Facts (“PAMF”) 76, 78, ECF No. 28-1.) The parties dispute several of the following 14 facts pertaining the time Mejia spent undergoing the security checks when entering 15 The Forum at the beginning of shifts and after meal and rest breaks. 16 Security Checks Before Clocking In 17 Although the parties do not dispute that The Forum requires security checks, 18 they do dispute whether Sportservice also requires the checks. (See PSGD 17, 18.) 19 Accordingly, the parties also dispute whether Sportservice has any rules restricting 20 what Mejia could do prior to clocking in to work. (See PSGD 19.) 21 The parties agree that Sportservice itself did not actually conduct the security 22 checks. (DSUF 59.) Instead, pursuant to the policies and procedures of The Forum 23 and its third-party security vendor, upon an employee’s arrival at one of the 24 predesignated security check stations, a security agent would check the employee’s 25 name against a list to verify their identity and give them a wristband. (PSGD 3.) The 26 employee would then undergo a pass-through security screening which involved 27 waiting in line, inspection of pockets and bags, and passing through a metal detector. 28 (Id.) While waiting in line, Mejia and other employees were able to engage in 2 1 personal activities, including using their smartphone. (DSUF 49.) Again, the parties 2 agree that Sportservice did not directly execute any part of this security check process. 3 That said, the parties also agree that Sportservice’s policies, entitled Inglewood 4 Sportservice Unit Work Rules (the “Work Rules”) clearly recognized The Forum’s 5 security check policies. (DSUF 10, 43.) Specifically, the Work Rules instructed 6 employees to enter The Forum at certain locations to undergo security checks, 7 including passing through a metal detector and submitting to a pat-down screening if 8 necessary. (PSGD 3.) The Work Rules further provide that “[a]ny associate who 9 refuses to comply with security screening and/or any CSC Security directive may be 10 11 12 subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination.” (Id.) In September 2019, Mejia was disciplined for violating the Work Rules by entering The Forum through an improper entrance. (PAMF 77.) 13 Meal Breaks 14 Sportservice had a written meal and rest break policy (the (“Policy”), and upon 15 hire, Mejia received, read, and understood the Policy. (DSUF 40, 41, 44, 65.) In 16 accordance with California law, the Policy provides that employees in non-exempt 17 positions are required to take a mandatory unpaid meal break (30–60 minutes per their 18 arrangement with their supervisor). (DSUF 46.) The Policy further provides that if 19 employees work more than 5 hours, they will be scheduled for one meal break; 20 however, if the employees work between 5 and 6 hours, they can waive the meal 21 break through a mutual consent with their employer. 22 employees who work more than 10 hours will be scheduled for a second meal break. 23 (Id.) The Policy provides that all employees may leave the premises during meal 24 breaks if they so choose. (Id.) Finally, the Policy provides that if was an employee is 25 ever unable to timely take their meal break, they are required to notify their supervisor 26 before or at the time they were unable to take their meal break. (DSUF 45, 46.) 27 28 3 (DSUF 46.) Any such 1 Additionally, at all relevant times inside The Forum, Sportservice posted 2 Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order 5-2001, which regulates conditions for 3 meal and rest breaks. (DSUF 39, 63.) 4 Upon hire, Mejia signed a written waiver that reflected her decision to waive a 5 meal break for shifts between 5 and 6 hours and a second meal break for shifts 6 between 10 and 12 hours. (DSUF 51, 55, 56, 60.) Mejia understood that her election 7 to waive would remain in effect unless she changed it, which she could do at any time. 8 (DSUF 52, 57.) Mejia was able, and knew how, to change her election, but she never 9 did. (DSUF 53, 54, 58, 59.) When Mejia reported that she did not take second meal 10 breaks on non-waivable shifts (i.e., shifts over 12 hours), Sportservice paid her meal 11 break premiums. (DSUF 61, 62.) On occasions when she did take a meal break, she 12 was required to clock back in from her meal break exactly 30 minutes after she 13 clocked out. (PAMF 80.) 14 Rest Breaks 15 The Policy also provides that non-exempt employees receive one paid 10- 16 minute rest break for each 4-hour work period or major fraction of a work period that 17 is longer than 2 hours. 18 employees who work: (1) less than 3.5 hours in a day are not entitled to a rest break, 19 (2) between 3.5 and 6 hours are entitled to one rest break, (3) between 6 and 10 hours 20 are entitled to two rest breaks, and (4) between 10 and 12 hours are entitled to three 21 rest breaks. (DSUF 67.) The Policy states that employees must monitor their rest 22 breaks and ensure that they take their breaks every day. (Id.) If any employee is 23 unable to take their rest break, the employee must notify their supervisor and a failure 24 to do so may lead to discipline, at Sportservice’s discretion. (Id.) (DSUF 66, 67.) Specifically, the Policy provides that 25 The Policy further states that during meal and rest breaks, employees are 26 relieved of all work duties and obligations. (DSUF 46, 67.) As with meal breaks, 27 employees taking rest breaks are permitted, but not required, to leave the premises. 28 (DSUF 46, 48, 68.) Mejia, for her part, took her 10-minute rest breaks and was paid 4 1 premiums for the occasions when she reported that she did not take a rest break. 2 (DSUF 71, 72.) 3 Mejia asserts that Sportservice, by requiring security screenings that would 4 shorten her meal and rest breaks, discouraged her from leaving the premises during 5 her breaks. (PAMF 79.) Sportservice disputes this contention by reasserting that it 6 was The Forum, not Sportservice, that required the security checks and was 7 responsible for facilitating and conducting the checks. (Defs.’ Resp. PAMF 79, ECF 8 No. 30.) 9 This Action 10 Mejia originally brought this suit as a putative class action in state court, 11 alleging seven claims against Sportservice for: (1) failure to pay wages for all hours 12 worked (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194, 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Cal. Lab. 13 Code §§ 510, 1194, 1198); (3) failure to provide meal breaks (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 512, 14 226.7); (4) failure to provide rest breaks (Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7); (5) failure to 15 provide complete and accurate wage statements (Cal. Lab. Code § 226); (6) failure to 16 pay all outstanding wages at end of employment (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201, 202, & 203); 17 and (7) unfair business practices (Cal. Bus. & Prof. § 17200). (Decl. Catherine S. 18 Feldman ¶ 3, Ex. 1 (“Compl.”), ECF No. 4.) 19 On October 19, 2020, Sportservice removed the action to this Court on the basis 20 of Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) jurisdiction. (See Notice Removal 3–24, ECF 21 No. 1.) However, the deadline for Mejia to file a motion for class certification was on 22 April 4, 2022, and Mejia did not file any such motion. (See Scheduling & Case 23 Management Order, ECF No. 13.) 24 individual claims. Sportservice now seeks summary judgment as to all seven of those 25 claims. (See Mot.) 26 III. Accordingly, Mejia proceeds with only her LEGAL STANDARD 27 A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 28 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 5 1 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The burden of establishing the absence of a 2 genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving party, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 3 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986), and the court must view the facts and draw reasonable 4 inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Scott v. Harris, 5 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 6 2000). A disputed fact is “material” where the resolution of that fact might affect the 7 outcome of the suit under the governing law, and the dispute is “genuine” where “the 8 evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 9 party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Conclusory or 10 speculative testimony in affidavits is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and 11 defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 12 (9th Cir. 1979). Moreover, though the Court may not weigh conflicting evidence or 13 make credibility determinations, there must be more than a mere scintilla of 14 contradictory evidence to survive summary judgment. Addisu, 198 F.3d at 1134. 15 Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party cannot simply 16 rest on the pleadings or argue that any disagreement or “metaphysical doubt” about a 17 material issue of fact precludes summary judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23; 18 Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Cal. 19 Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 20 (9th Cir. 1987). A “non-moving party must show that there are ‘genuine factual issues 21 that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be 22 resolved in favor of either party.’” Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., 818 F.2d at 1468 23 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250). “[I]f the factual context makes the non-moving 24 party’s claim implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive 25 evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show that there is a genuine issue for 26 trial.” Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 586–87). “[U]ncorroborated 27 and self-serving” testimony will not create a genuine issue of material fact. Villiarimo 28 v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002). The court should grant 6 1 summary judgment against a party who fails to demonstrate facts sufficient to 2 establish an element essential to his case when that party will ultimately bear the 3 burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. IV. 4 DISCUSSION 5 Sportservice seeks summary judgment for Mejia’s First through Fourth Claims, 6 arguing that, as a matter of law, there were no wage payment violations, no overtime 7 violations, no meal break violations, and no rest break violations. Sportservice also 8 argues that Mejia’s Fifth and Seventh Claims fail as a matter of law because they are 9 derivative of the first four claims, and Mejia’s Sixth Claim fails as she lacks standing 10 to bring it. The Court addresses each argument in turn. 11 A. First & Second Claims: Failure to Pay Wages 12 Mejia asserts her First and Second Claims for Sportservice’s failure to pay 13 wages for all hours worked and overtime wages for the time Mejia spent undergoing 14 the security checks before entering her workplace. Sportservice argues that these 15 claims fail because Sportservice did not institute, and therefore did not control, the 16 security checks and thus, are not responsible for the time employees spent undergoing 17 those checks. (Mot. 5–9.) 18 California law requires all employers to pay their employees a minimum wage 19 for all “hours worked.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070, subd. 4(B). “Hours worked” 20 is defined as “the time during which an employee is subject to the control of an 21 employer, and includes all the time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, 22 whether or not required to do so.” Id. § 11070, subd. 2(G). “[A]n employee who is 23 subject to the control of an employer does not have to be working during that time to 24 be compensated.” Frlekin v. Apple Inc., 8 Cal. 5th 1038, 1046 (2020), reh’g denied 25 (May 13, 2020). Thus, when determining whether time spent undergoing security 26 checks is compensable, the central question is whether the employee was subject to 27 the employer’s control during those checks. See id. at 1047. 28 7 1. 1 Whether Sportservice Exercised Control Over Mejia 2 Here, Sportservice contends that it did not exercise any control over the security 3 checks and therefore, over Mejia, because the requirement is that of The Forum and 4 not of Sportservice. Additionally, Sportservice cites to the undisputed fact that it did 5 not actually conduct the security checks and that Sportservice had no role in 6 determining what to inspect. (DSUF 9, 5, 24, 28.) 7 Sportservice controlled the security checks because Sportservice’s Work Rules 8 explicitly state that employees are required to undergo such checks, and include 9 instructions on where the employees should go and what they should do during the 10 checks. (PSGD 3, 4.) The Work Rules instruct employees that the checks involve 11 metal-detection or pat-down screening, and that earphones, headphones, and 12 sunglasses must be removed before approaching the security entrance.2 (PSGD 3, 4, 13 6–8.) Relying on deposition and declaration testimony, Mejia argues that because the 14 Work Rules stated that the security checks were mandatory and provided instructions 15 regarding the checks, Sportservice determined whether, who, how, and where to 16 check-in for security purposes. (PSGD 6–8, 20, 23–27.) However, Mejia argues that 17 On the one hand, a reasonable jury could find that such instructions are merely 18 general, summary descriptions of the security check requirement and only 19 demonstrate that Sportservice instructed its employees to undergo the security checks 20 at the security check locations. Accordingly, a jury could find that the instructions do 21 not demonstrate that Sportservice in any way determined or controlled, for example, 22 the criteria an employee needed to meet in order to be cleared, what specific items or 23 parts of the employee should be searched, what employees would be searched for, 24 when an employee would be flagged for further screenings, and the procedures to 25 26 27 28 Mejia also cites to the Work Rules’ requirements that associates must store their belongings in clear bags, may never allow anyone else to use their identification card to enter the venue, and may never use their identification card to gain entry to an event at the venue when not scheduled to work. (PSGD 3, 4, 6–8.) However, Mejia fails to show how these requirements are specific steps of the security check process, and not general requirements for being on the premises. 2 8 1 follow in the event of a screen-fail. The instructions also fail to demonstrate that 2 Sportservice communicated with the company or officers conducting the security 3 screenings, had any opportunity to influence or review how the checks were 4 conducted, or even had access to information regarding the status and outcomes of its 5 employees’ security checks. Thus, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the 6 Work Rules fail to connect the security checks to Sportservice in a meaningful or 7 substantial way. 8 illustrate the specific requirements and procedures of the security checks, Sportservice 9 correctly argues that none of this “proves that Sportservice control the security 10 checks.” (emphasis added). (Reply 4.) Indeed, a mere recital of Mejia’s experiences 11 and observations during the security checks does nothing to connect those checks to 12 Sportservice. And although Mejia cites to her own deposition testimony to 13 Nevertheless, on balance, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could also look 14 at this evidence and conclude Sportservice had at least some control over the security 15 checks and therefore, over Mejia. Accordingly, Mejia has raised a genuine dispute of 16 material fact as to whether Sportservice exercised any control over the security checks 17 and the Court cannot answer this factual question on summary judgment. 18 In addition to determining whether the employer exercises control over the 19 activity, “courts may and should consider other additional relevant factors—including, 20 but not limited to, the location of the activity, the degree of the employer’s control, 21 whether the activity primarily benefits the employee or employer, and whether the 22 activity is enforced through disciplinary measures.’” (the “Frlekin factors”). Frlekin, 23 8 Cal. 5th at 1056. Though Frlekin provided “a number of factors to be considered in 24 making this determination, it appears clear under the decision that an employer is 25 much more likely to be found to be exercising control when the disputed act is 26 required on the part of employees.” Boone v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 562 F. Supp. 27 3d 1114 (E.D. Cal. 2022). The Court therefore first considers whether Sportservice 28 required the security checks and then proceeds to analyze the Frlekin factors. 9 2. 1 Whether Sportservice Required the Security Checks 2 Here, the parties do not dispute that third-party The Forum required the security 3 checks. (DSUF 13, 15.) Sportservice argues, therefore, that the security checks are 4 not its own requirement. (Mot. 6.) Mejia contends that Sportservice essentially 5 adopted The Forum’s security check requirement by recognizing and reiterating it in 6 Sportservice’s Work Rules. (Opp’n 5–6.) However, Mejia does not cite to any 7 apposite authority to support her contention that merely recognizing a third-party- 8 instituted requirement, amounts to adoption of such requirement. 9 Indeed, the mere fact that an employee must adhere to a third party’s rules or 10 policies in order to enter the workplace, without more, does not automatically impute 11 such rules or policies onto the employer. See, e.g., Cazares v. Host Int’l, Inc., No. 20- 12 55803, 2021 WL 3667227, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2021) (finding that the defendant’s 13 business inside of an airport could not be liable for the time its employee spent 14 undergoing security screenings that were required and administered by a third party, 15 without allegations that the defendant employer actually exercised some level of 16 control over those screenings). Moreover, Mejia provides no evidence to demonstrate 17 that Sportservice included new or additional requirements to the security screening 18 processes that were not already imposed by The Forum. Thus, the Court finds that the 19 security check requirement is that of The Forum, not Sportservice. This factor weighs 20 against Sportservice’s liability for Mejia’s time undergoing the security checks. 3. 21 The Frlekin Factors 22 The Court analyzes each Frlekin factor in turn. As explained below, the Court 23 finds that there are at least two genuine disputes of material fact with regard to these 24 factors. 25 a. Location of the Security Checks 26 Although neither party presents argument about the precise locations of the 27 security checks, the Work Rules indicate that the security check process begins before 28 employees entered The Forum. Specifically, the Work Rules provide that employees 10 1 must enter “the building using the ‘tunnel’ after getting wrist banded at the CSC tent 2 on Pincay Boulevard. In the event the Associate entrance is closed, Associates should 3 enter the building at the Security Command center entrance.” 4 Parvaresh, Ex. A (“Mejia Dep.”), Ex. 2 (“Work Rules”), ECF No. 22-2.) Both parties 5 rely on the Work Rules and do not dispute them. Thus, the Court accepts as true, for 6 purposes of the Motion, that the security checks at least commonly occurred at a tent 7 on a street somewhere outside of Mejia’s workplace in The Forum’s building, 8 lessening Sportservice’s ostensible control over Mejia. 9 acknowledges that security checks also may have occurred at the security center inside 10 The Forum’s building, increasing such control. Thus, on balance, the Court finds this 11 factor is neutral. 12 (Decl. Romtin However, the Court also b. Degree of Sportservice’s Control 13 “The level of the employer’s control over its employees, rather than the mere 14 fact that the employer requires the employees’ activity, is determinative.” (emphasis 15 added). Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575, 587 (2000), as modified 16 (May 10, 2000). As stated above, the Court cannot determine at this time whether 17 Sportservice exercised any control over the security checks. Accordingly, the degree 18 of Sportservice’s control, if any, is also a factual question that a jury must decide. 19 c. Whether the Security Checks Benefitted Mejia or Sportservice 20 The Court next considers whether the security checks predominantly benefitted 21 Sportservice or Mejia. Here, Sportservice argues that the security checks “are wholly 22 unrelated to Sportservice’s business and do not benefit Sportservice.” 23 Sportservice contrasts this case from Freklin wherein the court found that the exit 24 security checks were “imposed mainly for [the employer’s] benefit by serving to 25 detect and deter theft.” 26 concludes, “this case involves entry inspections by The Forum to prevent contraband 27 and to protect public safety.” (Id. (emphasis added).) However, Mejia argues that 28 Sportservice did indeed enjoy the “benefit of contracting with the Forum and (Id. (citing Frlekin, 8 Cal. 5th at 1052).) 11 (Mot. 8.) Sportservice 1 providing a safe working environment for its employees and customers” noting that 2 “the mandatory security screenings in this case are completely intertwined with its 3 business interest as Defendants[’] entire business is based on its contract with the 4 Forum to provide concessions and other services at events held The Forum.” (Opp’n 5 5.) The Court agrees that Sportservice does at least somewhat benefit from the 6 security checks, and finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that either party 7 predominantly benefits from the checks. Thus, Mejia has raised a genuine dispute of 8 material fact as to which party predominantly benefitted from the security checks. 9 10 d. Whether Sportservice Enforced the Security Checks Through Disciplinary Measures 11 Finally, the Court must consider whether Sportservice enforced the security 12 check requirement by threatening or instituting disciplinary measures for non- 13 compliance. Sportservice does not directly address this issue. But Mejia cites to the 14 Work Rules, which states that “[a]ny [employee] who refuses to comply with security 15 screening and/or any CSC Security directive may be subject to disciplinary action up 16 to and including termination.” (See, e.g., PSGD 3, 4, 6, 7; see also Work Rules 17.) 17 Mejia also cites to the undisputed fact that in September 2019, she was disciplined for 18 entering her workplace through the back door in the back of the kitchen, in violation 19 of the Work Rules. (PSGD 77.) The Court thus finds that Sportservice enforced the 20 security checks through disciplinary measures, which weighs in favor of 21 Sportservice’s liability for Mejia’s time spent undergoing those checks. 22 In conclusion, the Court finds that Sportservice did not require the security 23 checks, which weighs against Sportservice’s liability. The Court also finds, however, 24 that Sportservice did enforce the security checks through disciplinary measures, which 25 weighs in favor of Sportservice’s liability. And the Court concludes that the location 26 of the security checks is neutral and does not move the needle of this analysis either 27 way. Finally, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to the central question in 28 this analysis: whether and to what degree Sportservice had control over the security 12 1 checks. There is also a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Sportservice or 2 Mejia predominantly benefitted from the security checks. The Court therefore cannot 3 decide on summary judgment Sportservice’s liability for Mejia’s time spent 4 undergoing the security checks. Thus, the Court DENIES Sportservice’s Motion as to 5 Mejia’s First and Second Claims. 6 B. 7 Sportservice seeks summary judgment as to Mejia’s Third Claim for failure to 8 provide meal breaks, arguing that Sportservice provided legally compliant meal 9 breaks, posted notices of such meal breaks on the premises, and paid Mejia premiums 10 Third Claim: Failure to Provide Meal Breaks for the meal breaks that she waived. (Mot. 9–16.) 11 An employer may not require an employee to work during a mandated rest or 12 meal break. Cal. Labor Code § 226.7(a). But an employer “need not ensure that the 13 employee does no work” during breaks. Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 14 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1034 (2012). Rather, an “employer satisfies this obligation if it 15 relieves its employees of all duty, relinquishes control over their activities and permits 16 them a reasonable opportunity to take an uninterrupted 30-minute break, and does not 17 impede or discourage them from doing so.” Id. at 1040. That said, “[a]n employer 18 may not undermine a formal policy of providing meal breaks by pressuring employees 19 to perform their duties in ways that omit breaks.” Id. 20 Here, Sportservice argues that it cannot be liable for meal break violations 21 because it posted the applicable wage order at all relevant times inside The Forum and 22 Mejia received and acknowledged Sportservice’s Policy, which is consistent with the 23 legal requirements for a meal break. 24 Sportservice also cites to its Policy to demonstrate Mejia was permitted, but never 25 required, to leave the premises during her meal breaks. (DSUF 46, 48, 68.) Finally, 26 Sportservice asserts that Mejia waived certain meal breaks through a valid written 27 waiver, which she could change at any time. (DSUF 51, 55, 56, 60.) And Mejia 28 received paid premiums for those meal breaks that she neither waived nor enjoyed. (Mot. 11; DSUF 39, 40, 41, 44, 63, 65.) 13 1 (DSUF 61, 62.) Thus, Sportservice concludes that Mejia received all meal breaks to 2 which she was entitled and Sportservice did not otherwise violate any meal break 3 requirements. Mejia presents two arguments in opposition, neither of which the Court 4 finds persuasive. 5 First, Mejia contends that Sportservice discouraged her from leaving the 6 premises during her meal breaks because the security screening upon reentry would 7 shorten her meal break. (Opp’n 11–13.) However, California law does not require 8 employers to provide meal breaks during which their employees can easily leave and 9 return to the premises, without any temporal cost or inconvenience. The law only 10 requires that employers relinquish control over their employees during such breaks 11 and not discourage them from taking the breaks.3 Brinker, 53 Cal. 4th at 1040. And 12 Mejia agrees that Sportservice never required her to leave The Forum during her meal 13 breaks. Accordingly, Sportservice neither had an obligation to facilitate convenient 14 offsite meal breaks nor forced Mejia to take her meal breaks offsite. Sportservice 15 therefore cannot be liable for Mejia feeling discouraged from leaving The Forum 16 during her meal breaks. 17 Next, Mejia contends that she was not relieved of all duty during her meal 18 breaks because she was forced to “work” during them by undergoing security 19 screenings. 20 required to facilitate offsite meal breaks and did not require Mejia to take her meal 21 breaks offsite. Accordingly, any security check Mejia underwent during her meal 22 breaks was her choice alone and thus not compensable by Sportservice. Accordingly, 23 the Court GRANTS Sportservice’s Motion as to Mejia’s Third Claim. This argument also fails for the same reason: Sportservice was not 24 C. Fourth Claim: Failure to Provide Rest Breaks 25 Sportservice seeks summary judgment on Mejia’s Fourth Claim for failure to 26 3 27 28 Mejia improperly cites to Bono Enterprises, Inc. v. Bradshaw for the proposition that employers are required to provide offsite meal breaks. (Opp’n 12 (citing 32 Cal. App. 4th 968, 975 (1995).) However, this standard applies to the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, not the California state laws under which Mejia brings her claims. 14 1 provide rest breaks, setting forth arguments similar to Sportservice’s meal break 2 arguments. Sportservice contends it complied with all legal requirements to provide 3 Mejia with rest breaks. (Mot. 16–20.) Mejia similarly opposes these contentions by 4 asserting that the security screenings discouraged her from taking her rest breaks. 5 (Opp’n 13–15.) The Court’s disposition on this issue is the same as its conclusion 6 regarding Mejia’s meal breaks. Without a legal duty to provide rest breaks offsite, or 7 without evidence that Sportservice forced Mejia to take her rest breaks offsite, 8 Sportservice cannot be liable for Mejia’s choice to subject herself to the security 9 checks. Because Sportservice has demonstrated that it provided Mejia with legally 10 compliant rest breaks, and Mejia has not demonstrated any actual rest break violation, 11 Sportservice is entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 12 Sportservice’s Motion as to Mejia’s Fourth Claim. 13 D. Fifth Through Seventh Claims: Derivative Claims 14 Finally, Sportservice seeks summary judgment as to Mejia’s Fifth and Seventh 15 Claims arguing that they are derivative of Mejia’s First through Fourth Claims, and 16 arguing that Mejia lacks standing to bring her Sixth Claim. (Mot. 20–22.) However, 17 as stated above, the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary 18 judgment on Mejia’s First and Second Claims and thus, Mejia’s Fifth Claim remains 19 viable to that extent. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Sportservice’s Motion as to 20 Mejia’s Fifth Claim. 21 Sportservice next argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Mejia’s 22 Sixth Claim for waiting time penalties for the same reasons stated above, but also 23 argues that Mejia lacks standing to bring such a claim because she is still employed by 24 Sportservice. (Mot. 21–22.) Indeed, a plaintiff does not have standing to bring a 25 cause of action for failure to timely pay wages after the termination of employment, 26 when that employee has not been terminated. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Hyatt Regency Long 27 Beach, No. CV094791GAFVBKX, 2009 WL 10673222, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 28 2009). As the parties do not dispute that Mejia remains employed by Sportservice, 15 1 Mejia does not have standing to bring her Sixth Claim. The Court thus GRANTS 2 Sportservice’s Motion as to Mejia’s Sixth Claim. 3 Finally, Sportservice argues that Mejia’s Seventh Claim for unfair business 4 practices is derivative of her underlying claims and should therefore fall with them. 5 (Mot. 22.) However, as some of Mejia’s underlying claims remain intact, so does this 6 one. Thus, the Court DENIES Sportservice’s Motion on Mejia’s Seventh Claim. V. 7 CONCLUSION 8 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Sportservice’s Motion for 9 Summary Judgment as to Mejia’s Third, Fourth, and Sixth Claims, and DENIES the 10 Motion as to all other claims. (ECF No. 22.) Additionally, on August 11, 2022, the 11 parties filed a Stipulation to continue the trial and related dates because the Court had 12 not yet resolved the Motion. (ECF No. 36.) As the Court has now resolved the 13 Motion, the Court DENIES as MOOT the parties’ Stipulation. 14 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 17 August 15, 2022 18 19 20 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16
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