Long Beach Memorial Medical Center v. United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, No. 2:2020cv03799 - Document 31 (C.D. Cal. 2021)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING PETITION TO VACATE ARBITRATION AWARD IN PART AND DENYING PETITION IN SUBSTANTIAL PART [Dkt. No. 1] by Judge Dean D. Pregerson: The Petition is DENIED, in substantial part, and GRANTED, in part. The petition is GRANTED, and the arbitrators award VACATED, insofar as it requires the Hospital to help Navarro maintain Patient Zs name in writing for his personal use. In all other respects, the petition is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. (shb)
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Long Beach Memorial Medical Center v. United Steel, Paper an...d Service Workers International Union Doc. 31 Case 2:20-cv-03799-DDP-RAO Document 31 Filed 07/21/21 Page 1 of 10 Page ID #:892 1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LONG BEACH MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 15 16 17 UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, 18 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 20-03799 DDP (RAOx) ORDER GRANTING PETITION TO VACATE ARBITRATION AWARD IN PART AND DENYING PETITION IN SUBSTANTIAL PART [Dkt. No. 1] Defendants. 19 Presently before the court is Petitioner Long Beach Memorial 20 21 Medical Center (“the Hospital”)’s Petitioner to Vacate Arbitration 22 Award. 23 oral argument, the court denies the petition in substantial part, 24 grants the petition in part, and adopts the following Order. 25 I. 26 Having considered the submissions of the parties and heard Background In June 2018, Hospital phlebotomist Daniel Navarro began to 27 draw patient Z’s blood in her hospital room. 28 the patient’s arm was too close him, so he moved her arm because he didn’t “want anybody getting the wrong idea.” According to Navarro, Navarro asked Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:20-cv-03799-DDP-RAO Document 31 Filed 07/21/21 Page 2 of 10 Page ID #:893 1 whether Patient Z was in pain, and she responded that she was used 2 to being stuck with needles. 3 won’t bring any whips or chains to beat you with.” 4 leaving the room, he also asked Patient Z whether her boots, which 5 were on the floor nearby, were made of leather. 6 Navarro then told her, “Well, we As Navarro was Patient Z complained that Navarro’s statements were 7 unprofessional and of a sexual nature. 8 Navarro said, “you don’t want other people to think you are doing 9 anything else with that arm,” implying a sexual act. According to Patient Z, Patient Z 10 also alleged that Navarro asked her whether she had any chains or 11 handcuffs, and said that her boots should be leather. 12 Navarro was disciplined, in writing, for violating a Hospital 13 policy that “[Hospital] employee[s] and other representatives are 14 expect to project[] police and friendly behavior toward [Hospital] 15 patient[s],” and was required to complete workplace harassment 16 training. 17 contact with Patient Z. 18 memorandum or measures. 19 Navarro was also verbally instructed to avoid all Navarro did not grieve the disciplinary Approximately two weeks later, Navarro was assigned to draw 20 Patient Z’s blood. 21 was there to draw her blood, to which she responded, “Okay.” 22 attending nurse, who remained present in the room, asked Navarro to 23 “please get on with it.” 24 he began to wonder whether she was the patient he was not to 25 contact. 26 his supervisor and said, “I believe I think I drew this patient 27 that had complained about me.” Navarro confirmed Patient Z’s blood and said he An As Navarro was drawing Patient Z’s blood, After finishing his duties, Navarro immediately contacted Patient Z later complained, and 28 2 Case 2:20-cv-03799-DDP-RAO Document 31 Filed 07/21/21 Page 3 of 10 Page ID #:894 1 asked that Navarro never draw her blood again, even though he “was 2 appropriate.” 3 The Hospital terminated Navarro for insubordination, finding 4 Navarro’s claims that he did not realize that Patient Z was the 5 same person were not credible. 6 Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied 7 Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO/CLC 8 (“the Union”) grieved the termination, which ultimately went to 9 binding arbitration. Navarro and Respondent, United The arbitrator concluded that Navarro’s 10 actions during the second blood draw warranted “serious 11 disciplinary action against him.” 12 however, that termination was not appropriate, and that Navarro 13 should instead be suspended for approximately eighteen months and 14 required to undergo additional training. 15 vacate the arbitrator’s decision. 16 II. 17 The arbitrator concluded, The Hospital now seeks to Legal Standard “Because federal labor policy strongly favors the resolution 18 of labor disputes through arbitration, judicial scrutiny of an 19 arbitrator's decision is extremely limited.” 20 Football League Mgmt. Council, 688 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) 21 (internal alterations omitted) (quoting United Food & Commercial 22 Workers Int’l Union, Local 588 v. Foster Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d 23 169, 173 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters 24 v. Drywall Dynamics, Inc., 823 F.3d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 2016) 25 (“Because of the centrality of the arbitration process to stable 26 collective bargaining relationships, courts reviewing labor 27 arbitration awards afford a nearly unparalleled degree of deference 28 to the arbitrator’s decision.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 3 Matthews v. Nat'l Case 2:20-cv-03799-DDP-RAO Document 31 Filed 07/21/21 Page 4 of 10 Page ID #:895 1 Notwithstanding allegations that an arbitrator made erroneous 2 factual determinations or misunderstood a party’s position, “[i]f 3 an arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract 4 and acting within the scope of his authority, the fact that a court 5 is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to 6 overturn his decision.” 7 Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (internal quotation marks and 8 citations omitted). 9 interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively Major Leauge Baseball Players Ass’n v. “It is only when the arbitrator strays from 10 ‘dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice’ that his decision 11 may be unenforceable.” 12 Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (alteration in 13 original)). 14 only in those instances where the arbitrator’s decision “fails to 15 draw its essence from” the underlying CBA. 16 State Warriors, 231 F.3d 520, 526 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Hawaii 17 Teamsters & Allied Workers Union, Local 996 v. United Parcel Serv., 18 241 F.3d 1177, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a reviewing 19 court’s “task is to determine whether the arbitrator interpreted 20 the collective bargaining agreement, not whether he did so 21 correctly”). 22 III. Discussion 23 24 25 A. Id. (quoting Steelworkers v. Enterprise In other words, an arbitration award will be set aside Sprewell v. Golden Public Policy Exception 1. Sexual Harassment Petitioner contends that the arbitrator’s decision should be 26 vacated because it runs counter to public policy against sexual 27 harassment. 28 when an arbitration award is contrary to public policy. An exception to the general rule of deference applies 4 Matthews, Case 2:20-cv-03799-DDP-RAO Document 31 Filed 07/21/21 Page 5 of 10 Page ID #:896 1 688 F.3d at 1111. 2 courts should be reluctant to vacate arbitral awards on public 3 policy grounds.” 4 citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). 5 can only vacate an arbitration award on public policy grounds if 6 (1) an “explicit, well defined and dominant public policy exists” 7 and (2), that policy “specifically militates against the relief 8 ordered by the arbitrator.” 9 “The public policy exception is narrow, and Drywall Dynamics, 823 F.3d at 534 (internal This Court Matthews, 688 F.3d at 1111. The Hospital invokes a broad California Public Policy against 10 “harassment.” 11 specifically targeting sexual harassment directed toward patients. 12 See Cal Bus. & Profs. Code § 726; Cal. Civil Code § 51.9. 13 Hospital must still demonstrate, however, that public policy 14 against sexual harassment directed against patients “specifically 15 militates against” the arbitrator’s determination that Navarro’s 16 insubordination, such as it was, justified an eighteen-month 17 suspension rather than permanent termination of employment. Indeed, California law also reflects a public policy The 18 Notably, the Hospital’s argument that Navarro’s continued 19 employment would frustrate public policy against sexual harassment 20 runs counter to the Hospital’s own disciplinary actions. 21 two incidents involving Navarro, only the first involved sexual 22 harassment. 23 Navarro would violate public policy, it did not terminate him after 24 that first, and only, incidence of harassment. 25 Hospital terminated Navarro for insubordination after he drew 26 Patient Z’s blood a second time, notwithstanding that (1) Navarro 27 behaved professionally and appropriately during the second blood 28 draw, (2) Navarro was assigned to draw patient Z’s blood, and (3) Of the Although the Hospital now argues that reinstating 5 Rather, the Case 2:20-cv-03799-DDP-RAO Document 31 Filed 07/21/21 Page 6 of 10 Page ID #:897 1 Navarro was specifically directed to draw Patient Z’s blood by an 2 attending nurse. 3 The arbitrator did not review Navarro’s termination for 4 insubordination in a vacuum. The arbitrator acknowledged that 5 Navarro’s comments “of a sexual nature” during Patient Z’s first 6 blood draw were “unprofessional, inappropriate, and wholly 7 unnecessary.” 8 the details of that incident, and the ensuing disciplinary action, 9 were not before him. The arbitrator explicitly recognized, however, that The arbitrator’s decision, rather, focused on 10 whether Navarro’s subsequent, professional, and appropriate contact 11 with Patient Z constituted just cause to terminate him for 12 insubordination. 13 In fulfilling his adjudicatory responsibilities, the 14 arbitrator considered the termination sanction in the context of 15 what Navarro was alleged to have committed, i.e., insubordination. 16 The arbitrator recognized that Navarro was “in a bit of a dilemma,” 17 having been simultaneously forbidden from and directed to interact 18 with Patient Z, and that Navarro “felt a sense of obligation and 19 duty to perform his job.” 20 realization that he made the wrong decision, and his self-reporting 21 to his supervisor. 22 was not before the arbitrator, the arbitrator specifically 23 distinguished the circumstances of the second blood draw, observing 24 that Navarro was not “terminated for having committed any acts or 25 having made any comments of a sexual[,] . . . unprofessional, 26 unacceptable [or] inexcusable nature.” 27 28 The arbitrator also recognized Navarro’s Furthermore, even though the first blood draw Having determined that Navarro was guilty of “extremely poor judgment” rather than intentional insubordination or reckless 6 Case 2:20-cv-03799-DDP-RAO Document 31 Filed 07/21/21 Page 7 of 10 Page ID #:898 1 behavior, the arbitrator found no just cause for permanent 2 termination of employment. 3 off lightly. 4 Navarro, including suspension for over one and a half years, 5 mandatory workplace harassment training, an additional human 6 resources meeting, and a continued no-contact directive with 7 respect to Patient Z. 8 conclude that California policy against sexual harassment “clearly 9 militates against” the arbitrator’s award. 10 The arbitrator imposed substantial sanctions on Under these circumstances, this Court cannot Therefore, the award does not fall within the ambit of the public policy exception. 11 12 But the arbitrator did not let Navarro 2. HIPAA In addition to requiring an eighteen-month suspension and 13 additional training, the arbitrator stated that Navarro “should 14 also be given Patient Z’s name again so that he can take the 15 necessary steps to commit it to memory, write it down and keep it 16 in a safe place, such as his wallet to refer to, if needed, (while 17 keeping her name confidential) to ensure he knows patient Z’s 18 identity and does not draw her blood or have any contact with her 19 in the future.” 20 public policy by putting the Hospitable in the untenable position 21 of violating the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 22 Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub.L. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936. 23 agrees. 24 confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all electronic 25 protected health information” and “[p]rotect against any reasonably 26 anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such 27 information.” 28 includes any information that relates to the health of an The Hospital contends that this provision violates The court HIPAA requires the Hospital to “[e]nsure the 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a). 7 “Health information” Case 2:20-cv-03799-DDP-RAO Document 31 Filed 07/21/21 Page 8 of 10 Page ID #:899 1 individual or provision of health care to an individual. 45 C.F.R. 2 § 160.103. 3 employees to maintain the name of a patient on a piece of paper in 4 his wallet at all times runs contrary to the public policy, 5 enshrined in HIPAA, of protecting patient privacy, including an 6 individual’s status as a patient. 7 arbitration award requiring the Hospital to “take the necessary 8 steps” to help Navarro keep Patient Z’s name written down “in a 9 safe place” is vacated. An award requiring the Hospital to allow one of its Accordingly, the portion of the 10 B. The arbitrator’s “own brand of industrial justice” 11 The Hospital also argues, briefly, that the arbitrator 12 dispensed his own brand of industrial justice, and that his award 13 did not draw its essence from the parties’ labor agreement. 14 argument has no merit. 15 brand” or “draw its essence” exception is narrow and “extremely 16 limited.” 17 No. 1173, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 886 F.2d 18 1200, 1208 n.8 (9th Cir. 1989). 19 of substantive validity—of an arbitrator’s interpretation is, and 20 always has been, beside the point. Instead, the appropriate 21 question for a court to ask when determining whether to enforce a 22 labor arbitration award interpreting a collective bargaining 23 agreement is a simple binary one: Did the arbitrator look at and 24 construe the contract, or did he not?” 25 at 532. 26 This Like the public policy exception, the “own Stead Motors of Walnut Creek v. Auto. Machinists Lodge “The quality—that is, the degree Drywall Dynamics, 823 F.3d Here, there is no dispute that under the relevant labor 27 agreement, the Hospital could only terminate Navarro for just 28 cause. The arbitrator’s entire decision centers on whether 8 Case 2:20-cv-03799-DDP-RAO Document 31 Filed 07/21/21 Page 9 of 10 Page ID #:900 1 Navarro’s second blood draw, considering the mitigating factors and 2 Navarro’s unconvincing claims of ignorance, constituted sufficient 3 just cause for his termination. 4 considered the labor contract, this court’s inquiry goes no 5 further. 6 Because the arbitrator clearly The Hospital also raises an argument that the arbitrator’s 7 decision did not draw its essence from the labor agreement because 8 the arbitrator was not mentally competent to render a decision. 9 Although not presented as such, this could be considered an 10 argument that the arbitrator “dispensed his own brand of justice.” 11 The Hospital’s argument is premised on the fact that the arbitrator 12 issued a delayed “Written Confirmation of Oral Decision and Award,” 13 rather than a more formal written decision, and on the Hospital’s 14 counsel’s declaration that the arbitrator stated to her that “he 15 was suffering from a medical condition that impaired his cognitive 16 functions, specifically, his ability to form complete, coherent 17 thoughts and to transcribe those thoughts into a written decision.” 18 Declaration of Christina Rentz ¶¶ 10-11. 19 that the arbitrator made those statements in a Union 20 representative’s presence, that representative denies that the 21 arbitrator made any statements about his cognitive abilities. 22 Declaration of Dianne Kanish ¶ 13. 23 disputed, hearsay declaration does not provide this Court with any 24 basis to conclude that the arbitrator’s reasoned decision was based 25 upon anything other than the parties’ collective bargaining 26 agreement. 27 characterization of the arbitrator’s decision as a “meandering and 28 disorganized four page statement” suggests that the Hospital’s Although counsel states The Hospital’s counsel’s Indeed, the Hospital’s uncharitable and overstated 9 Case 2:20-cv-03799-DDP-RAO Document 31 Filed 07/21/21 Page 10 of 10 Page ID #:901 1 fundamental objection is to the substantive validity of the 2 decision.1 3 however, cannot suffice to release the Hospital, or this Court, 4 from the strictures of the extremely narrow “draw its essence” 5 exception. 6 IV. 7 Disputed accounts of the arbitrator’s mental state, Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the Petition is DENIED, in 8 substantial part, and GRANTED, in part. 9 and the arbitrator’s award VACATED, insofar as it requires the The petition is GRANTED, 10 Hospital to help Navarro maintain Patient Z’s name in writing for 11 his personal use. In all other respects, the petition is DENIED. 12 13 14 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 17 18 Dated: July 21, 2021 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Contrary to the Hospital’s characterization, the decision is coherent and reasonably well-structured, and states the facts and the respective positions of the parties. 10
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