Sochil Martin v. La Luz Del Mundo et al, No. 2:2020cv01437 - Document 110 (C.D. Cal. 2020)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE (SEE DOCUMENT FOR SPECIFICS). Within 14 days of this Order, Garcia may file an amended answer to Martins Complaint that is consistent with this Order 48 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II (lc)
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Sochil Martin v. La Luz Del Mundo et al Doc. 110 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court Central District of California 8 9 10 11 SOCHIL MARTIN, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 Case No. 2:20-cv-01437-ODW-(ASx) ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE [48] v. LA LUZ DEL MUNDO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 I. 17 INTRODUCTION 18 On February 12, 2020, Plaintiff Sochil Martin initiated this action against 19 sixteen defendants, including Defendant Naasón Joaquin Garcia (“Garcia”). (Compl., 20 ECF No. 1.) On May 19, 2020, Garcia filed an Answer, in which he asserts the Fifth 21 Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as to every paragraph in the 22 Complaint. (See Answer, ECF No. 32.) On June 9, 2020, Martin moved to strike 23 Garcia’s Answer, and argues Garcia’s “blanket” invocation of the Fifth Amendment is 24 improper. (Mot. Strike Answer (“Mot.”) 1, ECF No. 48.) For the reasons discussed 25 below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the Motion.1 26 27 28 1 After considering the papers submitted in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. Dockets.Justia.com II. 1 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 In this action, Martin brings claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (Involuntary 3 Servitude), 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (Forced Labor), 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (Trafficking With 4 Respect to Forced Labor or Involuntary Servitude), 18 U.S.C. § 1594 (Conspiracy to 5 Violate the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act), 18 U.S.C. § 1590(b) 6 (Obstructing Enforcement of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act), 7 18 U.S.C. § 1593(A) (Benefitting Financially from Trafficking in Persons), 29 U.S.C. 8 § 201 et. seq. (Unpaid Labor), California Labor Code sections 1197, 226.7, 1198.5, 9 203 (Unpaid Wages), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et. seq. (Racketeering), California Civil Code 10 section 1708.5 (Sexual Battery), and California Civil Code section 52.4 (Gender 11 Violence). (See generally Compl. ¶¶ 157–270.) 12 Martin alleges that from the age of nine to thirty, she was enslaved, trafficked, 13 and sexually abused by the leaders of La Luz Del Mundo church (“Church”)—Garcia 14 and Samuel Joaquin Flores. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.) She further alleges various members of the 15 Church’s senior leadership directed, assisted, conspired, and acted in concert with 16 each other to commit the abuse and other harms she endured. (See generally id.) 17 According to Martin, before and after she escaped from the Church, “she witnessed or 18 learned of hundreds of other children and young women subjected to sexual abuse” at 19 the hands of the Church’s leadership, and asserts that “[b]oth sexual abuse and forced 20 labor are systematic practices that have been institutionalized” within the Church. 21 (Id. ¶ 6.) 22 Prior to Martin filing her Complaint, on June 4, 2019, the California 23 Department of Justice charged Garcia with sexually assaulting and/or trafficking four 24 Jane Does, including three minors. (See Mot. Intervene, ECF No. 50.) The initial 25 criminal proceeding was dismissed on procedural grounds, but the Government refiled 26 the criminal complaint in the Los Angeles Superior Court on July 30, 2020. (Id. at 2; 27 Government’s Status Report (“Status Report”), ECF No. 109.) 28 2 1 On May 19, 2020, Garcia answered Martin’s Complaint and asserts his Fifth 2 Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to every paragraph in the 3 Complaint in light of the ongoing parallel “criminal prosecution.” 4 1–270.) Martin moves to strike Garcia’s Answer; she contends an invocation of the 5 Fifth Amendment privilege must be: (1) specific; (2) in good faith; and (3) establish a 6 nexus between the allegation being denied and the fear of prosecution. (See Mot. 1.) III. 7 8 9 (Answer ¶¶ LEGAL STANDARD Under Rule 12(f), the Court may strike “any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). 10 “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and 11 money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues 12 prior to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). 13 “Motions to strike are generally regarded with disfavor because of the limited 14 importance of pleading in federal practice, and because they are often used as a 15 delaying tactic.” Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1152 16 (C.D. Cal. 2003); see also Sapiro v. Encompass Ins., 221 F.R.D. 513, 518 (N.D. Cal. 17 2004) (“Courts have long disfavored Rule 12(f) motions, granting them only when 18 necessary to discourage parties from making completely tendentious or spurious 19 allegations.”). 20 “In ruling on a motion to strike under Rule 12(f), the court must view the 21 pleading in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 22 Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1245 (C.D. Cal. 2011). “Thus, 23 ‘before granting such a motion, the court must be satisfied that there are no questions 24 of fact, that the claim or defense is insufficient as a matter of law, and that under no 25 circumstance could it succeed.’” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Tristar Pictures, 26 Inc. v. Del Taco, Inc., No. CV 99-07655-DDP (Ex), 1999 WL 33260839, at *1 (C.D. 27 Cal. Aug. 31, 1999)). 28 3 Cholakyan v. IV. 1 DISCUSSION 2 In Garcia’s Answer, he declines to respond to Martin’s allegations and asserts 3 his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as to every paragraph in the 4 Complaint. (See generally Answer.) The Court finds that Garcia’s assertions of the 5 Fifth Amendment privilege are proper, apart from his assertions in response to the 6 allegations concerning jurisdiction and venue. 7 “The privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked in civil as well as 8 criminal proceedings.” Baker v. Limber, 647 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing 9 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972)). In a civil proceeding, the 10 invocation of the privilege is “limited to those circumstances in which the person 11 invoking the privilege reasonably believes that his disclosures could be used in a 12 criminal prosecution, or could lead to other evidence that could be used in that 13 manner.” Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 2000); 14 Baker, 647 F.2d at 917 (“Some nexus between the risk of criminal conviction and the 15 information requested must exist.”). The privilege “is not asserted properly by merely 16 declaring that an answer will incriminate.” 17 Brunswick Corp. v. Doff, 638 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1981)). Instead, it must be 18 “evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that 19 a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered” 20 might incriminate the defendant. Id. at 917 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 21 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951)). Baker, 647 F.2d at 916 (quoting 22 Garcia provides a proper foundation for his assertion of the Fifth Amendment 23 privilege through his reference to the ongoing criminal prosecution. (See Answer 1.) 24 In the Answer’s prefatory paragraph, Garcia specifically states: “Defendant is 25 presently facing criminal prosecution” in a related criminal case. 26 Although Garcia could have provided more detail regarding the relevance of the 27 criminal proceeding, Martin cannot seriously feign ignorance of the “nexus” between 28 this case and the criminal case where she is in direct communication with the 4 (Answer 1.) 1 California Attorney General’s Office—the agency prosecuting the criminal case. (See 2 Mot. 4; Opp’n Mot. Strike (“Opp’n”) 10, ECF No. 56.) Thus, the general reference to 3 the criminal case, taken in the light most favorable to Garcia, establishes a foundation 4 for his assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See, 5 e.g., Baker, 647 F.2d at 917 (a defendant must merely describe the criminal case so 6 that the nexus between the civil and criminal case is evident). 7 In light of the ongoing parallel criminal prosecution, Garcia’s belief that his 8 responses to the allegations in the Complaint could be used against him in the criminal 9 proceeding is reasonable. (See Opp’n 21); see Glanzer, 232 F.3d at 1263 (a defendant 10 need only reasonably believe that his responses could be used in the criminal 11 prosecution, “or could lead to other evidence that could be used in that manner.”). 12 Here, “[b]oth [cases] allege that the entire [Church] operates as a vehicle for 13 widespread criminal activity, and that [Garcia] controls it all and is liable for the 14 actions of others within the religious denomination.” (Opp’n 21.) 15 Martin contends that, at a minimum, the Court should require Garcia to respond 16 to a list of thirty-eight complete and twenty partial paragraphs from the 270 paragraph 17 civil Complaint, as these selected paragraphs “d[o] not appear to raise Fifth 18 Amendment concerns” for Garcia. (Mot. 6.) It is not Martin’s role to determine 19 Garcia’s risk of self-incrimination. Moreover, the Complaint is rife with allegations 20 that Garcia is the mastermind behind a criminal enterprise, and even the paragraphs 21 Martin claims do not appear to raise Fifth Amendment concerns (e.g., ¶¶ 15, 17, 21) 22 relate to Garcia’s knowledge of the Church’s organizational structure, his position in 23 it, and his responsibility for the actions of others. Therefore, Garcia properly invokes 24 the Fifth Amendment privilege as to paragraphs 1–9, and 13–270. 25 Nevertheless, the Court finds that Garcia improperly asserts the privilege as to 26 paragraphs 10–12, which only concern jurisdiction and venue. 27 10–12); see Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 (the privilege is “confined to instances where 28 the [defendant] has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.”). 5 (See Answer ¶¶ 1 It is hard to fathom the danger in responding to allegations concerning jurisdiction and 2 venue, and Garcia has suggested his willingness to respond to such allegations. (See 3 Opp’n 3.) V. 4 CONCLUSION 5 In sum, Garcia’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against 6 self-incrimination is proper as to paragraphs 1–9 and 13–270; thus, the Court 7 DENIES IN PART the Motion as to these paragraphs. The Court GRANTS IN 8 PART the Motion with respect to the paragraphs concerning jurisdiction and venue, 9 10–12. Within fourteen (14) days of this Order, Garcia may file an amended answer 10 to Martin’s Complaint that is consistent with this Order. 11 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 14 October 30, 2020 15 16 17 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
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