Margaret Skipps v. Chad Wolf et al, No. 2:2019cv10557 - Document 44 (C.D. Cal. 2021)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 21 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II : Court GRANTS Defendants Motion. The Court will issue judgment. (Footnote 1: Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Alejandro Mayorkas, the current Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, is automatically substituted as the proper defendant in this action in place of Chad Wolf.) (lc) Modified on 8/27/2021 (lc).
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Margaret Skipps v. Chad Wolf et al Doc. 44 Case 2:19-cv-10557-ODW-AGR Document 44 Filed 08/27/21 Page 1 of 7 Page ID #:685 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court Central District of California 8 9 10 11 12 13 MARGARET SKIPPS, as personal Case No. 2:19-CV-10557-ODW (AGRx) representative for the estate of ALEXANDER REAGAN MA’ALONA, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY Plaintiff, JUDGMENT [21] 14 15 16 v. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, United States Department of Homeland Security, in his official capacity 1; et al., 17 Defendants. 18 19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 On December 13, 2019, Plaintiff Margaret Skipps, acting as personal 21 representative for the estate of Alexander Reagan Ma’alona, initiated this employment 22 discrimination action against Defendant Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of the 23 Department of Homeland Security. 24 Ma’alona, who passed away in 2018, worked for the Transportation Security 25 Administration (“TSA”) as a Transportation Security Officer from 2002 to 2012 and 26 was improperly removed from federal service because of his race, color, and sex in 27 1 28 (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Alejandro Mayorkas, the current Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, is automatically substituted as the proper defendant in this action in place of Chad Wolf. Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:19-cv-10557-ODW-AGR Document 44 Filed 08/27/21 Page 2 of 7 Page ID #:686 1 violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). (See generally id.) 2 Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Mot. Summ. J. 3 (“MSJ”), ECF No. 21.) 4 Defendant’s Motion.2 For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS II. 5 BACKGROUND3 6 The following facts are undisputed. As a result of the September 11, 2001 7 terrorist attacks, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 8 2001 (“ATSA”), which created the TSA. (Def.’s Statement of Uncontroverted Facts 9 (“DSUF”) 1, ECF No. 21-1.) The ATSA granted TSA broad authority to “assess 10 threats to transportation,” “enforce security-related regulations and requirements,” and 11 “oversee the implementation, and ensure the adequacy of security measures at 12 airports.” (DSUF 3.) Pursuant to the ATSA and TSA policy, all Transportation 13 Security Officers must pass an annual proficiency review to remain employed at the 14 TSA. (DSUF 4.) 15 In 2012, the time of Ma’alona’s removal, the TSA conducted the proficiency 16 review through an annual re-certification process called the Performance 17 Accountability and Standards System (“PASS”). 18 assessments were conducted in several categories, including image mastery, standard 19 operating procedures, practical skills, and on-screen alarm resolution protocol mastery 20 (“OMA”). (DSUF 6.) Each assessment had a remediation and re-assessment process 21 designed to provide an employee who did not pass the assessment an additional (DSUF 5.) The 2012 PASS 22 23 2 24 25 26 27 28 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 3 The Court OVERRULES all boilerplate objections and improper argument in the parties’ Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Statement of Genuine Issues. (See Scheduling and Case Mgmt. Order 7–9, ECF No. 14.) Further, where the objected evidence is unnecessary to the resolution of the Motion or supports facts not in dispute, the Court need not resolve those objections here. To the extent the Court relies on objected-to evidence in this Order, those objections are OVERRULED. See Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (proceeding with only necessary rulings on evidentiary objections). 2 Case 2:19-cv-10557-ODW-AGR Document 44 Filed 08/27/21 Page 3 of 7 Page ID #:687 1 opportunity to improve their performance. (DSUF 7.) Any employee that failed to 2 pass the assessment after three attempts was subject to removal. (DSUF 9.) 3 Ma’alona signed a form acknowledging he understood the PASS assessment 4 components and metrics. (DSUF 13.) On August 1, 2012, Ma’alona failed his first 5 assessment in the OMA category. (DSUF 14.) That same day, Ma’alona was notified 6 that he had up to fifteen calendar days to prepare for his second attempt to pass the 7 OMA assessment; he also received remediation training from an instructor. 8 (DSUF 15.) Ma’alona chose to retake the OMA assessment the following day and 9 failed a second time. (DSUF 18.) Again, Ma’alona was informed that he had up to 10 fifteen days to prepare for his third and final attempt to pass the assessment; he 11 received additional mediation training on August 7, 2012. (DSUF 19, 20.) Ma’alona 12 decided to take the OMA assessment on August 10, 2012, when he failed for a third 13 time. (DSUF 21.) 14 On August 28, 2012, Ma’alona submitted a letter to the TSA’s Assistant 15 Federal Security Director for Screening at Los Angeles International Airport, in which 16 he requested additional training and a fourth attempt to pass the OMA assessment. 17 (DSUF 24.) On October 1, 2012, Assistant Federal Security Director for Screening, 18 Jason Pantages issued a Notice of Proposed Non-Disciplinary Removal, for 19 Ma’alona’s failure to meet the annual proficiency review requirements. (DSUF 26.) 20 Pursuant to the Notice, Ma’alona submitted a written and an oral response, again 21 requesting a fourth opportunity to take the OMA assessment. (DSUF 27.) After 22 reviewing Ma’alona’s file, oral and written responses, the Acting Deputy Assistant 23 Federal Security Director, Geoff Shearer, determined Ma’alona’s assessments were 24 administered properly, on the dates of Ma’alona’s choosing, and the remediation 25 provided met the requirements of the 2012 PASS guidance. 26 December 4, 2012, Shearer issued a Notice of Decision on Proposed Non-Disciplinary 27 Removal, which upheld Pantages’s recommendation to remove Ma’alona from federal 28 service. (DSUF 31.) 3 (DSUF 29.) On Case 2:19-cv-10557-ODW-AGR Document 44 Filed 08/27/21 Page 4 of 7 Page ID #:688 1 On December 13, 2019, Plaintiff initiated this employment discrimination 2 action on behalf of Ma’alona, who was a male Asian/Pacific Islander with dark brown 3 skin, alleging disparate treatment on the basis of race, color, and sex (Counts I–III). 4 (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 53–91.) 5 Summary Judgment on all counts. 6 Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for III. LEGAL STANDARD 7 A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 8 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 9 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Courts must view the facts and draw reasonable 10 inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 11 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). A disputed fact is “material” where the resolution of that 12 fact might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and the dispute is 13 “genuine” where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 14 the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 15 Conclusory or speculative testimony in affidavits is insufficient to raise genuine issues 16 of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 17 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Moreover, though the Court may not weigh conflicting 18 evidence or make credibility determinations, there must be more than a mere scintilla 19 of contradictory evidence to survive summary judgment. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 20 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 21 Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party cannot simply 22 rest on the pleadings or argue that any disagreement or “metaphysical doubt” about a 23 material issue of fact precludes summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 24 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 25 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan 26 Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987). 27 allegations and “self-serving testimony” create a genuine issue of material fact. 28 Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002). The court 4 Nor will uncorroborated Case 2:19-cv-10557-ODW-AGR Document 44 Filed 08/27/21 Page 5 of 7 Page ID #:689 1 should grant summary judgment against a party who fails to demonstrate facts 2 sufficient to establish an element essential to his case when that party will ultimately 3 bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 4 Pursuant to the Local Rules, parties moving for summary judgment must file a 5 proposed “Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law” that sets out 6 “the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine dispute.” 7 C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-1. A party opposing the motion must file a “Statement of Genuine 8 Disputes” setting forth all material facts as to which it contends there exists a genuine 9 dispute. C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-2. “[T]he Court may assume that material facts as claimed 10 and adequately supported by the moving party are admitted to exist without 11 controversy except to the extent that such material facts are (a) included in the 12 ‘Statement of Genuine Disputes’ and (b) controverted by declaration or other written 13 evidence filed in opposition to the motion.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-3. 14 IV. DISCUSSION 15 Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of disparate 16 treatment under Title VII because Ma’alona did not perform his duties to the TSA’s 17 legitimate expectations for Transportation Security Officers. (MSJ 7–9.) The Court 18 agrees. 19 Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual on the 20 basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Weil v. Citizens Telecom Servs. 21 Co., 922 F.3d 993, 1002 (9th Cir. 2019); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a 22 prima facie case of disparate-treatment discrimination, the plaintiff must show that: 23 (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was performing according to his employer’s 24 legitimate expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and 25 (4) similarly situated individuals outside of the plaintiff’s protected class were treated 26 more favorably. Gowdin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998). 27 Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue of material fact as to the second element, 28 which requires evidence Ma’alona was performing to the TSA’s legitimate 5 Case 2:19-cv-10557-ODW-AGR Document 44 Filed 08/27/21 Page 6 of 7 Page ID #:690 1 expectations. Here, all Transportation Security Officers were required to pass the 2 annual proficiency review to remain employed at the TSA. It is undisputed that 3 Ma’alona failed to attain a qualifying score on his OMA assessment after three 4 attempts. (DSUF 14, 18, 21; Opp’n 7, ECF No. 22.) In light of the critical nature of 5 the TSA’s role in securing the safety of the traveling public, this was not a “minor” 6 performance issue. 7 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A] plaintiff who violates company policy and fails to improve his 8 performance despite a warning has not demonstrated satisfactory performance.” 9 (internal quotation marks omitted)); Swan v. Bank of Am., 360 F. App’x, 903, 905 10 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding the plaintiff failed to establish she performed her job 11 satisfactorily where, despite written warnings, she continued to perform poorly). 12 Therefore, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude Ma’alona was 13 performing to the TSA’s legitimate expectations. See, e.g., Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd., 521 F.3d 1201, 1208 14 Nevertheless, Plaintiff attempts to raise a genuine dispute as to whether 15 Ma’alona was performing to the TSA’s legitimate expectations by highlighting 16 Ma’alona’s qualifying scores on annual proficiency tests taken prior to the 2012 PASS 17 assessment, and performance reviews from prior years. (Opp’n 8–9.) But Plaintiff 18 misses the point. There is no dispute that in 2012, Ma’alona failed to pass the annual 19 proficiency review after three attempts in contravention of the ATSA and TSA policy. 20 Even if Ma’alona performed well in the years leading up to 2012, that does not change 21 Ma’alona’s failure to perform according to TSA’s legitimate expectations at the time 22 he was removed from federal service. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to establish a prima 23 facie case of disparate treatment. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 24 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 6 Case 2:19-cv-10557-ODW-AGR Document 44 Filed 08/27/21 Page 7 of 7 Page ID #:691 V. 1 2 3 4 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion. (ECF No. 21.) The Court will issue judgment. IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 7 8 August 27, 2021 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7
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