Ruben Loera v. Andrew Saul, No. 2:2019cv09052 - Document 22 (C.D. Cal. 2020)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. (efc)
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Ruben Loera v. Andrew Saul Doc. 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 RUBEN L., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of ) Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________) NO. CV 19-9052-E MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 18 PROCEEDINGS 19 20 Plaintiff filed a complaint on October 21, 2019, seeking review 21 of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. On November 22, 2019, the 22 parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge. 23 Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on March 27, 2020. 24 Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on June 2, 2020. 25 Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary 26 judgment on June 17, 2020 (“Plaintiff’s Opposition”). 27 taken the motions under submission without oral argument. 28 7-15; “Order,” filed October 24, 2019. The Court has See L.R. Dockets.Justia.com BACKGROUND 1 2 3 In March of 2015, when Plaintiff was 16 years old, his mother 4 filed an application for Supplemental Security Income on his behalf 5 (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 19, 509-15, 540). 6 asserts disability since January 31, 2012, based on autism, a learning 7 disorder and “half of [Plaintiff’s] brain [being] not fully 8 develop[ed]” (id.). 9 turned 18 years of age (A.R. 20, 24). The application While this application was pending, Plaintiff 10 11 An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) reviewed the record and heard 12 testimony from Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s mother, Plaintiff’s brother, a 13 medical expert and a vocational expert (A.R. 19-38, 45-168). 14 found that Plaintiff has a severe learning disorder, not otherwise 15 specified (A.R. 24, 32-33). 16 or equal a listed impairment set forth at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, 17 App. 1 (the “Listings”), either before or after he turned 18 (A.R. 25- 18 34 (adopting, inter alia, medical expert’s opinion at A.R. 59-61 for 19 the period before Plaintiff turned 18)). 20 after Plaintiff turned 18, he has had the residual functional capacity 21 to perform work at all exertion levels, limited to work involving: 22 (1) simple routine tasks; (2) occasional contact with supervisors; and 23 (3) brief and superficial contact with the public and coworkers. 24 A.R. 34-36 (giving moderate weight to the opinion of the psychological 25 consultative examiner). 26 assertedly could perform. 27 testimony at A.R. 129-30). 28 The Appeals Council denied review (A.R. 1-3). The ALJ The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not meet The ALJ also found that, See The ALJ identified certain jobs Plaintiff See A.R. 37 (adopting vocational expert Thus, the ALJ denied benefits (A.R. 38). 2 STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 2 Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the 3 4 Administration’s decision to determine if: (1) the Administration’s 5 findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the 6 Administration used correct legal standards. 7 Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 8 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner, 9 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). See Carmickle v. Substantial evidence is “such 10 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 11 support a conclusion.” 12 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Widmark v. 13 Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 14 15 If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may 16 not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. 17 Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by 18 isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. 19 Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, 20 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 21 detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. But the 22 23 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and 24 quotations omitted). 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 3 DISCUSSION 1 2 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in: (1) evaluating whether 3 4 Plaintiff met the criteria for child disability; (2) evaluating 5 Plaintiff’s testimony and statements; (3) evaluating the testimony of 6 Plaintiff’s mother and brother; (4) failing to include all of 7 Plaintiff’s alleged limitations in the ALJ’s residual functional 8 capacity assessment; and (5) failing to include all of Plaintiff’s 9 alleged limitations in the hypothetical questioning of the vocational 10 expert. 11 2-10. See Plaintiff’s Motion, pp. 3-11; Plaintiff’s Opposition, pp. 12 After consideration of the record as a whole, Plaintiff’s motion 13 14 is denied and Defendant’s motion is granted. The Administration’s 15 findings are supported by substantial evidence and are free from 16 material1 legal error. Plaintiff’s contrary arguments are unavailing. 17 18 I. Summary of the Record 19 20 A. Plaintiff’s Medical Records 21 22 The medical records, which are relatively sparse, reflect 23 diagnoses of, inter alia, “anxiety state unspecified” in April of 24 2010, learning problems at school in August of 2012, lack of normal 25 26 1 27 28 The harmless error rule applies to the review of administrative decisions regarding disability. See Garcia v. Commissioner, 768 F.3d 925, 932-33 (9th Cir. 2014); McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 886-88 (9th Cir. 2011). 4 1 development (unspecified) and development delay (unspecified) in 2 September of 2012, attention deficit without hyperactivity in October 3 of 2012, autistic disorder (active) and autonomic brain abnormality in 4 June of 2015 (A.R. 672, 858). 5 According to a progress note from June of 2015, Plaintiff’s 6 7 mother stated that Plaintiff had autism with a history of abnormal 8 brain/missing corpus callosum midbrain, and she requested a 9 “neurodevelopment” follow-up (A.R. 878). Examination findings 10 reportedly were normal (A.R. 878-79). Plaintiff was diagnosed with 11 learning problems at school, autonomic brain abnormality and autistic 12 disorder (active) (A.R. 879). 13 (A.R. 880). Plaintiff was referred to neurology 14 A neurology consultation note from July of 2015 reported that 15 16 Plaintiff complained of attention deficit and a learning disability 17 (A.R. 875). 18 was abnormal, and the neurologist recommended clinical correlation 19 (A.R. 881). 20 reported that Plaintiff complained of a learning disability/autistic 21 syndrome and attention deficit (A.R. 872). 22 examinations, Plaintiff reportedly had a symmetrical face, 5/5 motor 23 strength and 2/4 deep tendon reflexes (A.R. 873, 876). 24 diagnosed with autistic disorder (active) and anxiety state 25 (unspecified) (A.R. 873-74, 876). 26 (A.R. 873). 27 /// 28 /// An electroencephalography report from the following week At a follow-up in September of 2015, the neurologist At both neurology Plaintiff was No medications were prescribed 5 1 A primary care progress note from August of 2017 reported that 2 Plaintiff presented for a skin condition, but also complained of a 3 history of agenesia of the corpus callosum,2 claimed that he became 4 anxious and “very retracted socially” and asserted he was failing “in 5 scholar matters” (A.R. 868). 6 October of 2017 also reported that Plaintiff had corpus callosum 7 agenesis with mild autism, for which Plaintiff’s mother had requested 8 help (A.R. 861). 9 findings (beyond a skin condition) at either primary care visit, but A primary care progress note from Plaintiff had no reported abnormal examination 10 Plaintiff nevertheless was diagnosed with autistic disorder (active), 11 autonomic brain abnormality and “anxiety state unspecified” (A.R. 862, 12 869). Again, Plaintiff was referred to neurology (A.R. 870). 13 14 Neurological consultations in October and December of 2017 15 reported intact cranial nerves, 5/5 motor strength, 2/4 deep tendon 16 reflexes and normal sensation (A.R. 858-59, 865-66). 17 examination findings were reported (A.R. 858-59, 865-66). 18 neurologist diagnosed development delay (unspecified) and autistic 19 disorder (active) (A.R. 859). 20 medications and referred Plaintiff for follow-up with psychiatry (A.R. 21 860). No other The The neurologist prescribed no There are no additional medical records. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 Agenesia of the corpus callosum is “a rare birth defect in which the structure that connects the two hemispheres of the brain (the corpus callosum) is partially or completely absent.” Kimes v. Colvin, 2016 WL 1253543, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2016) (citation omitted); see also National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Agenesis of the Corpus Callosum Information Page, at https://www.ninds.nih.gov/Disorders/All-Disorders/ Agenesis-Corpus-Callosum-Information-Page (last visited July 16, 2020) (“[t]he effects of the disorder range from subtle or mild to severe, depending on associated brain abnormalities”). 6 B. 1 Plaintiff’s School Records 2 3 Plaintiff received a 2014 Individualized Education Program 4 (“IEP”) when Plaintiff was 16 years old and in the 11th grade (A.R. 5 718-45). 6 grades within the preceding year and then was reading at a 7.8 grade 7 level (A.R. 720). 8 math due to a learning disability (A.R. 720-22, 724). 9 reportedly had excellent school attendance, was always prepared with Plaintiff reportedly had increased his reading level by 3.1 He reportedly struggled with reading, writing and Plaintiff 10 necessary school supplies, was eager to learn, always put forth his 11 best effort and was friendly and cooperative, but did not participate 12 actively in group work (A.R. 723, 725). 13 as an introvert who failed properly to engage with other students 14 (A.R. 741). 15 Plaintiff had met all of the goals set by Plaintiff’s IEP (A.R. 818- 16 19). Plaintiff was characterized However, a December, 2015 annual review reflected that 17 18 Plaintiff also received an April, 2016 IEP when Plaintiff was 17 19 years old and in the 12th grade (A.R. 820-44). He reportedly was able 20 to understand and follow simple multiple-step oral instructions for 21 work-related activities, but needed to develop conversational skills 22 to negotiate and initiate social conversations (A.R. 820). 23 preceding year, Plaintiff had made “exponential progress” in reading 24 (A.R. 821). 25 ask for help when he needed it, did his best to complete assignments 26 in class, did the majority of his homework, was able to work well with 27 others and was able to make and keep friends (A.R. 823). 28 reportedly was going to take the “CAHSEE” (California High School Exit Within the According to the IEP, Plaintiff reportedly knew how to 7 Plaintiff 1 Exam) with accommodations (A.R. 830). 2 results of any such examination. The record does not reflect the 3 4 Special education teacher Salvador Plascencia3 completed a 5 teacher questionnaire dated April 30, 2015 (A.R. 757-64). Mr. 6 Plascencia had known Plaintiff for three years and spent 90 minutes 7 per day teaching Plaintiff English and History (A.R. 757). 8 reportedly received special education instruction because of an 9 auditory processing learning disability (A.R. 766). Plaintiff Mr. Plascencia 10 indicated that Plaintiff’s reading, math, and written language levels 11 were “far below basic” (A.R. 757). 12 five domains of functioning used in evaluating child disability 13 (discussed below) (A.R. 758-62). 14 scale ascending from “no problems” to “slight problems” to “obvious 15 problems” to “serious problems” to “very serious problems” (id.). 16 Plascencia rated Plaintiff as having “obvious” to “serious” problems 17 in acquiring and using information, stating that directions and 18 instructions had to be repeated and rephrased to ensure Plaintiff 19 understood (A.R. 758). 20 Plascencia rated “none” to “slight” problems in all areas except 21 carrying out multi-step instructions, where Mr. Plascencia opined that 22 Plaintiff had “obvious” problems (A.R. 759). 23 needed prompting to finish assignments and needed to develop 24 organizational skills (A.R. 759). Mr. Plascencia rated Plaintiff in The ratings utilized a problems In regard to attending and completing tasks, Plaintiff reportedly However, Mr. Plascencia reported no 25 26 3 27 28 Mr. The name of this teacher appears as “S. Plascencia” on the questionnaire, but the full name, “Salvador Plascencia,” appears on certain testing results in the administrative record (A.R. 750, 764, 813). 8 1 problems in “interacting and relating with others,” “moving about and 2 manipulating objects” or “caring for himself” (A.R. 760-62). 3 4 Education specialist Edward Miller completed a teacher 5 questionnaire dated October 22, 2015 (A.R. 771-78). Mr. Miller had 6 known Plaintiff for two years and spent 90 minutes per school day with 7 Plaintiff teaching History and English (A.R. 771). 8 reported that Plaintiff’s reading was at a 6th grade level, and his 9 math and written language were at a 5th grade level (A.R. 771). 10 Miller rated Plaintiff as having “none” to “slight” problems in 11 acquiring and using information, with the exception of reading and 12 comprehension, expressing ideas in written form, and recalling and 13 applying previously learned material, for which he rated Plaintiff as 14 having “obvious” problems (A.R. 772). 15 Plaintiff was able to follow instructions and answer teacher-generated 16 prompts orally and in writing, but needed extended time and support to 17 succeed academically (A.R. 772). 18 problems in “attending and completing tasks,” “interacting and 19 relating with others,” “moving about and manipulating objects” or 20 “caring for himself” (A.R. 773-76). Mr. Miller Mr. Mr. Miller indicated that However, Mr. Miller reported no 21 22 C. Opinion Evidence 23 24 Consultative examiner Dr. Banafshe P. Sharokhi prepared a 25 complete psychological evaluation of Plaintiff dated January 2, 2014, 26 (when Plaintiff was 15 years old) (A.R. 661-67). 27 was cooperative and friendly, had fair eye contact and appeared to 28 give genuine effort (A.R. 661). Plaintiff reportedly Dr. Sharokhi did not review any 9 1 records before preparing the evaluation (A.R. 663). Rather, 2 Plaintiff’s mother was the source of the historical information for 3 the evaluation (A.R. 661-62). 4 “appear[ed] to be highly embellishing academic and psychiatric 5 symptomatology, as reported symptoms appear[ed] highly discrepant with 6 presentation and current functioning” (A.R. 661-62). 7 mother claimed that Plaintiff had an underdeveloped half side of his 8 brain (A.R. 663). 9 communication deficits, and difficulty expressing himself (A.R. 662). To Dr. Sharokhi, Plaintiff’s mother Plaintiff’s She said Plaintiff had a history of speech delays, 10 She asserted that Plaintiff did not speak until he was five years old, 11 and spoke only 2-3 words at 5.5 years old (id.). 12 school district had diagnosed Plaintiff with a learning disability at 13 age three (A.R. 662). 14 diagnosed with high functioning autism by a mental health practitioner 15 (but not by the school district or Plaintiff’s doctor, which Dr. 16 Sharokhi considered “highly suspicious”) (id.). She said that the She also said that, in 2011, Plaintiff was 17 18 Plaintiff reportedly was attending 10th grade special education 19 classes for problems with reading, writing, math and social adjustment 20 (A.R. 663). 21 him and a history of anger spells (A.R. 662-63). 22 Plaintiff generally got along well with other children and sometimes 23 with adults, enjoyed playing with his friends at school and playing 24 video games with his friends outside of school (A.R. 662-63). 25 Plaintiff was generally well behaved (A.R. 662). Plaintiff reportedly had friends who were younger than Reportedly, 26 27 28 On mental status examination, Plaintiff was cooperative, friendly, had normal mood and affect, normal speech, intact 10 1 comprehension, mildly impaired immediate memory, attention and 2 concentration, coherent thought processes with mild distractibility 3 evident, and fair insight and judgment (A.R. 664). 4 testing yielded a valid full scale IQ of 85, within the low average 5 range, with an indication to rule out a learning disorder (not 6 otherwise specified), given the significant discrepancies within his 7 index scores (which ranged from 78 to 100). 8 A.R. 668-69 (addendum to Dr. Sharokhi’s report re additional reading, 9 spelling and math testing given which tended to confirm that the 85 IQ Intelligence See A.R. 665-66; see also 10 score was accurate); A.R. 749-52, 765 (additional academic testing by 11 Mr. Plascencia from January of 2015 reflecting below average scores in 12 math and reading with a recommendation for special education 13 services). 14 criteria for autistic disorder or any pervasive developmental 15 disorders (A.R. 667). 16 limitations appeared mild, with the lowest index being a processing 17 speed of 78 (A.R. 666). 18 Functioning (“GAF”) score of 60 (A.R. 666).4 19 Plaintiff would have mild inability to: (1) understand and respond to 20 complex requests, instructions or questions; (2) initiate and use 21 language; (3) interact with peers and adults; and (4) take care of 22 daily living skills. Dr. Sharokhi opined that Plaintiff did not meet diagnostic Dr. Sharokhi opined that Plaintiff’s overall Dr. Sharokhi assessed a Global Assessment of Dr. Sharokhi opined that See A.R. 667; see also A.R. 669-70 (reaffirming 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 The GAF scale is used by clinicians to report an individual’s overall level of functioning. See American Psychological Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed. 2000) (“DSM”). A GAF of 51-60 indicates “[m]oderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., temporarily falling behind in schoolwork).” Id. 11 1 same after reviewing academic records, including a December, 2012 IEP 2 and a December, 2013 questionnaire by Mr. Plascencia which are not in 3 the record). 4 A state agency psychiatrist reviewed the record in May of 2015, 5 6 when Plaintiff was 16 years old, and opined that Plaintiff had less 7 than marked limitations in all domains of functioning for evaluating 8 child disability (discussed below), and therefore did not meet the 9 Listings (A.R. 169-78). A state agency psychologist reviewed the 10 record in November of 2015, when Plaintiff was 17 years old, and 11 agreed with the prior findings that Plaintiff did not meet the 12 Listings (A.R. 180-89). 13 Medical expert Dr. Theron Aikens testified on two separate 14 15 occasions. Dr. Aikens testified that there was evidence Plaintiff has 16 some kind of a learning disorder (A.R. 58-59, 156). 17 mention in the record of autism spectrum disorder and corpus callosum 18 agenesis, Dr. Aikens found no objective support for these diagnoses 19 (A.R. 156-57).5 20 Plaintiff turned 18, Plaintiff had a marked limitation in his ability 21 to acquire and use information, but less than marked limitations in 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// While there was Dr. Aikens opined that, for the period before 25 26 5 27 28 The ALJ gave Plaintiff’s counsel time to supplement the record with any objective evidence regarding these diagnoses (A.R. 165-68). It appears that no additional records were provided. 12 1 the remaining areas of functioning (A.R. 60-61).6 2 to render an opinion as to Plaintiff’s condition as an adult because 3 Dr. Aikens felt there was insufficient evidence in the record after 4 Plaintiff turned 18 (A.R. 50-56, 61). 5 consultative examination (A.R. 65). Dr. Aikens declined The ALJ then ordered an adult 6 Consultative examiner Dr. Danita Stewart prepared a complete 7 8 psychological evaluation of Plaintiff dated December 18, 2017, when 9 Plaintiff was 19 years old (A.R. 852-57). Dr. Stewart reviewed Dr. 10 Sharokhi’s evaluation and the December, 2015 IEP (A.R. 853). 11 Plaintiff’s mother claimed that half of Plaintiff’s brain was not 12 fully developed (A.R. 853). 13 difficulties, attending special education since middle school, and 14 graduating from high school in 2016 (A.R. 853). 15 reported that he socialized with friends on a monthly basis (A.R. 16 854). Plaintiff reported a history of learning Plaintiff also 17 On mental status examination, Plaintiff was pleasant and 18 19 cooperative, with borderline intellectual functioning, euthymic mood 20 and stable affect, moderately diminished memory, mildly diminished 21 attention and concentration, and a low fund of knowledge (A.R. 854- 22 55). Testing yielded a full scale IQ score of 74, but with two 23 6 24 25 26 27 28 Regarding Plaintiff’s ability to interact and relate to others, Dr. Aikens acknowledged that an IEP reported that Plaintiff had failed to do group work and was an introvert who did not engage other students (A.R. 60, 64). However, Dr. Aikens also observed that: (1) none of the teachers reported any problems in that domain; (2) Plaintiff had reported to Dr. Sharokhi that he had friends in and out of school; and (3) other records suggested that Plaintiff was well liked by his peers (A.R. 60, 64 (citing A.R. 663, 669, 686, 741)). 13 1 reported subtest scaled scores of zero (an apparent error, see below) 2 (A.R. 855). 3 Plaintiff’s functional level (A.R. 856). 4 learning disorder (not otherwise specified), borderline intellectual 5 functioning, and a GAF of 60 (A.R. 856). 6 Plaintiff would be able to understand, remember and carry out short, 7 simplistic instructions without difficulty, would have mild inability 8 to understand, remember and carry out detailed instructions based on 9 his borderline intellectual functioning, would be able to make Dr. Stewart opined that the test was a valid estimate of Dr. Stewart assessed a Dr. Stewart opined that 10 simplistic work-related decisions without special supervision, would 11 be able to interact appropriately with coworkers, supervisors and the 12 public, would have no difficulties maintaining social functioning, 13 would have a mild restriction on daily activities, would have mild 14 difficulties in concentration, persistence or pace, and would have 15 mild inability to maintain attendance and complete an eight-hour 16 workday in a regular workplace setting, but would be able to deal with 17 usual stressors of a competitive workplace setting (A.R. 856-57).7 18 19 Returning for another hearing after Dr. Stewart’s examination, 20 Dr. Aikens opined that Dr. Stewart’s evaluation had been incomplete 21 22 7 23 24 25 26 27 28 The record also contains a medical source statement from Dr. Stewart dated December 18, 2017 (A.R. 848-51). She opined that Plaintiff has none-to-mild impairments in his ability to understand, remember and carry out instructions due to his borderline cognitive functioning (A.R. 848). Dr. Stewart indicated Plaintiff has no limits in his ability to interact with others or respond to changes in the work setting (A.R. 850). She stated that Plaintiff has a mild inability to focus and concentrate, particularly on tasks of increasing difficulty, and that he tested low on measures of auditory and visual memory (A.R. 850). 14 1 (A.R. 145-61). Specifically, (as Plaintiff’s counsel had suggested 2 (see, e.g., A.R. 645-49)), Dr. Aikens stated that the ALJ should not 3 rely on intelligence testing in Dr. Stewart’s evaluation due to the 4 apparently erroneous reporting of zeros for some subtest results (A.R. 5 158). 6 opinions in total (A.R. 158). 7 the ALJ’s offer to have Plaintiff undergo another consultative 8 examination in the event the ALJ deemed Dr. Stewart’s evaluation 9 inadequate (A.R. 136-37).8 Dr. Aikens suggested that the ALJ “toss out” Dr. Stewart’s However, Plaintiff’s counsel refused 10 D. 11 Plaintiff’s Statements and Testimony and those of the Lay Witnesses 12 13 Plaintiff testified that he attended special education classes, 14 15 eight to nine classes at a time, with 10 to 12 other students, a 16 teacher and a teacher’s assistant (A.R. 76-78). 17 that his teachers had to repeat things more than twice for him to get 18 it “stuck into [his] head” (A.R. 78-79). 19 had graduated from high school with a regular diploma and did not have 20 to take the California test usually required for such a diploma (A.R. 21 85-86).9 22 /// Plaintiff claimed However, Plaintiff said he 23 8 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff does not claim that the ALJ erred by deciding the case without ordering a further consultative examination. 9 Plaintiff’s counsel stated she did not think that Plaintiff had received a regular diploma, so the ALJ gave counsel the opportunity to submit additional evidence regarding the issue (A.R. 86-87). It does not appear that counsel submitted any additional evidence contrary to Plaintiff’s testimony that he graduated from high school with a regular diploma. 15 1 Plaintiff said he had not looked for work since he graduated 2 because he gets nervous and scared around people he does not know 3 (A.R. 84-85). 4 bus by himself and he did not like going out alone (A.R. 79). 5 Plaintiff said that, when he was in school, he did not really have 6 friends with whom he hung out (A.R. 85). 7 have one friend with whom he goes to the mall, movies, and other 8 places by taxi or with rides from that friend’s mother (A.R. 79-80). 9 Plaintiff said his mother was teaching him to cook, and he was able to Plaintiff said he had refused to learn how to use the However, he admitted he did 10 do dishes, vacuum, do laundry with his mother, take care of two cats, 11 play video games and watch television (A.R. 80-84, 88). 12 13 Plaintiff testified that, through a school program, he had worked 14 part time (i.e., 50 hours a month for two months) as a stock clerk for 15 Walgreen’s during his senior year of high school (A.R. 89-90). 16 Plaintiff walked to and from this job by himself (A.R. 94). 17 Plaintiff said he had trouble in the first couple of weeks with people 18 asking him where things were in the store because he had not learned 19 about the store’s products (A.R. 90). 20 mistake by failing to check for expiration dates (A.R. 93-94). 21 said he was able to accept feedback from his boss (A.R. 93-94). 22 Plaintiff said he could stock shelves after three weeks of learning, 23 but he had not wanted to continue working after the school program 24 ended because he did not like dealing with people (A.R. 91-93). 25 Plaintiff said he thought he could do simple work if he did not have 26 to deal with people and if the job were near him (A.R. 91-92). 27 /// 28 /// 16 Plaintiff also had made one He 1 Plaintiff’s mother testified that Plaintiff could not cook 2 without her there because he supposedly is afraid (A.R. 97). She said 3 she has to remind Plaintiff many times to do his household chores 4 (A.R. 97-98). 5 nervous, timid and fearful when he meets people whom he does not know 6 (A.R. 99-100, 125). 7 always has “a whole lot of excuses” for not doing things (A.R. 125- 8 27).10 She said that Plaintiff rarely communicates and he gets She claimed Plaintiff never goes out alone and 9 10 Plaintiff’s brother testified that Plaintiff feels weird around 11 other people and does not feel safe being out “on the street” by 12 himself (A.R. 67-68). 13 to school after the brother spent two or three weeks showing him the 14 way (A.R. 72; but see A.R. 95-96 (Plaintiff testifying that his 15 brother did not walk with him to school)). 16 Plaintiff walked home from school with friends who lived on the same He said that Plaintiff was able to walk alone The brother also said 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10 In a Disability Report - Child form in English completed by Plaintiff’s mother dated March 2, 2015, Plaintiff’s mother reported that she could not speak and understand or read and understand English; her preferred language was Spanish (A.R. 538-49). In a Function Report - Child form stamped March 12, 2015, which was also in English, Plaintiff’s mother reported, inter alia, that Plaintiff: (1) was attending school full time; (2) could not repeat stories he had heard; (3) could not explain why he did something; (4) is very shy, “has little people skills,” only makes friends when he wants to make friends; (5) reads and understands at an eighth grade level; (6) cannot make new friends or generally get along with her, adults, or his siblings; (7) cannot help around the house, cook meals for himself, take needed medication, use public transportation by himself, accept criticism or correction or obey rules at home, and he rarely asks for help; and (8) cannot keep busy on his own, finish things he starts or complete chores most of the time, and he must be told more than once and reminded of what he needs to do to stick with a task (A.R. 550-58). 17 1 street (A.R. 73). 2 friends with whom Plaintiff spent time (A.R. 68-69). 3 mother would drive Plaintiff and the friend to the mall or to the 4 movies approximately once a month (A.R. 68, 73). 5 Plaintiff needed reminding, but was able to do household chores (A.R. 6 69-70). 7 games that do not involve critical thinking (A.R. 71-72, 74-75). 8 said that Plaintiff had not tried to work since he turned 18 because 9 Plaintiff was afraid that other people would see him as “different” 10 Plaintiff’s brother had met only one of Plaintiff’s That friend’s He said that Plaintiff was able to watch television and play simple video He (A.R. 75). 11 12 II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conclusion that Plaintiff is Not Disabled. 13 14 Substantial evidence supports the conclusion Plaintiff was not 15 16 disabled during either of the relevant time periods. 17 A. 18 Plaintiff Did Not Meet His Burden of Establishing Disability Before He Turned 18. 19 20 For the period before he turned 18 years old, Plaintiff had the 21 22 burden to prove that his impairment(s) then met or medically equaled a 23 listed impairment. 24 determination procedure); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a) (child 25 claimant bears the burden of establishing how his impairments affects 26 his functioning). 27 /// 28 /// See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924 (outlining disability Plaintiff did not meet this burden. 18 1 In determining whether a child’s impairment or combination of 2 impairments functionally equals an impairment in the Listings, the 3 Commissioner must assess the child’s functioning in six domains: 4 (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and completing 5 tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about and 6 manipulating objects; (5) caring for oneself; and (6) health and 7 physical well-being. 8 equal the Listings, the impairment(s) must result in a “marked” 9 limitation in two domains or an “extreme” limitation in one domain (20 See 20 C.F.R. 416.926a(a)-(b). To functionally 10 C.F.R. 416.926a(d)). A “marked” limitation is one that “interferes 11 seriously” with the ability independently to initiate, sustain, or 12 complete activities (20 C.F.R. 416.926a(e)(2)). 13 limitation is one that “interferes very seriously” with the ability 14 independently to initiate, sustain, or complete activities (20 C.F.R. 15 416.926a(e)(3)). An “extreme” 16 17 Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had marked limitations in 18 acquiring and using information, but less than marked limitations in 19 the remaining domains (A.R. 27-32 (giving great weight to Dr. Aikens’ 20 opinion finding the same, great weight to Dr. Sharokhi’s opinion that 21 Plaintiff at most had mild limitations, and moderate weight to the 22 state agency physicians’ opinions that Plaintiff would have less than 23 marked limitations in all domains)). 24 constitute substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s non-disability 25 determination. 26 2007) (opinion of examining physician based on independent clinical 27 findings can provide substantial evidence to support administrative 28 conclusion of non-disability); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, The referenced medical opinions See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631-32 (9th Cir. 19 1 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (opinion of non-examining physician “may 2 constitute substantial evidence when it is consistent with other 3 independent evidence in the record”); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 4 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (where the opinions of non-examining 5 physicians do not contradict “all other evidence in the record” an ALJ 6 properly may rely on these opinions) (citation and emphasis omitted). 7 8 9 Significantly, no medical source (or non-medical source outside of Plaintiff’s family) opined that Plaintiff had materially greater 10 limitations. The record contains no treating doctor’s opinion 11 concerning Plaintiff’s functional limitations. 12 education teachers did not report marked limitations in any two 13 domains of functioning (A.R. 757-64, 771-78). Plaintiff’s special 14 15 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff did 16 not have marked limitations in the domains of attending and completing 17 tasks (Domain 2) and interacting and relating with others (Domain 3) 18 (Plaintiff’s Motion, p. 3). 19 discerned marked limitations in these domains based on: (1) Mr. 20 Plascencia’s opinion that Plaintiff needed prompting to finish 21 assignments and Mr. Miller’s assertedly similar opinion (Domain 2) 22 (A.R. 759, 772); (2) the claims of Plaintiff’s mother that Plaintiff 23 required repeated prompting to remind him of tasks and that Plaintiff 24 did not complete tasks (Domain 2) (A.R. 557); (3) Plaintiff’s 25 testimony that he required repeated prompts from his teachers for him 26 to complete a task (Domain 2) (A.R. 78-79); (4) Plaintiff’s IEP 27 indicating that he was unable actively to participate in group work, 28 was an introvert who failed properly to engage other students and Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have 20 1 needed to develop conversational skills to negotiate and initiate 2 social conversations (Domain 3) (A.R. 686, 707, 820); (5) the 3 testimony of Plaintiff and his brother that Plaintiff had only one 4 friend whom Plaintiff saw once a month (Domain 3) (A.R. 68-69, 73, 79- 5 80); and (6) the claims of Plaintiff’s mother that Plaintiff did not 6 get along with adults or siblings, did not make new friends, rarely 7 communicates with others, gets nervous and does not trust others 8 (Domain 3) (A.R. 125, 555). 9 Plaintiff’s Opposition, pp. 2-4. See Plaintiff’s Motion, pp. 3-5; 10 An ALJ is not required to discuss all evidence found 11 12 unpersuasive; an ALJ is only required to explain why significant 13 probative evidence has been rejected. 14 Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003); Vincent v. Heckler, 739 15 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984). 16 acknowledged the conflicting evidence on which Plaintiff relies (A.R. 17 26, 29-30, 33-34). 18 persuasive other aspects of Plaintiff’s testimony, other aspects of 19 the IEP reports, and other statements made by Plaintiff and his mother 20 to Dr. Sharokhi (A.R. 26, 29-30 (citing A.R. 85, 89-93, 667, 686, 21 823)). 22 attendance for a full schedule of classes, did his best to complete 23 assignments in class, did the majority of his homework, graduated with 24 a regular diploma, was able to work independently stocking shelves for 25 two months (even though he had some difficulty interacting with 26 customers), got along with adults and siblings, made and kept friends 27 and was able to work well with others (id.). 28 /// See Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Here, the ALJ expressly However, the ALJ also expressly found more Such evidence reflected that Plaintiff had proper school 21 1 It was the ALJ’s prerogative to weigh the evidence and to find, 2 (in accordance with the opinions of Plaintiff’s teachers, the state 3 agency psychiatrist and Dr. Aikens) that Plaintiff did not have marked 4 limitations in Domains 2 and 3. 5 opined that Plaintiff did not have any “serious” problems in attending 6 and completing tasks and had no problems interacting and relating with 7 others, and Mr. Miller found no problems in either of these two 8 domains (A.R. 759-60, 773-74). 9 that Plaintiff did not have marked impairments in any domains (A.R. As detailed above, Mr. Plascencia The state agency psychiatrist found 10 173-74). Dr. Aikens considered Plaintiff’s IEPs and the teachers’ 11 reports referencing the alleged limitations Plaintiff urges, but Dr. 12 Aikens nevertheless concluded that Plaintiff had less than marked 13 limitations in Domains 2 and 3 (A.R. 59-64). 14 15 While Plaintiff argues contrary interpretations of the evidence 16 in the record and relies heavily on the claims of his mother and 17 brother, it was for the ALJ to interpret the evidence, evaluate 18 credibility and resolve any conflicts in the evidence. 19 v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014) (court “leaves it 20 to the ALJ” “to resolve conflicts and ambiguities in the record”); 21 accord Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001); Andrews v. 22 Shalala, 53 F.3d at 1039-40. 23 than one rational interpretation,” the Court must uphold the 24 administrative decision. 25 accord Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002); 26 Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). 27 will uphold the ALJ’s rational interpretation of the evidence in the 28 present case notwithstanding any conflicts in the evidence. See Treichler When evidence “is susceptible to more See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d at 1039-40; 22 The Court B. 1 Substantial Evidence Supports the Conclusion that Plaintiff Was Capable of Work After He Turned 18. 2 3 Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s non-disability 4 5 determination for the time period after Plaintiff turned 18. No 6 treating doctor opined that Plaintiff has greater limitations than the 7 limitations the ALJ found to exist. 8 opinions (minus the unreliable IQ scores) in determining Plaintiff’s 9 residual functional capacity, supported by Dr. Aikens’ earlier The ALJ relied on Dr. Stewart’s 10 opinions, Dr. Sharokhi’s opinions, the IEPs, the teacher 11 questionnaires, and much of the testimony of Plaintiff and his family 12 (A.R. 35-36). 13 the ALJ’s decision. Dr. Stewart’s opinions provide substantial evidence for See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d at 631-32. 14 The vocational expert testified that a person with the residual 15 16 functional capacity the ALJ found to exist could perform certain jobs 17 existing in significant numbers in the national economy (A.R. 129-30). 18 The ALJ properly relied on this testimony in denying disability 19 benefits for the period after Plaintiff turned 18. 20 Secretary of Health and Human Services, 882 F.2d 1474, 1478-80 (9th 21 Cir. 1989); Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 774-75 (9th Cir. 1986). 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 23 See Barker v. 1 III. Plaintiff’s Remaining Arguments are Unavailing.11 2 3 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in: (a) evaluating evidence 4 from Plaintiff; (b) evaluating evidence from the other lay witnesses; 5 (c) failing to include all of Plaintiff’s alleged limitations in the 6 ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment; and (d) failing to 7 include all of Plaintiff’s limitations in the hypothetical questioning 8 of the vocational expert. 9 Plaintiff’s Opposition, pp. 2-10. 10 See Plaintiff’s Motion, pp. 3-11; As discussed below, these arguments are rejected. 11 12 An ALJ’s assessment of a claimant’s credibility is entitled to 13 “great weight.” Anderson v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 14 1990); Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985). 15 here, an ALJ finds that the claimant’s medically determinable 16 impairments reasonably could be expected to cause some degree of the 17 alleged symptoms of which the claimant subjectively complains, any 18 discounting of the claimant’s complaints must be supported by 19 specific, cogent findings. 20 (9th Cir. 2010); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995); 21 but see Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282-84 (9th Cir. 1996) 22 (indicating that ALJ must offer “specific, clear and convincing” Where, as See Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 23 11 24 25 26 27 28 The Court has considered and rejected all of the arguments raised in Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and in Plaintiff’s Opposition. The Court discusses Plaintiff’s principal arguments herein. Neither Plaintiff’s arguments nor the circumstances of this case show any “substantial likelihood of prejudice” resulting from any error allegedly committed by the ALJ. See generally McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 887-88 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the standards applicable to evaluating prejudice). 24 1 reasons to reject a claimant’s testimony where there is no evidence of 2 “malingering”).12 3 specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the ALJ rejected the 4 claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily 5 discredit the claimant’s testimony.” 6 885 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see 7 also Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-7p (explaining how to assess a 8 claimant’s credibility), superseded, SSR 16-3p (eff. Mar. 28, 2016).13 An ALJ’s credibility finding “must be sufficiently Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 9 10 An ALJ may discount lay witness testimony where the testimony is 11 similar to the claimant’s testimony and the ALJ has given legally 12 sufficient reasons for discounting the claimant’s testimony. 13 Valentine v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th 14 Cir.2009) (“In light of our conclusion that the ALJ provided clear and 15 convincing reasons for rejecting Valentine’s own subjective See 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 12 In the absence of an ALJ’s reliance on evidence of “malingering,” most recent Ninth Circuit cases have applied the “clear and convincing” standard. See, e.g., Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2017); Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2015); Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2014); Treichler v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d at 1102; Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 n.9 (9th Cir. 2014); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014-15 & n.18 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Ballard v. Apfel, 2000 WL 1899797, at *2 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2000) (collecting earlier cases). In the present case, the ALJ’s findings are sufficient under either standard, so the distinction between the two standards (if any) is academic. 13 25 26 27 28 The appropriate analysis under the superseding SSR is substantially the same as the analysis under the superseded SSR. See R.P. v. Colvin, 2016 WL 7042259, at *9 n.7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2016) (stating that SSR 16-3p “implemented a change in diction rather than substance”) (citations omitted); see also Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 n.5 (9th Cir. 2017) (suggesting that SSR 16-3p “makes clear what our precedent already required”). 25 1 complaints, and because Ms. Valentine’s testimony was similar to such 2 complaints, it follows that the ALJ gave germane reasons for rejecting 3 her testimony.”); see generally Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d at 1288 4 (“[T]he ALJ can reject the testimony of lay witnesses only if he gives 5 reasons germane to each witness whose testimony he rejects.”). 6 the ALJ stated sufficient reasons for deeming Plaintiff’s subjective 7 complaints and the lay witnesses’ statements less than fully credible. Here, 8 9 In finding Plaintiff capable of performing work limited to simple 10 routine tasks with occasional contact with supervisors and brief and 11 superficial contact with the public and coworkers, the ALJ considered 12 Plaintiff’s statements concerning his limitations (A.R. 35). 13 summarized above, Plaintiff had testified, inter alia, that he 14 attended special education classes with 10 to 12 other students, 15 needed teachers to repeat things more than twice for him to get it 16 “stuck into [his] head”14 and gets nervous and scared around people he 17 does not know (A.R. 76-79, 84-85). As 18 19 To the extent these statements may have suggested greater 20 limitations than the ALJ found to exist, the ALJ found these 21 statements not entirely consistent with other evidence in the record, 22 including other evidence from Plaintiff himself (A.R. 26, 33-35). 23 Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff was capable of greater learning 24 than he or his mother and brother sometimes reported, as evidenced by: 25 26 27 28 14 The vocational expert testified that, if a person with the limitations the ALJ found to exist were further limited by the need to be reminded two to three times a day to complete tasks, or were off task 15 percent or more of the workday, such limitations would preclude employment (A.R. 130). 26 1 (1) an IEP reflecting that Plaintiff was able to increase his reading 2 abilities by more than three grades in one school year (A.R. 720); 3 (2) the testimony of Plaintiff’s brother that Plaintiff plays simple 4 video games without needing instruction (A.R. 74-75); (3) Plaintiff’s 5 testimony that he took a full schedule of 8-9 high school classes and 6 graduated with a regular diploma (A.R. 77-78, 85-86);15 and 7 (4) Plaintiff’s testimony that he was able to work as a stock clerk 8 for Walgreen’s for 100 hours over a two month period, where he learned 9 to work independently stocking shelves and was able to take 10 instruction and learn from his errors (A.R. 89-94). See A.R. 26, 33- 11 35. 12 to walk to and from school by himself and was able to walk to and from 13 Walgreen’s by himself (A.R. 94-96), that he was learning how to cook 14 from his mother and could cook a couple of dishes (A.R. 80-81), and 15 that he could go to the mall and to movies with a friend (A.R. 79-80). 16 See A.R. 35. 17 reports of Plaintiff’s abilities. 18 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (claimant’s inconsistencies can adversely 19 impact claimant’s credibility); Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 20 (9th Cir. 1999) (inconsistences in a claimant’s statements were among 21 the “clear and convincing reasons” for discounting claimant’s The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff had testified that he was able The ALJ was not required to accept other, inconsistent See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15 Plaintiff’s counsel takes issue with the ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s diploma. Counsel argues that Plaintiff did not pass the California proficiency exam. See Plaintiff’s Motion, pp. 6-7 (citing A.R. 685, 797 concerning testing information before Plaintiff’s senior year). The evidence in the record did not require the ALJ to dismiss the significance of the diploma. Although there was discussion of accommodations for testing (A.R. 797), there is no report in the record of any senior year test results. Further, Plaintiff testified that he earned a regular diploma and did not have to take the test (A.R. 85-86). 27 1 credibility). 2 3 The ALJ acknowledged claims by Plaintiff’s mother and brother 4 that Plaintiff could not make new friends, generally did not get along 5 with adults or siblings, could not keep busy on his own, did not 6 finish things he started, required constant reminding to do chores, 7 did not complete chores, has difficulty with video games requiring 8 critical thinking, will not go places by himself, and has difficulty 9 interacting with people he does not know (A.R. 26, 33-35). However, 10 the ALJ also cited evidence to the contrary, e.g.: (1) Plaintiff’s 11 mother had reported to Dr. Sharokhi that Plaintiff generally got along 12 with other children (A.R. 662); (2) Plaintiff’s teachers did not 13 report that Plaintiff had any problems in “interacting and relating 14 with others” (A.R. 761, 774); (3) Plaintiff’s IEP review reported that 15 Plaintiff was able to work well with others, could make and keep 16 friends, did his best to complete assignments and did the majority of 17 his homework (A.R. 823); (4) Plaintiff had testified that he could 18 wash dishes, vacuum, take out trash, clean his room, care for two 19 cats, and work for Walgreen’s without someone constantly watching over 20 him and telling him what to do (A.R. 80-84, 88, 93) (suggesting to the 21 ALJ that any issue with completing household chores was actually a 22 “motivational problem”); and (5) Dr. Sharokhi had reported that 23 Plaintiff’s mother appeared to be highly embellishing Plaintiff’s 24 symptomatology, which included great discrepancies from Plaintiff’s 25 presentation and functioning (A.R. 661-62). 26 ALJ’s discussion of such evidence more than satisfied the requirement 27 of stating reasons germane for the rejection of the lay witness 28 testimony at issue. See A.R. 30, 34-35. The See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 2001) 28 1 (conflicts with the medical evidence or with evidence from the 2 claimant can constitute 3 a lay witness). “germane reasons” to reject the testimony of 4 5 In the present case, the ALJ stated sufficient valid reasons to 6 allow this Court to conclude that the ALJ discounted on permissible 7 grounds the portions of the statements of Plaintiff and the portions 8 of the statements of the lay witnesses on which Plaintiff now relies. 9 See Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d at 885. The Court therefore defers to 10 the ALJ’s credibility determinations. See Lasich v. Astrue, 252 Fed. 11 App’x 823, 825 (9th Cir. 2007) (court will defer to Administration’s 12 credibility determination when the proper process is used and proper 13 reasons for the decision are provided); accord Flaten v. Secretary of 14 Health & Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995).16 15 16 The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s arguments that the ALJ should 17 have included in the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment, 18 and in the hypothetical questioning of the vocational expert, various 19 alleged limitations the ALJ did not find to exist. 20 above, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s residual functional 21 capacity assessment, and the ALJ properly discounted the testimony and 22 statements suggesting greater limitations. 23 posed to a vocational expert need not include all conceivable 24 limitations that a favorable interpretation of the record might As discussed Hypothetical questions 25 26 16 27 28 The Court should not and does not determine the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony. Absent legal error, it is for the Administration, and not this Court, to do so. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750, 755–56 (9th Cir. 1989). 29 1 suggest to exist – only those limitations the ALJ finds to exist. 2 See, e.g., Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 3 2005); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); 4 Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d at 756-57. 5 questioning of the vocational expert included all of the limitations 6 the ALJ properly found to exist. Here, the hypothetical 7 CONCLUSION 8 9 10 For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary 11 judgment is denied and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 12 granted. 13 14 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 15 16 DATED: July 22, 2020. 17 18 19 /s/ CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 30
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