Grand Bayman Belize, Ltd. v. Wells Fargo and Company, et al, No. 2:2019cv07698 - Document 38 (C.D. Cal. 2021)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING WELLS FARGO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. WELLS FARGO SHALL SUBMIT A PROPOSED JUDGMENT WITHIN 7 DAYS OF DATE OF THIS ORDER 17 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II. (lc)
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Grand Bayman Belize, Ltd. v. Wells Fargo and Company, et al Doc. 38 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 United States District Court Central District of California 9 10 11 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 Case 2:19-cv-07698 ODW (RAOx) GRAND BAYMAN BELIZE, LTD., ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [17] v. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY et al., 15 Defendants. 16 I. 17 INTRODUCTION 18 Before the Court is Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s (sued as Wells Fargo 19 & Company) motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff Grand Bayman Belize, Ltd.’s 20 claim for wrongful payment of a wire transfer. (Mot. for Summ. J. (“Mot.”) 4, ECF 21 No. 17.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion.1 II. 22 BACKGROUND 23 On or about October 1, 2018, Grand Bayman received a fraudulent email, 24 purportedly an invoice from one of its vendors, RAD Architecture, Inc. (Notice of 25 Removal Ex. A (“Compl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 1-1.) The email directed Grand Bayman to 26 wire $226,991.45 to a Wells Fargo account ending in x3420 (“Account x3420”). (Id.) 27 28 1 Having carefully reviewed the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. Dockets.Justia.com 1 On October 2, 2018, in accordance with the email, Grand Bayman issued a payment 2 order to its bank to transfer the requested amount to Account x3420 (the “Wire 3 Transfer”). (Id. ¶ 7; Decl. Stephen D. Rothschild ¶ 7, Ex. 5, ECF No. 26 (“Payment 4 Order”).) 5 On October 5, 2018, Wells Fargo received the Wire Transfer, which identified 6 the beneficiary as Wells Fargo Account x3420, RAD Architecture, Inc., located in 7 Miami, Florida. (Wells Fargo’s Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (“SUF”) 1–2, 8 ECF No. 17-3;2 see also Decl. of Michelle Swirtz (“Swirtz Decl.”) Ex. 1, at WF 0019, 9 ECF No. 17-2 (“Wire Details”); Payment Order.) Within seven seconds of receipt, 10 Wells Fargo’s Money Transfer System (“MTS”) processed the Wire Transfer and 11 credited beneficiary Account x3420 with $226,991.45. (SUF 4–8.) By October 17, 12 2018, the funds had been withdrawn and Account x3420 closed. (SUF 10.) On 13 November 1, 2018, Wells Fargo received a message from Grand Bayman’s bank 14 requesting that the funds be returned. (SUF 11.) On May 23, 2019, Grand Bayman initiated this action to retrieve the transferred 15 16 funds, apparently based on California Commercial Code section 11207(a).3 17 Compl. ¶¶ 10, 14.) Wells Fargo now moves for summary judgment, arguing that it 18 falls under the safe harbor of section 11207(b)(1) because it processed the transfer 19 automatically (i.e., without human intervention), based on the account number alone, (See 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 Grand Bayman nominally disputes SUF 2, asserting that the Wire Transfer identified RAD Architecture in Florida as the intended beneficiary. (See Grand Bayman’s Statement of Genuine Disputes (“SGD”) 2, ECF No. 27.) However, Grand Bayman’s “disputed fact” is not inconsistent with Wells Fargo’s SUF 2, and the evidence to which Grand Bayman points supports the truth of Wells Fargo’s SUF 2. Accordingly, the Court finds SUF 2 undisputed. 3 Grand Bayman does not specify in its complaint the law on which it bases its claim. (See generally Compl. (citing no law).) In the briefs, the parties assume the action falls within the ambit of the California Uniform Commercial Code, Division 11. (See Mot. 4; Opp’n 3–10 (asserting sections 11207(a), 11209, 11302(a), and 11303(c)).) As discussed further, infra, Division 11 of the California Uniform Commercial Code governs Grand Bayman’s sole claim, which concerns an unauthorized wire funds transfer. See Zengen, Inc. v. Comerica Bank, 41 Cal. 4th 239, 249, 255 (2007); Chino Com. Bank, N.A. v. Peters, 190 Cal. App. 4th 1163, 1172 (2010). All code section references in this Order are to the California Commercial Code unless otherwise noted. 2 1 and thus had no actual knowledge of a mismatch between the beneficiary account 2 number and name. (Mot. 4.) 3 Grand Bayman purports to dispute that Wells Fargo processed the Wire 4 Transfer automatically. (SGD 3; Opp’n 8–9, ECF No. 26.) However, the parties do 5 not dispute that Wells Fargo’s automated MTS confirmed Account x3420 was a Wells 6 Fargo account and passed an external screening before the MTS credited Account 7 x3420. (SGD 4–8.) The parties also do not dispute that the entire transfer process 8 lasted only seven seconds. (See id.) Nevertheless, Grand Bayman contends that 9 Wells Fargo does not fall within the safe harbor because it had actual knowledge of 10 the mismatch between the beneficiary’s account number and name when it processed 11 the Wire Transfer. (SGD 9, 11; Opp’n 8–9.) 12 III. LEGAL STANDARD 13 A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 14 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 15 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The burden of establishing the absence of a 16 genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving party, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 17 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986), and the court must view the facts and draw reasonable 18 inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 19 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). A disputed fact is “material” where the resolution of that fact 20 might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and the dispute is 21 “genuine” where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 22 the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 23 Conclusory or speculative testimony in affidavits is insufficient to raise genuine issues 24 of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 25 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Moreover, though the Court may not weigh conflicting 26 evidence or make credibility determinations, there must be more than a mere scintilla 27 of contradictory evidence to survive summary judgment. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 28 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 3 1 Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party cannot simply 2 rest on the pleadings or argue that any disagreement or “metaphysical doubt” about a 3 material issue of fact precludes summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. 4 v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23. 5 Nor will uncorroborated allegations and “self-serving testimony” create a genuine 6 issue of material fact. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th 7 Cir. 2002). The court should grant summary judgment against a party who fails to 8 demonstrate facts sufficient to establish an element essential to the case when that 9 party will ultimately bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 10 Pursuant to the Local Rules, parties moving for summary judgment must file a 11 proposed “Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law” that should 12 set out “the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine 13 dispute.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-1. A party opposing the motion must file a “Statement of 14 Genuine Disputes” setting forth all material facts as to which it contends there exists a 15 genuine dispute. C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-2. “[T]he Court may assume that material facts as 16 claimed and adequately supported by the moving party are admitted to exist without 17 controversy except to the extent that such material facts are (a) included in the 18 ‘Statement of Genuine Disputes’ and (b) controverted by declaration or other written 19 evidence filed in opposition to the motion.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-3. IV. 20 DISCUSSION 21 Wells Fargo moves for summary judgment on grounds that it is entitled to 22 protection under section 11207(b), because it processed the Wire Transfer 23 automatically without actual knowledge of the mismatch between account name and 24 number. (Mot. 4) 25 “Article 4A of the UCC governs fund transfers, which includes wire 26 transfers . . . [and] has been adopted in California as Division 11 of the California 27 Uniform Commercial Code.” Chino Com. Bank, 190 Cal. App. 4th at 1172 (citation 28 omitted). A “‘[f]unds transfer’ means the series of transactions, beginning with the 4 1 originator’s payment order, made for the purpose of making payment to the 2 beneficiary of the order[, and] includes any payment order issued by the originator’s 3 bank . . . intended to carry out the originator’s payment order.” Sliders Trading Co. 4 L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, No. 17-CV-04930-LB, 2017 WL 6539843, at *6 (N.D. 5 Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) (quoting Cal. Com. Code § 11104(a)). Here, Grand Bayman (the 6 “originator”) requested that its bank (the “originator’s bank” or “receiving bank”) 7 issue a payment order to Wells Fargo (the “beneficiary’s bank”) to wire funds to 8 Account x3420, RAD Architecture (the “beneficiary”). (See Payment Order; Wire 9 Details WF 0018–19.)4 Accordingly, Division 11 governs this dispute. The Division 11 statute upon which Grand Bayman appears to primarily rely, 10 11 section 11207(a), states: 15 Subject to subdivision (b), if, in a payment order received by the beneficiary’s bank, the name, bank account number, or other identification of the beneficiary refers to a nonexistent or unidentifiable person or account, no person has rights as a beneficiary of the order and acceptance of the order cannot occur. 16 Cal. Com. Code § 11207(a). Essentially, Grand Bayman claims Wells Fargo violated 17 this provision by accepting the Wire Transfer. (Opp’n 5–7.) 12 13 14 18 However, section 11207(b) applies where, as here, a beneficiary’s bank receives 19 a payment order that “identifies the beneficiary both by name and by an identifying or 20 bank account number and the name and number identify different persons.” Cal. 21 Com. Code § 11207(b). In such a case, section 11207(b) expressly authorizes the 22 beneficiary’s bank to rely on the account number “so long as the bank does not know 23 that the beneficiary’s name and account number refer to different persons.” TME 24 25 26 27 28 4 See Cal. Com. Code §§ 11103(a)(2) (“ Beneficiary’ means the person to be paid by the beneficiary’s bank.”), 11103(a)(3) (“‘Beneficiary’s bank’ means the bank identified in a payment order in which an account of the beneficiary is to be credited pursuant to the order . . . .”), 11103(a)(4) (“‘Receiving bank’ means the bank to which the sender’s instruction is addressed.”), 11104(c) (“‘Originator’ means the sender of the first payment order in a funds transfer.”), 11104(d) (“‘Originator’s bank’ means . . . the receiving bank to which the [originator’s] payment order . . . is issued . . . .”). 5 1 Enters., Inc. v. Norwest Corp., 124 Cal. App. 4th 1021, 1031 (2004); Cal. Com. Code 2 § 11207(b)(1) (permitting reliance on the account number “as the proper identification 3 of the beneficiary of the order”). In this context, “‘[k]now’ means to have actual 4 knowledge.” TME, 124 Cal. App. 4th at 1031 (emphasis added). The beneficiary’s bank has no duty to “determine whether the name and number 5 6 refer to the same person.” TME, 124 Cal. App. 4th at 1032; Cal. Com. Code 7 § 11207(b)(1). This is because “funds transfers should be speedy, inexpensive, and 8 not labor intensive.” White & Summers, U.C.C. § 24:6 (6th ed.). Consequently, “[a] 9 very large percentage of payment orders . . . are processed by automated means 10 using . . . the identifying or bank account number without human reading of the 11 payment order itself.” Cal. Com. Code § 11207, cmt. 2.5 Thus, although a payment 12 order may allow inclusion of the beneficiary’s name, that information “plays no part 13 in the process of payment.” Id. (emphasis added). “[I]f a duty to [determine that the 14 name and number match] is imposed on the beneficiary’s bank[,] the benefits of 15 automated payment are lost . . . .” TME, 124 Cal. App. 4th at 1032 (quoting Cal. 16 Com. Code § 11207, cmt. 2.). 17 Here, Wells Fargo asserts that it automatically processed the Wire Transfer 18 based on account number alone, with no human intervention and no actual knowledge 19 of the mismatch. (Mot. 7–9.) Wells Fargo further asserts it did not learn about the 20 mismatch until November 2, 2018—four weeks after the transfer—when Grand 21 Bayman’s bank requested a wire recall. 22 section 11207(b), Wells Fargo seeks summary judgment, which the Court finds 23 appropriate for the following reasons. 24 A. (Mot. 8.) Based on these facts and Wells Fargo Carries Its Burden 25 The undisputed facts support Wells Fargo’s assertions. Wells Fargo’s MTS 26 received the Wire Transfer on October 5, 2018, at 07:13:39.08 Central Time. (SUF 1, 27 28 5 The Official Code Comments to Division 11 are persuasive in interpreting these statutes. Zengen, 41 Cal. 4th at 252. 6 1 4.) The Wire Transfer ordered $226,991.45 transferred from Grand Bayman to 2 Account x3420, under the name RAD Architecture. (SUF 1–2.) Upon receipt, the 3 MTS immediately used an “Autoretrieve” function to confirm the beneficiary account 4 number, Account x3420, was a Wells Fargo account number. 5 07:13:42.60, the MTS shared the pending Wire Transfer order with an external 6 screening application for screening pursuant to the Office of Foreign Assets Control 7 (“OFAC”). (SUF 6.) The application confirmed to MTS that the Wire Transfer order 8 passed OFAC screening. (SUF 7.) Accordingly, on October 5, 2018, at 07:13:46.50 9 (approximately seven seconds after the Wire Transfer was received), Account x3420 10 was credited with $226,991.45. (SUF 8.) Wells Fargo supports these undisputed facts 11 with competent declaration testimony and business records, neither of which Grand 12 Bayman challenges. (See Swirtz Decl. ¶¶ 14–15; Wire Details WF 0020–21.) Thus, 13 Wells Fargo adequately supports that it processed the Wire Transfer automatically, 14 without human intervention, based on the account number, and had no actual 15 knowledge of the mismatch at the time. (SUF 5.) At 16 The case of TME Enterprises, Inc. v. Norwest Corp. is instructive. 124 Cal. 17 App. 4th 1021. There, TME requested a wire transfer but provided an account number 18 and name identifying different persons. Id. at 1033. The California Court of Appeal 19 affirmed that section 11207(b)(1)’s safe harbor provided the bank immunity because, 20 even though the wire operator manually processed the wire, the bank relied on the 21 account number specified in the wire transfer order and the evidence failed to show 22 that the bank had actual knowledge of the mismatch. Id. at 1025, 1033–35. The same 23 result obtains here. 24 beneficiary by an account number, Account x3420, and a name, RAD Architecture, 25 identifying different persons. 26 knowledge of a mismatch when it processed the wire based solely on the account 27 number. If anything, the facts here support application of the safe harbor more 28 strongly than in TME, because, here, Wells Fargo processed the wire transfer Grand Bayman requested a wire transfer and identified the No evidence suggests that Wells Fargo had actual 7 1 automatically, without human intervention, whereas in TME, the wire operator 2 processed the wire manually. Id. at 1033–35. Thus, Wells Fargo establishes that, as in 3 TME, the safe harbor applies. 4 B. Grand Bayman Does Not Raise a Genuine Dispute of Fact 5 Grand Bayman attempts, unsuccessfully, to dispute that the Wire Transfer 6 occurred automatically without human intervention (see SGD 3), and that Wells Fargo 7 had no actual knowledge of the mismatch (see id. 9, 11). 8 First, Grand Bayman suggests the Wire Transfer was not automatically 9 processed because the Wire Details reflect a wire-transfer routing number associated 10 with a San Francisco branch, while a bank statement for Account x3420 happens to 11 list a direct-deposit routing number associated with a New Jersey branch. (Opp’n 9.) 12 Based on these two data points, Grand Bayman argues that Wells Fargo “redirected” 13 the Wire Transfer funds to New Jersey, and that the “redirection suggests a manual 14 intervention.” (Id.) But Grand Bayman fails to explain how an account holder’s 15 direct-deposit routing number being listed on their bank statement indicates, in any 16 way, that a manual redirection occurred. (See id.; SGD 3.) Indeed, this “evidence” is 17 irrelevant to the question of whether the Wire Transfer was automatically processed, 18 and Grand Bayman fails to raise any genuine dispute as to that established fact. See 19 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (discussing that a non-moving party must do “more than 20 simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” to raise a 21 genuine dispute). 22 Next, Grand Bayman contends that Wells Fargo knew about the mismatch 23 between the beneficiary account number and name because the account information 24 on file for Account x3420 gave Wells Fargo constructive knowledge. (SGD 9, 11.) 25 Even assuming Wells Fargo had constructive knowledge, however, the California 26 Court of Appeal rejected this very argument in TME Enterprises. There, TME argued 27 the safe harbor provision did not protect the bank from liability because signature 28 cards on file for the named beneficiary gave the bank constructive knowledge that the 8 1 named beneficiary did not match the identified account number. Id. at 1033. The 2 court found that “[c]onstructive knowledge . . . is insufficient to establish a violation” 3 where actual knowledge is required. Id. (citing U.C.C. § 4A-207, cmt.2). The same 4 applies here: constructive knowledge does not equal actual knowledge, and Grand 5 Bayman fails to raise a genuine dispute regarding Wells Fargo’s lack of actual 6 knowledge. 7 Finally, Grand Bayman suggests that Wells Fargo had actual knowledge of the 8 mismatch between beneficiary name and number because the words “possible name 9 mismatch” appear in the Wire Details. (Opp’n 8.) However, Wells Fargo establishes 10 in its moving papers that this phrase appears as the result of a missing MTS software 11 application and, consequently, rather than indicating an actual mismatch, the phrase 12 would have appeared in the log even if all respects of the transaction matched 13 perfectly. (Mot. 9; Decl. Swirtz ¶ 20). Grand Bayman does not address this point and 14 offers no evidence beyond the phrase’s mere appearance nor any explanation in 15 response. (See Opp’n 8.) This is insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of fact. See 16 Addisu, 198 F.3d at 1134, 1142 (requiring more than a mere scintilla of contradictory 17 evidence to survive summary judgment). 18 In short, even construing all reasonable inferences in Grand Bayman’s favor, no 19 reasonable juror could conclude a human intervened in the Wire Transfer or that Wells 20 Fargo had actual knowledge of the mismatch at the time it processed the transfer. 21 C. Grand Bayman’s Remaining Arguments Fail 22 Grand Bayman asserts a number of additional arguments that the safe harbor of 23 section 11207(b) does not apply or that processing the wire transfer was nevertheless 24 wrongful. (See generally Opp’n.) Each fails. 25 1. Complete Disconnect Between Fraudulent and Intended Beneficiary 26 Grand Bayman argues that the mismatch between the name and address of the 27 fraudulent beneficiary—Julieta Aquino 28 beneficiary—RAD Architecture in Florida—constitutes a “complete disconnect,” not 9 in New Jersey—and the intended 1 entitled to protection under the safe harbor. (Opp’n 1, 7–8.) On this issue, Grand 2 Bayman cites TME for the proposition that a bank “may not take advantage of the 3 section 11207(b) safe harbor if there is a ‘complete disconnect between the names.’” 4 (Opp’n 8 (quoting TME, 124 Cal. App. 4th at 1034).) But the language Grand 5 Bayman omits and the context of this quote demonstrate its inapplicability. First, the 6 actual language from TME is that a “bank should not be exposed to potential liability 7 for accepting a wire unless there is a complete disconnect between the names.” TME, 8 124 Cal. App. 4th at 1034. Contrary to what Grand Bayman represents, this language 9 does not completely bar application of the safe harbor when a complete disconnect 10 exists. Second, TME is distinguishable from the present case because in TME, a wire 11 operator manually reviewed and processed the wire transfer. 12 (discussing that, just because a wire operator manually reviews a wire transfer, that 13 “does not mean . . . that the employee has actual knowledge that the name and the 14 number refer to different people.”). Although a complete disconnect might preclude 15 applicability of section 11207(b)’s safe harbor when a wire transfer is manually 16 reviewed by a human who should recognize a glaring mismatch, Grand Bayman fails 17 to persuade that same principle should apply when a wire transfer is automatically 18 processed without human intervention, as is the case here. See id. at 1034 19 Grand Bayman’s reliance on Venture Recycling Group, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase 20 & Co., on this point is equally unavailing. (See Opp’n 8 (citing Venture Recycling, 21 No. CV 19-2253-MWF (KSX), 2019 WL 4543104, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2019)).) 22 In that case, the court denied a motion to dismiss because it found the plaintiff had 23 sufficiently alleged actual knowledge and a complete disconnect. Venture Recycling, 24 2019 WL 4543104, at *5. Here, the burden on summary judgment is higher than at 25 the pleading stage. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (discussing that the non-moving 26 party must go beyond the pleadings to survive summary judgment). Grand Bayman 27 offers nothing to support that any Wells Fargo employee reviewed the Wire Transfer 28 10 1 such that she would have had an opportunity to notice the discrepancy. The “complete 2 disconnect” theory is simply inapplicable on these facts. 3 2. Alternative Statutory Grounds for Relief 4 Finally, Grand Bayman argues that payment of the wire transfer was wrongful 5 under various other sections of Division 11. (See Opp’n 3–10 (seeking to apply 6 sections 11209(c), 11302(a)(1), and 11303(c)).) However, section 11207 “resolves the 7 issue” of a beneficiary bank’s responsibility “in carrying out a payment order in which 8 the identification of the beneficiary by name and number is conflicting.” Cal. Com. 9 Code § 11207, cmt. ¶ 2. As the issue here stems from a conflict between the provided 10 beneficiary name and number, section 11207(b), and the analysis above, clearly 11 governs. 12 Nevertheless, Grand Bayman’s arguments under other provisions also fail. 13 Grand Bayman contends Wells Fargo wrongfully accepted the transfer under 14 section 11209(c) because that section requires the beneficiary to have an account with 15 the receiving bank and RAD Architecture did not. (Opp’n 3–5.) However, Grand 16 Bayman studiously ignores that the identified beneficiary Account x3420 did have an 17 account with Wells Fargo. 18 “acceptance by the beneficiary bank [Wells Fargo] does not create any obligation to 19 the sender [Grand Bayman].” Cal. Com. Code § 11209, cmt. 4. Lastly, on their face, 20 neither section 11302(a) nor section 11303(c) apply to Wells Fargo in its role as the 21 beneficiary’s bank here. 22 receiving bank); 11303(c) (providing that “issuer of the erroneous order [Grand 23 Bayman] is entitled to recover from the beneficiary of the order”) (emphasis added).6 (See SUF 5; Wire Details WF 0020.) See id. §§ 11302(a) (providing the obligations of the V. 24 Regardless, CONCLUSION 25 The undisputed facts demonstrate that Wells Fargo did precisely what section 26 11207(b)(1) permits: it relied on an account number in processing a wire transfer 27 without knowing the beneficiary name and number referred to different persons. Cal. 28 6 The Court finds Grand Bayman’s remaining arguments equally unpersuasive and/or unsupported. 11 1 Com. Code § 11207(b)(1). “For originators and other senders[,] the message 2 embodied in [section 11207(b)] is that they should take steps to see that the numbers 3 on their messages are the correct numbers. They should take no satisfaction in the fact 4 that the proper names appear on the messages.” TME, 124 Cal. App. 4th at 1037 5 (quoting White & Summers, U.C.C., § 24-6). Grand Bayman may have failed to heed 6 the message, but it may not now find satisfaction in having listed the proper name. 7 Construing all reasonable inferences in Grand Bayman’s favor, Wells Fargo 8 establishes that it processed the Wire Transfer automatically based on the account 9 number provided, without actual knowledge of a mismatch between the beneficiary 10 name and number. Grand Bayman fails to raise a genuine issue of fact to dispute that 11 Wells Fargo is entitled to the protections of the safe harbor. Accordingly, the safe 12 harbor applies, and Grand Bayman’s claim for wrongful payment of a wire transfer 13 fails as a matter of law. The Court GRANTS Wells Fargo’s Motion for Summary 14 Judgment. Wells Fargo shall submit a Proposed Judgment within seven days of the 15 date of this order. 16 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 January 21, 2021 20 21 22 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28 12
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