Antonio Fernandez v. O Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC et al, No. 2:2019cv05464 - Document 50 (C.D. Cal. 2021)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S UNRUH ACT CLAIM WITHOUT PREJUDICE 34 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II (lc)
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Antonio Fernandez v. O Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC et al Doc. 50 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court Central District of California 8 9 10 11 ANTONIO FERNANDEZ, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 v. Case No. 2:19-cv-05464-ODW (KSx) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S UNRUH ACT CLAIM [34] O’REILLY AUTO ENTERPRISES, LLC, et al., Defendants. 16 17 I. 18 INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 19 On June 24, 2019, Plaintiff Antonio Fernandez filed a Complaint asserting a 20 claim for injunctive relief arising out of an alleged violation of the Americans with 21 Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and a claim for damages pursuant to California’s Unruh 22 Act. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Presently before the Court is Defendant O’Reilly Auto 23 Enterprises, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Federal Rule 24 of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1). (Mot. Dismiss Unruh Act Claim (“Motion” or 25 “Mot.”), ECF No. 34.) The matter is fully briefed. (Opp’n, ECF No. 36; Reply, ECF 26 No. 38.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion.1 27 28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. Dockets.Justia.com II. 1 LEGAL STANDARD 2 Rule 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to seek dismissal of a complaint for lack of 3 subject matter jurisdiction. A defendant may bring a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss 4 based on a lack of standing. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) 5 (“Because standing . . . pertain[s] to a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under 6 Article III, [it is] properly raised in a motion to dismiss under [Rule] 12(b)(1), not 7 Rule 12(b)(6).”). “A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.” 8 Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing White, 9 227 F.3d at 1242). A facial attack is based on the challenger’s assertion that 10 allegations in the complaint are “insufficient on their face to invoke federal 11 jurisdiction.” Id. “By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of 12 the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. III. 13 DISCUSSION 14 Defendant claims that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental 15 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim because Plaintiff is a high-frequency 16 litigant who seeks to avoid California’s heightened pleading standards and increased 17 filing fees for such claims. (See generally Mot.) 18 A. ADA and Unruh Act Claims 19 The ADA prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and 20 equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 21 accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, 22 leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. 23 § 12182(a). Under the ADA, “damages are not recoverable . . . only injunctive relief 24 is available.” Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. 25 § 12188(a)(1)). 26 The Unruh Act provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of [California] are 27 free and equal, and no matter what their . . . disability . . . are entitled to the full and 28 equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business 2 1 establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). The Unruh Act 2 also provides that a violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of § 51 of the Unruh 3 Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). Unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act allows for recovery of 4 monetary damages. A plaintiff may recover actual damages for each and every 5 offense “up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case 6 less than four thousand dollars ($4,000).” Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). “The litigant need 7 not prove she suffered actual damages to recover the independent statutory damages 8 of $4,000.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 2007). 9 B. 10 California’s Limitations on the Filing of Construction-Related Accessibility Claims 11 “In 2012, in an attempt to deter baseless claims and vexatious litigation, 12 California adopted heightened pleading requirements for disability discrimination 13 lawsuits under the Unruh Act.” Velez v. Il Fornaio (America) Corp., CV 3:18-1840 14 CAB (MDD), 2018 WL 6446169, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018). These heightened 15 pleading requirements apply to actions alleging a “construction-related accessibility 16 claim,” which California law defines as “any civil claim in a civil action with respect 17 to a place of public accommodation, including, but not limited to, a claim brought 18 under Section 51, 54, 54.1, or 55, based wholly or in part on an alleged violation of 19 any construction-related accessibility standard.” 20 California’s heightened pleading standard for construction-related accessibility claims 21 requires a plaintiff to include specific facts concerning the plaintiff’s claim, including 22 the specific barriers encountered or how the plaintiff was deterred and each date on 23 which the plaintiff encountered each barrier or was deterred. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 24 § 425.50(a). California law requires plaintiffs to verify their complaints alleging 25 construction-related accessibility claims. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.50(b)(1). A 26 complaint alleging construction-related accessibility claims that is not verified is 27 subject to a motion to strike. Id. 28 3 Cal. Civ. Code § 55.52(a)(1). 1 When California continued to experience large numbers of these actions, 2 California imposed additional limitations on “high-frequency litigants.” These 3 additional restrictions became effective on October 15, 2015. Under California law, a 4 “high-frequency litigant” is defined as: 8 A plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12month period immediately preceding the filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation. 9 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(1). The definition of high-frequency litigant also 10 extends to attorneys. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(2). In support of its 11 imposition of additional requirements on high-frequency litigants, the California 12 Legislature found and declared: 5 6 7 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 According to information from the California Commission on Disability Access, more than one-half, or 54 percent, of all construction-related accessibility complaints filed between 2012 and 2014 were filed by two law firms. Fortysix percent of all complaints were filed by a total of 14 parties. Therefore, a very small number of plaintiffs have filed a disproportionately large number of the constructionrelated accessibility claims in the state, from 70 to 300 lawsuits each year. Moreover, these lawsuits are frequently filed against small businesses on the basis of boilerplate complaints, apparently seeking quick cash settlements rather than correction of the accessibility violation. This practice unfairly taints the reputation of other innocent disabled consumers who are merely trying to go about their daily lives accessing public accommodations as they are entitled to have full and equal access under the state’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (Section 51 of the Civil Code) and the federal Americans with Disability Act of 1990 (Public Law 101336). 27 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(a)(2). In response to these “special and unique 28 circumstances,” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(3), California imposed a “high- 4 1 frequency litigant fee” requiring high-frequency litigants to pay a $1,000 filing fee at 2 the time of the filing of the initial complaint in addition to the standard filing fees. 3 Cal. Gov’t Code § 70616.5. California law also requires complaints filed by high- 4 frequency litigants to allege certain additional facts, including whether the action is 5 filed by, or on behalf of, a high-frequency litigant, the number of construction-related 6 accessibility claims filed by the high-frequency litigant in the preceding 12 months, 7 the high-frequency litigant plaintiff’s reason for being in the geographic area of the 8 defendant’s business, and the reason why the high-frequency litigant plaintiff desired 9 to access the defendant’s business. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.50(a)(4)(A). 10 C. Supplemental Jurisdiction 11 In an action over which a district court possesses original jurisdiction, that court 12 “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims 13 in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 14 controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 15 Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, district courts have discretion to decline to 16 exercise supplemental jurisdiction: 18 The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if— 19 (1) 17 20 21 22 23 24 the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. are other 25 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Supreme Court has described 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) as a 26 “codification” of the principles of “‘economy, convenience, fairness, and comity’” 27 that underlie the Supreme Court’s earlier jurisprudence concerning pendent 28 jurisdiction. City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172–73 (1997) 5 1 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988)); see also United 2 Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (citation omitted) (“It has 3 consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not 4 of plaintiff’s right. 5 convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should 6 hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though bound to apply state 7 law to them. Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of 8 comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer- 9 footed reading of applicable law.”). Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, 10 District courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state law 11 claims “[d]epending on a host of factors” including “the circumstances of the 12 particular case, the nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing state 13 law, and the relationship between the state and federal claims.” City of Chicago, 14 522 U.S. at 173. The supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding 15 that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court 16 should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values 17 of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” 18 484 U.S. at 350). Id. (quoting Cohill, 19 The Ninth Circuit does not require an “explanation for a district court’s reasons 20 [for declining supplemental jurisdiction] when the district court acts under” 28 U.S.C. 21 §§ 1367(c)(1)-(3), San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 478 22 (9th Cir. 1998), but does require a district court to “articulate why the circumstances 23 of the case are exceptional in addition to inquiring whether the balance of the Gibbs 24 values provide compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction in such circumstances.” 25 Exec. Software N. Am. Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 26 1545, 1558 (9th Cir. 1994). According to the Ninth Circuit, this “inquiry is not 27 particularly burdensome.” Id. When declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 28 under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4), “the court must identify the predicate that triggers the 6 1 applicability of the category (the exceptional circumstances), and then determine 2 whether, in its judgment, the underlying Gibbs values are best served by declining 3 jurisdiction in the particular case (the compelling reasons).” Id. 4 D. 5 The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Construction-Related Accessibility Claim 6 Because California’s heightened pleading standards and increased filing fees do 7 not apply in federal court, plaintiffs can circumvent the restrictions California has 8 imposed on Unruh Act claims alleging construction-related accessibility claims 9 simply by relying on § 1367(a)’s grant of supplemental jurisdiction to file their Unruh 10 Act claims in federal court when they combine construction-related accessibility 11 claims with an ADA claim for injunctive relief. The number of construction-related 12 accessibility claims filed in the Central District has skyrocketed both numerically and 13 as a percentage of total civil filings since California began its efforts to curtail the 14 filing of such actions. According to statistics compiled by the Clerk’s Office, in 2013, 15 the first year in which California’s initial limitations on such cases were in effect, 16 there were 419 ADA cases filed in the Central District, which constituted 3% of the 17 civil actions filed. Filings of such cases increased from 928 (7% of civil cases) in 18 2014, the year before the imposition of the additional $1,000 filing fee and additional 19 pleading requirements for high-frequency litigants, to 1,386 (10% of civil cases) in 20 2016, the first full year of those requirements. The number and percentage of such 21 cases filed in the Central District has increased in each year since California acted to 22 limit the filings by high-frequency litigants, reaching 1,670 (12% of civil cases) in 23 2017, 1,670 (18% of civil cases) in 2018, 3,595 cases (24% of civil cases) in 2019, 24 and 2,149 cases (27% of civil cases) in the first six months of 2020. 25 By enacting restrictions on the filing of construction-related accessibility 26 claims, California has expressed a desire to limit the financial burdens California’s 27 businesses may face for claims for damages under the Unruh Act and other state law 28 theories. By filing these actions in federal court, Plaintiff has evaded these limits and 7 1 sought a forum in which Plaintiff can claim these state law damages in a manner 2 inconsistent with the state law’s requirements. This situation, and the burden the ever- 3 increasing number of such cases poses to the federal courts, presents “exceptional 4 circumstances” and “compelling reasons” that justify the Court’s discretion to decline 5 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and any other state 6 law claims in this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). 7 Declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and 8 any other construction-related accessibility claim in these circumstances supports the 9 14 values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity: As a high-frequency litigant . . . the Court finds it would be improper to allow Plaintiff to use federal court as an endaround to California’s pleading requirements. Therefore, as a matter of comity, and in deference to California’s substantial interest in discouraging unverified disability discrimination claims, the Court declines supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim. 15 Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1031 (S.D. Cal. 2017); see also Gibbs, 16 383 U.S. at 726; Molski v. Hitching Post I Rest., Inc., CV 04-1077 SVW (RNBx), 17 2005 WL 3952248, at *9 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2005) (“Because the California courts 18 should be given an opportunity to interpret California’s disability laws, because the 19 calculated effort to avoid having California courts decide issues of California law is to 20 be discouraged, and because the parties themselves are entitled to a surer-footed 21 interpretation of California’s disability laws, the Court finds that compelling reasons 22 exist to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Molski’s state law claims.”). 10 11 12 13 23 Although some plaintiffs and their counsel have argued that they file in federal 24 court not to evade California’s restrictions, but because of the quality of the judges, 25 the ease of the ECF system for filing, and the prevalence of federal ADA decisional 26 authority, the Court finds such arguments unpersuasive and belied by the recent nature 27 of the dramatic increase in the filing of such cases in federal court. Indeed, those 28 reasons, if true at all, do not explain why nearly nine times more construction-related 8 1 accessibility actions are being filed in the Central District in 2019 than were filed in 2 2013. As one district court recently explained: 16 In attempting to show that his decision to file in federal court is not simply an attempt to evade California’s heightened pleading rules, Schutza insists the ‘quality of judges [and] the quality of legal rulings’ is higher in federal court. This argument, of course, flies in the face of our judicial system’s equal respect for state and federal courts. The convenience of electronic filing and the widespread availability of published opinions—other arguments Schutza advances—may be creature comforts that make filing in federal court more enticing, but they hardly outweigh the disservice that is done to California’s efforts to implement and interpret its own law when federal courts exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. If Schutza were able to articulate a persuasive reason for his decision to file in federal court, perhaps this would be a different story. As it stands, though, the Court can discern no basis for the state law claim being filed in federal court other than to prevent California from being able to apply and enforce its own rules. 17 Schutza v. Alessio Leasing, Inc. (Alessio Leasing), CV 18-2154 LAB (AGS), 18 2019 WL 1546950, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2019); see also Schutza, 262 F. Supp. 3d 19 at 1031 (“It is unclear what advantage—other than avoiding state-imposed pleading 20 requirements—Plaintiff gains by being in federal court since his sole remedy under 21 the ADA is injunctive relief, which is also available under the Unruh Act.”). “Federal 22 courts may properly take measures to discourage forum-shopping, and here, where 23 Plaintiff has filed over one hundred disability discrimination cases, and settled more 24 than fifty of them in a two-year period, the Court finds this to be a compelling reason 25 to decline supplemental jurisdiction.” Schutza, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 1031 (footnote 26 omitted) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965)). 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 27 One firm that has filed over 1400 actions asserting construction-related 28 accessibility claims in the Central District since 2016 admitted in its Responses to the 9 1 Court’s Order to Show Cause, that filing in federal court is done to avoid the 2 “financial burden” of California’s $1000 high-frequency litigant fee. (See Docket 3 No. 16, Case No. CV 19-9468-ODW (SKx) at 7 (“[F]iling in state court would cause a 4 ‘high-frequency litigant’ . . . such as Plaintiff to incur an unreasonable amount of 5 financial burden in the amount of $1,000. Such financial burden would prohibit 6 Plaintiff from enforcing his right to bring a substantial claim against individuals and 7 entities who have injured Plaintiff in his right provided by ADA and applicable state 8 statutes.”).) It is not, under the Gibbs factors, “fair” to defendants that plaintiffs may 9 pursue construction-related accessibility claims in this Court while evading the 10 limitations California has imposed on such claims. To allow federal courts to become 11 an escape hatch allowing plaintiffs to pursue such claims—regardless of whether a 12 particular plaintiff or the small number of law firms that frequently pursue these 13 actions currently satisfies the definition of a “high-frequency litigant”—is also an 14 affront to the comity between federal and state courts. 15 California’s elected representatives, not this Court, have enacted laws 16 restricting construction-related accessibility claims, and, as a result, dictated that these 17 claims be treated differently than other actions. 18 enterprising attorneys have evaded California’s limitations on construction-related 19 accessibility claims by filing these actions in federal court, this Court has not, as 20 some plaintiffs’ counsel suggest, engaged in a “calendar clearing exercise,” acted out 21 of “animus towards the case load of meritorious ADA and Unruh claims,” or 22 “discriminat[ed] against those with disabilities.” 23 supplemental jurisdiction in these extraordinary circumstances reflect a preference for 24 California’s restrictions on construction-related accessibility claims or offend the Erie 25 doctrine as some plaintiffs suggest in their Responses to the Court’s Order to Show 26 Cause. That the astronomical growth in the filing of these cases in federal court has 27 coincided with California’s limitations on construction-related accessibility claims 28 suggests that it is precisely because the federal courts have not adopted California’s 10 By merely recognizing that Nor does declining to exercise 1 limitations on such claims that federal courts have become the preferred forum for 2 them. 3 The Court therefore concludes that “exceptional circumstances” and 4 “compelling reasons” support the Court’s decision to decline to exercise supplemental 5 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and other construction-related accessibility 6 state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). In reaching this conclusion, the Court 7 notes that a significant number of judges both within the Central District of California 8 and elsewhere have similarly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 9 construction-related accessibility claims asserted under state law. See, e.g., Langer v. 10 Easton, CV 19-8562 PSG (ADSx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2019) (Gutierrez, J.); Zatian v. 11 Triple M Props., SACV 19-1951 JLS (DFMx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2019) (Staton, J.); 12 Whitaker v. Gomez, CV 19-8378 RSWL (MRWx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2020) (Lew, J.); 13 Garcia v. Dilbiyan, CV 20-1389 CJC (JCx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2020) (Carney, J.); 14 Garcia v. Khalil, CV 20-1280 ODW (PVCx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2020) (Wright, J.); 15 Garcia v. Ross Stores, Inc., CV 20-1392 RGK (JPRx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2020) 16 (Klausner, J.); Fernandez v. McAuley, CV 20-1279 MWF (GJSx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 17 2020) (Fitzgerald, J.); Garcia v. Thomas, CV 20-684 VAP (PLAx) (C.D. Cal. May 7, 18 2020) (Phillips, J.); Whitaker v. 7707 Sunset, Inc., CV 20-1149 DMG (AGRx) (C.D. 19 Cal. May 26, 2020) (Gee, J.); see also Reyes v. Snoozetown, LLC, CV 3:18-498 H 20 (JLB), 2018 WL 3438753 (S.D. Cal. July 16, 2018) (Huff, J.); Schutza v. Lamden, CV 21 3:17-2562 L (JLB), 2018 WL 4385377 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2018) (Lorenz, J.); 22 Rutherford v. Ara Lebanese Grill, CV 18-1497 AJB (WVG), 2019 WL 1057919 23 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019) (Battaglia, J.)2; Schutza v. Alessio Leasing, Inc., CV 18-2154 24 LAB (AGS), 2019 WL 1546950 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2019) (Burns, J.); Reyes v. 25 26 27 28 2 Several of the Responses filed by the firms representing plaintiffs cited to Schoors v. Seaport Village Operating Co., CV 16-3089 AJB (BGS), 2017 WL 1807954 (S.D. Cal. May 5, 2017), in which Judge Battaglia denied a defendant’s request to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. More recently, in Rutherford v. Ara Lebanese Grill, Judge Battaglia concluded that extraordinary circumstances and compelling reasons justified his decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s construction-related accessibility claim. 11 1 Flourshings Plus, Inc., CV 19-261 JM (WVG), 2019 WL 1958284 (S.D. Cal. May 2, 2 2019) (Miller, J.); Velez v. Cloghan Concepts, LLC, CV 3:18-1901 BTM (BGS), 2019 3 WL 2423145 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2019) (Moskowitz, J.); Langer v. Petras, CV 19- 4 1408 CAB (BGS), 2019 WL 3459107 (S.D. Cal. July 31, 2019) (Bencivengo, J.). 5 Exercising the Court’s discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction does not 6 deprive Plaintiff of any remedies. Nor does it allow an ADA claim for injunctive 7 relief to go unaddressed. The ADA claim remains pending in this Court. That the 8 ADA contains an anti-preemption clause does not indicate, as some plaintiffs’ counsel 9 suggest, that Congress intended for federal courts to provide a forum allowing 10 plaintiffs to evade state law restrictions on state law claims. See 42 U.S.C. 11 § 12201(b). Whatever inefficiencies are created by the Court’s decision to decline to 12 exercise supplemental jurisdiction are problems created by Plaintiff’s filing of this 13 action in federal court rather than in a state court: 22 [T]here is no relief available to [plaintiff] in federal court that could not be secured in state court. Had he brought this suit in state court, there would have been only one suit pending and he would have been eligible to receive every form of relief he seeks: an injunction, money damages, and attorney’s fees. By being “inefficient” and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state claim, this Court is simply recognizing that California has a strong interest in interpreting and enforcing its own rules without federal courts serving as a convenient end-around for creative litigants. If that results in occasional inefficiency, it’s a worthwhile tradeoff. 23 Alessio Leasing, 2019 WL 1546950, at *4. The Court additionally notes that if 24 Plaintiff legitimately seeks to litigate this action in a single forum, Plaintiff may 25 dismiss this action and refile it in a state court in accordance with the requirements 26 California has imposed on such actions. 27 supplemental jurisdiction, the Court is merely restoring the balance Congress struck 28 when it enacted the ADA and provided a private right of action for injunctive relief 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 12 Finally, by declining to exercise 1 and an award of attorneys’ fees, but did not allow for the recovery of statutory 2 damages. IV. 3 CONCLUSION 4 For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court, in its discretion, declines to exercise 5 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim and any other construction- 6 related accessibility state law claim. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s 7 Motion (ECF No. 34) and dismisses Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim without prejudice. 8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 12 March 4, 2021 13 14 15 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13
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