Lorrie Rough v. Andrew M. Saul, No. 2:2019cv05406 - Document 21 (C.D. Cal. 2020)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Paul L. Abrams. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) plaintiff's request for remand is granted; (2) the decision of the Commissioner is reversed; and (3) this action is remanded to defendant for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. (See documetn for details.) (sbou)

Download PDF

Lorrie Rough v. Andrew M. Saul Doc. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 WESTERN DIVISION 11 12 LORRIE R., 13 Plaintiff, 14 15 16 v. ANDREW M. SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 17 Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. CV 19-5406-PLA MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 18 19 I. 20 PROCEEDINGS 21 Lorrie R.1 (“plaintiff”) filed this action on June 20, 2019, seeking review of the 22 Commissioner’s denial of her applications for a period of disability and Disability Insurance 23 Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) payments. The parties filed Consents 24 to proceed before a Magistrate Judge on June 27, 2019, and July 19, 2019. Pursuant to the 25 Court’s Order, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation (alternatively “JS”) on January 27, 2020, that 26 27 28 1 In the interest of protecting plaintiff’s privacy, this Memorandum Opinion and Order uses plaintiff’s (1) first name and last initial, and (2) year of birth in lieu of a complete birth date. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(c)(2)(B), Local Rule 5.2-1. Dockets.Justia.com 1 addresses their positions concerning the disputed issues in the case. The Court has taken the 2 Joint Stipulation under submission without oral argument. 3 4 II. 5 BACKGROUND 6 Plaintiff was born in 1957. [Administrative Record (“AR”) at 863, 870.] She has past 7 relevant work experience as a home attendant, and in the composite job of swimming pool 8 servicer and sales clerk. [Id. at 26, 769.] 9 On July 16, 2015, plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and DIB and an 10 application for SSI payments, alleging in both that she has been unable to work since December 11 31, 2011. [Id. at 16; see also id. at 861-69, 870-75.] After her applications were denied, plaintiff 12 timely filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). [Id. at 805.] A 13 hearing was held on October 10, 2017, at which time plaintiff appeared represented by an 14 attorney, and testified on her own behalf. [Id. at 742-78.] At the hearing, plaintiff amended her 15 alleged onset date of disability to October 9, 2009. [Id. at 16, 745-46.] A vocational expert (“VE”) 16 also testified. [Id. at 769-77.] On March 9, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that 17 plaintiff was not disabled prior to April 1, 2012 (thereby denying her claim for DIB), but became 18 disabled on that date and has continued to be disabled through the date of the decision. [Id. at 19 16-28; see also JS at 2.] Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council. 20 [AR at 860.] When the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review on May 1, 2019 [id. 21 at 1-5], the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. See Sam v. Astrue, 22 550 F.3d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citations omitted). This action followed. 23 24 III. 25 STANDARD OF REVIEW 26 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has authority to review the Commissioner’s 27 decision to deny benefits. The decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 28 evidence or if it is based upon the application of improper legal standards. Berry v. Astrue, 622 2 1 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 2 “Substantial evidence . . . is ‘more than a mere scintilla[,]’ . . . [which] means -- and means 3 only -- ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 4 conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2019) (citations 5 omitted); Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017). “Where evidence is susceptible 6 to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Revels, 874 F.3d 7 at 654 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the Court “must consider the 8 entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts 9 from the Commissioner’s conclusion, and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum 10 of supporting evidence.” Id. (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) 11 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court will “review only the reasons provided by the ALJ 12 in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” 13 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 14 87, 63 S. Ct. 454, 87 L. Ed. 626 (1943) (“The grounds upon which an administrative order must 15 be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based.”). 16 17 IV. 18 THE EVALUATION OF DISABILITY 19 Persons are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable 20 to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is 21 expected to result in death or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at 22 least twelve months. Garcia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 768 F.3d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 23 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). 24 25 A. THE FIVE-STEP EVALUATION PROCESS 26 The Commissioner (or ALJ) follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in assessing 27 whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 28 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999)). 3 1 In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in 2 substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. Lounsburry, 3 468 F.3d at 1114. If the claimant is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, the 4 second step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a “severe” 5 impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting her ability to do basic work 6 activities; if not, a finding of nondisability is made and the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant has 7 a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner 8 to determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an 9 impairment in the Listing of Impairments (“Listing”) set forth at 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpart P, 10 appendix 1; if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are awarded. Id. If the 11 claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or equal an impairment in the 12 Listing, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has sufficient 13 “residual functional capacity” to perform her past work; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the 14 claim is denied. Id. The claimant has the burden of proving that she is unable to perform past 15 relevant work. Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). If the claimant meets 16 this burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. Id. The Commissioner then bears 17 the burden of establishing that the claimant is not disabled because there is other work existing 18 in “significant numbers” in the national or regional economy the claimant can do, either (1) by 19 the testimony of a VE, or (2) by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. part 20 404, subpart P, appendix 2. Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1114. The determination of this issue 21 comprises the fifth and final step in the sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; 22 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 721, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995); Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. 23 24 25 B. THE ALJ’S APPLICATION OF THE FIVE-STEP PROCESS At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 26 27 28 4 1 October 9, 2009, the alleged onset date.2 [AR at 18.] At step two, the ALJ concluded that since 2 the alleged onset date, plaintiff has the severe impairments of left carpal tunnel syndrome, status- 3 post carpal tunnel release; degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, status-post 4 cervical spinal surgery April 2017; heart palpitations; and anxiety disorder. [Id. at 19.] At step 5 three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff does not have an impairment or a combination of 6 impairments that meets or medically equals any of the impairments in the Listing. [Id.] The ALJ 7 found that prior to April 1, 2012, plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)3 to 8 perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b),4 as follows: 9 11 [L]ifting up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, standing and/or walking up to 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, and sitting up to 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, with the following additional restrictions: frequently push and pull with the left upper extremity; frequently handle, finger, and feel with the left upper extremity; and no fast-paced assembly line work. 12 [Id. at 19-20.] The ALJ further found that beginning on April 1, 2012, plaintiff -- who switched age 13 categories after that date to an “individual closely approaching retirement age” -- retained the RFC 14 to perform the same light work as prior to April 1, 2012, with an additional restriction that “she 15 would likely be absent from work approximately two days per month.” [Id. at 23.] At step four, 16 based on plaintiff’s RFC and the testimony of the VE, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is unable to 17 perform her past relevant work as a home attendant, and in the composite job of swimming pool 10 18 19 20 2 The ALJ concluded that plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2011. [AR at 18.] 3 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 RFC is what a claimant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. See Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). “Between steps three and four of the five-step evaluation, the ALJ must proceed to an intermediate step in which the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1151 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 4 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b). 5 1 servicer and sales clerk. [Id. at 26, 770-71.] At step five, based on plaintiff’s RFC, vocational 2 factors, and the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that prior to April 1, 2012, there were jobs existing 3 in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform, including work as a 4 “sales clerk” (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) No. 290.477-014). The ALJ further found 5 that beginning on April 1, 2012, there are no jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 6 economy that plaintiff can perform. [AR at 27, 774-75.] Accordingly, the ALJ determined that prior 7 to April 1, 2012, plaintiff was not disabled at any time from the alleged onset date of October 9, 8 2009, through April 1, 2012, but became disabled on that date and continued to be disabled 9 through March 9, 2018, the date of the decision. [Id. at 28.] 10 11 V. 12 THE ALJ’S DECISION 13 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred when she: (1) determined that plaintiff is disabled as 14 of April 1, 2012, but not prior thereto5; and (2) rejected plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony 15 regarding her functional limitations prior to April 1, 2012. [JS at 3.] As set forth below, the Court 16 agrees with plaintiff, in part, and remands for further proceedings. 17 18 A. FAILURE TO CALL A MEDICAL ADVISOR TO ESTABLISH DISABILITY DATE 19 Plaintiff argues that where, as here, the evidence regarding a disability onset date is not 20 5 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff asserts several arguments in connection with this claim: (1) plaintiff’s severe medically determinable impairments were the same before and after April 1, 2012; (2) the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s RFC beginning April 1, 2012, was identical to her RFC prior to April 1, 2012, with an additional limitation that she would likely be absent from work approximately two days per month, and did not offer any rationale for including this additional finding after, and not prior to, April 1, 2012; (3) the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the June 2016 opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician at Kaiser Permanente, Judy Kim, M.D., who opined that plaintiff was incapable of even a low stress job, would be absent from work more than four times a month and, since 2011, was not able to work on a full-time basis; (4) the ALJ’s evaluation of plaintiff’s anxiety disorder was “incorrect and incomplete”; and (5) because the evidence regarding plaintiff’s disability onset date is not clear from the medical records, the ALJ was required to procure the assistance of a medical expert to render an informed judgment as to that date. [AR at 4-6.] The Court fully considers only one of those arguments herein -- whether the ALJ was required to call a medical expert to determine plaintiff’s disability onset date. 6 1 clear from the medical evidence, the ALJ “must procure the assistance of a medical expert to 2 render an informed judgment.” [Id. at 6 (citing Armstrong v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 160 F.3d 587, 3 590 (9th Cir. 1998)).] She contends that Social Security Ruling (“SSR”)6 83-20 provides that “for 4 slowly progressive impairments, it is necessary to infer the onset date from the medical and other 5 evidence that describe the history and symptomatology of the disease process, and requires the 6 ALJ to obtain medical expert assistance in cases where the onset date is not clear from the 7 medical evidence and other pertinent evidence.” [Id. at 6-7 (citing SSR 83-20).] Plaintiff notes that 8 the onset of disability is critical in this case to her application for DIB as she was insured for DIB 9 only through December 31, 2011, and the fact that the ALJ found her disabled as of April 1, 2012, 10 meant that she was not entitled to DIB. [Id. at 6.] She argues that “[g]iven the progressive nature” 11 of her impairments, and the substantial medical evidence that those impairments, and the 12 symptoms and limitations associated with the impairments, existed prior to April 1, 2012, the ALJ 13 “committed reversible legal error” by failing to obtain the assistance of a medical advisor to 14 determine the onset date of plaintiff’s disability. [Id. at 7.] 15 Defendant concedes that when medical evidence from the relevant time period is 16 unavailable or inadequate, an ALJ must develop the incomplete record by calling on a medical 17 advisor, but argues that the ALJ has the authority to determine a disability onset date without 18 calling a medical advisor where there is a relatively complete medical chronology. [Id. at 8 (citing 19 Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 874 (9th Cir. 2017)).] It is only when the record is 20 ambiguous, or “when an incomplete record clearly could support an inference that a claimant’s 21 disability began when there were no contemporaneous medical records,” that the ALJ must 22 consult a medical advisor. [Id. at 9-10 (citing Wellington, 878 F.3d at 873; see also Diedrich v. 23 Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 2017)).] Defendant notes that plaintiff does not claim that 24 records from the relevant time period prior to her date last insured (“DLI”) are missing, or identify 25 26 27 28 6 “SSRs do not have the force of law. However, because they represent the Commissioner’s interpretation of the agency’s regulations, we give them some deference. We will not defer to SSRs if they are inconsistent with the statute or regulations.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 119, 1202 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 7 1 any gaps or ambiguities in the record “that would require a medical expert to unravel the 2 evidence.” [Id. at 9.] Defendant states that the record “contains Plaintiff’s complete treatment 3 history during the period 2009-17,” and the ALJ did not find the evidence ambiguous or the record 4 inadequate. [Id. (citing AR at 971-5939).] 5 6 1. Legal Standard 7 The disability onset date is the point at which the claimant is unable to engage in any 8 substantial gainful activity due to a mental or physical impairment that can be expected to last for 9 at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(A). “The ALJ is responsible for 10 studying the record and resolving any conflicts or ambiguities in it.” Diedrich, 874 F.3d at 638 11 (citing Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014)). Although 12 the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that she was disabled before her DLI, the ALJ also has 13 a duty to assist in developing the record. Armstrong, 160 F.3d at 589. “[I]n circumstances where 14 the ALJ must determine the date of disability onset and medical evidence from the relevant time 15 period is unavailable or inadequate, Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 83-20 states that the ALJ 16 should call a medical advisor.” Diedrich, 874 F.3d at 638. However, “[SSR 83-20’s] language 17 does not expressly mandate that the ALJ consult a medical advisor in every case where the onset 18 of disability must be inferred.” Wellington, 878 F.3d at 874 (quoting Bailey v. Chater, 68 F.3d 75, 19 79 (4th Cir. 1995)). 20 The Ninth Circuit has found that the ALJ’s obligation pursuant to SSR 83-20 to develop the 21 record does not apply if, “despite some inadequacies in the record, ‘a relatively complete medical 22 chronology’ of the claimant’s condition during the relevant time period is available.” Id. (citing 23 Pugh v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 1271, 1278 & n.9 (7th Cir. 1989)). Notwithstanding a complete medical 24 record, the available medical evidence should be considered “in view of the nature of the 25 impairment” and “what medical presumptions can reasonably be made about the course of the 26 condition.” SSR 83-20, 1983 WL 31249, at *3. Thus, the disability onset date “should be set on 27 a date when it is most reasonable to conclude from the evidence that the impairment was 28 sufficiently severe to prevent the individual from engaging in SGA (or gainful activity) for a 8 1 continuous period of 12 months or result in death,” and where a “[c]onvincing rationale [is] given 2 for the date selected.” Id.; see Wellington, 878 F.3d at 875 (citing SSR 83-20 and noting that the 3 onset date should be set on the date when “an ALJ can reasonably and confidently say that no 4 reasonable medical advisor could infer that the disability began during a period for which the 5 claimant lacked medical documentation”). 6 7 2. Evidence Prior to April 1, 2012 8 In determining that plaintiff was not disabled prior to April 1, 2012, the ALJ noted that 9 plaintiff “was seen routinely by physicians at Kaiser Permanente since her amended alleged onset 10 date in October 2009 for a variety of acute and chronic complaints” such as skin irritations, swollen 11 glands, and a herpes outbreak. [AR at 21.] The ALJ then reviewed the records during that time 12 period relating to each of plaintiff’s severe impairments. 13 With respect to plaintiff’s left carpal tunnel syndrome, the ALJ found that plaintiff “rarely, if 14 ever, reported symptoms of carpal tunnel syndrome between the amended alleged onset date in 15 October 2009, until May 2010, when she was seen by Manushak Amzoyan, M.D. for “persistent 16 symptoms of left carpal tunnel syndrome.” [Id.] Dr. Amzoyan noted that plaintiff was first seen 17 for that condition in June 2009 and that significant clinical signs were found at that time. [Id. 18 (citation omitted).] Plaintiff underwent a steroid injection in 2009 and her symptoms “got better 19 significantly.” [Id. (citation omitted).] In May 2010, Dr. Amzoyan recommended that plaintiff 20 undergo left carpal tunnel release surgery, and she did so on May 25, 2010. [Id. (citations 21 omitted).] After May 2010, plaintiff did not continue to report any left carpal tunnel symptoms. [Id.] 22 The ALJ next considered the records relating to plaintiff’s diagnosis of lumbar degenerative 23 disc disease. [Id.] She again noted that the medical evidence prior to the “established onset date” 24 of April 1, 2012, was not consistent with disability. [Id.] According to the ALJ, plaintiff “rarely, if 25 ever, reported symptoms of lower back pain and/or sciatica for nearly one year after her amended 26 alleged onset date.” [Id.] She notes that in October 2010, plaintiff was seen for complaints of 27 radiating sciatic pain but, according to the ALJ, the clinical findings were minimal. [Id. (citations 28 omitted).] Furthermore, plaintiff declined to attend physical therapy and, throughout 2011 (and 9 1 2012, and 2013), “rarely reported ongoing symptoms of lower back pain.” [Id.] 2 With respect to plaintiff’s anxiety disorder, the ALJ found that the “objective clinical findings 3 . . . were simply not commensurate with disabling limitations prior to her established onset date 4 of April 1, 2012.” [Id. at 22.] She notes that in October 2010 plaintiff reported chest-related 5 symptoms, but a cardiac examination and EKG were entirely normal, and her doctor believed her 6 symptoms were related to her anxiety. [Id. at 22, 1600.] Plaintiff was prescribed Celexa in 7 November 2010, which -- as she reported to her doctor in February 2011 -- she did not take 8 because “people at the church” told her not to take either Celexa or Xanax [id. at 1600, 1631, 9 1640]; in August 2011 plaintiff reported to her new primary care physician that she was 10 experiencing “significant family-related stress” due to financial issues, her son was suffering from 11 end-stage liver disease, and a brother was suffering with cancer. [Id. at 22 (citing id. at 1791).] 12 The August 9, 2011, treatment note also reflects that plaintiff was trying to enroll in college 13 classes, needed a refill of her Xanax, and “[d]oesn’t remember why she is not taking celexa as 14 prescribed” in October 2010. [Id. at 1791.] That same note also reflects that on that date the 15 doctor prescribed Xanax and Celexa. [Id.] In September 2011 plaintiff reported that the Xanax 16 was helping but when she took Celexa she felt she had palpitations and stopped the medication 17 right away. [Id. at 1809.] Plaintiff agreed to try Celexa again, beginning with just half a tablet. [Id.] 18 In October 2011, plaintiff reported that she was a full-time student and that her anxiety medication 19 was “working well,” but also complained that it was making her extremely fatigued during the day. 20 [Id. at 1931-32.] She asked the doctor whether she could try another medication “maybe with less 21 side effect of fatigue.” [Id. at 1931.] In November 2011 she “continued to report symptoms of 22 depression due to her son’s illness,” but was not “nervous/anxious,” and her medication was 23 changed to Zoloft. [Id. at 22, 1941-42.] She reported in December 2011 that the Zoloft also made 24 her sleepy. [Id. at 22, 1960.] The doctor reported at that time that plaintiff was “negative for 25 depression,” but was “nervous/anxious” and spent most of the visit “speaking about husband and 26 son.” [Id. at 1962.] The ALJ observed that “[t]here is very little evidence of any complaints of 27 symptoms of anxiety [in the five-month period] between December 2011 and April 2012, [plaintiff’s] 28 established [disability] onset date.” [Id. at 22.] 10 1 3. Evidence Beginning April 1, 2012 2 In determining plaintiff’s date of disability to begin on April 1, 2012, the ALJ found that 3 “beginning on April 1, 2012, [plaintiff’s] allegations regarding her symptoms and limitations are 4 consistent with the evidence.” [AR at 23.] She noted that plaintiff’s “musculoskelatal conditions” 5 significantly worsened as of that date, but then summarized records relating to plaintiff’s lower 6 back pain dating from August 2013 through approximately April 2017, and records relating to 7 plaintiff’s cervical neck pain dating from approximately February 7, 2016, through August 14, 2017, 8 to support that position. [Id. at 23-24 (citations omitted).] For instance, the ALJ noted that in 9 January 2013 plaintiff reported radiating lower back pain and was prescribed Norco, although she 10 did not report symptoms again until July 2013. [Id. (citations omitted).] With respect to plaintiff’s 11 cervical degenerative disc disease, the ALJ noted a 2016 MRI showing multilevel cervical spinal 12 stenosis; epidural steroid injections administered in November 2016 and March 2017; and cervical 13 spinal surgery on April 27, 2017. [Id. at 24 (citations omitted).] After the surgery, plaintiff 14 continued to report “constant bilateral upper extremity numbness” in her hands. [Id.] These 15 records do not support the ALJ’s conclusion that April 1, 2012, was the date that plaintiff became 16 disabled. 17 With respect to plaintiff’s mental health, the ALJ also specifically found that plaintiff’s mental 18 impairments “worsened in April 2012.” [Id. at 24.] According to the ALJ, on April 25, 2012, plaintiff 19 reported anxiety “due to the loss of several family members” and complained of heart pain [id. at 20 2142]; on April 27, 2012, she appeared “very anxious” about her heart pain and requested a 21 treadmill test, for which the results were normal [id. at 2188-89]; on May 5, 2012, she was seen 22 in the emergency department complaining of numbness, spasms, a racing heartbeat, and feeling 23 like there was a clot in her heart; she exhibited rapid, highly pressured, and tangential speech [id. 24 at 2230-40]; her treating physician recommended on May 11, 2012, that plaintiff seek treatment 25 with a psychiatrist due to her “many somatic symptoms” [id. at 2335-36]; on May 16, 2012, she 26 was described as agitated with inappropriate judgment, and irrational with erratic behavior, and 27 exhibited highly pressured speech [id. at 2376]; also on May 16, 2012, the examiner reported that 28 that she could not “get in a word without asking” plaintiff to stop talking and that plaintiff “appears 11 1 acutely manic and possible [sic] gravely disabled,” and refused to listen to any explanation for her 2 symptoms “other than her own” [id. at 2380]; and on May 17, 2012, plaintiff reported that her 3 husband had been “monitoring her” and that he had “attempted to feed her broken glass” [id. at 4 2383.] On May 17, 2012, plaintiff was diagnosed with mood disorder, not otherwise specified, and 5 a rule-out diagnosis of bipolar disorder, as well as panic disorder, and history of personality 6 disorder. [Id. at 2385.] The ALJ noted that plaintiff stabilized “briefly,” but at some point she 7 stopped taking her psychoactive medications, and “sought medical treatment for various and 8 ambiguous symptoms, several times a month since 2013.” [Id. at 24.] For instance, the ALJ 9 stated that plaintiff reported throat problems a few weeks after becoming a vegetarian; ear pain 10 due to getting a flea in her ear; various rashes and skin irritations; and multiple concerns “largely 11 unfounded about bed bugs or fleas.” [Id. (citing id. at 2019-20, 2502-03, 2889, 2921, 2952, 2968- 12 69).] At a June 4, 2013, treatment visit, plaintiff also was reported to appear to be in a manic state 13 and had not been taking her Risperdol. [Id. at 2968-69.] The ALJ noted similar treatment notes 14 from August 2013 through 2015, reporting skin complaints, concerns about bedbugs, anal skin 15 tags, herpes, spider bites, and tongue swelling. [Id. (citations omitted).] The ALJ concluded that 16 plaintiff’s mental impairments were disabling “as of, but not before, April 1, 2012,” and, as “wholly 17 supported by the objective medical evidence,” her “conditions were documented to have 18 significantly worsened as of that date.” [Id. at 25.] 19 20 4. Discussion 21 Plaintiff argues that her medical records show a primary diagnosis of “panic disorder” in 22 October 2010; that anxiety diagnoses and symptoms were noted throughout the end of 2010, and 23 throughout 2011; and that in November 2011 she was also diagnosed with depression. [JS at 5- 24 6.] She notes that the records in 2010 and 2011 describe her as “nervous/anxious.” [Id. at 5 25 (citing AR at 1576, 1577).] She explained to her providers in November 2010 that taking Celexa 26 made her tired, and she tried taking Xanax “but it made her feel like a zombie.” [Id. at 6 (citing AR 27 at 1593).] Plaintiff states that in March 2011, she “began taking the medication for anxiety 28 consistently.” [Id. (citing AR at 1674, 1697, 1760-61).] 12 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s 1 determination that she has been disabled as of April 1, 2012, “but not prior thereto, particularly not 2 prior to her DLI of December 31, 2011, was arbitrary and contrary to the substantial evidence of 3 record.” [JS at 2 (emphasis in original).] She argues that because the evidence regarding her 4 disability onset date is not clear from the medical evidence, the ALJ erred when she failed to 5 procure the assistance of a medical expert to make that determination. [Id. at 6.] 6 Defendant responds that the ALJ properly found that plaintiff’s anxiety disorder and related 7 heart palpitations were severe impairments before and after plaintiff’s DLI, and also properly found 8 that the objective clinical findings regarding plaintiff’s mental health limitations “were simply not 9 commensurate with disabling limitations” prior to April 1, 2012. [Id. at 9 (citing AR at 19, 22).] 10 Defendant summarizes the same pre-April 2012 evidence cited to by the ALJ and then 11 summarizes the post-April 2012 evidence cited to by the ALJ as evidence of plaintiff’s worsening 12 conditions. [Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted).] 13 While the post-April 1, 2012, medical records relating to plaintiff’s mental health condition 14 arguably reflect a worsening of her mental condition, one of the problems with the ALJ’s 15 determination of April 1, 2012, as plaintiff’s onset date is that the records cited to by the ALJ do 16 not reflect significant differences in plaintiff’s pre-April 1, 2012, and post-April 1, 2012, mental 17 health diagnoses and complaints.7 18 In this case, the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff’s disability onset date commenced on April 19 1, 2012, was not obvious from the medical records. That is, while the medical record is 20 voluminous and there does not appear to be any significant gap in the records, there also does 21 not appear to be any specific treatment record or records dated on or about April 1, 2012, that 22 reflect a treating provider’s opinion that plaintiff was disabled due to her mental impairments, 23 symptoms or limitations as of that date. Indeed, the treatment note closest in time to April 1, 2012, 24 only states as follows: 25 26 27 28 7 The Court notes that plaintiff does not appear to be arguing that her physical impairments alone were disabling prior to April 1, 2012. In fact, the ALJ’s discussion of the records relating to plaintiff’s allegedly worsening physical impairments (i.e., her degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spines) after April 1, 2012, began with a discussion of an August 2013 record reflecting “worsening lower back pain” -- more than 16 months after April 1, 2012. 13 1 4 Patient here for anxiety, recently l[o]st several family members. Patient states she went to get her marijuana license and told BP[] elevated. Patient treated for HTN in past, last took in 2009 (took for 3 months). Patient would like BP medications. Patient states that she has chronic chest pressure typically associated with her anxiety. Typically has nausea, palpitations, sweating -- which she experienced today. Patient has multiple social issues. She is not seeing a therapist or psychiatry. 5 [AR at 24 (citing id. at 2142).] The provider recommended “stress relief and seeking behavioral 6 medicine evaluation.” [Id. at 2142.] The ALJ then cited to an April 27, 2012, treatment note 7 relating to an exercise stress test administered at plaintiff’s request due to plaintiff’s history of 8 “anxiety [with] worsening ‘heart pain’ x2 months; feels chest pressure all the time, believes she 9 has blockage in her heart.” [Id. at 2188.] Plaintiff was noted to be “very anxious” and her 10 symptoms were described as vague. [Id. at 2189.] Her EKG and exercise stress test were 11 normal. [Id.] The ALJ summarized a few other May 2012 treatment notes, including a May 11, 12 2012, note reflecting that plaintiff’s primary care physician had “recommended” psychiatric 13 treatment. [Id. at 24.] A review of that note reflects that plaintiff had “multiple somatic complaints” 14 with her primary worry “being something [was] wrong with [her] heart,” and the physician’s notation 15 that although plaintiff denied “primary anxiety,” she was “willing to [go to] psychiatry re: anxiety 16 caused.” [AR at 2336.] Then, on May 17, 2012, plaintiff presented at Kaiser Permanente and was 17 evaluated by the “Psychiatric Emergency Team.” [Id. at 2383-92.] At that visit she reported that 18 the day before she had been evaluated in the emergency department for her anxiety, specifically 19 her belief that she was having clots in her heart and was going to die. [Id. at 2383.] Plaintiff was 20 described as “quite hyper-verbal, tangent[i]al, anxious, and quite distractible.” [Id.] The evaluators 21 concluded that “this is a psychiatric problem manifesting in somatic complaints.” [Id.] Plaintiff’s 22 daughter, who accompanied her to the emergency room, stated that plaintiff’s family had made 23 many appointments with Kaiser Permanente psychiatry, but that plaintiff either “no shows or 24 cancels them.” [Id.] It was indicated that plaintiff was a “very poor reporter due to her hyper- 25 verbal and extreme anxiety”; gave hints of paranoia throughout her presentation; believed that her 26 husband had been monitoring her by bugging her phones; and stated that when she and her 27 husband were breaking up “he made her a tuna sandwich, broke a glass,” and “on the second bite 28 she found a shard of glass in the sandwich.” [Id.] The report also indicated that plaintiff has a 2 3 14 1 history of excessive spending, including feeding friends and buying them things “over the past 2 2 1/2 years” (i.e., since approximately December 2009), even when she had no income. [Id.] 3 Plaintiff responded to the evaluators’ “[s]imple questions . . . with rapid, long, and convoluted 4 stories straying from the question, and “states she is goal directed, and yet sounds like she 5 accomplishes very little.” [Id. at 2384.] After summarizing these records, the ALJ observed that 6 since 2013 plaintiff had consistently sought medical treatment for “various and ambiguous” 7 symptoms. [Id. at 24-25 (summarizing several mental health treatment notes between 2013 and 8 2017).] 9 As in Armstrong, the evidence in this case demonstrates that plaintiff suffered from various 10 mental impairments prior to her DLI of December 31, 2011. See Armstrong, 160 F.3d at 589.8 11 The ALJ concluded that plaintiff’s disability onset date was April 1, 2012, based on plaintiff’s 12 “worsening” condition, but provided neither a legitimate medical basis nor a convincing rationale 13 for selecting that date over any other.9 Moreover, although the ALJ stated that there was little 14 evidence of mental health treatment between December 2011 and April 2012, the record shows 15 that during that time period she had a December 12, 2011, follow-up appointment for her anxiety 16 [id. at 1960]; was seen for recurrent right lateral epicondylitis for which she had received “repeat 17 injections” and attended occupational therapy sessions [see id. at 1987-2006, 2117]; underwent 18 mammogram screening; and was seen for complaints of trouble swallowing, which she attributed 19 to her newly-implemented vegetarian diet and lack of red meat. [Id. at 2020, 2075.] Additionally, 20 the ALJ noted plaintiff was a “full-time student” in October 2011, but plaintiff testified at the hearing 21 -- seeming very confused about the dates she attended and the classes she took -- that she only 22 attended school for one to two semesters, took two English classes, a guitar class, a piano class, 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 In Armstrong, the ALJ denied plaintiff’s application for DIB after finding him not disabled as of his DLI, but granted plaintiff’s application for SSI payments, finding that he had been disabled since August 9, 1994. Armstrong, 160 F.3d at 589. This result is similar to the one herein. 9 To the extent the ALJ determined plaintiff’s date of disability to be April 1, 2012, based on the ALJ’s finding that “beginning on April 1, 2012, [plaintiff’s] allegations regarding her symptoms and limitations are consistent with the evidence,” this did not provide a “legitimate medical basis” for selecting that date. [AR at 23.] 15 1 and a math class, and that she failed the math and piano classes. [Id. at 22, 750-56.] Although, 2 as the ALJ characterized it, plaintiff’s mental health condition appeared to be “worsening” as of 3 April 2012, the Court cannot assume -- based on just a four-month period between December 4 2011 and April 2012 where there is little mention of mental health complaints in the record -- that 5 plaintiff’s well-documented mental health impairments prior to December 2011 were not already 6 disabling sometime prior to April 1, 2012. Because “[m]ental disorders may manifest themselves 7 over a period of time[,] . . . the precise date of onset of a disabling psychological impairment may 8 be difficult, or impossible to ascertain, and the services of a specialist may be necessary to infer 9 the onset date.” Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 945 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 1991); 10 see also Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir.1996) (stating “depression is one of the 11 most underreported illnesses in the country because those afflicted often do not recognize that 12 their condition reflects a potentially serious mental illness”). In this case, the ALJ provided neither 13 a legitimate medical basis nor a convincing rationale for selecting April 1, 2012, as the disability 14 onset date over any other prior to that date. Additionally, the error was not harmless because the 15 ALJ’s decision was determinative of whether plaintiff was entitled to DIB. Because the record is 16 ambiguous as to when plaintiff’s severe mental impairments (alone or in combination with her 17 physical impairments) became disabling, the ALJ should have consulted with a medical expert to 18 make that determination. 19 Remand is appropriate so that the ALJ can “create a record which forms a basis for th[e] 20 onset date.” Armstrong, 160 F.3d at 590. The ALJ can fulfill this responsibility “by calling a 21 medical expert . . . to determine the onset date.” Id. 22 23 B. SUBJECTIVE SYMPTOM TESTIMONY 24 Plaintiff argues that the only reason given by the ALJ for rejecting plaintiff’s testimony was 25 because that testimony was not supported by the objective medical evidence. [Id. at 17.] She 26 argues that the medical evidence in fact was consistent “in material respects with [her] testimony 27 regarding her subjective symptoms and functional limitations prior to April 1, 2012.” 28 Additionally, she submits that the ALJ rejected plaintiff’s allegations “solely on the basis of lack of 16 [Id.] 1 objective corroborating evidence, and failed to provide any other specific, clear and convincing 2 reasons for rejecting her allegations . . . prior to April 1, 2012.” [Id. (citations omitted).] 3 Defendant responds that in addition to the lack of objective evidence, the ALJ also based 4 her determination to discount plaintiff’s testimony on the fact that plaintiff received conservative 5 treatment to control her pain, the fact that her carpal tunnel syndrome improved after surgery, the 6 fact that clinical examinations did not support plaintiff’s complaints of back pain, and because 7 plaintiff’s statement that she was a full-time student in October 2011 was inconsistent with her 8 testimony of disabling limitations. [Id. at 21 (citations omitted).] 9 While a lack of objective medical evidence supporting a plaintiff’s subjective complaints 10 cannot provide the only basis to reject a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony (Trevizo v. 11 Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 679 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 12 883 (9th Cir. 2006))), it is one factor that an ALJ can consider in evaluating symptom testimony. 13 See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Although lack of medical evidence 14 cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor the ALJ must consider in 15 his credibility analysis.”); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *5 (“objective medical evidence is a 16 useful indicator to help make reasonable conclusions about the intensity and persistence of 17 symptoms, including the effects those symptoms may have on the ability to perform work-related 18 activities for an adult”). “The intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of many symptoms can be 19 clinically observed and recorded in the medical evidence. . . . These findings may be consistent 20 with an individual’s statements about symptoms and their functional effects. However, when the 21 results of tests are not consistent with other evidence in the record, they may be less supportive 22 of an individual’s statements about pain or other symptoms than test results and statements that 23 are consistent with other evidence in the record.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *5. As the 24 Ninth Circuit recently held, “an ALJ’s ‘vague allegation’ that a claimant’s testimony is ‘not 25 consistent with the objective medical evidence,’ without any ‘specific finding in support’ of that 26 conclusion, is insufficient.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103 (citation omitted) (the “ALJ must identify 27 the testimony that was not credible, and specify ‘what evidence undermines the claimant’s 28 complaints.’”); Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493-94 (9th Cir. 2015) (the ALJ must identify 17 1 the testimony she found not credible and “link that testimony to the particular parts of the record” 2 supporting her non-credibility determination). 3 administrative law require [this Court] to review the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and 4 factual findings offered by the ALJ -- not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the 5 adjudicator may have been thinking.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225- 6 26 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Additionally, “[l]ong-standing principles of 7 Because the matter is being remanded to obtain testimony from a medical expert as to 8 plaintiff’s disability onset date, and that determination may impact the ALJ’s consideration of 9 plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, the ALJ must also reconsider on remand, pursuant to 10 SSR 16-3p, plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony and provide specific, clear and convincing 11 reasons for discounting plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, if warranted. 12 13 VI. 14 REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 15 The Court has discretion to remand or reverse and award benefits. Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 16 682 (citation omitted). Where no useful purpose would be served by further proceedings, or where 17 the record has been fully developed, it is appropriate to exercise this discretion to direct an 18 immediate award of benefits. Id. (citing Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1019). Where there are outstanding 19 issues that must be resolved before a determination can be made, and it is not clear from the 20 record that the ALJ would be required to find plaintiff disabled if all the evidence were properly 21 evaluated, remand is appropriate. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021. 22 In this case, there is an outstanding issue that must be resolved before a final determination 23 can be made. In particular: on remand, the ALJ shall call a medical advisor or expert to testify -- 24 based on all of the medical evidence of record, including, but not limited to, the June 2016 medical 25 source statement from plaintiff’s treating physician at Kaiser Permanente, Dr. Kim,10 who opined 26 27 28 10 The ALJ discounted Dr. Kim’s June 2016 opinion [AR at 5164-72] because she “did not begin treating [plaintiff] until well after her established onset date.” [AR at 25.] However, in (continued...) 18 1 that plaintiff could “no longer work on a full time basis” since 2011 [AR at 5164-68] -- regarding 2 whether plaintiff’s disability onset date was sometime prior to April 1, 2012.11 The ALJ may also 3 reconsider on remand, pursuant to SSR 16-3p, plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, and 4 provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting plaintiff’s subjective 5 symptom testimony, if warranted. 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 / 11 / 12 / 13 / 14 / 15 / 16 / 17 / 18 19 10 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (...continued) addition to being reflected on an April 26, 2012, Kaiser Permanent treatment record as plaintiff’s primary care physician (“PCP”), Dr. Kim is also reflected on several other Kaiser Permanente records as plaintiff’s PCP well prior to April 1, 2012, as well as prior to December 31, 2011, her date last insured. [See, e.g., id. at 1707 (April 22, 2011), 1747 (June 5, 2011), 2019 (March 13, 2012).] Moreover, as noted by plaintiff, “as a Kaiser Permanente physician, Dr. Kim had access to all of Plaintiff’s medical records which pre-dated her initial treatment of Plaintiff, and it is reasonable to assume that as a treating physician, Dr. Kim had reviewed all necessary medical records available to her.” [JS at 5.] 11 Nothing herein is intended to disrupt the following: (1) the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff was disabled at least as of April 1, 2012; and (2) the ALJ’s step four finding that plaintiff is unable to perform her past relevant work as a home attendant, and in the composite job of swimming pool servicer and sales clerk. Additionally, the ALJ’s determination of plaintiff’s severe impairments and RFC before and after her disability onset date must continue to reflect at least the severe impairments and RFC limitations found by the ALJ in the March 9, 2018, decision. [Id. at 26.] 19 1 VII. 2 CONCLUSION 3 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) plaintiff’s request for remand is granted; (2) the 4 decision of the Commissioner is reversed; and (3) this action is remanded to defendant for further 5 proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. 6 7 8 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this Order and the Judgment herein on all parties or their counsel. This Memorandum Opinion and Order is not intended for publication, nor is it intended to be included in or submitted to any online service such as Westlaw or Lexis. 10 11 DATED: February 11, 2020 PAUL L. ABRAMS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 20

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.