Theressa Shields et al v. Andeavor Logistics LP et al, No. 2:2019cv04995 - Document 34 (C.D. Cal. 2019)
Court Description: STATEMENT OF DECISION GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE COURT by Judge John F. Walter. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to State Court is GRANTED and this action is REMANDED to Los Angeles County Superior Court. (Made JS-6. Case Terminated.) (iv)
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T h e r e s s a S h i e l d s e t a l v . A n d e a v o r L o g iD s o t c i 1 2 3 JS-6 4 Note Changes Made by Court 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 13 THERESSA SHIELDS, 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Plaintiff, v. ANDEAVOR LOGISTICS LP; ANDEAVOR REFINING AND MARKETING CO; ANDEAVOR COMPANY; TESORO REFINING AND MARKETING COMPANY LLC; TESORO CORPORATION; MARATHON PETROLEUM LOGISTICS SERVICES LLC; MARATHON PETROLEUM COMPANY LP; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 2:19-cv-04995-JFW-SS STATEMENT OF DECISION GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE COURT Defendants. 23 24 25 26 27 28 STATEMENT OF DECISION GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND D o c k e t s 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 On May 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants in the Los 3 Angeles County Superior Court alleging the following state law claims for relief: (1) 4 disability discrimination in violation of California Fair Employment and Housing 5 Act (“FEHA”), California Government Code (“Cal. Gov. Code”) § 12940(a); (2) 6 failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of Cal. Gov. Code 7 § 12940(m); (3) failure to engage in a timely, good faith interactive process in 8 violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(n); (4) sex and/or race discrimination in 9 violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a); (5) retaliation in violation of Cal. Gov. Code 10 § 12940(h); (6) failure to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent 11 discrimination and/or retaliation in violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(k); (7) 12 wrongful termination in violation of California public policy; and (8) retaliation in 13 violation of California Labor Code § 1102.5(b). See Document Number (“Doc. 14 No.”) 1-1, Exhibit (“Exh.”) B, Complaint ¶¶ 29-82. 15 On June 7, 2019, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal, alleging this Court 16 has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, on grounds that 17 Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, 18 preempts Plaintiff’s state law claims. Doc. No. 1. 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 “The Ninth Circuit strictly construes the removal statute against removal 21 jurisdiction.” Bonilla v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 407 F.Supp.2d 22 1107, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2005). The Court must reject removal “if there is any doubt as 23 to the right of removal in the first instance.” Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate 24 of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010). 25 The LMRA preempts a plaintiff’s state law claims only where the court must 26 interpret the CBA. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125 (1994); Burnside v. 27 Kiewit Pacific Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007); Cramer v. Consolid. 28 1 STATEMENT OF DECISION GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND 1 Freightways Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The plaintiff’s claim is the 2 touchstone for this analysis; the need to interpret the CBA must inhere in the nature 3 of the plaintiff’s claim.”). A “hypothetical connection” between a plaintiff’s claim 4 and the CBA is “not enough to preempt the claim: adjudication of the claim must 5 require interpretation of a provision of the CBA.” Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691-92 6 (emphasis added). The Court reviews Plaintiff’s claims, and not Defendants’ 7 proposed defenses, to determine whether the CBA triggers Section 301 preemption. 8 See Humble v. Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[R]eliance on CBA 9 provisions to defend against an independent state law claim does not trigger 10 [Section] 301 preemption.”); Irving v. Okonite Co., Inc., 120 F.Supp.3d 1020, 1026 11 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Humble to deny defendant’s argument for preemption based 12 on defendant’s anticipated use of CBA to defend against FEHA claims). 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 A. Plaintiff’s FEHA Claims Are Not Preempted by Section 301 OF The 15 16 LMRA. The first six of Plaintiff’s eight causes of action are claims under FEHA. 17 “The Ninth Circuit has ‘consistently held that state law discrimination claims under 18 the FEHA do not require courts to interpret the terms of a CBA and are therefore not 19 preempted by [Section] 301.’” Klausen v. Warner Bros Tele., 158 F.Supp.3d 925, 20 930-31 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting Schrader v. Noll Mfg. Co., 91 Fed. App’x 553, 555 21 (9th Cir. 2004) and citing Ackerman v. W. Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir. 22 1988)); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 23 1989); Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 240 (9th Cir. 1990); Ramirez v. 24 Fox Tele. Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1993)). FEHA creates 25 “nonnegotiable state law rights which cannot be altered by contract, including by 26 CBAs.” Id. (quoting Ramirez, 998 F.2d at 748); see also Chmiel, 873 F.2d at 1286 27 (holding FEHA rights are “defined and enforced under state law without reference to 28 2 STATEMENT OF DECISION GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND 1 the terms of any collective bargaining agreement”); Cook, 911 F.2d at 240 (“[The 2 employee’s] state-law claim is consequently independent of the agreement. That 3 [he] might also have separate remedies under the bargaining agreement makes no 4 difference.”); Humble, 305 F.3d at 1009 (“As the Supreme Court explained in 5 Lingle, just because a CBA provides a remedy or duty related to a situation that is 6 also directly regulated by non-negotiable state law does not mean the employee is 7 limited to a claim based on the CBA.”). 8 9 10 1. Plaintiff’s First and Fourth Causes of Action for Disability, Sex, and Race Discrimination Plaintiff’s FEHA discrimination claims allege that Defendants discriminated 11 against her based on her disability, sex, and/or race when they terminated her 12 employment, failed to rehire her and rejected her for an open alternative position. 13 See Doc. No. 1-1, Exh. B, Complaint ¶¶ 32, 53. These claims require a factual 14 inquiry into Defendants’ motives, an inquiry that requires no interpretation of the 15 CBA. See, e.g., Detabali v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 482 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007) 16 (finding no Section 301 preemption in FEHA discriminatory termination claim 17 “because there is no dispute over the meaning of any terms within the agreement”); 18 Robles v. Gillig LLC, 771 F.Supp.2d 1181, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“The key to 19 resolving Plaintiff’s claims will be Defendant’s motivation in terminating Plaintiff’s 20 employment, i.e. whether Defendant terminated him because of his disability. This 21 purely factual determination does not require a court to interpret the ‘just cause’ 22 provision of the CBA.”). 23 2. Plaintiff’s Second and Third Causes of Action for Failure to 24 Provide Reasonable Accommodations and Failure to Engage in 25 the Interactive Process 26 Plaintiff’s FEHA claim for failure to provide reasonable accommodations for 27 her disability is not preempted by the LMRA because the range of options for 28 3 STATEMENT OF DECISION GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND 1 accommodating her disabilities are not limited to those identified in the CBA. See 2 Jimeno v. Mobil Oil Corp., 66 F.3d 1514, 1528 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a claim 3 for FEHA reasonable accommodation was not preempted because there was a range 4 of accommodations that the employer might have provided that would not have 5 required interpreting the terms of the CBA). In fact, FEHA regulations require an 6 employer to consider “any and all reasonable accommodations of which it is aware 7 or that are brought to its attention by the applicant or employee, except ones that 8 create an undue hardship.” See 2 Cal. Code Regs. § 11068. In addition, even if the 9 Court must refer to the CBA to review some of the accommodations available to 10 Plaintiff, the CBA remains only “peripherally relevant” to Plaintiff’s claims and 11 mere reference to the CBA does not “mandate preemption.” Humble, 305 F.3d at 12 1011. 13 With respect to Plaintiff’s FEHA claim for failure to engage in the interactive 14 process, the Court must also engage in a fact-specific inquiry into whether 15 Defendants reasonably accommodated Plaintiff’s disability, the Court must also 16 perform a fact-specific inquiry into whether Defendants engaged in a good faith 17 interactive process in determining the options available to Plaintiff. See 2 Cal. Code 18 Regs. § 11069 (c) (California regulation outlining the fact-specific interactive 19 process obligations of an employer under FEHA). Therefore, Plaintiff’s failure to 20 engage in the interactive process claim would only potentially require reference to, 21 as opposed to interpretation of, the CBA. See Humble, 305 F.3d at 1010. 22 Defendants confuse the difference between reference to a CBA and 23 interpretation of a CBA. In Perez v. Proctor and Gamble Manufacturing Co., 161 24 F.Supp.2d 1110 (E.D. Cal. 2001), the plaintiff claimed he was constructively 25 discharged in violation of FEHA when his employer failed to accommodate his 26 disability with an alternate position. The employer argued the claim was preempted 27 by the LMRA because the court would have to interpret the selection guidelines of 28 4 STATEMENT OF DECISION GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND 1 the CBA to determine whether the plaintiff was eligible for other positions. Id. at 2 1118. The district court rejected this argument because the “selection guidelines and 3 the CBA are simply one of several factors for the court to consider in evaluating his 4 claim.” Id. at 1118-19. Indeed, “[t]he meaning of the selection guidelines are not 5 the subject of dispute. While the analysis of [the employer’s] FEHA defense 6 requires the court to consider the guidelines, it does not require the court to interpret 7 them.” Id. at 1119 (emphasis in original); see also Roberts v. Boeing Co., No. CV 8 05-6813, 2006 WL 4704616, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2006) (holding no preemption 9 where no material dispute over CBA terms). 10 In this case, there is no material dispute about the meaning of the CBA. As in 11 Perez, this dispute centers on Defendants’ failure to meet their FEHA obligations to 12 accommodate Plaintiff’s disability and to engage in a good faith interactive process 13 to explore all possible reasonable accommodations. The CBA provisions on 14 alternate positions are only a few of the “several factors for the [C]ourt to consider in 15 evaluating [Plaintiff’s] claim.” Perez, 161 F.Supp.2d at 1118-19. 16 17 3. Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action for Retaliation Plaintiff’s claim for FEHA retaliation is not preempted by Section 301. 18 Plaintiff must show (1) that she “opposed practices forbidden [under FEHA]; (2) 19 retaliatory animus on the part of the employer; (3) an adverse action by the 20 employer; (4) a causal link between the retaliatory animus and the adverse action; (5) 21 damages; and (6) causation.” Washington v. Cal. City Correction Ctr., 871 22 F.Supp.2d 1010, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2012). None of these elements require 23 interpretation of, let alone reference to, the CBA. See Detabali, 482 F.3d at 1203-04 24 (holding that FEHA retaliation claim not preempted, in keeping with “long line of . . 25 . cases holding that FEHA employment discrimination claims are not ispo facto 26 preempted by [Section] 301 of the LMRA”). Instead, these factors require a specific 27 factual inquiry that “pertains to the conduct of the employee and the conduct and 28 5 STATEMENT OF DECISION GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND 1 motivation of the employer.” Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 2 399, 407 (1988) (holding Illinois state tort of retaliatory discharge was not preempted 3 by Section 301). 4 5 6 4. Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action for Failure to Take All Reasonable Steps to Prevent Discrimination and/or Retaliation Plaintiff’s final FEHA claim for Defendants’ failure to prevent the 7 discrimination and retaliation is derivative of her claims for FEHA discrimination 8 and retaliation. See Ravel v. Hewlett-Packard Enterprise, Inc., 228 F.Supp.3d 1086, 9 1098 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (“Courts have interpreted a failure to prevent discrimination 10 claim [to be] essentially derivative of a [FEHA] discrimination claim.” [internal 11 quotations and citations omitted]). Becase the Court does not need to interpret the 12 CBA for Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims, it also does not need to 13 interpret it in deciding the failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation claim. 14 The claim requires a factual inquiry into Defendants’ motive in taking the 15 discriminatory and retaliatory acts and determining whether Defendants responded in 16 a manner deemed reasonable under FEHA, none of which requires interpretation of 17 the CBA. See Klausen, 158 F.Supp.3d at 934 (holding that plaintiff’s FEHA 18 discrimination and failure to prevent claims not preempted by Section 301). 19 B. Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination in 20 Violation of Public Policy Is Not Preempted By Section 301 of the 21 LMRA. 22 Plaintiff’s state common law wrongful termination claim is not preempted 23 because it furthers a state interest and is based on FEHA and Article I, Section 8 of 24 the California Constitution, which is the state constitutional prohibition against 25 discrimination. See Doc. No. 1-1, Exh. B, Complaint ¶ 72; see also Young v. 26 Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 1001 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A wrongful 27 termination in violation of public policy] claim is not preempted if it poses no 28 6 STATEMENT OF DECISION GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND 1 significant threat to the collective bargaining process and furthers a state interest in 2 protecting the public transcending the employment relationship.”); Brown v. 3 Brotman Med. Ctr., Inc., 571 Fed. App’x 572, 575 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding a 4 wrongful termination claim premised on FEHA discrimination “further[s] a state 5 interest in preventing workplace discrimination” and “does not require interpretation 6 of the CBA as it focuses on [the employer’s] motivations”). The Ninth Circuit 7 agrees: “[t]here is little doubt that California has adopted a public policy against 8 discrimination in the work place . . . [E]nforcement of the state discrimination 9 statutes would not require interpretation of any of the provisions of the collective 10 bargaining agreement.” Jackson v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 643-44 (9th Cir. 11 1989). Accordingly, Section 301 does not preempt Plaintiff’s common law claim for 12 wrongful termination in violation of public policy. 13 C. Plaintiff’s Eighth Cause of Action for Violation of Labor Code § 1102.5. 14 15 Labor Code § 1102.5 protects employees against unlawful retaliation for 16 reporting unlawful conduct. “The elements of this claim require an inquiry into the 17 respective actions of the employer and the employee in order to determine whether 18 [the defendant] retaliated against [the plaintiff] after [she] engaged in whistleblowing 19 activity . . . This inquiry will not depend on interpretation of terms in the CBA.” 20 Brown, 571 Fed. App’x at 575; see also Garcia v. Rite Aid Corp., No. CV 17-02124, 21 2017 WL 1737718, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2017) (citing Brown to find Labor 22 Code § 1102.5 claim not preempted by Section 301). In this case, Plaintiff claims 23 Defendants retaliated against and failed to re-hire her because she filed her 24 Complaint of Discrimination with the DFEH. See Doc. No. 1-1, Exh. B, Complaint 25 ¶ 79. Thus, this claim requires an inquiry into Defendants’ motivation for these 26 actions, which does not require interpretation of the CBA.1 27 1 Defendants claim the Court has original jurisdiction under over this case 28 because Plaintiff’s Labor Code § 1102.5 claim alleges that Defendants retaliated 7 STATEMENT OF DECISION GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND 1 D. Plaintiff’s Grievance Does Not Trigger LMRA Preemption 2 Defendants also claim the Court must interpret the CBA in order to determine 3 whether Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies through the 4 agreement’s grievance procedures. However, Plaintiff does not alleges any specific 5 violations of the CBA. In addition, even if this Court would be required to address 6 the same set of facts in this case as those that could be used in filing a grievance 7 under the CBA, the Supreme Court has held that such a claim is independent of the 8 CBA: 9 10 11 12 [E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for [Section] 301 pre-emption purposes. 13 Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409-10. 14 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s grievance for unjust termination preempts 15 Plaintiff’s legal claims. However, the Supreme Court has rejected this argument. In 16 Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407, the Court held that a wrongful termination claim was not 17 preempted by a pending grievance: “To defend against a retaliatory discharge claim, 18 an employer must show that it had a nonretaliatory reason for the discharge . . . ; this 19 purely factual inquiry likewise does not turn on the meaning of any provision of a 20 collective-bargaining agreement.” Similarly, in this case, Plaintiff’s discrimination, 21 22 against and failed to rehire her after she complained of violations of the FEHA and 23 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 the federal antidiscrimination statute. See Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 33-35 (citing Doc. No. 1-1, Exh. B, 24 Complaint ¶ 79). Defendants offer no authority or explanation for this argument. 25 California Labor Code § 1102.5 provides state protections to whistleblowers who report violations of or noncompliance with state or federal statutes, rules, or 26 regulations. Simply reporting conduct that violates state and federal statutes does not 27 convert Plaintiff’s state law Labor Code § 1102.5 claim to a federal question. Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument. 28 8 STATEMENT OF DECISION GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND 1 retaliation, and wrongful termination claims do not “turn on the meaning” of the 2 CBA. Instead, those claims require a fact-specific inquiry that involves discrete 3 state-law rights and operates wholly independently from the CBA procedure. Id. at 4 411 (“[T]here is nothing novel about recognizing that substantive rights in the labor 5 relations context can exist without interpreting collective-bargaining agreements.”). 6 V. CONCLUSION 7 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to State Court is 8 GRANTED and this action is REMANDED to Los Angeles County Superior Court. 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 12 13 Dated: July 31, 2019 Hon. John F. Walter United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9 STATEMENT OF DECISION GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND
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