Ryan Morrison v. City of Los Angeles, California et al, No. 2:2019cv01961 - Document 93 (C.D. Cal. 2022)
Court Description: ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE by Judge Jesus G. Bernal for NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to FEDERAL RULES CIVIL PROCEDURE 56 78 , Report and Recommendation (Issued) 91 , NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment 84 . The Court accepts the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. It therefore is ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and Plaintiff's summary-judgment motion is DENIED. Judgment is to be entered in Defendants' favor, dismissing this action with prejudice as to Plaintiff's federal claims and without prejudice as to his state-law claims. (es)
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Ryan Morrison v. City of Los Angeles, California et al Doc. 93 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 RYAN MORRISON, 11 Plaintiff, 12 13 v. ALVARO RAMOS et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 19-1961-JGB (JPR) ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE The Court has reviewed de novo the records on file and 17 Report and Recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge, which 18 recommends that Defendants’ summary-judgment motion be granted 19 except as to the state-law claims, which should be dismissed 20 without prejudice, and Plaintiff’s summary-judgment motion be 21 denied. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. On May 10, 2022, Plaintiff 22 objected to portions of the R. & R.; Defendants didn’t respond. 23 In 47 pages of objections, Plaintiff has included no record 24 citations other than when quoting (without quotation marks) the 25 R. & R., making it virtually impossible for the Court to assess 26 his arguments. See Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 27 1996) (noting that district court need not “scour the record in 28 search of a genuine issue of triable fact” (citation omitted)); 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (“[C]ourt need consider only the cited 2 materials[.]”). At any rate, he mostly reargues points made in 3 his summary-judgment motion, Opposition to Defendants’ motion, 4 and Reply, which the Magistrate Judge already considered and 5 appropriately rejected. 6 Only a few warrant discussion. Plaintiff doesn’t challenge the Magistrate Judge’s finding 7 that his malicious-prosecution claim fails or that his state-law 8 claims should be dismissed. Nor does he dispute that the 9 preliminary-hearing finding of probable cause precludes 10 relitigation of probable cause here. He instead insists that 11 probable cause is not a “total defense to false arrest and 12 imprisonment” claims. (Objs. at 14.) But as the Magistrate 13 Judge noted (see R. & R. at 12), the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly 14 held the opposite. See Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d 15 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The absence of probable cause is a 16 necessary element of [a] § 1983 false arrest” claim); Hart v. 17 Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Because police had 18 probable cause to arrest him, [plaintiff’s] false arrest claim 19 necessarily fails.”); Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 20 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (“To prevail on his § 21 1983 claim for false arrest and imprisonment, [plaintiff] would 22 have to demonstrate that there was no probable cause to arrest 23 him.”). 24 Plaintiff claims, again, that Morrison “testified she never” 25 told arresting officers Mirzoyan and Ramos that Plaintiff 26 “contacted her in May 2016 and asked if he could move in with her 27 in [California] temporarily to attend school.” 28 also id. at 4-5, 7, 19, 21-23.) (Objs. at 3; see As the Magistrate Judge noted 2 1 (see R. & R. at 7 n.5, 25-26), however, that’s not true, and 2 Plaintiff points to nothing in the record to the contrary. 3 Indeed, at the preliminary hearing, Morrison testified that after 4 Plaintiff called and “said he was coming out to California,” she 5 “offered to let him stay with [her] for a couple of months.” 6 (Pl.’s Statement Genuine Disputes, Ex. 2 at 9.) 7 was living alone. (See id.) At the time, she When Plaintiff arrived in 8 California, they leased a different residence together. (See id. 9 at 10; id., Ex. 3 at 42, 48; id., Ex. 12 at 20-21.) 10 At Plaintiff’s criminal trial, Morrison was testifying about 11 that leased residence when she seemed to deny that he had told 12 her that he was moving in with her temporarily: 13 Q And you needed [Plaintiff] to cosign for the 14 apartment because he had good credit and you did 15 not. 16 A 17 18 No. He –- he was moving in with me. We both had to sign it. Q Now, didn’t [Plaintiff] tell you that he was moving 19 in with you temporarily to help you get on your 20 feet but then he was going to move out on his own? 21 A No. It was –- we signed a year’s lease. 22 (Id., Ex. 3 at 47.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument (see Objs. 23 at 3-4), this testimony wasn’t in the context of what she told 24 Defendants leading up to Plaintiff’s arrest; that came later (see 25 Pl.’s Statement Genuine Disputes, Ex. 3 at 65-68). She never 26 denied having told Defendants around the time of his arrest that 27 she had agreed to let Plaintiff move in with her temporarily (see 28 R. & R. at 7 n.5, 25-26); their evidence on that point therefore 3 1 remains undisputed (see Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 8, Mirzoyan 2 Decl. ¶ 8; id., Ex. 2 at 2-3).1 3 Next, Plaintiff challenges the Magistrate Judge’s finding 4 that Ramos and Mirzoyan had to act fast because Morrison seemed 5 to be in harm’s way. (See Objs. at 6-7.) He claims Morrison 6 went to the police station “only to drop off paperwork,” not to 7 “report a crime or seek police action.” 8 25.) (Objs. at 7; see id. at Thus, he argues, she didn’t “fear[] for [her] safety.” 9 (Id. at 7; see id. at 25 (claiming that Morrison “was not in fear 10 for her safety” because “[s]he was not [at the police station] to 11 make a report or seek police action”).) 12 But the “paperwork” Morrison dropped off was a medical 13 report showing that she had suffered rib fractures the day she 14 called police and stating that she had “[ch]est pain after 15 assault.” (Pl.’s Statement Undisputed Facts, Ex. 5 at 3.) 16 What’s more, Mirzoyan declared that Morrison said she believed 17 Plaintiff’s threats were credible and that she “feared for her 18 safety.” (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 8, Mirzoyan Decl. ¶ 11; see 19 also Pl.’s Statement Genuine Disputes, Ex. 10 at 37 (Ramos 20 testifying that Morrison “expressed being . . . afraid”).). And 21 she told them that Plaintiff had thrown items around the house, 22 including a 20-inch television, and struck her with a walker, 23 which was consistent with what responding officer Avila saw when 24 25 26 27 28 1 Plaintiff likewise claims that Ramos and Mirzoyan knew he “paid rent and was on [the] lease” (Objs. at 37; see also id. at 89, 32) and that Morrison told them that he “paid money towards [the] apartment” (id. at 45), but he cites no evidence supporting those claims. (See R. & R. at 25.) In any event, all that matters is what Ramos and Mirzoyan believed at the time of his arrest, not what they might have learned later. 4 1 she first entered the apartment. 2 (citing record evidence).)2 (See R. & R. at 13, 15-16 Indeed, Morrison later told Boylls 3 that she had “[f]ear[ed] that [Plaintiff] would be at her 4 residence” and therefore “responded to [the police station] and 5 spoke with” Ramos and Mirzoyan there. (Pl.’s Statement 6 Undisputed Facts, Ex. 25 at 2; see also R. & R. at 31.) She 7 reported that she “live[d] in constant fear” of Plaintiff (Pl.’s 8 Statement Undisputed Facts, Ex. 25 at 2) and requested a 9 restraining order (id., Ex. 2 at 89-90). Thus, Ramos and 10 Mirzoyan would have reasonably believed that Morrison was in 11 harm’s way and had to act quickly. 12 (See R. & R. at 25.) Plaintiff wrongly claims that “Avila testified nothing 13 stopped her from arresting Plaintiff,” and she could have 14 “fil[ed] an arrest report.” (Objs. at 21; see also id. at 24 15 (arguing that Avila had “opportunity” to arrest Plaintiff).) In 16 fact, Avila couldn’t arrest him because he was “already gone” 17 when she “took the investigative report.” (Pl.’s Statement 18 Genuine Disputes, Ex. 5 at 13; see Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1 at 19 3-4 (investigative report noting that Avila and her partner 20 searched for but couldn’t find Plaintiff).) 21 Arguing that Mirzoyan and Ramos should have investigated 22 Morrison’s claims more before arresting him, Plaintiff for the 23 first time states that Morrison had falsely accused people 24 2 In his Objections, Plaintiff for the first time “den[ies]” 25 that Morrison “made these statements” to Mirzoyan and Ramos. 26 (Objs. at 20.) Never mind that he previously didn’t dispute those facts (see Pl.’s Statement Genuine Disputes at 7-8 (noting that 27 they were “undisputed”)), he has pointed to no contradictory evidence. (See Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 8, Mirzoyan Decl. ¶ 12 28 (Mirzoyan declaring what Morrison told them).) 5 1 before: she “has a long history of accusing people,” “[m]ade many 2 false police reports,” and “filed complaints against many other 3 people including judges, lawyers, medical doctors, psychologists, 4 school teachers and principles [sic] and family members and 5 more.” (Objs. at 25-26.) Even if that’s true, however, nothing 6 suggests that Defendants had reason to so suspect, and because of 7 Morrison’s apparent injuries at Plaintiff’s hands, they had to 8 act quickly. They had no immediate basis to doubt Morrison’s 9 veracity, as the Magistrate Judge found. 10 (See R. & R. at 16-17) Plaintiff’s next argument fares even worse: because Mirzoyan 11 allegedly testified that he entered the residence only to 12 investigate, he must have lied in his declaration about Morrison 13 giving him consent to enter to arrest Plaintiff. 14 9.) (See Objs. at As the Magistrate Judge noted (see R. & R. at 26 n.18), 15 Mirzoyan never testified that he entered the residence only to 16 investigate. But even if he did, that wouldn’t mean that 17 Morrison didn’t consent to their entry to arrest Plaintiff. 18 Indeed, she affirmatively told police that she wanted Plaintiff 19 arrested (see Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 8, Mirzoyan Decl. ¶ 13; 20 see also id., Ex. 1 (investigative report noting that Morrison 21 told Avila that she “want[ed]” Plaintiff “prosecuted for th[e] 22 crime”)), so when she brought them to the apartment and used her 23 key to open the door and let them in, the officers would have 24 reasonably inferred that she did so so that they could arrest 25 Plaintiff. 26 Ramos testified, Plaintiff asserts, “that there were no 27 facts known to hi[m] that suggested . . . Morrison had any 28 access, mutual use or control over the bedroom with Plaintiff.” 6 1 (Objs. at 38.) But as with all his objections, he doesn’t supply 2 supporting record citations, and the Court has found no such 3 testimony. Indeed, Morrison repeatedly referred to the apartment 4 as hers and told the officers that Plaintiff was supposed to stay 5 with her for a short time. (See Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 8, 6 Mirzoyan Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11, 13; id., Ex. 2 at 2-3.) As the 7 Magistrate Judge correctly noted, no facts known to Ramos and 8 Mirzoyan suggested that Plaintiff had “exclusive control” over 9 the room. 10 (See R. & R. at 29; see also id. at 24-25.) Finally, as to qualified immunity, Plaintiff again discusses 11 United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1073, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 12 1991), stating that it’s “nearly identical” to his case. 13 at 43.) (Objs. But as the Magistrate Judge found, no Supreme Court or 14 Ninth Circuit case as of November 2016 held that a parent’s 15 consent “prevails (or doesn’t prevail) over a present and 16 objecting adult child.” (R. & R. at 28.) And even if Whitfield 17 is “nearly identical” (Objs. at 43), it certainly doesn’t reflect 18 a “robust consensus” of persuasive authority, Dist. of Columbia 19 v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589-90 (2018) (“clearly established” 20 means “dictated by ‘controlling authority’” or supported by 21 “robust consensus” of “persuasive authority” (citation omitted)). 22 (See R. & R. at 28-29 (summarizing cases disagreeing with 23 Whitfield)); see also In re D.C., 188 Cal. App. 4th 978, 987 24 (2010) (observing that Whitfield “does not reflect a clear 25 federal consensus”). Thus, the Magistrate Judge correctly found 26 that Mirzoyan and Ramos were entitled to qualified immunity on 27 Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim: they had no “fair and clear 28 warning of what the Constitution requires.” 7 City & Cnty. of S.F. 1 v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 617 (2015) (citation omitted). 2 The Court accepts the findings and recommendations of the 3 Magistrate Judge. It therefore is ORDERED that Defendants’ 4 motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and Plaintiff’s 5 summary-judgment motion is DENIED. Judgment is to be entered in 6 Defendants’ favor, dismissing this action with prejudice as to 7 Plaintiff’s federal claims and without prejudice as to his state8 law claims. 9 10 DATED: June 21, 2022 11 JESUS G. BERNAL U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8
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