Stacy Lee Hernandez v. Nancy Berryhill, No. 2:2018cv10619 - Document 25 (C.D. Cal. 2020)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION by Magistrate Judge Alka Sagar. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. (see document for further details) (hr)

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Stacy Lee Hernandez v. Nancy Berryhill Doc. 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STACY LEE HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff, 12 v. 13 14 CASE NO. CV 18-10619 AS MEMORANDUM OPINION ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, 1 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 For the reasons discussed below, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, 19 pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Commissioner’s 20 decision is affirmed. 21 22 PROCEEDINGS 23 24 On December 21, 2018, Stacy Lee Hernandez (“Plaintiff”) filed 25 a Complaint seeking review of the denial of her application for 26 1 27 28 Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for his predecessor. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Dockets.Justia.com 1 disability benefits 2 (“Commissioner” or “Agency”). (Dkt. No. 1). 3 consented the 4 Magistrate Judge. 5 Defendant filed an Answer along with the Administrative Record 6 (“AR”). (Dkt. Nos. 13, 14). 7 (“Joint Stip.”) 8 respective positions regarding Plaintiff’s claims. to by proceed the Commissioner before of Security The parties have undersigned (Dkt. Nos. 11, 23, 24). on Social United States On May 16, 2019, The parties filed a Joint Stipulation September 16, 2019, setting forth their (Dkt. No. 19). 9 10 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 11 12 On February 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed applications for 13 Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security 14 Income (“SSI”), pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security 15 Act, alleging a disability onset date of October 28, 2012. 16 103-04, 196-212). The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s applications 17 initially and on reconsideration. 18 Plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified at a hearing before 19 an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). 20 heard testimony from Sharon Spaventa, a vocational expert (“VE”). 21 (AR 62-70, see id. 306-10). (AR 74-132). (AR On July 13, 2017, (AR 32-73). The ALJ also 22 23 On January 30, 2018, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s request for 24 benefits. (AR 15-26). 25 the ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff has not engaged in 26 substantial gainful activity since October 28, 2012, the alleged 27 onset date. 28 right elbow osteoarthritis, lumbar spine degenerative disc disease, (AR 18). Applying the five-step sequential process, At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s 2 1 status post remote right arm surgery, affective disorder, obesity, 2 and headaches are severe impairments. 3 the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 4 combination 5 severity of any of the listings enumerated in the regulations. 2 6 (AR 20-21). of impairments that meet (AR 18). or At step three, medically equal the 7 8 The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity 9 (RFC) 3 and concluded that she can perform sedentary work, as defined 10 in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a), 4 except: Plaintiff can 11 be “on feet 4 hours of an 8-hour day; lift 20 pounds occasionally, 12 10 pounds frequently; push/pull occasionally with the right upper 13 extremity; occasionally balance, stoop, crawl; frequently fully 14 extended reaching with dominant upper extremity; simple routine 15 tasks.” 16 unable to perform any past relevant work. 17 Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, work experience and the VE’s (AR 21). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is (AR 24). Based on 18 2 19 20 The ALJ explicitly considered whether Plaintiff’s medically determinable mental impairments meet the requirements of Listing 12.04 (depressive, bipolar and related disorders). (AR 20-21). 21 3 22 23 The RFC is what a claimant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). 4 24 25 26 27 28 “Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a). 3 1 testimony, the ALJ determined, at step five, that there are jobs 2 that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that 3 Plaintiff 4 stuffer, and addresser. 5 that Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the Social 6 Security Act from October 28, 2012, through the date of the 7 decision. can perform, including small (AR 24-25). parts assembler, toy Accordingly, the ALJ found (AR 25-26). 8 9 The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on 10 October 19, 2018. (AR 1–6). 11 of the ALJ’s decision, which stands as the final decision of the 12 Commissioner. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c). 13 14 STANDARD OF REVIEW 15 16 This Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine 17 if: (1) the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial 18 evidence; and (2) the Commissioner used proper legal standards. 19 U.S.C § 405(g); see Carmickle v. Comm’r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th 20 Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). 21 “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a 22 preponderance.” 23 1998) (citing Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 24 1997)). 25 accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 26 1074; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). 27 determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, “a court 28 must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that 42 Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. It is relevant evidence “which a reasonable person might 4 Hoopai, 499 F. 3d at To 1 supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] 2 conclusion.” 3 2001) (citation omitted); see Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 4 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (inferences “reasonably drawn from the record” 5 can constitute substantial evidence). Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 6 7 This Court “may not affirm [the Commissioner’s] decision 8 simply by isolating a specific quantum of support evidence, but 9 must also consider evidence that detracts from [the Commissioner’s] 10 conclusion.” 11 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 12 Court cannot disturb findings supported by substantial evidence, 13 even though there may exist other evidence supporting Plaintiff’s 14 claim. 15 “If 16 reversing 17 substitute its judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” 18 157 F.3d at 720-21 (citation omitted). Ray v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 914, 915 (9th Cir. 1987) However, the See Torske v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 59, 60 (9th Cir. 1973). the evidence the can reasonably [Commissioner’s] support conclusion, either [a] affirming court may or not Reddick, 19 20 DISCUSSION 21 22 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ (1) improperly assessed her 23 RFC; (2) erred in assessing lay witness testimony; (3) failed to 24 properly 25 incomplete hypothetical to the VE. 26 19-23, 27-32). 27 the record as a whole, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision assess her subjective symptoms; and (4) posed an (Joint Stip. at 7-10, 13-17, After consideration of the parties’ arguments and 28 5 1 to be supported by substantial evidence and free from material 2 legal error. 5 3 4 A. 5 The ALJ’s Reasons for Discrediting Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony Were Specific, Clear and Convincing 6 7 At her hearing, Plaintiff testified that she stopped working 8 after a disagreement with her manager. (AR 42-43). She also 9 experienced chronic headaches and had difficulty extending her 10 right arm. 11 six days a month where she cannot get out of bed. 12 Her medications do not help. 13 Plaintiff does not have full extension of her right arm and has 14 developed arthritis which has gotten worse in the last few years. 15 (AR 55-56). 16 57). 17 the pain for a couple days. 18 pain that radiates to her hip and right leg. (AR 48-49). The pain 19 in her back is 3/10 on a good day and 6/10 on a bad day. (AR 48). 20 Plaintiff experiences chronic depression, which is only partially 21 controlled with medication. (AR 38-39, 44-46). Plaintiff has headaches five to (AR 52). (AR 51-52, 58). Due to surgery as a child, She also has difficulty rotating her right elbow. (AR She has had a cortisone injection in her elbow that helped (AR 46). Plaintiff experiences back (AR 59). 22 23 Plaintiff 24 experiencing pain. 25 26 27 28 is able to (AR 49). walk only one-half block before She can lift a gallon of milk with 5 The harmless error rule applies to the review of administrative decisions regarding disability. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 886–88 (9th Cir. 2011); see Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (an ALJ’s decision will not be reversed for errors that are harmless). 6 1 her left arm without pain. (AR 50, 57). She can sit for 20 to 30 2 minutes before needing to move around. 3 with her adult daughter and is able to drive without difficulty. 4 (AR 53-54). 5 daughter to school. (AR 50). Plaintiff lives She does as many chores as possible and drives her (AR 55). 6 7 When assessing a claimant’s credibility regarding subjective 8 pain or intensity of symptoms, the ALJ must engage in a two-step 9 analysis. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). 10 First, the ALJ must determine if there is medical evidence of an 11 impairment that could reasonably produce the symptoms alleged. 12 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). 13 analysis, the claimant is not required to show that her impairment 14 could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom 15 she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have 16 caused some degree of the symptom.” 17 (citation omitted). 18 evidence of the pain or fatigue itself, or the severity thereof.” 19 Id. (citation omitted). “In this Id. (emphasis in original) “Nor must a claimant produce objective medical 20 21 If the claimant satisfies this first step, and there is no 22 evidence of malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and 23 convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony about 24 the symptom severity. 25 see also Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (“[T]he ALJ may reject the 26 claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms only 27 if he makes specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons 28 for doing so.”); Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 678 (citation omitted); 7 1 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering 2 based on affirmative evidence thereof, he or she may only find an 3 applicant 4 credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for each.”). 5 “This is not an easy requirement to meet: The clear and convincing 6 standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases.” 7 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 (citation omitted). not credible by making specific findings as to 8 9 Where, as here, the ALJ finds that a claimant suffers from a 10 medically determinable physical or mental impairment that could 11 reasonably be expected to produce her alleged symptoms, the ALJ 12 must evaluate “the intensity and persistence of those symptoms to 13 determine the extent to which the symptoms limit an individual’s 14 ability to perform work-related activities for an adult.” 15 Sec. Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *3. 6 16 superseded SSR 96–7p and eliminated the term “credibility” from 17 the Agency’s sub-regulatory policy. 18 has noted that SSR 16–3p Soc. SSR 16–3p However, the Ninth Circuit 19 20 makes clear what [the Ninth Circuit’s] precedent already 21 required: that assessments of an individual’s testimony 22 by an ALJ are designed to “evaluate the intensity and 23 persistence of symptoms after the ALJ finds that the 24 25 26 27 28 6 SSR 16-3p, which superseded SSR 96-7p, is applicable to this case, because SSR 16-3p, which became effective on March 28, 2016, was in effect at the time of the Appeal Council’s October 19, 2018 denial of Plaintiff’s request for review. Nevertheless, the regulations on evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, including pain, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929, have not changed. 8 1 individual has a medically determinable impairment(s) 2 that 3 symptoms,” and not to delve into wide-ranging scrutiny 4 of the claimant’s character and apparent truthfulness. could reasonably be expected to produce those 5 6 Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 678 n.5 (quoting SSR 16–3p) (alterations 7 omitted). 8 9 In discrediting the claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, 10 the 11 evaluation, such as . . . prior inconsistent statements concerning 12 the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less 13 than candid; unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek 14 treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and the 15 claimant’s daily activities.” 16 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 17 a claimant’s testimony and conduct, or internal contradictions in 18 the claimant’s testimony, also may be relevant. 19 775 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2014); Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 20 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). 21 consider the observations of treating and examining physicians 22 regarding, among other matters, the functional restrictions caused 23 by the claimant’s symptoms. 24 Burrell, 775 F.3d at 1137. 25 reject subjective testimony based “solely” on its inconsistencies 26 with the objective medical evidence presented. 27 Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation 28 omitted). ALJ may consider: “ordinary techniques of credibility Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, Inconsistencies between Burrell v. Colvin, In addition, the ALJ may Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; accord However, it is improper for an ALJ to 9 Bray v. Comm’r of 1 Further, the ALJ must make a credibility determination with 2 findings that are “sufficiently specific to permit the court to 3 conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s 4 testimony.” 5 2008) (citation omitted); see Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 6 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A finding that a claimant’s testimony is not 7 credible must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court 8 to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on 9 permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 10 testimony regarding pain.”) (citation omitted). 11 interpretation of a claimant’s testimony may not be the only 12 reasonable one, if it is supported by substantial evidence, “it is 13 not [the court’s] role to second-guess it.” 14 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). Although an ALJ’s Rollins v. Massanari, 15 16 Plaintiff vaguely asserts that the ALJ erroneously discredited 17 her subjective symptom statements. (Joint Stip. at 20-23). As 18 set forth below, however, the ALJ provided multiple, specific, 19 clear, and convincing reasons, supported by evidence in the record, 20 to find Plaintiff’s complaints of pain and other symptomology only 21 partially credible. (AR 22-23). 22 23 First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s (AR 22-23). statements were 24 internally inconsistent. 25 inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or between the 26 testimony and the claimant’s conduct.” 27 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 28 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (“ALJ may engage in ordinary techniques of 10 “[T]he ALJ may consider Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1 credibility evaluation, 2 claimant’s 3 416.929(c)(4). 4 adverse credibility finding. 5 (“The record reflects that [the claimant] responded favorably to 6 conservative 7 inflammatory medication [and] a transcutaneous electrical nerve 8 stimulation unit . . . . Such a response to conservative treatment 9 undermines [claimant’s] reports regarding the disabling nature of 10 his pain.”); Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 254 (9th Cir. 1996) 11 (“evidence 12 treatment” supports an adverse credibility finding). 13 that Plaintiff consistently reported that her medications and 14 treatment were effective at relieving her pain and other symptoms. 15 (AR 22). 16 medications from Plaintiff’s primary care provider. 17 66). 18 her headaches. 19 after receiving epidural steroid injections in July, November, and 20 December 2014. 21 acknowledged improvement with baclofen and water therapy. 22 411). 23 Plaintiff was obtaining functional pain relief on her current 24 regimen. 25 relief from a recent epidural steroid injection. 26 next month, Plaintiff’s treating physician again noted that she 27 was obtaining functional pain control with her current medication 28 regimen without any side effects. testimony”); such accord as . . . 20 inconsistencies C.F.R. in §§ 404.1529(c)(4), Moreover, a good response to treatment supports an treatment suggesting See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1040 including . . . that [the the claimant] use responded of anti- well to The ALJ noted Despite a history of depression, it was maintained by (AR 319, 327- In July 2013, Plaintiff reported that analgesics relieved (AR 342). She reported significant improvement (AR 425, 435, 450). In March 2015, Plaintiff (AR In April 2015, Plaintiff’s treating physician found that (AR 406). In March 2016, Plaintiff acknowledged 80% pain 11 (AR 484). (AR 490). The In November 2016, 1 Plaintiff reported good pain control from her opioid medications, 2 with increased physical activity, improved mood, and normal sleep. 3 (AR 536). 4 (AR 5 testimony of disabling pain. 6 Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can 7 be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for 8 the purpose of determining eligibility for SSI benefits.”). In May 2017, Plaintiff reported that her pain was 0/10. 694). These admissions directly contradict Plaintiff’s See Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 9 10 Second, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s reported 11 participation in everyday activities were inconsistent with her 12 testimony about pain and functional limitations. 13 must be especially cautious in concluding that daily activities 14 are inconsistent with testimony about pain, because impairments 15 that would unquestionably preclude work and all the pressures of a 16 workplace environment will often be consistent with doing more than 17 merely resting in bed all day.” 18 Nevertheless, an ALJ properly may consider the claimant’s daily 19 activities in weighing credibility. 20 If 21 claimant’s asserted limitations, it has a bearing on credibility. 22 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016. 23 reported good function and activities of daily living with her 24 injections and medication. 25 Plaintiff is able to do cleaning, laundry, drive a car, and shop 26 in stores. 27 and engaging in social activities, such as lunch and movies, with a claimant’s level of (AR 23). “ALJs Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039. activity is inconsistent with the Here, in September 2016, Plaintiff (AR 23, 549). (AR 23, 256-57). As noted by the ALJ, She has no trouble handling money 28 12 1 her friends. (AR 23, 257-58). These activities belie Plaintiff’s 2 testimony of disabling symptoms and limitations. 3 4 Plaintiff contends that it takes her all day to clean and has 5 help doing some household chores. (Joint Stip. at 20). 6 the Plaintiff’s 7 transferring the ability to do these chores into workplace skills. 8 Instead, it is Plaintiff’s ability to do these chores, not how long 9 they take, that undermines her subjective statements. ALJ is not, contrary to assertion However, (id.), (AR 23). 10 11 Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not stop working due 12 to her impairments, but rather because of a “disagreement” with 13 her employer. 14 claimant left her job for reasons other than an alleged impairment. 15 See Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001), as 16 amended (Nov. 9, 2001); see also Gregory v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 664, 17 667 (9th Cir. 1988) (“substantial evidence indicated that the 18 condition of Gregory’s back had remained constant for a number of 19 years and that her back problems had not prevented her from working 20 over that time”); Sadeeq v. Colvin, 607 F. App’x 629, 631 (9th Cir. 21 2015) (ALJ did not err in concluding an impairment was not severe 22 where the claimant “was able to continue working” despite his 23 symptoms). 24 as to the reason she stopped working and “[i]t is equally likely 25 that given her obesity and other impairments that the employer had 26 made accommodations for her to work.” 27 Plaintiff herself acknowledged that she stopped working due to a 28 “disagreement (AR 23). An ALJ may properly consider whether a Plaintiff contends that the ALJ is merely “speculating” with [her] manager” 13 (Joint Stip. at 20-21). and testified that she But was 1 physically able to work despite her headaches and difficulty using 2 her arm. (AR 42, 45-46). 3 4 Finally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s subjective statements 5 about the intensity and limiting effects of her symptoms were 6 inconsistent with the objective medical evidence. 7 inconsistencies with the objective medical evidence cannot be the 8 sole ground for rejecting a claimant’s subjective testimony, it is 9 a factor that the ALJ may consider when evaluating credibility. 10 Bray, 554 F.3d at 1227; Burch, 400 F.3d at 681; Rollins, 261 F.3d 11 at 857; see SSR 16-3p, at *5 (“objective medical evidence is a 12 useful indicator to help make reasonable conclusions about the 13 intensity and persistence of symptoms, including the effects those 14 symptoms 15 activities”). 16 ability to walk and sit are belied by physical examinations that 17 demonstrated 18 negative straight leg raising test. (AR 333, 593). While Plaintiff 19 complained of significant issues with her right arm and headaches, 20 her treatment was focused instead on her lower back pain. 21 of treatment records during the relevant period suggests that 22 Plaintiff’s right arm symptoms were not as severe as she alleged. 23 See Tommasetti, 553 F.3d at 1039–40 (ALJ may properly infer that 24 claimant’s pain “was not as all-disabling as he reported in light 25 of the fact that he did not seek an aggressive treatment program”). may have on Here, normal the ability Plaintiff’s gait, only 26 27 28 14 to perform testimony mild pain (AR 23). about with While work-related her limited motion, and a The lack 1 The Court finds that the ALJ offered clear and convincing 2 reasons, supported by substantial evidence in the record, for his 3 adverse credibility findings. Accordingly, no remand is required. 4 5 B. The ALJ Provided Germane Reasons For Rejecting Lay Testimony 6 7 In a third-party statement, Plaintiff’s friend asserted that 8 Plaintiff is unable to stand on her feet for long period time and 9 often wakes up with headaches. (AR 244). Nevertheless, Plaintiff 10 is able to perform personal care tasks, prepare meals, do some 11 house and yard work, and drive a car. 12 friend asserted that Plaintiff has difficulty lifting, squatting, 13 bending, standing, reaching, walking, sitting, kneeling, climbing, 14 completing tasks, and concentrating. 15 only two to six blocks at a time before needing to rest and cannot 16 lift more than 15-20 pounds. (AR 245-47). (AR 249). Plaintiff’s Plaintiff can walk (AR 249). 17 18 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in assessing the lay 19 witness 20 Plaintiff’s friend’s statements “little weight” because they were 21 similar 22 statements, were contradicted by the objective medical record. 23 24). 24 evidence that an ALJ must take into account, unless he or she 25 expressly determines to disregard such testimony and gives reasons 26 germane to each witness for doing so.” 27 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). “One reason for which an ALJ may discount 28 lay testimony is that it conflicts with medical evidence.” testimony. to (Joint Plaintiff’s Stip. at allegations 15-17). and, The like ALJ gave Plaintiff’s (AR “Lay testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms is competent 15 Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d Id. 1 The ALJ provided germane reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s 2 friend’s statement. 3 the statement submitted by Plaintiff. 4 id. 254-62). 5 reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 6 because 7 [Plaintiff’s] complaints, it follows that the ALJ also gave germane 8 reasons 9 Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2017); see Molina, 674 at The third-party statement largely mirrored As discussed above, the ALJ gave clear and convincing Plaintiff’s for 1122 (Compare AR 244-53, with friend’s rejecting (because the “the “lay lay lay testimony witness was similar testimony.” testimony Thus, to Leon described the v. 10 F.3d same 11 limitations as Molina’s own testimony, . . . the ALJ’s reasons for 12 rejecting Molina’s testimony apply with equal force to the lay 13 testimony”); Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 14 694 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In light of our conclusion that the ALJ 15 provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Valentine’s 16 own subjective complaints, and because Ms. Valentine’s testimony 17 was similar to such complaints, it follows that the ALJ also gave 18 germane reasons for rejecting her testimony.”). 19 20 21 In sum, the ALJ provided germane reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s friend’s lay testimony, and no remand is required. 22 23 C. The ALJ’s RFC Assessment Is Supported By Substantial Evidence 24 25 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate 26 her RFC. (See generally Joint Stip. at 7-13, 19-23). 27 asserts that the ALJ failed to fully assess the medical opinions, 28 16 She vaguely 1 her right elbow limitations, chronic headaches, degenerative disc 2 disease, and obesity on her ability to work. (Id.). 3 4 “A claimant’s residual functional capacity is what he can 5 still do despite his physical, mental, nonexertional, and other 6 limitations.” 7 Cir. 1989) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545). 8 requires the ALJ to consider a claimant’s impairments and any 9 related symptoms that may “cause physical and mental limitations Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th An RFC assessment 10 that affect what [he] can do in a work setting.” 11 §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). In determining a claimant’s RFC, 12 the 13 functional capacity assessments made by consultative examiners, 14 State 15 §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 16 416.913(c). ALJ considers Agency all relevant physicians, and evidence, including medical experts. see id. 416.945(a)(3); also 20 C.F.R. residual 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(c), 17 18 Here, in fashioning all of Plaintiff’s [Plaintiff’s] RFC, the ALJ 19 “consider[ed] 20 impairments that are not severe” and found that she was capable of 21 a limited range of sedentary work. 22 Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1996) (“When a claimant suffers 23 from multiple impairments, the Commissioner must consider their 24 combined effect in determining whether the claimant is disabled.”); 25 accord 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.923(c), 416.945(a)(2). 26 found that Plaintiff’s right elbow osteoarthritis, lumbar spine 27 degenerative disc disease, status post remote right arm surgery, 28 affective disorder, obesity, and headaches are severe impairments. 17 impairments, properly including (AR 17, 21); see Macri v. The ALJ properly 1 (AR 18-20). 2 with medical findings or diagnostic tests, that these impairments 3 limit 4 determination. 5 evidence that contradicts the ALJ’s conclusions. 6 allege more right upper extremity limitation than the ALJ assessed. 7 (Compare Joint Stip. at 7, 9-10, with AR 21). 8 extent that she is relying on her subjective statements or her 9 friend’s third-party report, the ALJ properly discredited this 10 her Plaintiff does not meet her burden to demonstrate, functional capacity further than the ALJ’s RFC Indeed, Plaintiff does not identify any medical Plaintiff does However, to the evidence, as discussed above. 11 12 Further, Plaintiff misapprehends her treating physician’s 13 opinion. 14 Plaintiff “cannot stand for long periods of time[ ] and cannot lift 15 over 20 pounds.” 16 Plaintiff’s limitations, she is capable of sedentary work. 17 593). 18 Nevertheless, Plaintiff emphasizes that in the next sentence, Dr. 19 Collins indicated, “although [Plaintiff] cannot do any lifting, I 20 do not believe this makes her unable to do any form of work.” 21 593) (emphasis added). 22 hyperbolic statement ignores the context of his statement, as well 23 as the overall medical record. 24 clearly found Plaintiff capable of lifting 20 pounds. (AR 593). 25 “[T]he resolving 26 ambiguities in the medical evidence.” 27 1041. 28 her arm condition, and the few records indicate only somewhat In November 2015, Aaron Collins, D.O., opined that (AR 593). Dr. Collins concluded that even with The ALJ gave Dr. Collins’s opinion “great weight.” ALJ is the (AR (AR 24). (AR But Plaintiff’s focus on Dr. Collins’s final In the prior sentence, Dr. Collins arbiter with respect to Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at Moreover, Plaintiff sought relatively little treatment for 18 1 limited range of motion. 2 subjective statements, Plaintiff does not identify any medical 3 records 4 Plaintiff and her friend reported that she can lift up to 15-20 5 pounds. 6 the state agency consultants both concluded that Plaintiff is 7 capable of lifting up to 20 pounds occasionally, which is what the 8 ALJ adopted. (AR 21, 82, 112). Thus, substantial evidence supports 9 the 10 that preclude (AR 321, 586, 615). her (AR 249, 259). ALJ’s assessment occasionally. from “any” Other than her own lifting. Indeed, both And after reviewing the medical evidence, limiting Plaintiff to lifting 20 pounds (AR 21). 11 12 failed to 13 reconcile the differences between the Agency’s two consultants. In 14 June 2015, G. Bugg, M.D., a State agency consultant, evaluated the 15 medical record and opined that Plaintiff is limited to performing 16 work at the sedentary level, but with additional limitations, 17 including occasional pushing, pulling and reaching with her right 18 arm. 7 19 medical record and found that Plaintiff is limited to sedentary 20 work with occasional postural activities and occasional overhead 21 reaching with her right arm. 22 the ALJ rejected Dr. Bugg’s opinion in favor of Dr. Sohn’s opinion 23 without any explanation. 24 the ALJ found that Dr. Sohn’s opinion provided “greater consistency 25 26 27 28 Nevertheless, (AR 82-83). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ In January 2016, M. Sohn, M.D., reevaluated the (AR 112-13). Plaintiff contends that (Joint Stip. at 8). 7 To the contrary, Plaintiff contends that Dr. Bugg also restricted her to occasional handling and fingering with her right upper extremity. (Joint Stip. at 8). But Dr. Bugg clearly found that Plaintiff’s handling (gross manipulation) and fingering (fine manipulation) were “unlimited.” (AR 83). 19 1 with the record that showed that [Plaintiff] had very little 2 treatment 3 difficulties 4 providers.” 5 record indicating “50% pain reduction following ESI” and normal 6 gait and posture despite reduced lumbosacral range of motion. 7 109). 8 referred to pain management for both lumbar spine and headaches, 9 as well as her elbow,” she does not identify any medical records 10 that support a greater upper extremity limitation than assessed in 11 the RFC. 12 in arthritis in Plaintiff’s elbow, the arthritis did not prevent 13 her from using her arm. 14 March 2014 and June 2016 medical records finding she had limited 15 range of motion in her right elbow (Joint Stip. at 14-15) (citing 16 AR 319, 517), subsequent medical records indicate that Plaintiff 17 maintained normal function and activities of daily living with her 18 medications and therapy (AR 536, 694). 19 20), Plaintiff exhibited reduced range of motion in some planes 20 but normal motion in others. 21 had normal grip strength in both hands and full muscle strength in 22 both arms. 23 that Plaintiff is capable of a limited range of sedentary activity. for her with right any (AR 23). elbow and functional did not activities frequently to her report treatment Further Dr. Sohn noted new evidence in the (AR While Plaintiff argues that she “sought treatment and was To the contrary, while arm surgery as a teenager resulted (AR 614). (AR 321, 355). While Plaintiff emphasizes As the ALJ noted (AR 18- (AR 321, 517). In 2016, Plaintiff Thus, substantial medical evidence indicates 24 25 Plaintiff appears to confuse conditions with impairments. She 26 emphasizes that the ALJ did not assess any limitations related to 27 her pain, adjustment disorder, sacroiliitis, lumbago, lumbosacral 28 spondylosis, lumbar radiculopathy, 20 lumbar facet arthropathy, 1 degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, headaches, and obesity. 2 (Joint Stip. at 7-9, 14-15, 21-23). 3 receives a particular diagnosis, it does not necessarily follow 4 that 5 symptoms and true limitations that generally determine whether she 6 is disabled. 7 existence of an impairment is insufficient proof of a disability.” 8 Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993); see Key v, 9 Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The mere diagnosis 10 of an impairment . . . is not sufficient to sustain a finding of 11 disability.”); accord Lundell v. Colvin, 553 F. App’x 681, 684 (9th 12 Cir. 2014). 13 obese yet still perform full-time work.” 14 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2005). 15 “[c]onditions must not be confused with disabilities. 16 security disability benefits program is not concerned with health 17 as such, but rather with ability to engage in full-time gainful 18 employment.” 19 No. CV 17-2558, 2017 WL 6209817, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2017); 20 Owen v. Berryhill, No. 17 CV 5193, 2018 WL 388593, at *5 (W.D. 21 Wash. Jan. 12, 2018), aff’d sub nom. Owen v. Saul, No. 18-35210, 22 2020 WL 1656440 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020). 23 the medical evidence, the ALJ took all Plaintiff’s symptoms and 24 impairments into consideration in restricting her to a limited 25 range of sedentary work. 26 affective 27 Plaintiff to simple, routine tasks. the claimant is disabled, However, even if a claimant because it See Rollins, 261 F.3d at 856. is the claimant’s Indeed, “[t]he mere For example, a “person can be depressed, anxious, and Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 As the Seventh Circuit explained: The social Id. (citation omitted); accord Davis v. Berryhill, disorder and (AR 21). chronic 28 21 In any event, based on And in consideration of her headaches, (AR 21). the ALJ restricted 1 The ALJ has the sole authority to review medical and other 2 record evidence 3 functions. 4 capacity” is an issue “reserved to the Commissioner”). 5 the evidence, the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff had the ability 6 to 7 Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1174-76 (ALJ is responsible for translating 8 claimant’s impairments into work-related functions and determining 9 RFC); see also Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041–42 (“The ALJ is 10 responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in 11 medical 12 omitted). 13 substantial evidence, and no remand is required. 8 perform and translate the evidence into work related 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (the “residual functional a limited testimony, and range for of sedentary resolving work. Based on See ambiguities.”) Stubbs- (citation Accordingly, the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 8 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff also contends that the hypothetical posed to the VE did not contain all of her limitations. (Joint Stip. at 2931). But the hypothetical question contained all the limitations supported by the overall medical record, as reflected in the ALJ’s RFC determination. (Compare AR 21, with id. 66-67). As noted above, the ALJ’s RFC was supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s testimony in response to the hypothetical was proper. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2002); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756–57 (9th Cir. 1989). 22 1 ORDER 2 3 4 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. 5 6 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 7 8 DATED: May 27, 2020 9 /s/ _________ ALKA SAGAR UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 23

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