Daniel Masterson et al v. CWALT, Inc. et al, No. 2:2018cv08929 - Document 74 (C.D. Cal. 2021)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS, 25 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson: Defendants Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs FAC is DISMISSED. IT IS SO ORDERED. (shb)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Daniel Masterson et al v. CWALT, Inc. et al Doc. 74 Case 2:18-cv-08929-DDP-PLA Document 74 Filed 08/10/21 Page 1 of 6 Page ID #:5394 1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DANIEL MASTERSON, ET AL., 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 CWALT, INC., ET AL., 15 Defendants. ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 18-08929 DDP (PLAx) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [25] 16 17 Presently before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 18 Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. 19 submissions of the parties, the court grants the motion and adopts 20 the following Order. 21 I. 22 Having considered the Background Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which spans over 23 350 pages, exclusive of exhibits, and alleges 116 causes of action, 24 is the latest iteration of Plaintiffs’ efforts to allege claims 25 related to their 2007 execution of a $1,995,000 promissory note 26 secured by a Deed of Trust to Plaintiffs’ home in Hollywood, 27 California. 28 The Deed of Trust named Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration (FAC ¶ 31, Ex. 1.) See Case No. 2:14-cv-08741-DDP-AJW. Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as beneficiary as nominee for lender Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:18-cv-08929-DDP-PLA Document 74 Filed 08/10/21 Page 2 of 6 Page ID #:5395 1 Countrywide Home Loans. 2 to Defendant Bank of New York Mellon (“BONY”) in its capacity as 3 trustee for the certificate holders of CWALT, Inc., Alternative 4 Loan Trust 2007-13 Mortgage Pass-through Certificates, Series 2007- 5 19. 6 contention that over one hundred assignments of mortgages and deeds 7 of trusts into mortgage backed securities are “fatally flawed.” 8 (FAC ¶ 25.) 9 II. 10 (FAC, Ex.2.) (Ex. 1.) In 2010, MERS assigned the deed Plaintiffs’ complaint is premised on the Defendants now move to dismiss the FAC. Legal Standard A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) may challenge the court’s 11 jurisdiction facially, based on the legal sufficiency of the claim, 12 or factually, based on the legal sufficiency of the jurisdictional 13 facts. 14 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice 15 12-38 to 12-41 (3d ed.1999)). 16 complaint on its face, the court considers the complaint’s 17 allegations to be true, and draws all reasonable inferences in the 18 plaintiff’s favor. 19 2009). 20 White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000)(citing 2 12.30[4], at Where the motion attacks the Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it 21 “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 22 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 23 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 24 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a 25 court must “accept as true all allegations of material fact and 26 must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 27 plaintiff.” 28 Although a complaint need not include “detailed factual Ashcroft v. Iqbal, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). 2 Case 2:18-cv-08929-DDP-PLA Document 74 Filed 08/10/21 Page 3 of 6 Page ID #:5396 1 allegations,” it must offer “more than an unadorned, 2 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal,556 U.S. at 3 678. 4 statement of a legal conclusion “are not entitled to the assumption 5 of truth.” Id. at 679. In other words, a pleading that merely 6 offers “labels and conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the 7 elements,” or “naked assertions” will not be sufficient to state a 8 claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 678 (citations and 9 internal quotation marks omitted). 10 Conclusory allegations or allegations that are no more than a “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 11 should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 12 plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 13 at 679. Plaintiffs must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that 14 their claims rise “above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 15 at 555-56. 16 claim for relief” is “a context-specific task that requires the 17 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 18 sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 19 III. Discussion 20 “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible Defendants contend that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing. 21 (Motion at 4.) 22 burden of demonstrating that he has standing. 23 Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 24 plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is 25 (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not 26 conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to 27 the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as 28 opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by A party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the 3 Lujan v. Defs. of To meet that burden, “a Case 2:18-cv-08929-DDP-PLA Document 74 Filed 08/10/21 Page 4 of 6 Page ID #:5397 1 a favorable decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t 2 Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). 3 As an initial matter, the court notes that Plaintiffs’ 4 Opposition is, in some instances, non-responsive to Defendants’ 5 arguments, and in others, refers to causes of action that are not 6 stated in the body of the FAC. 7 CV 12-8540-GHK (SHX), 2013 WL 12130011, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 8 2013); Richter v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., No. CV 05-498 ABC, 2007 9 WL 6723708, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2007). See Grabhorn v. HSBC Bank USA, No. More fundamentally, 10 however, Plaintiffs fail to allege an actual or imminent, concrete 11 injury in fact. 12 on their mortgage, and therefore at no risk of foreclosure. 13 24.) 14 assert breaches of various trusts’ prospectuses or pooling and 15 service agreements (“PSAs”), even though they are not parties to 16 such agreements, this Court has already addressed, and rejected 17 those arguments. 18 F.3d 79, 91 (2nd Cir. 2014); Masterson v. Bank of New York Mellon, 19 No. CV 14-08741 DDP AJWX, 2015 WL 1285039, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20 20, 2015). 21 investors in a trust lack standing to bring claims based on a 22 violation of trust rules. See, e.g., Rubio v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 23 C 13-05752 LB, 2014 WL 1318631 at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2014); 24 Yarpezeshkan v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 14-cv-237 JM, 2014 WL 25 3002410 at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Jul. 2, 2014); Armeni v. America’s 26 Wholesale Lender, No. CV 11-8537 CAS, 2012 WL 603242 at *3 (C.D. 27 Cal. Feb. 24, 2012); see also Rajamin, 757 F.3d at 86. The FAC acknowledges that Plaintiffs are current (FAC ¶ To the extent Plaintiffs contend that they have standing to See Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 757 As this court has explained, mortgagors who are not 28 4 Case 2:18-cv-08929-DDP-PLA Document 74 Filed 08/10/21 Page 5 of 6 Page ID #:5398 1 Plaintiffs appear to argue that they have standing to 2 challenge void assignments, while simultaneously recognizing the 3 existence of authority stating, to the contrary, that assignments 4 to trusts that post-date the trusts’ closing date render such 5 assignments voidable, not void. 6 law, as interpreted by an overwhelming majority of New York, 7 California, and federal courts . . . provides that defects in the 8 securitization of loans can be ratified by the beneficiaries of the 9 trusts established to hold the mortgage-backed securities and, as a (Opposition at 19.) “New York 10 result, the assignments are voidable.” 11 N.A., No. 18CV411-CAB-BGS, 2019 WL 108478, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 12 2019) (quoting Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 6 Cal. App. 13 5th 802, 805, 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 3 (2016)). 14 foreclosure borrower (which Plaintiffs are not) has standing to 15 challenge a void assignment is, therefore, irrelevant. 16 v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 62 Cal. 4th 919, 939 (2016). 17 Plaintiffs support their argument that this Court should ignore 18 this weight of authority with but a single citation to a New York 19 case that was reversed on appeal. 20 Erobobo, 127 A.D.3d 1176, 1178 (2015) (“[A] mortgagor whose loan is 21 owned by a trust[] does not have standing to challenge the [] 22 possession or status as assignee of the note and mortgage based on 23 purported noncompliance with certain provisions of the PSA.”) 24 (emphasis added). 25 additional assignments, to which Plaintiffs are also not parties or 26 beneficiaries, does nothing to confer standing upon Plaintiffs 27 where none existed before. 28 IV. Pearson v. JP Morgan Chase, Whether a post- See Yvanova See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Plaintiffs’ inclusion in the FAC of one hundred Conclusion 5 Case 2:18-cv-08929-DDP-PLA Document 74 Filed 08/10/21 Page 6 of 6 Page ID #:5399 1 2 For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ FAC is DISMISSED. 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 7 Dated: August 10, 2021 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
