Daniel G. Viera v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 2:2018cv07438 - Document 24 (C.D. Cal. 2019)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner. (mr)
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Daniel G. Viera v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DANIEL GERARDO VIERA, Plaintiff, 12 13 14 15 16 CASE NO. CV 18-7438 SS v. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 21 Daniel Gerardo Viera (“Plaintiff”) brings this action seeking 22 to overturn the decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social 23 Security (the “Commissioner” or “Agency”) denying his applications 24 for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. 25 The parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to the 26 jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. 27 (Dkt. Nos. 11-13). 28 the Commissioner’s decision. For the reasons stated below, the Court AFFIRMS Dockets.Justia.com 1 II. 2 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 3 4 On December 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed applications for 5 Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income, 6 pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (the 7 “Act”), alleging a disability onset date of September 9, 2013. 8 77-78, 151-60). 9 initially. (AR The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s applications (AR 77-88). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing 10 before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which took place on 11 August 14, 2017. 12 decision on September 8, 2017, finding that Plaintiff was not 13 disabled because there are jobs in the national economy that he 14 can perform. 15 denied Plaintiff’s request for review. 16 followed on August 24, 2018. (AR 34-52, 98-147). (AR 15-26). The ALJ issued an adverse On June 29, 2018, the Appeals Council (AR 1-6). This action 17 18 III. 19 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 20 21 Plaintiff was born on December 24, 1973. (AR 153). He was 22 forty-three (43) years old when he appeared before the ALJ on 23 August 14, 2017. 24 and has one year of college. 25 his mother. 26 warehouse manager. (AR 182-83). 27 bipolar disorder, obsessive-compulsive 28 anxiety. (AR 182). (AR 39). (AR 41, 153). Plaintiff graduated from high school (AR 39). He is single and lives with Plaintiff last worked in May 2010 as a 2 He alleges disability due to disorder (OCD), and 1 A. Plaintiff’s Statements and Testimony 2 3 On March 16, 2015, Plaintiff submitted an Adult Function 4 Report. 5 to concentrate and focus on tasks. 6 disorder causes depression and hypersomnia. 7 requires reminders to take care of personal needs and grooming. 8 (AR 206). 9 207). (AR 204-12). He asserted that his OCD affects his ability (AR 204, 208). His bipolar (AR 204-05). Plaintiff rarely goes outside and does not drive. He (AR While he complains of being socially withdrawn, he is able 10 to enjoy social activities with friends and family. 11 Plaintiff contends that his mental impairments affect his ability 12 to talk, hear, see, complete tasks, concentrate, understand, and 13 follow instructions. 14 cause 15 dizziness, hypersomnia, and anorexia. multiple (AR 209). side (AR 208-09). He asserts that his medications effects, including nausea, drowsiness, (AR 211). 16 17 At Plaintiff’s hearing, he testified that his medications 18 stabilize 19 hypersomnia. 20 staying focused. 21 gets him to his appointments on time. 22 shopping because he gets agitated, nervous, and frustrated around 23 other 24 marijuana in 2012. 25 being arrested for driving under the influence of marijuana. 26 44). his people. mental impairments (AR 39-40, 43-44). (AR 40). (AR 42). (AR 38). but cause drowsiness and He has trouble concentrating and His mother drives him everywhere and (AR 41, 44). Plaintiff He seldom goes acknowledged last using He lost his driver’s license after 27 28 3 (AR 1 B. Treatment History 2 3 Plaintiff began treating with Ernesto Cortez, D.O., in 2000. 4 (AR 185). 5 not been seen since 2011. (AR 273). Plaintiff requested medication 6 for anxiety and insomnia. 7 worked well for him in the past.1 8 ideations, thoughts, or plans. 9 included Abilify, Klonopin, and Prozac.2 In November 2013, Dr. Cortez noted that Plaintiff had (AR 273). He stated that Xanax had (AR 273). (AR 273). He denied suicidal His current medications (AR 273). A neurological 10 examination was grossly normal. 11 anxiety, stable on Alprazolam, and referred Plaintiff to outpatient 12 psychology. 13 disorder was stable on Abilify, and his medications were continued. 14 (AR 269-70, 346-47). 15 bipolar disorder as stable. (AR 274). (AR 274). Dr. Cortez assessed In December 2014, Plaintiff’s bipolar In May 2017, Dr. Cortez assessed Plaintiff’s (AR 339-40). 16 17 Plaintiff began treating with Jorge Dubin, M.D., in December 18 2013. 19 examinations were unremarkable, and Plaintiff denied any medication 20 side effects. 21 normal (AR 186). In February and March 2014, mental status (AR 298, 304). self-perception, He was fully oriented, exhibited intact memory, mild concentration 22 1 23 24 25 26 27 28 Xanax (alprazolam)is a benzodiazepine that is used to treat anxiety disorders, panic disorders, and anxiety caused by depression. <www.drugs.com> (last visited June 4, 2019). 2 Abilify (aripiprazole) is an antipsychotic medication used to treat schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Klonopin (clonazepam) is a benzodiazepine used to treat panic disorder and agoraphobia. Prozac (fluoxetine) is a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor used to treat major depressive disorder and OCD. <www.drugs.com> (last visited June 4, 2019). 4 1 impairment, and fair judgment and insight. 2 reported improvements in OCD symptoms. 3 diagnosed 4 polysubstance abuse. 5 that Plaintiff was doing well. 6 swings. 7 (AR 297). 8 July 2014, Plaintiff exhibited moderate concentration deficits and 9 fair bipolar (AR 297). affective disorder, (AR 304). (AR 304). (AR 298). OCD, and and Dr. Dubin history of In May 2014, Dr. Dubin emphasized (AR 297). Plaintiff denied mood A mental status examination was unremarkable. Plaintiff’s medications were continued. insight a Plaintiff judgment, but his mood, (AR 297). affect, In psychomotor 10 activity, and thought process and content were all normal. (AR 11 295). 12 any mood swings. 13 293). 14 but otherwise intact memory, organized thought processes, clear 15 thought content, and only mild concentration deficits. In October 2014, Plaintiff reported doing well and denied (AR 293). Seroquel helped him stay calm. (AR A mental status examination demonstrated an anxious mood (AR 293). 16 17 In January 2015, Plaintiff reported doing better, being 18 slightly depressed but with no psychotic symptoms. 19 mental status examination exhibited mild concentration deficits 20 and fair insight and judgment. 21 reported only rarely experiencing OCD symptoms. 22 depressed but otherwise doing well. 23 examination was unremarkable. 24 Seroquel, Abilify, and Prozac.3 (AR 290). In April 2015, Plaintiff (AR 291). (AR 291). The In March 2015, Plaintiff (AR 290). (AR 290). (AR 290). He was A mental status Dr. Dubin continued 25 26 3 27 28 Seroquel (quetiapine) is an antipsychotic medication used to treat schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. <www.drugs.com> (last visited June 4, 2019). 5 1 exhibited an anxious mood but otherwise the examination was largely 2 normal. (AR 289). 3 4 On April 2, 2015, David K. Middleton, Ph.D., completed a 5 mental disorder questionnaire. (AR 281-87). 6 Plaintiff in December 2013. 7 Plaintiff’s grooming was “adequate but marginal,” his mannerisms 8 “friendly but slightly odd,” and his gait slow and deliberate. 9 281). (AR 285). He first treated Dr. Middleton reported that (AR Plaintiff reported a history of OCD, depression, paranoia, 10 and mania since high school. 11 ideation 12 examination, Plaintiff was oriented, his memory intact, and insight 13 and judgment were marginal. 14 functioning, assessed with WAIS-III testing, was in the range of 15 average cognitive skills with no intellectual impairment. 16 282). 17 Middleton found “no evidence of distortion in form of thought.” 18 (AR 283). 19 and delusions appear to be managed adequately with medication. 20 283). 21 that Plaintiff’s condition is chronic, unlikely to improve. 22 285). and generalized (AR 281, 283). anxiety He described paranoia symptoms. (AR 282). (AR 282). On Plaintiff’s intellectual (AR Plaintiff reported persistent paranoid delusions, but Dr. Dr. Middleton concluded that Plaintiff’s mood swings (AR Dr. Middleton diagnosed bipolar disorder and OCD and opined (AR 23 24 In August 2015, Norma R. Aguilar, a board-eligible 25 psychiatrist, conducted a complete psychiatric evaluation on behalf 26 of the Agency. 27 and groomed, with normal posture and gait. 28 stated he has “obsessive compulsive disorder which I do rituals (AR 308-16). Plaintiff was appropriately dressed 6 (AR 308). Plaintiff 1 and counting numbers and I also have bipolar depression.” (AR 2 308). 3 paranoid feelings, insomnia, anorexia, racing thoughts, and low 4 motivation. (AR 309). 5 ideations. (AR 6 medications 7 Plaintiff acknowledged a history of substance abuse, including 8 alcohol, methamphetamine, and marijuana. 9 able to bathe and dress without assistance and to handle his own He reported nervousness, poor concentration, poor memory, and 10 money. 11 and friends. Plaintiff denied suicidal or homicidal 309). He monthly psychotherapy (AR 310). reported some benefits sessions. from (AR (AR 310). his 309). Plaintiff is Plaintiff has good relationships with family (AR 310). 12 13 On examination, Plaintiff was cooperative, with normal body 14 movements and eye contact. 15 depressed, with labile affect and no psychomotor retardation. 16 310). 17 association, thought disorganization, flight of ideas, thought 18 blocking, 19 Plaintiff’s thought content was characterized by paranoid and 20 grandiose delusions. 21 hallucinations. 22 with intact memory, concentration, and calculation. 23 Plaintiff’s fund of information and intelligence and his insight 24 and judgment were within normal limits. 25 diagnosed 26 remission. 27 in his ability to follow simple and detailed oral and written 28 instructions; His thought (AR 310). process tangentiality, or disorder, (AR 311). to normal without looseness circumstantiality. (AR 310). (AR 310). bipolar was His mood was slightly (AR (AR of 310). He reported obsessions and tactile Plaintiff was alert, fully oriented, OCD, and (AR 311). polysubstance (AR 311). Dr. Aguilar abuse, in She opined that Plaintiff has no limitations interact with 7 the public, coworkers, and 1 supervisors; and to comply with work rules, such as safety and 2 attendance. 3 to respond to changes in a routine work setting and moderately 4 limited in his ability to respond to work pressures. (AR 312). Plaintiff is mildly limited in his ability (AR 312). 5 6 In December 2015, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Dubin that he was 7 feeling better, without any nervousness or anxiety. 8 sleep was okay and his OCD under control without any side effects 9 from his medications. (AR 326). (AR 326). His Other than a mild impairment in 10 concentration, a mental status examination was unremarkable. (AR 11 326). 12 process, thought content, memory, and concentration were within 13 normal limits. 14 moderate 15 insight/judgment but otherwise a mental status examination was 16 within normal limits. 17 worsening symptoms, but other than moderate concentration deficits 18 and poor insight/judgment, a mental status examination was largely 19 unchanged. 20 concentration, but Plaintiff had calm psychomotor activity, clear 21 thought content, and intact memory. 22 OCD, major depressive disorder, and history of polysubstance abuse. 23 (AR 318). 24 discontinued aripiprazole. In April 2016, Plaintiff’s psychomotor control, thought (AR 324). concentration (AR 318). In October 2016, Plaintiff exhibited deficits, (AR 322). anxious mood, and fair In May 2017, Plaintiff reported Dr. Dubin noted a moderate impairment in (AR 318). Dr. Dubin diagnosed He prescribed fluoxetine, quetiapine and buspirone and (AR 318). 25 26 27 28 8 1 C. State Agency Consultants 2 3 On September 17, 2015, Robert Liss, Ph.D., a State agency 4 consultant, evaluated the mental health records and concluded that 5 Plaintiff’s affective and anxiety disorders are severe impairments. 6 (AR 59). 7 activities of daily living, mild difficulties in maintaining social 8 functioning, 9 concentration, persistence or pace. He opined that Plaintiff has a mild restriction of and moderate difficulties (AR 59). in maintaining Dr. Liss concluded 10 that Plaintiff is moderately limited in his ability to understand, 11 remember, and carry out detailed instructions; maintain attention 12 and concentration for extended periods; work in coordination with 13 or in proximity to others without being distracted by them; and to 14 complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from 15 psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace 16 without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. 17 61-62). (AR 18 19 IV. 20 THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 21 22 To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must 23 demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 24 that prevents the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful 25 activity and that is expected to result in death or to last for a 26 continuous period of at least twelve months. 27 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). 28 The impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing 9 Reddick v. Chater, 1 work previously 2 employment that exists in the national economy. 3 180 4 § 423(d)(2)(A)). F.3d performed 1094, 1098 or (9th any Cir. other 1999) substantial gainful Tackett v. Apfel, (citing 42 U.S.C. 5 6 To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ 7 conducts a five-step inquiry. 8 steps are: 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The 9 10 (1) Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful 11 activity? 12 not, proceed to step two. 13 (2) Is the If so, the claimant is found not disabled. claimant’s impairment 14 claimant is found not disabled. 15 three. 16 (3) severe? If not, If the If so, proceed to step Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal one of the 17 specific impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 18 Subpart P, Appendix 1? 19 disabled. 20 (4) If so, the claimant is found If not, proceed to step four. Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If 21 so, the claimant is found not disabled. 22 to step five. 23 (5) If not, proceed Is the claimant able to do any other work? 24 claimant is found disabled. 25 not disabled. 26 27 28 10 If not, the If so, the claimant is found 1 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 2 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)- 3 (g)(1), 416.920(b)-(g)(1). 4 5 The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four 6 and 7 Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54. 8 affirmative duty to assist the claimant in developing the record 9 at every step of the inquiry. the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. Additionally, the ALJ has an Id. at 954. If, at step four, the 10 claimant meets his or her burden of establishing an inability to 11 perform past work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant 12 can perform some other work that exists in “significant numbers” 13 in 14 residual functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and work 15 experience. 16 721; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1). 17 may do so by the testimony of a VE or by reference to the Medical- 18 Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 19 Appendix 2 (commonly known as “the grids”). 20 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). 21 exertional (strength-related) and non-exertional limitations, the 22 Grids are inapplicable and the ALJ must take the testimony of a 23 vocational expert (“VE”). 24 Cir. 2000) (citing Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 25 1988)). the national economy, taking into account the claimant’s Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098, 1100; Reddick, 157 F.3d at The Commissioner Osenbrock v. Apfel, When a claimant has both Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th 26 27 28 11 1 V. 2 THE ALJ’S DECISION 3 4 The ALJ employed the five-step sequential evaluation process 5 and concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning 6 of the Act. 7 has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 9, 8 2013, the alleged onset date. 9 that Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder, OCD, and history of drug abuse 10 are severe impairments. (AR 17). At step three, the ALJ determined 11 that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of 12 impairments that meet or medically equal the severity of any of 13 the listings enumerated in the regulations. (AR 15-27). At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff (AR 17). At step two, the ALJ found (AR 17-20). 14 15 The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff’s RFC and concluded that he 16 can perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with 17 the 18 tasks, no tasks requiring hypervigilance, not responsible for the 19 safety of others, no jobs requiring significant teamwork.” 20 20). 21 perform any past relevant work. 22 RFC, age, education, work experience, and the VE’s testimony, the 23 ALJ determined at step five that there are jobs that exist in 24 significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can 25 perform, including hand packager, cleaner, and store laborer. 26 25-26). 27 disability, as defined by the Act, from September 9, 2013, through 28 the date of the decision. following nonexertional limitations: “noncomplex routine (AR At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to (AR 25). Based on Plaintiff’s (AR Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not under a (AR 26-27). 12 1 VI. 2 STANDARD OF REVIEW 3 4 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 5 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The court may set aside 6 the Commissioner’s decision when the ALJ’s findings are based on 7 legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the 8 record as a whole. 9 2014) (citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 10 1052 (9th Cir. 2006)); Auckland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 11 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097); Smolen v. 12 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Fair v. Bowen, 13 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989)). Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 14 15 “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than 16 a preponderance.” 17 Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)). 18 evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to 19 support a conclusion.” 20 Smolen, 21 evidence supports a finding, the court must “‘consider the record 22 as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 23 detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.’” 24 F.3d at 1035 (citing Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 25 1993)). 26 or reversing that conclusion, the court may not substitute its 27 judgment for that of the Commissioner. 28 21 (citing Flaten v. Sec’y, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)). 80 F.3d Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (citing Jamerson v. at It is “relevant Id. (citing Jamerson, 112 F.3d at 1066; 1279). To determine whether substantial Auckland, 257 If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming 13 Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720- 1 VII. 2 DISCUSSION 3 4 Plaintiff raises a single claim for relief. He contends that 5 the ALJ impermissibly rejected his subjective symptom testimony. 6 (Dkt. No. 22 at 5-12). 7 8 9 Plaintiff testified that he is unable to work due to deficits in concentration and focus, and 10 frustrated when around other people. 11 have 12 hypersomnia side effects. helped stabilize his being symptoms fearful, (AR 40-44). but cause agitated, or His medications drowsiness and (AR 39-40, 43-44). 13 14 When assessing a claimant’s credibility regarding subjective 15 pain or intensity of symptoms, the ALJ must engage in a two-step 16 analysis. 17 First, the ALJ must determine if there is medical evidence of an 18 impairment that could reasonably produce the symptoms alleged. 19 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. 20 not required to show that her impairment could reasonably be 21 expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she 22 need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of 23 the symptom.” 24 must a claimant produce objective medical evidence of the pain or 25 fatigue itself, or the severity thereof.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). “In this analysis, the claimant is Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). “Nor Id. (citation omitted). 26 27 If the claimant satisfies this first step, and there is no 28 evidence of malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and 14 1 convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony about 2 the symptom severity. 3 see also Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (“[T]he ALJ may reject the 4 claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms only 5 if he makes specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons 6 for doing so.”); Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 7 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering 8 based on affirmative evidence thereof, he or she may only find an 9 applicant not Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 678 (citation omitted); credible by making specific findings as to 10 credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for each.”). 11 “This is not an easy requirement to meet: The clear and convincing 12 standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases.” 13 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 (citation omitted). 14 15 16 In discrediting the claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, the ALJ may consider the following: 17 18 (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such 19 as 20 inconsistent 21 other testimony by the claimant that appears less than 22 candid; 23 failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed 24 course 25 activities. the claimant’s (2) of reputation statements concerning unexplained treatment; for or and (3) the lying, symptoms, inadequately the prior and explained claimant’s daily 26 27 Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation 28 omitted). Inconsistencies between a claimant’s testimony and 15 1 conduct, or internal contradictions in the claimant’s testimony, 2 also may be relevant. 3 Cir. 2014); Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 4 1997). 5 treating and examining physicians regarding, among other matters, 6 the functional restrictions caused by the claimant’s symptoms. 7 Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; accord Burrell, 775 F.3d at 1137. However, 8 it is improper for an ALJ to reject subjective testimony based 9 “solely” on its inconsistencies with the objective medical evidence Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th In addition, the ALJ may consider the observations of 10 presented. 11 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 12 13 Further, the ALJ must make a credibility determination with 14 findings that are “sufficiently specific to permit the court to 15 conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s 16 testimony.” 17 2008) (citation omitted); see Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 18 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A finding that a claimant’s testimony is not 19 credible must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court 20 to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on 21 permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s 22 testimony regarding pain.”) (citation omitted). 23 interpretation of a claimant’s testimony may not be the only 24 reasonable one, if it is supported by substantial evidence, “it is 25 not [the court’s] role to second-guess it.” 26 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 27 28 16 Although an ALJ’s Rollins v. Massanari, 1 The ALJ provided multiple, specific, clear, and convincing 2 reasons, supported by evidence in the record, to find Plaintiff’s 3 complaints 4 credible. 5 support the Commissioner’s decision. of disabling mental (AR 18-19, 21-24). symptomology only partially These reasons are sufficient to 6 7 First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s (AR 18-19, 21). statements were “[T]he ALJ may consider 8 internally inconsistent. 9 inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or between the 10 testimony and the claimant’s conduct.” 11 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 12 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (“ALJ may engage in ordinary techniques of 13 credibility 14 claimant’s 15 416.929(c)(4). While Plaintiff asserted that his medications cause 16 side effects, including drowsiness and hypersomnia (AR 39-40, 43- 17 44, 211), he consistently denied medication side effects to his 18 treatment providers. 19 2015; April, July and October 2016; and February and May 2017, 20 Plaintiff reported “no side effects” from his medications to Dr. 21 Dubin. 22 Cortez 23 medications. 24 reported that Plaintiff “tolerate[s] well” his medications with 25 “mild benefit noted.” 26 Plaintiff reported some benefit from his medications but did not 27 mention any serious side effects. 28 testifying to having trouble getting along with others, Plaintiff evaluation, testimony”); such Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d as . . . accord 20 inconsistencies C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), In January, February and March 2014; December (AR 298, 299, 304, 318, 320, 322, 323, 324, 326). did not in note any adverse reactions from (AR 270, 272, 339, 342, 345, 355). (AR 285). Dr. Plaintiff’s Dr. Middleton At his consultative examination, 17 (AR 309). Further, despite 1 acknowledged being able to enjoy social activities with friends 2 and family. (Compare AR 42, with id. 208-09). Similarly, Plaintiff 3 told Dr. Aguilar that he has good relationships with family and 4 friends. 5 is fearful, agitated, and frustrated around other people (AR 40- 6 44), the medical record demonstrates generally normal presentations 7 to treatment providers and examiners, without any mentions of fear, 8 agitation, or frustration. (AR 19, 264-367). All of these 9 inconsistencies diminish Plaintiff’s credibility. (AR 18-19, 21). (AR 310). Finally, despite Plaintiff asserting that he 10 11 Second, the ALJ found that exhibited Plaintiff a “good 12 response 13 medication management.” 14 that 15 disabling 16 benefits.” 17 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). 18 medications were helping him. 19 Xanax helped control his anxiety and insomnia. 20 October 2014, he reported that Seroquel helped him stay calm and 21 denied any mood swings. 22 reported only rarely incurring OCD symptoms. 23 Dr. Aguilar that his medications and monthly psychotherapy sessions 24 were helpful. 25 Dr. Dubin that he was feeling better, without any nervousness or 26 anxiety, and that his OCD was under control from his medications. 27 A 28 finding. to can good prescribed be for treatment, consisted (AR 18; see id. 19, 21). controlled the which effectively purpose of with determining of routine “Impairments medication are not eligibility for SSI Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, (AR 309). response to Plaintiff consistently reported that his In November 2013, he stated that (AR 293). (AR 273-74). In In March 2015, Plaintiff (AR 290). He told In December 2015, Plaintiff reported to treatment supports an adverse credibility See Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 254 (9th Cir. 1996) 18 1 (“evidence suggesting that 2 treatment” supports an adverse credibility finding). 3 Plaintiff’s 4 medication. 5 anxiety as stable on Xanax. 6 2017, Dr. Cortez assessed Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder as stable 7 on Abilify. 8 emphasized that Plaintiff was doing well on his medications. 9 297). treating [the providers claimant] noted responded positive well to Similarly, responses to In November 2013, Dr. Cortez assessed Plaintiff’s (AR 274). In (AR 269-70, 339-40, 346-47). December 2014 and May In May 2014, Dr. Dubin (AR In April 2015, Dr. Middleton concluded that Plaintiff’s mood 10 swings and delusions were managed adequately with medications. (AR 11 283). 12 Finally, the ALJ found that the medical record “demonstrates 13 14 minimal evidence of significant mental status abnormalities.” 15 18; see id. 19, 21-24). 16 medical 17 claimant’s subjective testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ may 18 consider when evaluating credibility. 19 Burch, 400 F.3d at 681; Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857; see SSR 16-3p, 20 at *5 (“objective medical evidence is a useful indicator to help 21 make reasonable conclusions about the intensity and persistence of 22 symptoms, including the effects those symptoms may have on the 23 ability to perform work-related activities”). 24 neurological examination was normal. 25 March 26 Plaintiff was fully oriented, exhibited normal self-perception, 27 intact memory, mild concentration deficits, and fair judgment and 28 insight. evidence 2014, cannot mental (AR 304). (AR While inconsistencies with the objective be status the sole ground for rejecting a Bray, 554 F.3d at 1227; In November 2013, a (AR 274). examinations were In February and largely normal: In July 2014, Plaintiff exhibited moderate 19 1 concentration deficits and fair insight and judgment, but his mood, 2 affect, psychomotor activity, and thought process and content were 3 all normal. (AR 295). In October 2014, a mental status examination 4 demonstrated an anxious mood but otherwise intact memory, organized 5 thought 6 concentration deficits. 7 Plaintiff exhibited an anxious mood but otherwise the mental status 8 examinations were largely normal. 9 Dr. processes, Middleton tested that thought (AR 293). and only mild In March and April 2015, (AR 289, 290). Plaintiff’s intellectual 12 persistent paranoid delusions, Dr. Middleton found “no evidence of 13 distortion in form of thought.” 14 Aguilar found that Plaintiff’s mood was slightly depressed with 15 labile 16 Plaintiff’s 17 oriented, with intact memory, concentration, and calculation. 18 311). 19 and judgment were within normal limits. 20 2015, other than a mild concentration deficit, a mental status 21 examination was 22 Plaintiff’s psychomotor 23 memory, and concentration were all within normal limits. 24 In May 2017, Plaintiff exhibited moderate concentration deficits, 25 anxious mood, labile affect, and poor insight/judgment, but calm 26 psychomotor activity, clear thought content, intact memory, full 27 orientation, normal self-perception, and normal speech. thought process was with no While Plaintiff reported (AR 283). psychomotor normal and intellectual impairment. (AR 282). were functioning 11 no skills In April 2015, concluded but cognitive content, 10 affect his clear In August 2015, Dr. retardation. normal; he was (AR 310). alert, fully (AR His fund of information and intelligence and his insight unremarkable. (AR control, 28 20 (AR 311). 326). thought In process In December April and 2016, content, (AR 324). (AR 318). 1 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to acknowledge that 2 his treating physicians “noted impairment in concentration, mood, 3 and affect.” 4 opinion, the ALJ noted that on occasion, Plaintiff’s symptoms 5 included mild to moderate concentration deficits, fair judgment 6 and insight, depressed mood, and labile affect. 7 23). 8 and OCD are severe impairments. 9 cited by Plaintiff supports the various diagnoses he has received, (Dkt. No. 22 at 5). To the contrary, throughout his (AR 19, 21, 22, Moreover, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder (AR 17). While the “evidence” 10 it does not support his allegations of debilitating symptoms. 11 mere existence of these impairments does not provide any support 12 for the disabling limitations alleged by Plaintiff. 13 mere 14 disability.” 15 1993); see Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1985) 16 (“The mere diagnosis of an impairment . . . is not sufficient to 17 sustain a finding of disability.”). existence of an impairment is The Indeed, “[t]he insufficient proof of a Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 18 19 Furthermore, the ALJ did not completely reject Plaintiff’s 20 testimony. (AR 21). 21 to the State agency physician’s assessment and the consultative 22 examiner’s 23 Plaintiff’s hearing testimony. (AR 23-24) (ALJ finding “moderate 24 social the 25 including [Plaintiff’s] testimony, as well as the treatment notes 26 received at the hearing level”). 27 subjective statements, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has moderate 28 limitations opinion because restrictions in Indeed, the ALJ gave less than full weight based they on understanding, 21 did not have totality of the the benefit of evidence, Based partially on Plaintiff’s remembering, or applying 1 information; in interacting 2 concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. 3 ALJ accommodated Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder and OCD and his 4 moderate difficulties in social functioning, in understanding and 5 applying information and in concentration, persistence, or pace by 6 restricting him to noncomplex routine tasks, no tasks requiring 7 hypervigilance, not responsible for the safety of others, no public 8 interaction, 9 limitations preclude Plaintiff from performing any past relevant 10 work, the VE opined that there are still jobs in the national 11 economy that Plaintiff can perform. and limited with others; teamwork. (AR and with regard (AR 18-19). 20). While to The these (AR 25-26, 47-50). 12 13 In sum, the ALJ offered clear and convincing reasons, 14 supported by substantial evidence in the record, for his adverse 15 credibility findings. 16 supports the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility, no remand 17 is required. Accordingly, because substantial evidence 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 22 1 VIII. 2 CONCLUSION 3 4 Consistent with the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be 5 entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner. The Clerk of 6 the Court shall serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on 7 counsel for both parties. 8 9 DATED: June 6, 2019 10 /S/ __________ SUZANNE H. SEGAL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION LEXIS/NEXIS OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 23 IN WESTLAW,
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