Michael Glover v. United States of America, No. 2:2018cv05000 - Document 8 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING Petitioners Petition for Writ of Coram Nobis 1 by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew,, (Made JS-6. Case Terminated.) (shb)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Michael Glover v. United States of America Doc. 8 1 O 2 JS-6 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 MICHAEL GLOVER, 20 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 21 Currently before the Court is Petitioner Michael 13 Petitioner, 14 v. 15 16 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 17 Respondent. 18 19 CV 18–05000-RSWL ORDER re: Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Coram Nobis [1] 22 Glover’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Coram 23 Nobis (“Petition”) [1]. Having reviewed all papers 24 submitted pertaining to this Petition, the Court NOW 25 FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: the Court DENIES 26 Petitioner’s Petition. 27 /// 28 /// 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Background 3 On October 2, 2001, Petitioner pleaded guilty to 4 two counts of transporting a minor with intent to 5 engage in criminal sexual activity. Resp. to Pet. for 6 Writ of Coram Nobis (“Opp’n”) 1:6-8, ECF No. 7. On 7 February 4, 2002, the Court sentenced Petitioner to 8 twenty-four months in prison and three years of 9 supervised release. 10 Id. at 1:11-12. Petitioner claims that, before his plea hearing, he 11 was not given two pieces of evidence. Id. at 3:16-18. 12 The first piece of evidence allegedly withheld was an 13 online chat conversation between the victim and 14 Petitioner. Pet. for Writ of Coram Nobis (“Pet.”) 15 2:14-16, ECF No. 1. Petitioner claims that he asked 16 the victim, “How ol[d] are you?” and she responded, 17 “I’m 17 years of age, I will not be 18 yrs old until 18 August 2000!” Id. at 2:16-19. After receiving this 19 message, Petitioner claims that he told the victim that 20 they could not meet until she turned eighteen. 21 2:20. Id. at Petitioner claims that the online chat took 22 place on his computer, which the FBI confiscated. 23 at 2:21-22. Id. The second piece of evidence that was 24 allegedly withheld was statements made by several of 25 Petitioner’s associates, who told an unnamed FBI agent 26 “that [Petitioner] doesn’t go after under-age females.” 27 Id. at 2:22-25. 28 Petitioner also claims that FBI agents wrote on his 2 1 Rap Sheet that he was arrested for traveling across 2 state lines, kidnaping a child, and “fondling her.” 3 Id. at 3:11-15. Petitioner claims that he has never 4 been arrested on this charge. Id. at 3:15-16. 5 Further, Petitioner claims that the Government relied 6 on these statements during Petitioner’s plea hearing 7 without taking into account evidence that the Rap Sheet 8 contained falsified information. 9 B. 10 Id. at 7:21-23. Procedural Background On June 5, 2018, Petitioner filed the instant 11 Petition [1]. The Government filed its Response [7] on 12 July 6, 2018. Petitioner did not file a reply. 13 II. DISCUSSION 14 A. Legal Standard 15 Under the All Writs Act, a federal court may grant 16 writs such as coram nobis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 17 writ of coram nobis is an “extraordinary writ.” Matus- 18 Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 19 2002). It provides a remedy when a petitioner has 20 served his sentence. Estate of McKinney By & Through 21 McKinney v. United States, 71 F.3d 779, 781 (9th Cir. 22 1995). To show that a claim warrants coram nobis 23 relief, a petitioner must establish that “(1) a more 24 usual relief is not available; (2) valid reasons exist 25 for not attacking the conviction earlier; (3) adverse 26 consequences exist from the conviction sufficient to 27 satisfy the case or controversy requirement under 28 Article III; and (4) the error is of the most 3 A 1 fundamental character.” 2 omitted). Id. at 781-82 (quotation The petitioner has the burden to satisfy 3 each requirement, and failure to meet any one of the 4 four requirements is fatal to a petition. See 5 Matus-Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758, 760 (9th 6 Cir. 2002). 7 A writ of coram nobis is rarely granted; the 8 Supreme Court has stated that “it is difficult to 9 conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case 10 today where [a writ of coram nobis] would be necessary 11 or appropriate.” Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 12 416, 429 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting 13 United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 n.4 (1947)). 14 B. Discussion 15 1. 16 17 More Usual Relief and Case or Controversy Requirement The Government does not dispute that Petitioner has 18 satisfied the first and third requirements for coram 19 nobis relief: (1) that a more usual relief is not 20 available and (2) that adverse consequences exist from 21 the conviction sufficient to satisfy the case or 22 controversy requirement under Article III. Thus, the 23 Court assumes that Petitioner has satisfied these 24 requirements. 25 2. 26 Petitioner argues that his delay in filing this Valid Reason for Delay 27 Petition was justified because he could not have 28 discovered the FBI’s obstruction of justice at an 4 1 earlier date and because the FBI’s misconduct was 2 placed on his record in a complex and clever way. Pet. 3 6:21-22. 4 “[T]he time for filing a petition [for writ of 5 coram nobis] is not subject to a specific statute of 6 limitations.” Telink, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 7 42, 45 (9th Cir. 1994). Rather, courts require “coram 8 nobis petitioners to provide valid or sound reasons 9 explaining why they did not attack their sentences or 10 convictions earlier.” United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 11 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2005). “[T]he burden of proof is 12 on the petitioner to offer valid reasons for the 13 delay.” United States v. Riedl, 496 F.3d 1003, 1008 14 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit has “considered 15 delay to be reasonable . . . when new evidence was 16 discovered that the petitioner could not reasonably 17 have located earlier.” 18 Id. at 1007. Petitioner provides newly-discovered evidence that 19 the FBI allegedly: (1) withheld evidence that 20 Petitioner told the victim that he could not see her 21 until she was eighteen years old; (2) withheld 22 statements made by Petitioner’s associates stating that 23 Petitioner does not pursue underage girls; and 24 (3) stated that Petitioner was arrested for kidnaping 25 and fondling the victim. 26 See Pet. 2:25-3:10. Here, Petitioner does not show that he exercised 27 due diligence in bringing this new evidence. See 28 Dhingra v. United States, No. C 16-03803 SBA, 2016 U.S. 5 1 Dist. LEXIS 132702, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2016) 2 (denying coram nobis because the defendant did “not 3 show that he exercised due diligence in pursuing [his] 4 claim”). Given that Petitioner himself made the 5 statements in the online chat, the Court can assume 6 that he was aware of the statements’ existence prior to 7 the plea hearing. Thus, Petitioner could have 8 requested the statements from the FBI before his plea 9 hearing or in the nearly seventeen years preceding this 10 Petition, and, had the FBI refused, he could have 11 brought the FBI’s refusal to the attention of the 12 Court. See Martinez v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 2d 13 1072, 1076 (D. Haw. 2000) (“[D]elay is not justified if 14 the petitioner was aware of a potential ground for 15 relief earlier, but did not choose to pursue it.”). 16 Further, Petitioner does not explain how he learned of 17 his associates’ statements, nor does he explain why he 18 could not have learned of these statements earlier. 19 Without this information, Petitioner has not provided a 20 valid excuse for his delay in bringing this allegation 21 to the Court’s attention. Lastly, Petitioner states 22 that he did not look at his Rap Sheet until April 2018. 23 Pet. 3:10-12. Given that Petitioner does not contend 24 that he was previously denied the opportunity to see 25 his Rap Sheet, the Court has no reason to believe that 26 Petitioner could not have found the alleged statements 27 on his Rap Sheet earlier in the seventeen years between 28 his plea hearing and the filing of this Petition. 6 1 Thus, Petitioner has not validly explained his 2 delay in bringing this Petition. Error of a Fundamental Character1 3 3. 4 Petitioner claims that the FBI’s alleged refusal to 5 turn over online chat statements and disclose 6 conversations with Petitioner’s associates, combined 7 with its alleged tampering with Petitioner’s record, 8 creates an error of the most fundamental character. 9 Courts reserve the writ of coram nobis for errors that 10 are of “the most fundamental character, such that the 11 proceeding itself is rendered invalid.” McKinney, 71 12 F.3d at 781 (internal quotation marks and citations 13 omitted). To show error of the most fundamental 14 character, a petitioner’s allegations must 15 “specifically delineate the factual basis of his 16 claim.” United States v. Taylor, 648 F.2d 565, 573 17 (9th Cir. 1981). 18 Here, Petitioner does not specifically delineate 19 the factual basis for his claims. Instead, Petitioner 20 simply speculates that the FBI withheld evidence and 21 lied on his record, which is insufficient to 22 demonstrate an error of a fundamental character. See 23 Dhingra, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132702, at *4 24 25 26 27 28 1 Petitioner must satisfy all four requirements to be granted a writ of coram nobis. Therefore, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Petition because he has not provided a valid explanation for his delay in filing the Petition. However, for the sake of completeness, the Court will analyze the “fundamental error” requirement as well. 7 1 (dismissing a coram nobis petition which speculated 2 that an underage victim was actually an adult FBI 3 informant because the “petition [was] devoid of any 4 facts supporting [the Petitioner’s] assertion that the 5 minor victim of his criminal offense was actually an 6 ADULT FBI Agent/Informer” (internal quotations 7 omitted)). 8 Further, even if Petitioner had provided a factual 9 basis for his claims, Petitioner has not shown a 10 fundamental error that warrants reversing his 11 conviction. Petitioner pleaded guilty, under 18 U.S.C. 12 § 2423(a), to two counts of transporting a minor with 13 intent to engage in criminal sexual activity. Under 14 § 2423(a), a Petitioner cannot claim ignorance of a 15 victim’s age as a defense. See United States v. 16 Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Ignorance 17 of the victim’s age provides no safe harbor from the 18 penalties in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). If someone knowingly 19 transports a person for the purposes of prostitution or 20 another sex offense, the transporter assumes the risk 21 that the victim is a minor, regardless of what the 22 victim says or how the victim appears.”). Thus, for 23 the purposes of Petitioner’s conviction, it is 24 irrelevant that Petitioner thought that the victim was 25 eighteen. Further, Petitioner’s associates’ purported 26 testimony would not render Petitioner’s plea hearing 27 invalid, as it does not provide any new details about 28 the offense that might show that Petitioner’s 8 1 conviction was a fundamental error. 2 Thus, Petitioner has not shown that these 3 allegations present a fundamental error in his criminal 4 proceeding sufficient to grant a writ of coram nobis. 5 6 III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES 7 Petitioner’s Petition. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 DATED: August 14, 2018 s/ RONALD S.W. LEW 11 HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW Senior U.S. District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
