Pamela Bechtel v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 2:2018cv03647 - Document 22 (C.D. Cal. 2020)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Autumn D. Spaeth. The decision of the Social Security Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and the action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. (see document for further details) (hr)
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Pamela Bechtel v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PAMELA B. O/ B/ O MICHAEL P., an Individual, Case No.: 2:18-0 3647 ADS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 14 15 ANDREW M. SAUL, Com m issioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. 17 I. IN TROD U CTION 18 Plaintiff Pam ela B., on behalf of Michael P. (“Plaintiff”), 1 challenges Defendant 19 Andrew M. Saul2 , Com m issioner of Social Security’s (hereinafter “Com m issioner” or 20 21 22 23 24 1 Plaintiff’s and his representative’s nam es have been partially redacted in com pliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recom m endation of the Com m ittee on Court Adm inistration and Case Managem ent of the J udicial Conference of the United States. 2 On J une 17, 20 19, Saul becam e the Com m issioner of Social Security. Thus, he is autom atically substituted as the defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). -1Dockets.Justia.com 1 “Defendant”) denial of his applications for a period of disability and disability insurance 2 benefits (“DIB”), and supplem ental security incom e (“SSI”). Plaintiff contends that the 3 Adm inistrative Law J udge (“ALJ ”) im properly assessed his m ental residual functional 4 capacity (“RFC”), as well as erred in finding that Plaintiff had the ability to perform jobs 5 existing in significant num bers in the national econom y. For the reasons stated below, 6 the decision of the Com m issioner is affirm ed, and this m atter is dism issed with 7 prejudice. 8 II. FACTS RELEVAN T TO TH E APPEAL 9 Plaintiff testified that he has a high school education and worked as an electrician 10 for twenty-five (25) years, until he was laid off in 20 10 . (Adm inistrative Record “AR” 51, 11 69-70 ). Plaintiff worked for a com pany and at the beginning of his career did a lot of 12 residential work, but he m ainly did com m ercial electrical work at the end. (AR 69-70 ). 13 After Plaintiff lost his job, he testified that he did try to find work in the electrical field or 14 warehouse work but was never able to secure a new job. (AR 71). Plaintiff testified that 15 shortly after losing his job, however, was when his neuropathy kicked in and his alleged 16 disability onset date is stated as October 7, 20 10 . (AR 51, 70 ). 17 When asked as to his prim ary problem , Plaintiff stated that it “is m y feet and 18 back . . . and m y neck.” (AR 71). Plaintiff likened the pain in his feet to “walking on a 19 bed of needles.” Id. Plaintiff further testified that his diabetes and hypertension were 20 not under control. (AR 71-72). These were the only problem s that Plaintiff identified as 21 preventing him from working when questioned by the ALJ . Under questioning by his 22 attorney, Plaintiff also testified that he had received psychiatric care for depression and 23 was taking m edication for depression as well. (AR 74). 24 -2- 1 III. PROCEED IN GS BELOW 2 A. Pro ce d u ral H is to ry 3 Plaintiff protectively filed his applications for DIB and SSI on J uly 7, 20 14, 4 alleging disability beginning October 7, 20 10 . (AR 189-95, 196-20 4). Plaintiff was 5 insured for DIB through J une 30 , 20 13. (AR 20 6-0 7). Plaintiff’s claim s were denied on 6 October 8, 20 14 (AR 125-29, 130 -34), and on Novem ber 10 , 20 14, Plaintiff filed a 7 request for hearing before an ALJ (AR 138-39). A hearing was held before ALJ Sally C. 8 Reason on J une 15, 20 16. (AR 49-78). Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and 9 testified at the hearing, as well as m edical expert Kweli J . Am usa, MD, and vocational 10 consultant Antonio R. Reyes. Id. 11 On Septem ber 16, 20 16, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, finding that 12 Plaintiff had been disabled within the m eaning of the Social Security Act 3 since February 13 3, 20 15, but not prior thereto.4 (AR 24-48). On October 11, 20 16, Plaintiff filed a 14 request for review of the ALJ ’s decision with the Appeals Council. (AR 184-88). 15 Plaintiff passed away on J une 26, 20 17, and his sister, Pam ela B., substituted in as a 16 party to his claim . (AR 7, 10 ). The ALJ ’s decision becam e the Com m issioner’s final 17 decision when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on March 23, 18 20 18. (AR 1-6). Plaintiff then filed this action in District Court on April 30 , 20 18, 19 challenging the ALJ ’s decision. [Docket (“Dkt.”) No. 1]. 20 21 22 23 24 3 Persons are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or m ental im pairm ent expected to result in death, or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 m onths. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). 4 As Plaintiff was insured for DIB only through J une 30 , 20 13, the ALJ ’s finding effectively denied Plaintiff’s DIB claim . Plaintiff was only awarded benefits on his SSI claim , from February 3, 20 15. -3- On Septem ber 11, 20 18, Defendant filed an Answer, as well as a copy of the 1 2 Certified Adm inistrative Record. [Dkt. Nos. 14, 15]. The parties filed a J oint 3 Subm ission on February 6, 20 19. [Dkt. No. 20 ]. The case is ready for decision.5 4 B. Su m m ary o f ALJ D e cis io n Afte r H e arin g 5 In the decision (AR 28-43), the ALJ followed the required five-step sequential 6 evaluation process to assess whether Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security 7 Act.6 20 C.F.R. §§ 40 4.1520 (a) and 416.920 (a). At s te p o n e , the ALJ found that 8 Plaintiff had not been engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 7, 20 10 , the 9 alleged onset date. (AR 30 ). At s te p tw o , the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the 10 following severe im pairm ents: (a) status post left ulna nerve surgery; (b) diabetes 11 m ellitus; (c) hypertension; (d) obesity; and (e) depression. (AR 30 ). At s te p th re e , the 12 ALJ found that since the alleged onset date of October 7, 20 10 , Plaintiff “has not had an 13 im pairm ent or com bination of impairm ents that m eets or m edically equals the severity 14 of one of the listed im pairm ents in 20 CFR Part 40 4, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 15 40 4.1520 (d), 40 4.1525, 40 4.1526, 416.920 (d), 416.925 and 416.926).” (AR 31). 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 5 The parties filed consents to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate J udge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), including for entry of final J udgm ent. [Dkt. Nos. 8, 10 ]. 6 The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to assess whether a claim ant is disabled: Step one: Is the claim ant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claim ant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. Step two: Does the claim ant have a “severe” im pairm ent? If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate. Step three: Does the claim ant’s im pairm ent or com bination of im pairm ents m eet or equal an im pairm ent listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 40 4, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claim ant is autom atically determ ined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. Step four: Is the claim ant capable of perform ing his past work? If so, the claim ant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. Step five: Does the claim ant have the residual functional capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claim ant is not disabled. If not, the claim ant is disabled. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 20 C.F.R. §40 4.1520 ). -4- The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) 7 1 2 to perform a range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 40 4.1567(b) and 416.967(b) 8, 3 except: 4 [Plaintiff] can stand and walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour day, one hour at a tim e, but never clim b ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, occasionally balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl. [Plaintiff] can occasionally be exposed to extrem e tem peratures, vibratory equipm ent, and uneven terrain. [Plaintiff] can occasionally use the left upper extrem ity (nondom inant) for gross and fine m otor functions. (AR 32-33). 5 6 7 8 At s te p fo u r, based on Plaintiff’s RFC and the vocational expert’s testim ony, the 9 ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work as an electrician. (AR 10 41). At s te p five , the ALJ found that “[p]rior to February 3, 20 15, the date [Plaintiff’s] 11 age category changed,” considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, RFC and 12 the vocational expert’s testim ony, there “were jobs that exist in significant num bers in 13 the national econom y that [Plaintiff] could have perform ed” such as clerk, furniture 14 rental clerk and gate attendant. (AR 41-42). 15 16 17 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 An RFC is what a claim ant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional lim itations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 40 4.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). 8 “Light work” is defined as lifting no m ore than 20 pounds at a tim e with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted m ay be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting m ost of the tim e with som e pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of perform ing a full or wide range of light work, you m ust have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1567(b); see also Rendon G. v. Berryhill, 20 19 WL 20 0 6688, at *3 n.6 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 20 19). 24 -5- The ALJ also found that “[b]eginning on February 3, 20 15, the date [Plaintiff’s] 1 2 age category changed,” considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, RFC and 3 the vocational expert’s testim ony, “there are no jobs that exist in significant num bers in 4 the national econom y that [Plaintiff] could perform .” (AR 42). Accordingly, the ALJ 5 determ ined that Plaintiff was not disabled prior to February 3, 20 15 but becam e 6 disabled on that date and has continued to be disabled through the date of the decision, 7 Septem ber 16, 20 16. (AR 42). However, the ALJ determ ined that the Plaintiff was not 8 under a disability within the m eaning of the Social Security Act at any tim e through 9 J une 30 , 20 13, the date last insured. (AR 42). 10 IV. AN ALYSIS 11 A. Is s u e s o n Ap p e al 12 Plaintiff raises two issues for review: whether the ALJ (1) erred in the 13 determ ination of Plaintiff’s m ental RFC; and (2) erred in finding that Plaintiff had the 14 ability to perform jobs existing in significant num bers in the national econom y. [Dkt. 15 No. 20 , p. 3]. 16 B. Stan d ard o f Re vie w 17 A United States District Court m ay review the Com m issioner’s decision to deny 18 benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 40 5(g). The District Court is not a trier of the facts but 19 is confined to ascertaining by the record before it if the Com m issioner’s decision is 20 based upon substantial evidence. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 10 10 (9th Cir. 20 14) 21 (District Court’s review is lim ited to only grounds relied upon by ALJ ) (citing Connett v. 22 Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 20 0 3)). A court m ust affirm an ALJ ’s findings of 23 fact if they are supported by substantial evidence and if the proper legal standards were 24 applied. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 20 0 1). An ALJ can satisfy -6- 1 the substantial evidence requirement “by setting out a detailed and thorough sum m ary 2 of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and 3 m aking findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation 4 om itted). 5 “[T]he Com m issioner’s decision cannot be affirm ed sim ply by isolating a specific 6 quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court m ust consider the record as a whole, 7 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the Secretary’s 8 conclusion.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 10 33, 10 35 (9th Cir. 20 0 1) (citations and 9 internal quotation m arks om itted). “‘Where evidence is susceptible to m ore than one 10 rational interpretation,’ the ALJ ’s decision should be upheld.” Ryan v. Com m ’r of Soc. 11 Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 20 0 8) (citing Burch v. Barnhart, 40 0 F.3d 676, 679 12 (9th Cir. 20 0 5)); see Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Adm in., 466 F.3d 880 , 882 (9th Cir. 20 0 6) (“If 13 the evidence can support either affirm ing or reversing the ALJ ’s conclusion, we m ay not 14 substitute our judgm ent for that of the ALJ .”). However, the Court m ay review only “the 15 reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determ ination and m ay not affirm the ALJ 16 on a ground upon which [s]he did not rely.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 17 20 0 7) (citation om itted). 18 Lastly, even if an ALJ errs, the decision will be affirm ed where such error is 19 harm less, that is, if it is “inconsequential to the ultim ate nondisability determ ination,” 20 or if “the agency’s path m ay reasonably be discerned, even if the agency explains its 21 decision with less than ideal clarity.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 80 6 F.3d 487, 492 (9th 22 Cir. 20 15) (citation omitted); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 110 4, 1115 (9th Cir. 20 12). 23 24 -7- 1 C. Th e ALJ Pro p e rly As s e s s e d Plain tiff’s RFC 2 Plaintiff contends that his assessed RFC is not supported by substantial evidence 3 because the ALJ should have included additional m ental lim itations in the RFC finding. 4 Specifically, Plaintiff contends ALJ ’s decision was contrary to the opinions of the 5 exam ining and reviewing physicians. 6 1. Legal Standard for Consideration of Im pairm ents in the Disability Evaluation and for Weighing Medical Opinions 7 8 9 At step three of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ determ ines whether the claim ant’s im pairm ent or com bination of impairm ents is of a severity to m eet or 10 m edically equal a listed im pairm ent. Before turning to step four, the ALJ fashions the 11 claim ant’s RFC. A district court m ust uphold an ALJ ’s RFC assessm ent when the ALJ 12 has applied the proper legal standard and substantial evidence in the record as a whole 13 supports the decision. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 20 0 5). In 14 m aking an RFC determ ination, the ALJ m ay consider those lim itations for which there 15 is support in the record and need not consider properly rejected evidence or subjective 16 com plaints. Id. The Court m ust consider the ALJ ’s decision in the context of “the entire 17 record,” and if the “‘evidence is susceptible to m ore than one rational interpretation,’ the 18 ALJ ’s decision should be upheld.” Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198 (citation om itted). 19 An ALJ is not obligated to discuss “every piece of evidence” when interpreting the 20 evidence and developing the record. See Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 21 10 0 6, 10 12 (9th Cir. 20 0 3) (citation om itted). Sim ilarly, an ALJ is also not obligated to 22 discuss every word of an opinion or include lim itations not actually assessed by the 23 m edical professional. See Fox v. Berryhill, 20 17 WL 3197215, *5 (C.D. Cal. J uly 27, 24 20 17); Howard, 341 F.3d at 10 12. -8- 1 The ALJ m ust also consider all m edical opinion evidence. 20 C.F. R. §§ 2 40 4.1527(b), 416.927(b). “As a general rule, m ore weight should be given to the opinion 3 of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claim ant.” 4 Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citing Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987)). 5 Where the treating doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it m ay only 6 be rejected for “clear and convincing” reasons. Id. (citing Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 7 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 20 0 5)). “If a treating or exam ining doctor’s opinion is contradicted 8 by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ m ay only reject it by providing specific and 9 legitim ate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 10 11 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 20 17) (quoting Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216). “Substantial evidence” m eans m ore than a m ere scintilla, but less than a 12 preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person m ight accept as 13 adequate to support a conclusion.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 50 4 F.3d 10 28, 10 35 (9th Cir. 14 20 0 7) (citing Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882). “The ALJ can m eet this burden by setting out a 15 detailed and thorough sum m ary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 16 interpretation thereof, and m aking findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 17 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation om itted); see also Tom m asetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 10 35, 10 41 18 (9th Cir. 20 0 8) (finding ALJ had properly disregarded a treating physician’s opinion by 19 setting forth specific and legitim ate reasons for rejecting the physician’s opinion that 20 were supported by the entire record). 21 22 23 24 -9- 2. The ALJ Properly Considered Plaintiff’s Mental Im pairm ents. 1 2 In assessing Plaintiff’s m ental im pairm ent, the ALJ stated: 3 The record does not support that depression rendered the claim ant disabled. The claim ant has never been hospitalized in a psychiatric hospital for an extended period for his m ental health im pairm ent of depression. His suicidal ideation appears secondary to acute life events, such as the break-up with his girlfriend. 4 5 6 7 (AR 37). The ALJ then provided a significant review and analysis of Plaintiff’s m ental 8 health records to support her finding. (AR 37-40 ). The ALJ considered the opinion of 9 the State agency m edical consultant, Elizabeth Covey, Ph.D. (AR 85-10 3) and the 10 consultative exam iner who perform ed a com prehensive psychological evaluation of 11 Plaintiff in Septem ber 20 14, Avazeh Chehrazi, Ph.D. (AR 919-24). Plaintiff contends 12 that the ALJ rejected the opinions of both Dr. Chehrazi and Dr. Covey, failing to provide 13 any ‘“clear and convincing’ reasons and/ or ‘specific and legitim ate’ reasons, and 14 concluded that Plaintiff had no m ental lim itations other than to sim ple repetitive tasks 15 (unskilled work).” [Dkt. 20 , 6]. 16 Prelim inarily, the Court notes the ALJ found that Plaintiff was lim ited to light 17 work and, as Plaintiff states points out, did lim it him to sim ple repetitive tasks as well. 18 (AR 31-33, 40 ). Accordingly, she necessarily credited aspects of Plaintiff’s subjective 19 com plaints and the findings of the exam ining, and reviewing physicians. To the extent 20 the ALJ rejected portions of Dr. Covey and Dr. Chehrazi’s opinions, she com plied with 21 Magallanes and provided specific and legitimate reasons for doing so that are supported 22 by the entire record. 23 24 As m entioned above, in addition to lim iting Plaintiff in the RFC to light work, the ALJ found Plaintiff was lim ited to “sim ple repetitive tasks.” (AR 40 ). The ALJ -10 - 1 specifically stated that that she considered “all sym ptom s” in fashioning the RFC. (AR 2 33). In doing so, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s subjective statem ents and testim ony 3 about his m ental health treatm ent, the m ental health records of evidence, and the fact 4 that no treating or exam ining m edical source assessed him as precluded from sustaining 5 work activity due to any m ental health issues. (AR 37-40 ). 6 Plaintiff has failed to show how this exhaustive consideration of his m ental health 7 issues was in error. As m entioned, the ALJ found depression to be a severe im pairm ent 8 at step two, assessed Plaintiff’s m ental functioning at step three and acknowledged that 9 the “paragraph B” and “paragraph C” criteria are separate findings from the RFC, and 10 then considered all of Plaintiff’s m ental health issues in assessing her RFC. (AR 31-33, 11 37-40 ). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown the ALJ failed to consider his m ental 12 im pairm ents in assessing the RFC. 13 To the extent Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ should have included even 14 m ore restrictive lim itations in the RFC, Plaintiff has failed dem onstrate he is entitled to 15 relief. Plaintiff has not pointed to any opinion precluding him from all work activity on 16 account of m ental health issues. See, e.g., Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th 17 Cir. 1993) (substantial evidence supported finding claimant, although im paired, was not 18 disabled and could perform work because “[n]one of the doctors who exam ined 19 [claim ant] expressed the opinion that he was totally disabled”). Further, he has not 20 explained how the single “m oderate” findings in the paragraph B and paragraph C 21 analysis or any of his other m ental lim itations are sufficiently restrictive to ultim ately 22 preclude him from perform ing work. See, e.g., Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 10 77 (explaining the 23 Ninth Circuit has not “held m ild or m oderate depression to be a sufficiently severe non- 24 exertional lim itation that significantly lim its a claim ant’s ability to do work beyond the -11- 1 exertional lim itation.”); Shapiro v. Berryhill, 20 20 WL 836830 , at *1, 6 (D. Nev. Feb. 2 20 , 20 20 ) (RFC that included restriction to sim ple, non-detailed, non-com plex work, 3 with occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors but never the public, 4 adequately accounted for the m oderate findings in two paragraph B criteria); Ball v. 5 Colvin, 20 15 WL 2345652, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 20 15) (“As the ALJ found that 6 Plaintiff’s m ental im pairm ents were m inim al, the ALJ was not required to include them 7 in Plaintiff’s RFC.”); Sisco v. Colvin, 20 14 WL 2859187, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. J une 20 , 8 20 14) (ALJ not required to include in RFC assessm ent m ental im pairm ent that im posed 9 “no significant functional lim itations”). 10 Plaintiff’s m ain argum ent is that the ALJ im properly rejected Dr. Covey’s 11 restriction that he can perform sim ple repetitive tasks “with no public contact.” Plaintiff 12 contends the ALJ failed to give specific and legitim ate reasons for not including this 13 lim itation on public contact in the assessed RFC. To the contrary, however, the ALJ did 14 a thorough analysis of Plaintiff’s record and testim ony and found it does not support 15 this lim itation. 16 Accordingly, for the reasons outlined above, the Court finds no error in 17 fashioning the RFC and concludes that the ALJ duly considered Plaintiff’s m ental 18 im pairm ents in the decision. 19 D . Th e ALJ Pro p e rly Evalu ate d Plain tiff’s Ability to Pe rfo rm Jo bs in th e N atio n al Eco n o m y 20 21 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ im properly relied on the vocational expert’s 22 testim ony in finding Plaintiff was able to perform certain jobs, as the hypothetical given 23 to the vocational expert did not include Plaintiff’s m ental lim itations supported by the 24 m edical record. [Dkt. No. 20 , 15]. -12- 1 Plaintiff’s entire argum ent rests on the prem ise that the ALJ im properly 2 evaluated the opinions of Drs. Chehrazi and Covey and did not include sufficient m ental 3 lim itations in Plaintiff’s RFC. As set forth, there was no legal error in the ALJ ’s 4 evaluation of these m edical opinions. Furtherm ore, there also was no legal error in the 5 RFC assessed by the ALJ . Plaintiff would like for the ALJ to have included m ental 6 lim itations based alm ost exclusive on his subjective complaints. The ALJ is only bound 7 to include lim itations to the RFC supported by substantial evidence. See Batson v. 8 Barnhart, 359 F.3d 1190 , 1197 (9th Cir. 20 0 4); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 9 (9th Cir. 20 0 5); Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 20 0 1) (“Nor was 10 the ALJ bound to accept as true the restrictions set forth in the second hypothetical 11 question if they were not supported by substantial evidence.”). 12 Based on the properly assessed RFC of light work, the ALJ properly relied upon 13 the VE testim ony to conclude that prior to February 3, 20 15, Plaintiff was “capable of 14 m aking a successful adjustm ent to other work that exists in significant num bers in the 15 national econom y.” (AR 41-42); see Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217 (because the “hypothetical 16 that the ALJ posed to the VE contained all of the lim itations that the ALJ found credible 17 and supported by substantial evidence in the record,” the “ALJ ’s reliance on testim ony 18 the VE gave in response to the hypothetical therefore was proper”). 19 20 There was no error in the ALJ ’s finding that Plaintiff had the ability to perform jobs existing in significant num bers in the national econom y prior to February 3, 20 15. 21 22 23 24 -13- 1 2 V. CON CLU SION For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Social Security Com m issioner is 3 AFFIRMED, and the action is DISMISSED with prejudice. J udgment shall be entered 4 accordingly. 5 6 DATE: J une 8, 20 20 7 8 / s/ Autum n D. Spaeth THE HONORABLE AUTUMN D. SPAETH United States Magistrate J udge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 -14-
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