Toyka Harris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 2:2018cv02341 - Document 25 (C.D. Cal. 2019)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 17 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 17 .) The Court will issue judgment, and the Clerk of the Court shall close the case. IT IS SO ORDERED. MD JS-6. Case Terminated. (lom) Modified on 4/5/2019 (lom).
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Toyka Harris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. Doc. 25 O JS-6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court Central District of California 8 9 10 11 Plaintiff, 12 13 Case No. 2:18-cv-02341-ODW (FFM) TOYKA HARRIS, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S v. 14 DELTA AIR LINES, INC.; and DOES 1- MOTION FOR SUMMARY 15 25, inclusive, JUDGMENT [17] 16 Defendants. 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiff, Toyka Harris, brings this action against Defendant, Delta Air Lines, 20 Inc., for various claims related to Defendant’s termination of Plaintiff’s employment. 21 Plaintiff alleges six claims: (1) race discrimination in violation of California 22 Government Code section 12940; (2) disability discrimination in violation of 23 California Government Code section 12940; (3) failure to prevent discrimination in 24 violation of California Government Code section 12940(k); (4) failure to reasonably 25 accommodate disability in violation of California Government Code section 26 12940(m); (5) retaliation for medical leave in violation of California Government 27 Code section 12945.2; and (6) retaliation in violation of California Government Code 28 section 12940(h). Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Dockets.Justia.com 1 Judgment, or in the alternative, 2 (ECF No. 17.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion.1 II. 3 Partial Summary Judgment (“Motion”). FACTUAL BACKGROUND 4 Plaintiff began her career with Defendant in October 1995 in a call center. 5 (Pl.’s Statement of Additional Material Facts (“PSAMF”) 1, ECF No. 18-1.) Plaintiff 6 remained in this position until she was furloughed in September 2005. (Id. 3.) In 7 May 2007, Plaintiff returned to active employment with Defendant as a customer 8 service agent. (Id. 4.) 9 A. Plaintiff’s Injury History 10 During Plaintiff’s employment, she suffered several on the job injuries. As a 11 result, Plaintiff took four medical leaves of absences. (Id. 7.) These injuries included 12 a carpal tunnel injury, tenosynovitis, and a shoulder strain, resulting in medical leave 13 between 2001 to 2003. (Id. 9, 13; Mot. 2.) In 2009, Plaintiff experienced anxiety 14 attacks and insomnia, in which her doctor placed her on leave from work. (PSAMF 15 25; Mot. 2.) Plaintiff’s request for medical leave was approved by a third-party 16 administrator, Sedgwick. (PSAMF 26.) Plaintiff took leave from November 9, 2009, 17 to March 7, 2010. (Id.) Although Plaintiff returned to work on March 8, 2010, 18 Plaintiff again took medical leave for her anxiety disorder from November 11, 2011, 19 to January 30, 2012, which was also approved by Sedgwick. (Id. 30, 31.) Plaintiff 20 eventually returned to work on January 31, 2014, with no restrictions. (Id. 33.) On 21 March 19, 2015, Plaintiff purportedly took a one-day medical leave for anxiety, 22 however, Sedgwick denied Plaintiff’s medical leave because it was not timely 23 reported. (Id. 34, 35.) 24 B. Altercations Involving Plaintiff 25 During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, she was involved in a number 26 of incidents with co-workers and customers. In 2011, a Caucasian co-worker, Marilyn 27 28 1 After considering the papers filed in connection with this Motion, the Court deemed this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 2 1 Tucker, began “barking orders” at Plaintiff. (PSAMF 37.) Plaintiff complained about 2 this incident to the performance leader, however, Ms. Tucker was not disciplined. 3 (Id. 39.) 4 In July 2013, Defendant received a letter from a passenger describing Plaintiff 5 as rude, unfriendly, and argumentative. (Decl. of Eon Rambharan (“Rambharan 6 Decl.”) Ex. B (“Employee Summary”), at 9–10, ECF No. 17-3.) Defendant informed 7 Plaintiff of this complaint, and Plaintiff recalled the incident and indicated that the 8 passenger was also upset. (Id. at 10.) Defendant requested that Plaintiff personally 9 inform her performance leader of any incidents in the future to ensure that customers 10 receive the level of professionalism expected from Defendant. (Id.) In November 11 2013, Defendant received another passenger complaint regarding Plaintiff’s conduct. 12 (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff did not recall this incident and Defendant acknowledged that the 13 letter was general, but Defendant conveyed to Plaintiff the general perception of the 14 letter regarding her quality of customer service. (Id.) In November 2014, a passenger 15 complained because Plaintiff was involved in an argument with a co-worker and that 16 Plaintiff acted very rudely to her co-worker. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff acknowledged that 17 she had an argument in front of customers, apologized for her conduct, and explained 18 that her co-worker was rude to her. (Id.) 19 On January 1, 2015, Defendant received another customer complaint about 20 Plaintiff because Plaintiff was not answering the passenger’s questions and began 21 yelling at the customer. 22 investigate the situation, however, Plaintiff responded that Defendant “does not care 23 for her well being or her safety.” (Id.) Plaintiff stated that she did “not have to help 24 passengers if they start to yell at her.” (Id.) As a result of this incident and the other 25 customer complaints, on January 6, 2015, Plaintiff received a Corrective Action 26 Notice. (Rambharan Decl. Ex. C.) The notice informed Plaintiff that if she did not 27 immediately improve her performance, Plaintiff may receive more serious corrective (Id. at 8.) Defendant attempted to talk to Plaintiff to 28 3 1 action. (Id.) Plaintiff refused to sign the acknowledgement of receipt of the letter 2 because she believed that the complaints were inaccurate. (PSAMF 51.) 3 However, Plaintiff received another customer complaint on February 24, 2015, 4 in which the customer complained that Plaintiff was rude and that the customer felt 5 insulted by Plaintiff’s actions. (Employee Summary 7.) Plaintiff stated that she did 6 not recall this incident. (Id.) Defendant again advised Plaintiff that passengers cannot 7 perceive her to be rude and unhelpful. (Id.) 8 On March 28, 2015, Plaintiff was involved in two separate incidents. In the 9 first incident, while Plaintiff was assisting a passenger, Ashley Johnson, a co-worker 10 and ready reserve employee,2 brought another passenger to Plaintiff for assistance. 11 (PSAMF 54, 55.) What caused this incident between Plaintiff and Ms. Johnson is 12 unclear, however, the incident resulted in a shouting match between Plaintiff and Ms. 13 Johnson in front of customers. (Rambharan Decl. Ex. H.) The second incident 14 occurred in the employee break room some time after the first incident. (PSAMF 57.) 15 While in the break room, Plaintiff ranted loudly about ready reserve employees. (Id.) 16 There were at least two ready reserve employees in the break room that overheard 17 Plaintiff’s statements. (See id.) Plaintiff complained that ready reserve employees are 18 ghetto, disrespectful, did not know anything, and that she had the ability to get them 19 fired. (Id.) Two ready reserve employees complained to the performance leader, 20 Melita McKay, about Plaintiff’s conduct in the break room. (See Rambharan Decl. 21 Exs. I, J.) The ready reserve employees noted that Plaintiff was trying to intimidate 22 them with her statements about being able to get them fired and, as a result, they felt 23 that they would be unable to ask the customer service agents for help. (Id. Exs. I, J.) 24 25 26 27 28 2 Defendant characterizes ready reserve employees as similar to customer service agents but are considered part-time. (Mot. 5.) 4 1 C. Decision to Terminate Plaintiff’s Employment 2 Defendant, through its Department Manager, Eon Rambharan, investigated the 3 incidents involving Plaintiff. (Rambharan Decl. ¶ 4.) On March 31, 2015, Plaintiff 4 was suspended pending the result of the investigation. (PSAMF 59.) On April 1, 5 2015, Ms. Mckay wrote a letter to Mr. Rambharan recommending that Plaintiff’s 6 employment be terminated as a result of her job performance, customer complaints, 7 and incidents with co-workers. (Rambharan Decl. Ex. D.) This recommendation for 8 termination was also approved by Defendant’s Human Resources department. (Id. ¶ 9 7, Ex. E.) On April 10, 2015, while suspended, Plaintiff claimed that she suffered an 10 anxiety attack because of the unwarranted suspension, and she obtained a letter from 11 her physician indicating that her condition warranted disability (retroactive to March 12 31, 2015). (PSAMF 61.) 13 On April 27, 2015, Defendant ultimately approved of the decision to terminate 14 Plaintiff. (Rambharan Decl. Ex. F.) On April 28, 2015, Plaintiff was provided notice 15 that Defendant had decided to terminate her employment, but that she also had the 16 option to resign. 17 termination was effective April 30, 2015. (Id. ¶ 8.) 18 D. (Id. Ex. F.) Plaintiff declined to resign, and as a result, her Complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing 19 Following her termination, on September 25, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint 20 with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) alleging that she 21 was terminated because she is African-American and as a result of her disabilities. 22 (Compl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-1.) 23 dismissed Plaintiff’s claims based on insufficient evidence. 24 Findley (“Findley Decl.”) Ex. S, ECF No. 17-2.) 25 III. On July 20, 2016, the DFEH investigated and (Decl. of Amy W. LEGAL STANDARD 26 A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 27 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 28 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Courts must view the facts and draw reasonable 5 1 inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott, 550 U.S. at 378. 2 A disputed fact is “material” where the resolution of that fact might affect the outcome 3 of the suit under the governing law, and the dispute is “genuine” where “the evidence 4 is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 5 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Conclusory or speculative 6 testimony in affidavits is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat 7 summary judgment. Thornhill’s Publ’g Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th 8 Cir. 1979). Moreover, though the Court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make 9 credibility determinations, there must be more than a mere scintilla of contradictory 10 evidence to survive summary judgment. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 11 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 12 Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party cannot simply 13 rest on the pleadings or argue that any disagreement or “metaphysical doubt” about a 14 material issue of fact precludes summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 15 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 16 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 17 Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987). Nor will uncorroborated allegations and 18 “self-serving testimony” create a genuine issue of material fact. Villiarimo v. Aloha 19 Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002). 20 summary judgment against a party who fails to demonstrate facts sufficient to 21 establish an element essential to his case when that party will ultimately bear the 22 burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. The court should grant 23 Pursuant to the Local Rules, parties moving for summary judgment must file a 24 proposed “Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law” that should 25 set out “the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine 26 dispute.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-1. A party opposing the motion must file a “Statement of 27 Genuine Disputes” setting forth all material facts as to which it contends there exists a 28 genuine dispute. C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-2. “[T]he Court may assume that material facts as 6 1 claimed and adequately supported by the moving party are admitted to exist without 2 controversy except to the extent that such material facts are (a) included in the 3 ‘Statement of Genuine Disputes’ and (b) controverted by declaration or other written 4 evidence filed in opposition to the motion.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-3. IV. 5 DISCUSSION 6 California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California 7 Government Code section 12940 et seq., makes it unlawful for an employer to 8 discharge a person from employment or discriminate based on that person’s race or 9 disability. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). 10 The California Supreme Court adopted the burden-shifting framework in 11 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973), to analyze 12 disparate treatment claims. Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 354 (2000). 13 Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff has the initial burden to establish a prima 14 facie case of discrimination. Id. If the prima facie case is shown, then a presumption 15 of discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the 16 adverse employment action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Id. 17 at 355. 18 presumption is negated, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that 19 the proffered reason is mere pretext for discrimination. Id. at 356. If the defendant states a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, then the 20 However, when an employer moves for summary judgment, “the burden is 21 reversed . . . because the defendant who seeks summary judgment bears the initial 22 burden.” Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d 728, 745 (9th 23 Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). To prevail on summary judgment, the 24 employer is required to “show either that (1) plaintiff could not establish one of the 25 elements of [the] FEHA claim or (2) there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 26 for its decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment.” Lawler v. Montblanc N. Am., 27 LLC, 704 F.3d 1235, 1242 (9th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original). If the employer 28 meets its burden, then the “employee must demonstrate either that the defendant’s 7 1 showing was in fact insufficient or . . . that there was a triable issue of fact material to 2 the defendant’s showing.” 3 original). 4 A. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (omission in Race Discrimination in Violation of FEHA 5 Plaintiff’s first cause of action is for race discrimination in violation of FEHA. 6 To state a prima facie case of discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff must show that: 7 (1) she “was a member of a protected class”; (2) she “was qualified for the position 8 [s]he sought or was performing competently in the position she held”; (3) she 9 “suffered an adverse employment action”; and (4) the employer acted with 10 discriminatory motive or “some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” 11 Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 355; see also Lawler, 704 F.3d at 1242. 12 Here, Defendant bears the burden to show that Plaintiff could not establish one 13 of the elements of her FEHA race discrimination claim or that there was a legitimate, 14 nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. 15 Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to set forth evidence that it acted with a 16 discriminatory motive, and relatedly, that Plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate, 17 nondiscriminatory reason. 18 Defendant has set forth evidence that Plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate, 19 nondiscriminatory reason. Plaintiff was terminated following an investigation into 20 Plaintiff’s March 28, 2015, incidents involving a co-worker and other ready reserve 21 employees as well as prior customer complaints regarding Plaintiff’s demeanor and 22 attitude. (Rambharan Decl. Ex. D.) At her deposition, when asked why she believed 23 disciplinary action was taken against her because of her race, she responded, “I don’t 24 know how to answer that.” (Findley Decl. Ex. A (“Harris Deposition”), at 150.) 25 Plaintiff was also asked, “Do you think you were terminated because of your race?” 26 (Id.) Plaintiff responded, “I think I was terminated because of the amount of time I 27 had with the company.” (Id.) Plaintiff has provided no evidence that race was a 28 factor in her termination. 8 1 Instead, Plaintiff argues that there were two incidents where Caucasian 2 employees were treated more favorably than African American employees. (Opp’n 3 11–12.) The first incident Plaintiff referred to was an incident that occurred in 2009 4 when Plaintiff complained about a Caucasian employee and the employee was not 5 subjected to any disciplinary action. (Opp’n 11.) Plaintiff does not describe whether 6 this other employee was also a customer service agent, whether this other employee 7 had a history of customer complaints, whether this employee was working under a 8 corrective action notice, or whether this other employee threatened to have other 9 employees fired. The second incident involved “Sergio” in which Sergio confronted 10 Plaintiff about returning late from lunch. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff was not disciplined for 11 returning late, and Sergio did not make any racial comments to Plaintiff. (Reply 3, 12 ECF No. 19.) It is unclear to the Court how these two incidents relate to why Plaintiff 13 was terminated in 2015, or how these incidents suggest that Plaintiff’s termination 14 was motivated by race. 15 As Defendant states a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s 16 termination, and Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the proffered reason was mere 17 pretext for discrimination, summary judgment on this issue is proper. 18 B. Disability Discrimination in Violation of FEHA 19 Similar to Plaintiff’s first claim, to state a prima facie case for disability 20 discrimination, Plaintiff must show: (1) she “was a member of a protected class”; (2) 21 she "was qualified for the position [s]he sought or was performing competently in the 22 position she held”; (3) she “suffered an adverse employment action”; and (4) the 23 employer acted with discriminatory motive or “some other circumstance suggests 24 discriminatory motive.” Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 355. 25 Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish that she was terminated for a 26 discriminatory reason because Defendant had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 27 for terminating Plaintiff. Defendant states that (1) it was not aware of Plaintiff’s 28 9 1 disability (and thus could not have discriminated against Plaintiff for her disability); 2 and (2) Plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. 3 As discussed above, Defendant provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 4 for Plaintiff’s termination. This reason has nothing to do with Plaintiff’s disability. 5 Plaintiff argues that there is “evidence to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s disability and 6 need for accommodation were treated with disdain by [Defendant].” (Opp’n 16.) 7 Plaintiff relies on Defendant’s third-party administrator’s denial of her requests for 8 medical leave. However, the first denial was based on Plaintiff’s failure to timely 9 request the accommodation. (PSAMF 34, 35.) Plaintiff provides no evidence that the 10 second request was ever submitted. However, even assuming it was, it would have 11 been submitted after she was suspended, but before she was terminated. Employers 12 “proceeding along lines previously contemplated, though not yet determined, is no 13 evidence whatsoever of causality.” Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 14 273 (2001). 15 nothing in rebuttal to Defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 16 termination. Accordingly, summary judgment is proper. 17 C. Similar to Plaintiff’s claim for race discrimination, Plaintiff offers Failure to Prevent Discrimination 18 As Plaintiff fails to create a triable issue of material fact as to her race or 19 disability discrimination claim, her claim for failure to prevent discrimination in 20 violation of California Government Code section 12940(k) must also fail. Trujillo v. 21 N. Cty. Transit Dist., 63 Cal. App. 4th 280, 289 (1998) (“Employers should not be 22 held liable for failure to take necessary steps to prevent such conduct, except where 23 the actions took place and were not prevented.”). Plaintiff has set forth no evidence 24 that she was subjected to race or disability discrimination that required Defendant to 25 remedy the discrimination. In fact, Plaintiff believed she was terminated because of 26 her length of employment with Defendant, not because of any race or disability 27 discrimination. (See Harris Deposition 150.) Accordingly, summary judgment on this 28 issue is proper. 10 1 D. Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodations 2 The elements of a prima facie claim for failure to make reasonable 3 accommodations are: “(1) the plaintiff has a disability covered by FEHA; (2) the 4 plaintiff is qualified to perform essential functions of the position; and (3) the 5 employee failed to accommodate the plaintiff’s disability.” Achal v. Gate Gourmet, 6 Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 781, 798 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Scotch v. Art Inst. of 7 Cal.-Orange Cty., Inc., 173 Cal. App. 4th 986, 1010 (2009)). 8 accommodation means a “modification or adjudgment to the workplace that enables a 9 disabled employee to perform the essential functions of the job held.” Taylor v. Trees, 10 Reasonable Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1111 (E.D. Cal. 2014). 11 To face liability under section 12940(m), an employer must be aware of the 12 employee’s disability. King v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 426, 443 13 (2007). An “employee can’t expect the employer to read his mind and know he 14 secretly wanted a particular accommodation and sue the employer for not providing.” 15 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). An employer cannot be “liable for failing to 16 accommodate a disability of which it had no knowledge.” Id. (internal quotation 17 marks omitted). An employee is responsible for requesting accommodation for his or 18 her disability, unless the employer recognizes that the employee has a need for such 19 accommodation. Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). 20 In response, Plaintiff offers a hodgepodge of reasons in support of her claim for 21 failure to provide reasonable accommodations that essentially boils down to (1) two 22 requests for accommodations to wear a splint for her wrist and to work on a modified 23 schedule, and (2) Defendant’s denial of her request for leave on March 19, 2015. 24 (Opp’n 15, 20.) However, Plaintiff provides no support that she informed Defendant 25 of her requests for accommodation. Plaintiff’s evidence shows that in 2001, her 26 doctor told her that she should have a modified work schedule in May of that year, and 27 that in 2009, her doctor told her that she should wear a splint. (PSAMF 10, 11.) 28 Plaintiff sets forth no evidence that she ever informed Defendant of her disability. 11 1 Instead, Plaintiff offers conclusory arguments, without evidence, that Defendant had 2 to be aware. 3 judgment. Importantly, before the Court are Plaintiff’s doctor’s notes indicating that 4 she should wear a splint for her wrist and she should be on a modified work schedule 5 between May 8, 2001, and May 22, 2001. (Harris Decl. Exs. E, F.) There is no 6 evidence that these requests were ever communicated to Defendant. Additionally, 7 Plaintiff admitted in her deposition that whenever she did request accommodations to 8 Defendant’s third-party administrator, Sedgwick, the requests were approved. (Harris 9 Deposition 234.) (Opp’n 15.) This is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary 10 Moreover, Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for leave on March 19, 11 2015, did not have anything to do with Plaintiff’s disability. There is no dispute that 12 Plaintiff took a part of the day off, allegedly because of her disability, but Plaintiff did 13 not inform Sedgwick until over two days later. (PSAMF 34, 35.) When Plaintiff 14 eventually informed Sedgwick, Sedgwick denied Plaintiff’s request because it was 15 untimely. (Id. 35.) Accordingly, summary judgment on this issue is proper. 16 17 E. Retaliation 18 Plaintiff’s fifth and sixth claims are for retaliation in violation of California 19 Government Code sections 12945.2 and 12940(h). Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation 20 under section 12945.2 is based on Defendant’s retaliation for her medical leave 21 pursuant to the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”); whereas Plaintiff’s claim 22 under 12940(h) is a claim of retaliation based on Plaintiff’s request for 23 accommodations. (Opp’n 21–25.) 24 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) “she 25 engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse 26 employment action; and (3) a casual link between the protected activity and the 27 employer’s action.” Akers v. Cty. of San Diego, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1453 (2002). 28 12 1 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims for retaliation fail because she did not 2 engage in protected activity and that there is no causal link between any alleged 3 protected activity and the decision to terminate Plaintiff. (Mot. 18–19.) In response, 4 Plaintiff argues that the causal link is satisfied based simply on the timeline and the 5 “close temporal association between the protected activity . . . and the adverse 6 employment actions.” (Opp’n 24.) 7 Defendant relies solely on Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & 8 Power, 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1235 (2006) for the proposition that a “[c]lose 9 proximity in time of an adverse action to an employee’s resistance or opposition to 10 unlawful conduct” is sufficient to establish a causal link. (Opp’n 24–25.) However, 11 close proximity in time alone is insufficient to establish a causal link. See Univ. of 12 Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 358 (2013) (stating that an employee 13 who knows she is about to be fired may be tempted to forestall lawful action by 14 making an unfounded charge of discrimination). Here, as explained above, Plaintiff 15 took her purported medical leave and did not make a request within two days of her 16 leave. Plaintiff’s request for medical leave on March 19, 2015 was denied by a third- 17 party because it was untimely. This is undisputed. Further, although Plaintiff was 18 terminated a little less than two months later, Plaintiff does not set forth how the 19 denial of leave by a third party and her termination are in any way related. This is not 20 sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment. 21 Defendant provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination: 22 her job performance, past customer complaints, and incidents with co-workers. 23 Plaintiff has provided no evidence that she was retaliated against as a result of her 24 requests for medical leave or her purported requests for accommodation. 25 Accordingly, summary judgment is proper. 26 27 28 13 As set forth above, V. 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for 3 Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 17.) The Court will issue judgment, and the Clerk of 4 the Court shall close the case. 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 8 9 10 11 April 5, 2019 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14
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