Kelli Christine Shultz v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 2:2018cv02237 - Document 27 (C.D. Cal. 2019)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge John D. Early. IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and remanding this matter for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Order. (see document for details) (hr)
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Kelli Christine Shultz v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 WESTERN DIVISION 11 KELLI C. S.1, 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 15 16 NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 17 Defendant. 18 19 20 21 22 23 ) Case No. 2:18-cv-02237-JDE ) ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ) ) ORDER ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff Kelli C. S. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint on March 19, 2018, seeking review of the Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). The parties filed a Joint Submission (“Jt. Stip.”) regarding the issues in dispute on February 22, 2019. The matter now is ready for decision. 24 25 26 27 28 1 Plaintiff's name has been partially redacted in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Dockets.Justia.com 1 I. 2 BACKGROUND 3 Plaintiff filed her application for DIB on January 12, 2015, alleging 4 disability commencing on January 9, 2014. AR 46, 152-57. On October 23, 5 2017, after her application was denied initially and on reconsideration (AR 58, 6 73), Plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified before an Administrative Law 7 Judge (“ALJ”), as did a vocational expert. AR 31-45. On November 9, 2017, 8 the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled (AR 15-25), but found she had severe 9 impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and obesity. AR 10 17. The ALJ also found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 11 impairments that met or medically equaled a listed impairment and had the 12 residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work, except she can 13 never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and she can only occasionally stoop, 14 kneel, crouch, and crawl. AR 19. 15 The ALJ determined that although Plaintiff was unable to perform her 16 past relevant work as a licensed nurse practitioner (AR 23), considering her age, 17 education, work experience, and RFC, Plaintiff was capable of performing jobs 18 that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, including: addresser; 19 document preparer, microfilming; and stuffer. AR 24-25. Accordingly, the ALJ 20 concluded Plaintiff was not under a “disability,” as defined in the Social 21 Security Act (“SSA”), from the alleged onset date through the date of the 22 decision. AR 25. After, Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision by 23 the Appeals Council was denied (AR 1-6), this action followed. 24 II. 25 LEGAL STANDARDS 26 27 28 A. Standard of Review Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this court may review the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The ALJ’s findings and decision should be upheld if 2 1 they are free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence based on 2 the record as a whole. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 3 2015) (as amended); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). 4 Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable person 5 might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 6 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). It is more than a scintilla, but less than a 7 preponderance. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a 8 finding, the reviewing court “must review the administrative record as a whole, 9 weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from 10 the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th 11 Cir. 1998). “If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or 12 reversing,” the reviewing court “may not substitute its judgment” for that of 13 the Commissioner. Id. at 720-21; see also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 14 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 15 rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are 16 supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”). 17 Lastly, even if an ALJ errs, the decision will be affirmed where such 18 error is harmless (Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115), that is, if it is “inconsequential to 19 the ultimate nondisability determination,” or if “the agency’s path may 20 reasonably be discerned, even if the agency explains its decision with less than 21 ideal clarity.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (citation omitted). 22 23 B. Standard for Determining Disability Benefits When a claimant’s case has proceeded to consideration by an ALJ, the 24 ALJ conducts a five-step sequential evaluation to determine at each step if the 25 claimant is or is not disabled. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1110. 26 First, the ALJ considers whether the claimant currently works at a job 27 that meets the criteria for “substantial gainful activity.” Id. If not, the ALJ 28 proceeds to a second step to determine whether the claimant has a “severe” 3 1 medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of 2 impairments that has lasted for more than twelve months. Id. If so, the ALJ 3 proceeds to a third step to determine whether the claimant’s impairments 4 render the claimant disabled because they “meet or equal” any of the “listed 5 impairments” set forth in the Social Security regulations at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 6 Subpart P, Appendix 1. See Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 7 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 2015). If the claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal a 8 “listed impairment,” before proceeding to the fourth step the ALJ assesses the 9 claimant’s RFC, that is, what the claimant can do on a sustained basis despite 10 the limitations from her impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 11 416.920(a)(4); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p. 12 After determining the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ proceeds to the fourth 13 step and determines whether the claimant has the RFC to perform her past 14 relevant work, either as she “actually” performed it when she worked in the 15 past, or as that same job is “generally” performed in the national economy. See 16 Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 2016). If the claimant cannot 17 perform her past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to a fifth and final step to 18 determine whether there is any other work, in light of the claimant’s RFC, age, 19 education, and work experience, that the claimant can perform and that exists 20 in “significant numbers” in either the national or regional economies. See 21 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1999). If the claimant can 22 do other work, she is not disabled; but if the claimant cannot do other work 23 and meets the duration requirement, the claimant is disabled. See id. at 1099. 24 The claimant generally bears the burden at each of steps one through 25 four to show she is disabled, or she meets the requirements to proceed to the 26 next step; and the claimant bears the ultimate burden to show she is disabled. 27 See, e.g., Molina, 674 F.3d at 1110; Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 28 (9th Cir. 1995). However, at Step Five, the ALJ has a “limited” burden of 4 1 production to identify representative jobs that the claimant can perform and 2 that exist in “significant” numbers in the economy. See Hill v. Astrue, 698 3 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012); Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100. 4 III. 5 DISCUSSION 6 The parties present four disputed issues (Jt. Stip. at 3): 7 Issue No. 1: Whether the ALJ erred by finding Plaintiff’s mental 8 impairments were not severe; Issue No. 2: Whether the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective 9 10 symptoms and third-party statements2; Issue No. 3: Whether the ALJ erred in assessing medical opinion 11 12 evidence; and Issue. No. 4: Whether the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff has the ability to 13 14 perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. 15 A. 16 17 Step Two Determination Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred by not finding her bipolar and post- traumatic stress disorders to be severe impairments. Jt. Stip. at 3-7. 18 1. Applicable Law 19 At Step Two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ determines whether 20 the claimant has a severe, medically determinable impairment or combination 21 of impairments that meets the durational requirement. See 20 C.F.R. 22 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). In assessing severity, the ALJ must 23 determine whether the claimant’s medically determinable impairment or 24 combinations of impairments significantly limits his ability to do basic work 25 2 26 27 28 In the statement of disputed issues, this appears as “Issue No. 3” even though it is listed as the second issue and later briefed as “Issue No. 2.” See Jt. Stip. at 3, 11, 18. The Court refers to it as “Issue No. 2” to comport with the chronology of the issues in the briefing. 5 1 activities. See Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). Step two is 2 a “de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” Smolen v. 3 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). An impairment or combination of 4 impairments may be found “not severe only if the evidence establishes a slight 5 abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability 6 to work.” Webb, 433 F.3d at 686 (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290). The ALJ 7 “may find that a claimant lacks a medically severe impairment or combination 8 of impairments only when [that] conclusion is ‘clearly established by medical 9 evidence.’” Id. at 687 (citation omitted). Harmless error analysis applies to the 10 Step Two determination. Davenport v. Colvin, 608 F. App’x 480, 481 (9th Cir. 11 2015); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2005). 12 2. Analysis 13 At Step Two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had two severe physical 14 impairments, degenerative disc disease and obesity, but no severe mental 15 impairments. AR 17-19. Regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ 16 considered her bipolar and post-traumatic stress disorders and provided an 17 analysis with specific consideration of the four functional areas known as the 18 “paragraph B” criteria, but found neither severe. AR 18-19. The ALJ also 19 explained that “[t]he limitations identified in the ‘paragraph B’ criteria are not 20 a[n RFC] assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental impairments at 21 steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation process. The mental [RFC] 22 assessment used at steps 4 and 5 . . . require a more detailed assessment by 23 itemizing various functions contained in the broad categories found in 24 paragraph B . . ..” AR 18-19. 25 Here, although the ALJ did not find Plaintiff’s mental impairments to be 26 severe, even assuming the ALJ erred, any error would be harmless for two 27 reasons. First, as noted, the ALJ resolved Step Two in Plaintiff’s favor, i.e., the 28 ALJ found Plaintiff’s claim survived the “gatekeeping” step designed to 6 1 dispose of groundless claims by finding other impairments to be severe. The 2 ALJ did not terminate the sequential evaluation at Step Two; rather, he 3 continued the analysis through the final steps of the disability determination. 4 See Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007) (the Step Two 5 finding is “merely a threshold determination” that “only raises a prima facie 6 case of a disability”); Burch, 400 F.3d at 682 (concluding that any error ALJ 7 committed at Step Two was harmless where the step was resolved in 8 claimant’s favor); Kemp v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 3981195, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9 8, 2017) (any error in declining to find impairments severe harmless because 10 11 Step Two is the “gatekeeping” step, and the ALJ continued the analysis). Second, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s mental health issues in assessing 12 her RFC. The ALJ stated at Step Four that he considered all symptoms in 13 fashioning the RFC. AR 19. Moreover, in the RFC assessment itself, the ALJ 14 again considered Plaintiff mental limitations from her bipolar and post- 15 traumatic stress disorders and management of her mental impairments. AR 21- 16 23. Accordingly, any error in declining to find a severe mental health 17 impairment was harmless because the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s mental health 18 impairments at Step Four. See Hurter v. Astrue, 465 F. App’x 648, 652 (9th 19 Cir. 2012) (error in declining to find depression and anxiety severe harmless 20 because ALJ considered all symptoms in formulating RFC); see also Duncan 21 v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 6059140, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2017) (ALJ contrasted 22 the “special technique” analysis with the “more detailed assessment” required 23 for the RFC, indicating the ALJ’s later analysis of claimant’s mental 24 impairment was designed to address the RFC). 25 For these reasons, the Court finds any error at Step Two was harmless.3 26 27 28 3 As part of this claim, Plaintiff also alleges that the ALJ had a duty to further develop the record regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments, including by calling a 7 1 B. Third-Party Function Report 2 In part of Issue 2, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by discounting the 3 third-party function report completed by her ex-husband.4 Jt. Stip. at 17-18. 4 1. Applicable Law 5 “In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must consider 6 lay witness testimony concerning a claimant’s ability to work.” Bruce v. 7 Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Stout v. Comm’r Soc. 8 Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also 20 C.F.R. 9 §§ 404.1513(a)(4), 416.913(a)(4). Friends and family members in a position to 10 observe a symptoms and activities are competent to testify as to a claimant’s 11 condition. See Diedrich, 874 F.3d at 640. Such testimony “cannot be 12 disregarded without comment.” Bruce, 557 F.3d at 1115 (quoting Nguyen v. 13 Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996)); Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 14 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he ALJ is required to account for all lay 15 witness testimony in the discussion of his or her findings.”). When rejecting 16 law witness testimony, an ALJ must give specific reasons germane for 17 discounting the testimony. Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 18 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009). 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 consultative examiner or seeking an opinion from Plaintiff’s treating sources or a medical advisor. Jt. Stip. at 6. Considering the Court’s disposition of Issue No. 2, Plaintiff may raise this request for further factual development with the ALJ on remand. See Diedrich v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The ALJ is responsible for studying the record and resolving any conflicts or ambiguities in it.”) 4 Defendant does not acknowledge or otherwise attempt to refute Plaintiff’s argument. Jt. Stip. at 18-23; See Kinley v. Astrue, 2013 WL 494122, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 8, 2013) (“The Commissioner does not respond to this [aspect of claimant’s] argument, and it is unclear whether this is a tacit admission by the Commissioner that the ALJ erred or whether it was an oversight. Either way, the Commissioner has waived any response.”). 8 1 2 1. Analysis Plaintiff’s ex-husband completed a Form SSA-3380-BK “Function 3 Report-Adult-Third Party” provided by the Agency. AR 188-96. The report 4 was based on his observations of Plaintiff during their 24 years of marriage, 5 living together, and doing “everything” with her. AR 188. He explained his 6 observations of her limitations, including her inability to lift, bend, and stretch 7 due to constant pain, and the side effects of her “high dose” pain medication. 8 AR 188, 193, 195. He described her activities from the time she wakes up until 9 she goes to bed, the assistance she receives from others, and her difficulties in 10 performing various activities. AR 188-93. He provided information regarding 11 her ability to do certain physical and mental tasks and explained that she is 12 “unable to move physically without pain.” AR 193-94. 13 The ALJ did not summarize or otherwise discuss any of the statements 14 made in the function report, but discounted them because: (1) the statements 15 were not given under oath; (2) the statements “appear[ed] to be no more than 16 parroting of the subjective complaints already testified to by the claimant”; 17 (3) Plaintiff’s ex-husband was “not competent to make a diagnosis or argue the 18 severity of [Plaintiff’s] symptoms”; and (4) “most importantly,” his statements 19 were “not supported by the clinical or diagnostic medical evidence” discussed 20 earlier in the decision. AR 29. 21 Here, the ALJ improperly discounted the statements. First, there is no 22 requirement that a third-party function report be administered under oath. See 23 Valenzuela v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 1524496, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2018) 24 (“an ALJ cannot disregard a lay witness’s testimony simply because it was not 25 provided under oath”). Plaintiff’s ex-husband completed a form approved and 26 provided by the Agency, and there is no requirement on the form or under the 27 regulations that a third-party attest to his or her observations and abilities of a 28 claimant under oath. See Stewart v. Astrue, 2012 WL 487467, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 9 1 Feb. 15, 2012) (ALJ improperly discounted statements because they “were not 2 given under oath”; the third party “submitted her observations regarding 3 [claimant]’s activities and abilities on a ‘Function Report-Adult-Third Party,’ 4 which is the Social Security Administration’s own ‘Form SSA–3380–BK.’”); 5 §§ 404.1513(a)(4), 416.913(a)(4). 6 Second, the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s ex-husband’s statements 7 “appear[ed]” to parrot Plaintiff’s subjective complaints is insufficient. AR 19. 8 The ALJ fails to explain how Plaintiff’s ex-husband’s account of his 9 observations of the effects of Plaintiff’s pain and other symptoms on her 10 functional limitations and activities around the house, as he was well qualified 11 to do, was improper. See Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993); 12 Buckard v. Astrue, 2010 WL 5789044, at *17 (D. Or. Dec. 7, 2010) (“Far from 13 ‘parroting’ [claimant]'s allegations, the [third-party] witnesses described 14 independent observations of [claimant]’s physical condition.”). Consistency of 15 testimony is not, in and of itself, a ground to discount testimony. Moreover, 16 the ALJ failed to identify, compare, or otherwise comment on the statements 17 in the function report and how they related to Plaintiff’s testimony.5 See, e.g., 18 Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494 (ALJ must identify “which testimony she 19 found not credible, and . . . explain[] which evidence contradicted that 20 testimony.” (emphasis in original)); Stephens v. Colvin, 2014 WL 6982680, at 21 *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2014) (ALJ improperly disregarded claimant’s mother’s 22 third-party statements by failing to comment on her testimony); Lewis v. 23 Astrue, 2009 WL 2044661, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2009) (finding “not 24 sustainable” ALJ’s rejection of third-party function report because it was not 25 26 27 28 5 The ALJ merely cited the entirely of Plaintiff’s function report (AR 179-87), and the third-party function report (AR 188-96), with a “compare” signal. AR 23. The ALJ makes no mention or citation to Plaintiff’s hearing testimony. 10 1 given under oath and appeared to be no more than “a parroting of the 2 subjective complaints already testified to by the [Plaintiff]”). 3 Third, the ALJ’s reasoning that Plaintiff’s ex-husband was “not 4 competent to make a diagnosis or argue the severity of [Plaintiff’s] symptoms” 5 is legally deficient. As mentioned, friends and family members who are in a 6 position to observe a claimant’s symptoms and daily activities are deemed to 7 be competent to testify as to those symptoms and activities. See Diedrich, 874 8 F.3d at 640; Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 918-19. Indeed, the statements do not contain 9 diagnosis or medical findings because the very purpose of third-party testimony 10 is to obtain the lay witness’s subjective impression of claimant’s abilities and 11 limitations. Thus, the ALJ improperly discounted the statements for this 12 reason. See Dallas v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 2017 WL 4242028, at *5 (D. 13 Ariz. Sept. 25, 2017) (ALJ improperly disregarded function report because 14 third party was not a doctor trained to make observations about claimant’s 15 limitations); Augg v. Colvin, 2016 WL 1388054, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 8, 16 2016) (“There is no requirement that a lay witness be ‘medically trained to 17 make exacting observations.’ Nor should there be given that lay witnesses are 18 by definition not medical professionals.”); Earhart v. Colvin, 2015 WL 19 2368597, at *4 (D. Or. May 18, 2015) (noting Commissioner’s concession that 20 third-party’s lack of medical training was not a valid reason for rejecting 21 testimony). 22 The fourth and final reason offered by the ALJ is likewise inadequate. A 23 lack of support from the “clinical or diagnostic medical evidence” is not a 24 proper basis for disregarding lay witness’ observations. Diedrich, 874 F.3d at 25 640 (quoting Bruce, 557 F.3d at 1116 (“Nor under our law could the ALJ 26 discredit [the witness’s] lay testimony as not supported by medical evidence in 27 the record.”)). That lay testimony and third-party function reports may differ 28 from medical records alone “is precisely why such evidence is valuable at a 11 1 hearing.” Diedrich, 874 F.3d at 640; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1289 (ALJ erred by 2 rejecting testimony of claimant’s family members about claimant’s symptoms 3 because medical records did not corroborate those symptoms); Bray v. 4 Berryhill, 2018 WL 3076919, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2018) (“[T]o the extent 5 the ALJ determined that the [third-party function r]eport should be discounted 6 based on a lack of support from the medical records, this was not a germane 7 reason to give ‘little weight’ to [friend’s] observations.”); Stewart, 2012 WL 8 487467, at *6 (ALJ’s statement that third-party statements were “not supported 9 by the clinical or diagnostic medical evidence,” without more, is not a 10 sufficiently specific reason to reject statements). Accordingly, the ALJ did not rely on specific germane reasons supported 11 12 by substantial evidence to discount the third-party report. In this instance, the 13 Court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s error was harmless. The ALJ’s decision 14 lacks any “meaningful explanation” based on specific evidence in the record for 15 rejecting the report. See, e.g., Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (ALJ’s failure 16 adequately to specify reasons for discrediting testimony “will usually not be 17 harmless”). Because of the significant functional limitations reflected in the 18 third-party report, the Court cannot confidently conclude that no reasonable 19 ALJ, when fully crediting the statements, could have reached a different 20 disability determination. Stout, 454 F.3d at 1055-56; Stephens, 2014 WL 21 6982680 at *7 (improper rejection of third-party testimony was not harmless 22 because, if credited, it could support a finding that claimant is disabled). 23 C. 24 Remand is appropriate. The decision whether to remand for further proceedings is within this 25 Court’s discretion. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000) 26 (as amended). Where no useful purpose would be served by further 27 administrative proceedings, or where the record has been fully developed, it is 28 appropriate to exercise this discretion to direct an immediate award of benefits. 12 1 See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004); Harman, 211 F.3d 2 at 1179 (noting that “the decision of whether to remand for further proceedings 3 turns upon the likely utility of such proceedings”). A remand for further 4 proceedings is appropriate where outstanding issues must be resolved before a 5 determination of disability can be made and it is not clear from the record that 6 the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled and award disability 7 benefits. See Bunnell v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2003). 8 9 Here, the Court concludes that remand for further proceedings is warranted. Properly credited third-party statements necessarily bolster 10 Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ’s assessment of which is challenged 11 in the other portion of Issue 2. A remand will allow the ALJ to reconsider 12 Plaintiff’s credibility in light of the third-party statements.6 Moreover, because 13 the assessment of both Plaintiff’s credibility and the third-party report 14 referenced the medical evidence of record, an evaluation of both in 15 conjunction with that evidence, including the medical opinion raised in Issue 16 3, is necessary. See e.g., Vaughn v. Berryhill, 242 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1010 (E.D. 17 Cal. 2017) (dispensing of exhaustive analysis of plaintiff’s remaining issues 18 because ALJ’s evaluations of credibility “are inescapably linked to conclusions 19 regarding the medical evidence”); Alderman v. Colvin, 2015 WL 12661933, at 20 *8 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 14, 2015) (remanding due to interrelated nature of ALJ’s 21 decision to discount credibility and give appropriate consideration to medical 22 opinions). Finally, a proper synthesis of all of the disputed issues – Plaintiff’s 23 subjective complaints, the third-party function report, and the medical 24 25 26 27 28 6 This is particularly important here given the Commissioner’s notation that least one of the reasons for discrediting Plaintiff likely is not sufficiently specific. See Jt. Stip. at 22 n.5. 13 1 evidence of record – impacts the analysis of what jobs, if any, Plaintiff could 2 perform in the national economy (Issue No. 4). 3 Because it is unclear, in light of these issues, whether Plaintiff is in fact 4 disabled, remand here is on an “open record.” See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 5 495; Bunnell, 336 F.3d at 1115-16. The parties may freely take up the 6 remaining issues in the Joint Stipulation, and any other issues relevant to 7 resolving Plaintiff’s claim of disability, before the ALJ. 8 9 Accordingly, on remand, the ALJ shall reassess the third-party function and Plaintiff’s subjective complaints in conjunction with the medical evidence, 10 and then reassess Plaintiff’s RFC in light of that analysis, and thereafter 11 proceed through the remaining steps of the disability analysis to determine 12 what work, if any, Plaintiff is capable of performing that exists in significant 13 numbers in the national or regional economy. 14 IV. 15 ORDER 16 Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), IT THEREFORE IS 17 ORDERED that Judgment be entered reversing the decision of the 18 Commissioner of Social Security and remanding this matter for further 19 administrative proceedings consistent with this Order. 20 21 Dated: March 25, 2019 ______________________________ JOHN D. EARLY United States Magistrate Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14
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