South Seas Pictures Ltd v. Ken s Island Food, et al, No. 2:2018cv00887 - Document 30 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT {28] by Judge Otis D. Wright, II. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and awards $15,000 in statutory damages, $1,500 in attorneys' fees, and enjoins Defendants from further violating South Seas' copyright. The Court will issue a judgment. IT IS SO ORDERED. (lom)
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South Seas Pictures Ltd v. Ken s Island Food, et al Doc. 30 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 United States District Court Central District of California 9 10 11 12 13 SOUTH SEAS PICTURES LTD., a Case No. 2:18-cv-00887-ODW Limited New Zealand Corporation, (AFMx) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S Plaintiff, MOTION FOR DEFAULT v. KEN’S ISLAND FOOD, entity unknown, JUDGMENT [28] et al., Defendants. I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff South Seas Pictures LTD (“South Seas”) brought suit against Defendants Ken’s Island Food, El Rubios Jr. Market, Kumar’s Island Market, Le Fala Island Market, Poasa Imports, and Polynesian Favorites (“Defendants”) for copyright infringement and unfair business practices. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Despite being served, Defendants did not respond to South Seas’ Complaint. South Seas then requested, and the Clerk entered, default as to all Defendants. (ECF Nos. 21, 23, 26.) South Seas now moves for default judgment against Defendants. (ECF No. 28.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS South Seas’ Motion, and awards South Seas $15,000 in 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 statutory damages, $1,500 in attorneys’ fees, and enjoins Defendants from further 2 violating South Seas’ copyright.1 3 II. 4 A. BACKGROUND Factual Background 5 South Seas is a film company that specializes in films that involve the Samoan 6 culture. (Compl. ¶ 13.) In 2017, it marketed and exhibited one of its films entitled, 7 “MATAI THE CHIEF: PART 6” (hereinafter, “Protected Work”). (Id. ¶ 19.) The 8 Protected Work is registered with the United States Copyright Office, Registration No. 9 PA-2-066-286. (Id. ¶ 19.) South Seas contracts with Lagi Manu d/b/a Motu Tutasi 10 Productions, as the exclusive North American distributor. (Id. ¶ 15.) 11 In summer 2017, South Seas discovered that “Defendants marketed and sold 12 unauthorized counterfeit copies of the [Protected Work] for sale in their retail stores.” 13 (Id. ¶ 17.) South Seas, through its exclusive distributor, learned that Defendants were 14 selling DVD copies of MATAI THE CHIEF: PART 6 at their retail stores. (Declaration 15 of Lagi Manu (“Manu Decl.”) ¶ 8.) Manu purchased some of these infringing DVDs at 16 Defendants’ stores. (Id. ¶¶ 9–12.) 17 South Seas’ counsel sent cease and desist letters in July and September 2017, to 18 which Defendants, at that point, did not respond. (Id. ¶¶ 20–23.) South Seas alleges 19 that “Defendants knowingly, deliberately, intentionally and willfully copied and 20 exploited the Protected Work in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 501.” (Id. ¶ 24.) III. 21 22 A. LEGAL STANDARD Default judgment 23 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), the Clerk of the Court must enter a 24 party’s default “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought 25 has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or 26 otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After a default has been entered by the Clerk of the 27 28 After carefully considering the papers filed in support of the Motion, the Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. 1 2 1 Court, a court may enter a default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b). Fed. R. Civ. 2 P. 55(b). However, “a defendant’s default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to 3 a court-ordered judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc., v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 4 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 5 Before the Court can award a default judgment, the requesting party must satisfy 6 the procedural requirements established under the Local Rules of this district and Rule 7 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. Central 8 District of California Local Rule 55-1 requires that the movant submit a declaration 9 establishing: (1) when and against whom default was entered; (2) identification of the 10 pleading to which default was entered; (3) whether the defaulting party is a minor, an 11 incompetent person, or exempt under the Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act; and (4) 12 that the defaulting party was served with notice, if required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 13 Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1006 (C.D. Cal. 2014); C.D. Cal. Local 14 Rule 55-1. 15 After satisfying the procedural requirements, the decision to grant default 16 judgment is determined by the discretion of the district court. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 17 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). When moving for default judgment, the well-pleaded 18 factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, with the exception that 19 allegations as to the amount of damages must be proved by the plaintiff. Televideo Sys., 20 Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987). Along with the complaint, 21 the Court looks “to affidavits and declarations to determine whether default judgment 22 is appropriate.” Title Design Collection Inc. v. Ross Stores Inc., No. CV 13-8899 GAF 23 (ASX), 2014 WL 12773909, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2014) (citing William W. 24 Schwarzer et al., California Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial 25 § 6:91 (2010)). 26 In exercising discretion to award a default judgment, courts in the Ninth Circuit 27 consider a number of factors (the “Eitel factors”), including (1) the possibility of 28 prejudice to plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency 3 1 of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake; (5) the possibility of a dispute 2 concerning material facts; (6) whether defendant’s default was due to excusable neglect; 3 and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring 4 decisions on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). 5 B. Copyright infringement 6 To prove copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show (1) ownership of a valid 7 copyright and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. Feist 8 Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). A plaintiff bringing suit 9 under the Copyright Act “may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to 10 recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all 11 infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work.” 17 U.S.C. 12 § 504(c)(1). This election is available to a plaintiff “regardless of the adequacy of the 13 evidence offered as to . . . actual damages or the amount of the defendant’s profits.” 14 Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 15 1195 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on 16 Copyright § 14.04[A]). 17 Statutory damages range from $750 to $30,000 per work infringed. 17 U.S.C. 18 § 504(c)(2). A single statutory award is available for each copyrighted work that has 19 been copied. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Sols., Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 946– 20 47 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 18 C.J.S. Copyright § 127 (2011)) (“Only a single award of 21 statutory damages within the statutory limits may be made for all infringements 22 involved in the action with respect to any one work . . . .”). If the copyright holder 23 proves that the infringement was “willful,” the Court may, in its discretion, increase 24 statutory damages up to $150,000 per work. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). Conversely, if an 25 infringer is innocent, the Court may decrease statutory damages to $200 per work. Id. 26 An innocent infringer is one who “was not aware and had no reason to believe that his 27 or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright.” Id. The burden of proving 28 4 1 innocent infringement falls on the infringer. See D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 2 912 F.2d 29, 35 (2nd Cir. 1990). 3 “The court has wide discretion in determining the amount of statutory damages 4 to be awarded, constrained only by the specified maxima and minima.” Harris v. Emus 5 Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1984). In making its determination, the 6 Court is guided by “what is just in the particular case, considering the nature of the 7 copyright, the circumstances of the infringement and the like.” Peer Int’l Corp. v. 8 Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting F.W. Woolworth Co. 9 v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 232 (1952)). “Even for uninjurious and 10 unprofitable invasions of copyright the court may, if it deems it just, impose a liability 11 within [the] statutory limits to sanction and vindicate the statutory policy” of 12 discouraging infringement. Woolworth Co., 344 U.S. at 233. IV. 13 14 A. DISCUSSION Procedural Requirements 15 South Seas satisfies the procedural requirements for default judgment pursuant 16 to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) and Local Rule 55-1. By declaration, South Seas’ attorney 17 identified the Complaint and established that the Clerk of the Court entered default 18 against Defendants. (Declaration of Joshua Eichenstein (“Eichenstein Decl.”) ¶¶ 12– 19 16, ECF No. 28-2.) The Declaration further confirms that Defendants are not infants, 20 incompetent persons, nor are they exempt under the Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act. 21 (Id. ¶ 22.) Finally, South Seas provided the Court with notice that Defendants have not 22 appeared in this action, and, as such, written notice of default judgment under Federal 23 Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), as referenced by Local Rule 55-1(e), is not required. 24 (Id.) Even so, South Seas served its Motion on Defendants via mail with the filing of 25 its Motion. (Id. ¶ 23.) 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 5 1 B. Eitel Factors 2 In determining if default judgment is appropriate, the Court considers in turn each 3 of the seven factors articulated in Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. The Court finds that the 4 Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting this Motion. 5 1. Without default judgment, South Seas will suffer prejudice. 6 The first Eitel factor considers the prejudice that would be suffered by the 7 plaintiff, if default is not entered. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. Denial of default leads to 8 prejudice when it leaves a plaintiff without a remedy or recourse for recovery of 9 compensation. Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enter., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 916, 920 10 (C.D. Cal. 2010); PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. “[P]ast misconduct and current 11 failure to litigate [a] case indicate that [a defendant] is highly unlikely to correct past 12 behavior or otherwise compensate [p]laintiffs without a default judgment by the Court.” 13 Kerr Corp. v. Tri Dental, Inc., No. SACV 12–0891–DOC–CWx, 2013 WL 990532, at 14 *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013). 15 As discussed below, Defendants had sufficient time to appear in this suit, but 16 have not done so. At this point, it appears that default judgment is the only way for 17 South Seas to vindicate its rights. Indeed, Kumar’s Island Market specifically said it 18 would not appear and defend this action. (Eichenstein Decl. ¶¶ 19–21, Ex. 6.) On the 19 whole, the first Eitel factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment. 20 2. South Seas pleads sufficient and meritorious claims. 21 “Under an Eitel analysis, the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claims and the 22 sufficiency of the complaint are often analyzed together.” Universal Music-MGB NA 23 LLC v. Quantum Music Works, Inc., No. CV 16–3397 FMO (AJWx), 2017 WL 24 2350936, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2017). Together, the two factors “require that a 25 plaintiff state a claim on which [it] may recover.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld 26 Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 499 (C.D. Cal. 2003). To state a claim for copyright 27 infringement, South Seas must demonstrate (1) ownership of a valid copyright and 28 6 1 (2) copying of the protected elements of the work. Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 361; L.A. 2 Printex Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 2012). 3 South Seas has met the first requirement for copyright infringement by 4 demonstrating ownership of a valid copyright in the Protected Work. A copyright 5 registration certificate constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright 6 and the facts stated on the certificate, including the fact that the plaintiff owns a 7 copyright. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Seattle Lighting Fixture Co., 345 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th 8 Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted); see also Entm’t Research Grp., Inc. v. Genesis 9 Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997); 9th Circuit Model Jury 10 Instruction 17.5. South Seas presents a Certificate of Registration from the United 11 States Copyright Office demonstrating registration of the Protected Work, and the 12 photographic elements therein. (Eichenstein Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 28-3.) Therefore, 13 South Seas has made a prima facie showing of ownership. Since Defendants have not 14 appeared to rebut this showing, the Court concludes that South Seas owns a valid 15 copyright in the Protected Work. 16 South Seas has also met the second requirement for copyright infringement by 17 demonstrating copying through circumstantial evidence that (1) the defendant had 18 access to the copyrighted work prior to the creation of defendant’s work and (2) there 19 is substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and the defendant’s work. See 20 Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, 853 F.3d 980, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2017). First, South 21 Seas alleges copying by asserting that Defendants had access to the Protected Work. 22 (Compl. ¶¶ 29, 39.) South Seas also provided photographs of the infringing DVDs 23 accompanied by receipts identifying the Defendants’ respective retail stores. (Manu 24 Decl. ¶¶ 10–11, 17–20, Exs. 2–4.) Thus, even though Defendants’ exact method of 25 copying is unclear, the substantial similarity of the infringing DVDs coupled with 26 Defendants’ access to the Protected Work is sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants 27 copied the protected elements of the Protected Work. The Court therefore finds that the 28 well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint state a claim for copyright infringement. 7 1 The Court notes, however, that many of the Complaint’s allegations are 2 conclusory assertions that lack a specific factual underpinning. (See Compl. ¶¶ 24, 36, 3 41.) In determining if a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 4 Court need not accept as true “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 5 inferences.” Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996). For 6 example, South Seas alleges that Defendants “knowingly, deliberately, intentionally 7 and willfully copied and exploited the Protected Work,” but provided no specific facts 8 showing willfulness. (Compl. ¶ 24.) In ruling on this Motion, the Court disregards such 9 conclusory allegations and instead looks only to the well-pleaded factual allegations in 10 the Complaint, along with affidavits and documentary evidence in the record. See Title 11 Design Collection, 2014 WL 12773909, at *2. Considering only these sources, the 12 Court cannot find that Defendants willfully infringed the Protected Work. 13 South Seas also asserts a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law 14 (“UCL”). California’s UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act 15 or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “By proscribing any unlawful business 16 practice, section 17200 borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful 17 practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” Cel-Tech 18 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999) 19 (quotations omitted). 20 “fraudulent” prongs of the UCL, making unlawful conduct independently actionable 21 even if it is not unfair or fraudulent. Id. Here, because the Court finds that South Seas 22 sufficiently pleaded a claim under the Copyright Act, that violation of the law also 23 serves as a basis for South Seas’ UCL claim. The “unlawful” prong is separate from the “unfair” and On the balance, the second and third Eitel factors support default judgment. 24 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 8 1 2 3. Gaps and inconsistencies in the record do not present the possibility of disputed material facts. 3 The next Eitel factor considers the possibility of disputed material facts. 4 PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. The general rule is that a defaulting party admits the 5 facts alleged in the complaint to be taken as true. Televideo, 826 F.2d at 917–19. Thus, 6 this Eitel factor often weighs strongly in favor of default judgment. Here, after taking 7 the facts alleged in the Complaint as true, the Court finds no substantial gaps or 8 inconsistencies in the record that indicate disputes of material facts. 9 South Seas clearly explains that Defendants lacked authorization to copy or 10 distribute the Protected Work because Manu was the exclusive North American 11 distributor of South Seas. (Manu Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 28-10 (distribution agreement)). 12 Since Defendants did not have authorization to copy or distribute the Protected Work 13 in any capacity, they do not have a right to copy the Protected Work. Cf. Sony Corp. v. 14 Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984) (“[A]nyone who is authorized 15 by the copyright owner to use the copyrighted work in a way specified in the statute . . 16 . is not an infringer of the copyright with respect to such use.”). 17 In sum, the record does not contain substantial inconsistencies, which would 18 preclude default judgment. Since South Seas addresses the key factual inquiries 19 necessary to find that Defendants infringed its copyright, this Eitel factor weighs in 20 favor of granting default judgment. 21 22 4. The sum of money awarded to South Seas weighs in favor of default judgment. 23 The fourth Eitel factor balances the sum of money at stake with the “seriousness 24 of the action.” Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. Bayporte Enters., Inc., No. C 11–0961– 25 CW (MEJ), 2011 WL 6141079, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011). The amount at stake 26 must not be disproportionate to the harm alleged. Id. Default judgments are disfavored 27 where the sum of money requested is too large or unreasonable in relation to a 28 9 1 defendant’s conduct. Truong Giang Corp. v. Twinstar Tea Corp., No. C 06–03594 2 JSW, 2007 WL 1545173, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007). 3 Although South Seas asks for $750,000 in statutory damages, the Court awards 4 it $15,000, for the reasons discussed below. Therefore, this factor presents no barrier 5 to default judgment in this case. 6 5. The remaining Eitel factors support default judgment. 7 South Seas served Defendants with notice of this suit, and Defendants’ failure to 8 defend can no longer be described as excusable neglect. (See ECF Nos. 10–14, 16–17.) 9 Moreover, one of the defendants specifically declined to defend this suit, despite South 10 Seas telling it of the consequences. (Eichenstein Decl. ¶¶ 19–21, Ex. 6.) Finally, 11 although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favor decisions on the merits, when a 12 defendant has failed to appear, “a decision on the merits [is] impractical, if not 13 impossible,” and default judgment is warranted. PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. For these reasons, the Court finds that the Eitel factors favor granting a default 14 15 judgment against Defendants. 16 C. 17 18 Remedies South Seas requests statutory damages, an injunction, and attorneys’ fees. (Mot. 16–21.) The Court addresses each request in turn. 19 1. 20 Because Defendants have not appeared or shown that their infringement was 21 innocent, the Court can award no less than $750 in statutory damages, per violation. 22 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). Conversely, the Court may grant statutory damages up to 23 $150,000 per violation, if the Court finds that Defendants are willful infringers. See id. 24 As discussed above, the Court finds that South Seas’ allegations of willful infringement 25 are conclusory, and not supported by facts warranting a statutory award of $150,000. 26 Instead, the Court considers the purposes of statutory damages, as applied to the facts 27 of this case. See Peer Int’l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 28 1990) (quoting Woolworth, 344 U.S. at 232) (“In measuring the damages, the court is Statutory damages. 10 1 to be guided by ‘what is just in the particular case, considering the nature of the 2 copyright, the circumstances of the infringement and the like. . . .’”). 3 While statutory damages do not necessarily have to be tied to lost profits related 4 to infringement, the Court enjoys wide latitude in fashioning an appropriate remedy 5 within the parameters of the statute. See Harris, 734 F.2d at 1335. Here, the distribution 6 agreement provides some insight into what South Seas anticipated making on its 7 movies. The agreement provides: 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 (Manu Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 28-10.) The modest costs associated with the production 15 of 500 units of the film ($525) and anticipated sales targets, lead the Court to believe an 16 award of the statutory maximum of $30,000 per violation, without a willfulness finding, 17 would be excessive. Instead, a statutory award of $3,000 per violation per Defendant, 18 will serve the purposes of statutory damages—to compensate South Seas, and punish 19 Defendants. See Harris, 734 F.2d at 1335. Furthermore, South Seas’ interests will be 20 protected by the injunction it seeks, which the Court addresses below. 21 2. Injunctive relief. 22 “As a general rule, a permanent injunction will be granted when liability has been 23 established and there is a threat of continuing violations.” MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak 24 Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 520 (9th Cir.1993). To be entitled to an injunction, a plaintiff 25 must demonstrate that: 1) it has suffered an irreparable injury; 2) remedies available at 26 law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; 3) the 27 equities tip in the plaintiff’s favor; and 4) the injunction serves the public interest. eBay 28 Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 11 1 Irreparable Harm: South Seas suffered irreparable harm because Defendants 2 copied, displayed, and sold the Protected Work in their retail stores. Defendants’ 3 actions affect South Seas’ reputation, as well as its marketing and distribution plans. 4 As owner of the Protected Work, South Seas has the right to choose how, when, and 5 where it is displayed; Defendants violated that right. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 6 Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1218 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 7 Inadequate Remedy at Law: Although South Seas is entitled to damages, only 8 an injunction will adequately prevent future violations of its copyright. See Apple, Inc. 9 v. Pystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949–50 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 10 Balance of Equities & Public Interest: South Seas tried to resolve its dispute 11 with Defendants first by reaching out via letter, and second by filing this lawsuit. 12 Defendants have not responded, nor otherwise established any defense. Defendants 13 have no legitimate interest in continuing to violate South Seas’ copyright by using the 14 Protected Work. See Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. Avant! Corp., 125 F.3d 824, 830 (9th 15 Cir. 1997) (quoting Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Exp. Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1338 (9th 16 Cir. 1995), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Apple Inc. v. 17 Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 2011)) (“Where the only hardship that the 18 defendant will suffer is lost profits from an activity which has been shown likely to be 19 infringing, such an argument in defense merits little equitable consideration….”). For 20 these reasons, the public interest is served by entering an injunction, and the equities tip 21 in South Seas’ favor. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS South Seas’ request for an 22 injunction and enjoins Defendants from further violating South Seas’ copyright. 23 3. Attorneys’ fees. 24 South Seas asks the Court to award $18,600 in attorneys’ fees associated with 25 this Motion. (Mot. 21.) The Central District Local Rules provide a schedule for 26 attorneys’ fees awarded in default judgments. L.R. 55–3. Yet, the Court is free to 27 render a judgment for a fee that it deems reasonable. Id.; see also Kirtsaeng v. John 28 Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S.Ct. 1979, 1985 (2016) (holding that, in copyright action, the 12 1 court must exercise its discretion to award attorneys’ fees by weighing factors such as 2 “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness and the need in particular 3 circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.”). South 4 Seas calculated its requested attorneys’ fees assuming a statutory damage award of 5 $750,000, and therefore the Court must adjust the award to align with the statutory 6 damages of $15,000. 7 The Central District Local Rules schedule provides that for a default judgment 8 award of $10,000, the plaintiff is entitled to $1,200 plus 6% of the amount over $10,000 9 of the awarded sum. In light of the above discussion, the Court awards $1,500 in 10 attorneys’ fees ($1,200 + ($5,000 * 6%)). V. 11 CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Default 13 Judgment and awards $15,000 in statutory damages, $1,500 in attorneys’ fees, and 14 enjoins Defendants from further violating South Seas’ copyright. The Court will issue 15 a judgment. 16 17 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. August 6, 2018 20 21 ____________________________________ 22 OTIS D. WRIGHT, II 23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28 13
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