Chris Langer v. San Pedro Street Properties, LLC et al, No. 2:2017cv08780 - Document 23 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING in part Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment 19 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II: The Court GRANTS Langer's Motion for default judgment and awards $4000.00 in statutory damages. To the extent that SPSP's p arking lot is one of public accommodation, it must comply with the specifications set forth in the ADAAG. The Court GRANTS, IN PART, Langer's request for attorneys' fees and costs and awards $600.00 in attorneys' fees and $625.00 in costs. (jp)
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Chris Langer v. San Pedro Street Properties, LLC et al Doc. 23 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court Central District of California 8 9 10 11 Case No. 2:17-cv-08780-ODW(AFM) CHRIS LANGER, an individual Plaintiff, 12 v. 13 14 SAN PEDRO STREET PROPERTIES, 15 LLC, a California limited liability 16 company; and Does 1-10, ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT [19] Defendants. 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 Plaintiff Chris Langer (“Plaintiff” or “Langer”) moves for default judgment 21 against Defendant San Pedro Street Properties, LLC (“SPSP”) for violations of the 22 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh”). 23 (See Pl.’s Appl. for Default J., ECF No. 19.) For the reasons discussed below, the 24 Court GRANTS Langer’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment and GRANTS, IN 25 PART, Langer’s request for attorney’s fees and costs.1 26 27 28 1 After carefully considering the papers filed in support of the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. Dockets.Justia.com II. 1 BACKGROUND 2 Langer is a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair for mobility. (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF 3 No. 1.) He has a specially equipped van and a disabled-person parking placard. (Id.) 4 Plaintiff alleges that he visited SPSP in June 2017 to make a purchase from a store on 5 the property (“LA Display Fixture”) and found that the lot lacked handicap parking 6 spaces. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 11.) Langer alleges that the lack of handicap parking “denied 7 [him] . . . full and equal access” and “caused him difficulty and frustration.” (Id. 8 ¶ 16.) Langer alleges that he would like to return to the business but is deterred 9 because of SPSP’s failure to offer handicap-accessible parking. (Id. ¶ 18.) 10 On December 6, 2017, Langer filed this action against SPSP for failing to 11 provide a handicap-accessible parking space on its premises, in violation of the ADA 12 and Unruh. (See generally id.) On January 9, 2018, Langer requested that the Clerk 13 of Court enter default, which it did on January 10, 2018. (ECF Nos. 9, 13). However, 14 two hours after Langer’s request, SPSP applied for a stay pending mediation. (ECF 15 No. 10.) Accordingly, on January 16, 2018, the Court ordered Langer to show cause 16 why the Court should not set aside the entry of default. (ECF No. 14.) 17 SPSP filed a notice explicitly stating that it had considered the economics of the 18 case and elected to “allow the default to stand.” (Notice of Election by Def. to Allow 19 Entry of Default to Remain (“Notice”), ECF No. 15.) SPSP also noted it had “taken 20 measures to make sure that the parking lot is used by employees only, and is not a 21 public accommodation, thus is not subject to the ADA.” (Id.) Accordingly, the Court 22 discharged its Order to Show Cause and allowed the default to stand. (ECF No. 16.) 23 For eight months, Langer took no further action to prosecute the matter. (ECF No. 24 18.) On August 22, 2018, the Court ordered Langer to show cause why the Court 25 should not dismiss the matter for failure to prosecute. (Id.) Langer then moved for 26 entry of default judgment. (Mem. in Support of Mot. (“Mot.”), ECF No. 19-1.)2 27 2 28 On September 26, 2018, SPSP filed an Objection to Proposed Default Judgment and Order. The Court cannot consider SPSP’s Objection because it was filed after the Clerk entered default. See Great Am. Inc. Co. v. M.J. Menefee Const., Inc., No. F06-0392-AWI-DLB, 2006 WL 2522408, at *2 2 1 Langer seeks (1) injunctive relief under the ADA compelling SPSP to provide 2 handicap-accessible parking in compliance with the ADA and Unruh, (2) damages 3 under Unruh for the statutory minimum of $4000.00, and (3) $6660.50 in attorneys’ 4 fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205 and California Civil Code section 52. 5 (Compl. 7; Mot. 6.) 6 For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Langer’s Motion for Entry of 7 Default Judgment and GRANTS, IN PART, Langer’s request for attorney’s fees and 8 costs. 9 III. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 55(b) authorizes a district court to 11 grant default judgment after the Clerk enters default under Rule 55(a). Fed. R. Civ. 12 P. 55(b). Before a court can enter default judgment against a defendant, the plaintiff 13 must satisfy the procedural requirements set forth in FRCP 54(c) and 55, as well as 14 Local Rules 55-1 and 55-2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c), 55; C.D. Cal. L.R. 55-1, 55-2. 15 Local Rule 55-1 requires that the movant submit a declaration establishing: (1) when 16 and against which party default was entered; (2) identification of the pleading to 17 which default was entered; (3) whether the defaulting party is a minor, incompetent 18 person, or active service member; (4) that the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 19 U.S.C. § 3931, does not apply; and (5) that the defaulting party was properly served 20 with notice, if required under Rule 55(b)(2). C.D. Cal. L.R. 55-1. 21 If these procedural requirements are satisfied, a district court has discretion to 22 grant a default judgment. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 23 24 25 26 27 28 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2006) (noting that entry of default cuts off a defendant’s right to appear in the action). Should SPSP desire the Court to consider its Objection, SPSP must first move to set aside entry of default. See Jitrade, Inc. v. Style in USA, Inc., No. 2-17-cv-04245-ODW-SK, 2017 WL 8185858, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2017) (finding that a defendant seeking to defend an action after default has been entered must first move to set aside entry of default); see also KT AMC Co. v. LWC Capital, LLC, No. 2:17-cv-04289-ODW-PLA, 2017 WL 7171719, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2017) (same); Warner Bros. Home Entm’t, Inc. v. Meyers, No. CV-13-00890-SJO-VBKx, 2013 WL 12142605, at *1 (C.D. Cal. April 24, 2013) (same). Accordingly, the Court STRIKES Defendant’s Objection. (ECF No. 21.) 3 1 “[A] defendant’s default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered 2 judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc., v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 3 2002). 4 Factors”): (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the 5 plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of 6 money at stake; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether 7 the defendant’s default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy 8 favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 9 1986). Generally, upon entry of default, the defendant’s liability is conclusively 10 established, and the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as 11 true, except those pertaining to the amount of damages. 12 Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–19 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing Geddes v. 13 United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). In exercising its discretion, a court considers several factors (the “Eitel Televideo Sys., Inc. v. 14 A party who has violated the ADA or Unruh is liable for attorneys’ fees and 15 costs under 42 U.S.C. § 12205 or California Civil Code section 52(a). Where, on 16 application for default judgment, a party seeks attorney fees and costs pursuant to a 17 statute, those fees are calculated in accordance with the schedule provided by the 18 court. C.D. Cal. L.R. 55-3. A court may award attorney fees in excess of the schedule 19 when the attorney makes a request at the time of the entry of default. Id. IV. 20 DISCUSSION 21 Langer has satisfied the procedural requirements, and the Eitel Factors weigh in 22 favor of granting default judgment. However, the Court finds that the amount of 23 attorneys’ fees requested is excessive and unreasonable, and reduces the fee award 24 accordingly. 25 A. Procedural Requirements 26 Langer has complied with the procedural requirements for the entry of a default 27 judgment. Langer’s counsel asserts: (1) the Clerk entered default against SPSP (2) on 28 the Complaint that Langer filed on December 6, 2017; (3) SPSP is not an infant or 4 1 incompetent person; (4) SPSP is not covered under the Servicemembers Civil Relief 2 Act; and (5) Langer served SPSP with notice of this Motion for Entry of Default 3 Judgment by first class United States Mail on August 29, 2018.3 (Mot. 1, 2; Decl. of 4 Dennis Price (“Price Decl.”) ¶¶ 2, 5, ECF No. 19-4.) Thus, Langer satisfied the 5 procedural requirements of FRCP 54(c) and 55, as well as Local Rule 55-1. 6 B. Eitel Factors 7 Once the procedural requirements are satisfied, a district court must consider 8 the Eitel Factors in exercising its discretion to enter default judgment. Upon review, 9 the Court finds that the factors favor granting entry of default judgment against SPSP. 10 1. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff 11 The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff will suffer prejudice if a 12 default judgment is not entered. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. Denial of default leads to 13 prejudice when it leaves a plaintiff without a remedy or recourse for recovery of 14 compensation. Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enter., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 916, 920 15 (C.D. Cal. 2010); PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here, SPSP consciously elected 16 not to participate in the action. Absent entry of default judgment, Langer is left 17 without recourse to recover on SPSP’s ADA and Unruh violations. Accordingly, this 18 factor favors entry of default judgment. 19 2. Substantive Merits & 3. Sufficiency of the Complaint 20 The second and third Eitel factors require a plaintiff to state a claim under 21 which he may recover. PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d. at 1175. Langer asserts claims for 22 violations of both the ADA and Unruh. 23 a. Langer’s ADA Claim 24 Langer has alleged facts sufficient to establish that SPSP violated Title III of the 25 ADA, which prohibits any public accommodation from discriminating against a 26 27 28 3 The Court also notes that SPSP counsel has appeared in this case and consented to receive service through the CM/ECF System. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 5-3.2. As such, he received notice of Plaintiff’s Motion through the CM/ECF System. 5 1 disabled person “in the full and equal enjoyment of . . . services, facilities, privileges, 2 advantages, or accommodations.” (Mot. 2, 3.) 3 To succeed on his ADA claim, Langer must establish that (1) he is “disabled 4 within the meaning of the ADA,” (2) that SPSP “is a private entity that owns, leases, 5 or operates a place of public accommodation,” (3) that SPSP denied Langer public 6 accommodation because of his disability, (4) that the parking lot at SPSP’s property 7 “presents an architectural barrier prohibited under the ADA,” and (5) “the removal of 8 the barrier is readily achievable.” Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 9 1007–08 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th 10 Cir. 2007)). 11 First, under the ADA, a “disability” is “a physical or mental impairment that 12 substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). The 13 ADA lists walking as a “major life activit[y].” Id. § 12102(2)(A). Langer alleged that 14 he is a “paraplegic who cannot walk and who uses a wheelchair for mobility.” 15 (Compl. ¶ 1.) Because Langer’s allegations are accepted as true, he has established 16 that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 17 Second, the ADA specifically lists sales establishments as “private entities 18 considered public accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E). Property owners are 19 charged with ensuring compliance with the ADA. Id. § 12182(a). Here, Langer 20 alleged that “LA Display Fixture is a facility open to the public, a place of public 21 accommodation, and a business establishment.” (Compl. ¶ 9.) Langer also alleged 22 that SPSP is a private entity that owns the real property on which LA Display Fixture 23 is located. (Id. ¶¶ 2–3.) Accepting these allegations as true, LA Display Fixture is a 24 place of public accommodation and subject to Title III of the ADA. 25 As to the third and fourth factors, “a public accommodation shall maintain . . . 26 facilities . . . that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with 27 disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.211(a). “Whether a facility is readily accessible is 28 defined, in part, by the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG).” Chapman v. 6 1 Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks 2 omitted). The ADAAG guidelines “lay out the technical structural requirements of 3 places of public accommodation.” Id. (quoting Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 4 364 F.3d 1075, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2004)). The ADAAG guidelines require facilities 5 that offer public parking to provide at least one handicap-accessible parking space. 6 ADAAG § 4.1.2(5)(a) (1991); see also ADAAG § 208 (2010) (“Where parking spaces 7 are provided, parking spaces shall be provided in accordance with 208.”). Here, 8 Langer alleges SPSP failed to provide a handicap-accessible parking space in its 9 public lot and that the inaccessible conditions denied him full and equal access to LA 10 Display Fixture. (Compl. ¶¶ 8–11, 16.) Accepting these allegations as true, the lack 11 of handicap-accessible parking in SPSP’s public lot presented an architectural barrier 12 that denied Langer public accommodation because of his disability. 13 Fifth, creating a designated handicap-accessible parking space in a public 14 parking lot is considered readily achievable. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b); Vogel, 992 F. 15 Supp. 2d at 1011. Thus, the Court finds that removal of the barrier is “readily 16 achievable.” 17 18 19 Accepting as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, Langer has alleged facts sufficient to establish a violation of the ADA. b. Unruh Civil Rights Act Claim 20 The court in Vogel noted, “[a] violation of the ADA necessarily violates the 21 Unruh Act.” 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1011. Since Langer has established a meritorious 22 ADA claim, the Court finds that Langer also established a meritorious Unruh claim. 23 Langer has alleged sufficient facts to establish his ADA and Unruh claims. As 24 such, he has stated a claim under which he may recover. Accordingly, the second and 25 third Eitel factors favor granting entry of default judgment. 26 4. The Amount at Stake 27 The fourth Eitel factor balances “the amount of money at stake in relation to the 28 seriousness” of a defendant’s conduct. PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176; Eitel, 782 7 1 F.2d at 1471. 2 Landstar, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 921. Here, Langer requests the statutory minimum of 3 $4000.00 for damages under Unruh. (Mot. 6.) Given that Langer’s request for 4 damages under Unruh is the statutory minimum, the damages sought are proportionate 5 to the harm alleged. 6 judgment. 7 The amount at stake must be proportionate to the harm alleged. Consequently, the amount at stake favors entry of default 5. Possibility of Dispute 8 The fifth Eitel factor considers the possibility that material facts are in dispute. 9 PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Because the allegations in Langer’s Complaint are 10 presumed true, no factual disputes exist that would preclude entry of default. See 11 Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1013. Further, SPSP filed a notice, “allow[ing] the default 12 to stand.” (Notice 2.) As such, SPSP forfeited any challenge to the material facts 13 alleged. See Great Am. Inc. Co., 2006 WL 2522408, at *2 (noting that entry of default 14 cuts off a defendant’s right to defend). Accordingly, the Court finds this factor favors 15 entry of default judgment. 16 6. Possibility of Excusable Neglect 17 The sixth Eitel factor considers the possibility that a defendant’s default is the 18 result of excusable neglect. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. Here, Langer properly served 19 SPSP with notice of the Complaint by first class United States Mail on December 18, 20 2017. (Proof of Service, ECF No. 7.) As SPSP responded and elected to allow the 21 default to stand (Notice 2), this factor weighs in favor of entering default judgment. 22 7. Policy Favoring Decision on the Merits 23 “[D]efault judgments are ordinarily disfavored. Cases should be decided upon 24 their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472 (citing Pena v. 25 Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985)). However, where the 26 defendant fails to answer the plaintiff’s complaint, “a decision on the merits [is] 27 impractical, if not impossible.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. SPSP elected to 28 8 1 allow the default to stand, making a decision on the merits impossible. (See Notice 2.) 2 Accordingly, this factor does not preclude entry of default judgment. All factors favor, or do not preclude, the entry of default judgment. 3 4 Consequently, the Court finds entry of default judgment appropriate. 5 C. 6 Damages 1. Statutory Damages 7 While the ADA does not provide for monetary damages, Unruh does. See 42 8 U.S.C. § 12188(a); Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a) (entitling the prevailing party to damages 9 “in no case less than four thousand dollars”). Langer requests the $4000.00 statutory 10 minimum. Accordingly, the Court awards Langer $4000.00 in statutory damages. 11 2. Attorney’s Fees and Costs 12 As both the ADA and Unruh claims are meritorious, Langer may recover 13 attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 12205 or California Civil Code section 52(a). 14 Langer may also recover costs as provided in 29 U.S.C. § 1920, FRCP 54(d)(1) and 15 Local Rule 54-2. 16 In an application for default judgment, where attorney’s fees are sought 17 pursuant to a statute, fees are calculated according to the schedule provided by the 18 court. C.D. Cal. L.R. 55-3. Where the amount of judgment falls between $1000.01 19 and $10,000.00, the fee award is “$300 plus 10% of the amount over $1,000.” Id. As 20 such, the schedule grants attorney’s fees in the amount of $600.00.4 However, attorneys may request fees in excess of the schedule, as Langer’s 21 22 attorneys have done. 23 reasonableness of the fees requested. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 24 To determine reasonableness, a court considers the “lodestar” method, multiplying the 25 hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. Courts should exclude 26 hours that are excessive, redundant, or not reasonably expended. Id. at 434. Id. It is in the Court’s discretion to determine the 27 28 4 Total damages award is $4000.00. Accordingly, $300.00 + (($4000.00 – $1000.00) x 0.10) = $600.00. Thus, Langer would be granted $600.00 in attorney’s fees under the schedule. 9 1 Langer’s attorney, Dennis Price, requests $6035.50 in fees and $625.00 in costs, 2 for a total of $6660.50. (Mot. 6; Price Decl. 7.) Attorney Price submitted a billing 3 statement reflecting that his firm expended a total of 14.9 hours of work billed at rates 4 of either $350.00 or $425.00, depending on the attorney completing a given task. 5 (Price Decl. 7–9.) The Court finds the number of hours expended excessive. While 6 represented by the same firm, Langer has filed over 600 cases since 2014 in the 7 Central District of California alone—over 25 cases before this Court.5 The cases 8 include nearly identical complaints and subsequent filings. In light of the redundancy 9 of work, familiarity with Langer, expertise in the area of law, and straightforward 10 nature of the cases involved for the extensively-trained attorneys, deviation from 11 Local Rule 55-3 is not warranted. Accordingly, the Court awards attorney’s fees 12 pursuant to Local Rule 55-3 in the amount of $600.00. The Court accepts Attorney 13 Price’s declaration of costs and awards costs in the amount of $625.00. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 See, e.g., Langer v. Roclar Co. Inc. et al., No. 2:14-cv-01623-ODW-AJW; Langer v. Michael Butler Grass Valley Ass’n et al., No. 2:14-cv-05992-ODW-RZ; Langer v. Elsinore Pioneer Lumber Co. et al., No. 2:14-cv-08293-ODW-PLA; Langer v. Steve Demircift et al., No. 2:15-cv-05006ODW-PLA; Langer v. Luxor Props., Inc. et al., No. 2:15-cv-09906-ODW-JPR; Langer v. Ennabe Props., Inc. et al., No. 2:16-cv-00053-ODW-KS; Langer v. Zipora Ostfeld et al., No. 2:16-cv04921-ODW-PLA; Langer v. Rigoberto Garcia et al., No. 2:16-cv-05755-ODW-SK; Langer v. Goodwill et al., No. 2:16-cv-05955-ODW-AJW; Langer v. Darla Lesh et al., No. 2:16-cv-05985ODW-SK; Langer v. Pamela S. Harper et al., No. 2:16-cv-07043-ODW-JPR; Langer v. Maria E. Figueroa et al., No. 2:16-cv-07107-ODW-AJW; Langer v. Rodney A. Topkov et al., No. 5:17-cv00959-ODW-KK; Langer v. Yobana Chavez et al., No. 2:17-cv-ODW-AS; Langer v. Agop Arakelian et al., No. 2:17-cv-06409-ODW-GJS; Langer v. Rosa United Invs., Inc. et al., No. 2:17cv-08940-ODW-AS; Langer v. Ted S. Mayeda et al., No. 8:15-cv-01032-ODW-AJW; Langer v. Laura D. Lenc et al., No. 2:18-cv-07617-ODW-E; Langer v. Jamshid Shafai et al., No. 2:18-cv07246-ODW-RAO; Langer v. Argo-Lincoln, LLC, No. 2:18-cv-05734-ODW-AS; Langer v. Ramesh K. Manglani et al., No. 2:18-cv-04977-ODW-GJS; Langer v. 1240 Palmetto, LLC et al., No. 2:18cv-02541-ODW-AFM; Langer v. John Tchaprazian et al., No. 2:18-cv-02536-ODW-E; Langer v. 919-921 Broadway LLC et al., No. 2:18-cv-02447-ODW-FFM; Langer v. Maroun Boutros et al., No. 2:18-cv-01497-ODW-SS; Langer v. 6228 Franklin, LLC. et al., No. 2:18-cv-00565-ODW-SS. 10 V. 1 CONCLUSION 2 The Court GRANTS Langer’s Motion for default judgment and awards 3 $4000.00 in statutory damages. To the extent that SPSP’s parking lot is one of public 4 accommodation, it must comply with the specifications set forth in the ADAAG. The 5 Court GRANTS, IN PART, Langer’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs and 6 awards $600.00 in attorneys’ fees and $625.00 in costs. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 November 8, 2018 11 12 ____________________________________ 13 OTIS D. WRIGHT, II 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11
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