Jose Estrada v. Sun Family Properties LLC et al, No. 2:2017cv07869 - Document 33 (C.D. Cal. 2019)

Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 17 ; AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 19 . The Court DECLINES to exercisesupplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim and DISMISSES itWITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court will issue Judgment by Judge Otis D. Wright, II. (lc)

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Jose Estrada v. Sun Family Properties LLC et al Doc. 33 O JS-6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court Central District of California 8 9 10 11 Plaintiff, 12 v. 13 14 15 16 Case 2:17-cv-07869-ODW (FMMx) JOSE ESTRADA, SUN FAMILY PROPERTIES, LLC; RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY; and DOES 1–10, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [17]; AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [19] Defendants. 17 I. 18 INTRODUCTION 19 Jose Estrada brings the present action against Sun Family Properties, LLC, and 20 Ralphs Grocery Company, for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act 21 (“ADA”) and the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh”). (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Estrada 22 and Defendants now cross-move for summary judgment. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 23 (“DMSJ”), ECF No. 17.; Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“PMSJ”), ECF No. 19.) For the reasons 24 that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion and DENIES Estrada’s Motion 25 as to the ADA claim, and DISMISSES Estrada’s Unruh claim WITHOUT 26 PREJUDICE.1 27 28 1 After considering the papers filed in connection with the Motions, the Court deemed the matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. Dockets.Justia.com II. 1 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 The undisputed facts establish the following. Jose Estrada is a paraplegic who 3 cannot walk and uses a wheelchair to get around. (Pl.’s Statement of Uncontroverted 4 Facts (“PSUF”) 1, ECF No. 19-2.) 5 Company (collectively “Defendants”) are the owners and/or operators of the Ralph’s 6 grocery store located at 1770 Carson Street, Torrance, California (“Store”), a place of 7 public accommodation. (PSUF 2–4.) On September 6, 2017, Estrada visited the Store. 8 (PSUF 5.) In the meat department, he found the bag dispenser too high for him to reach. 9 (PSUF 7.) Mr. Evens Louis, Estrada’s expert, visited the Store on September 19, 2017. 10 (Decl. of Evens Louis (“Louis Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 19-8.) Louis found that the bag 11 dispenser in the meat department was located more than eighty-four inches above the 12 floor. (Louis Decl. ¶ 4.) Louis also found that the ticket dispenser on the transaction 13 counter of the deli department was located at fifty-seven inches above the floor. (Louis 14 Decl. ¶ 5.)2 Sun Family Properties and Ralphs Grocery 15 On October 27, 2017, Estrada initiated this lawsuit against Defendants alleging 16 violations of the ADA and Unruh. (Compl.) In his Complaint, Estrada alleged two 17 architectural barriers at the Store: (1) bags at the meat department located too high and 18 (2) ticket dispenser at the deli counter located too high. (See Compl. ¶¶ 13, 19, 29, 31; 19 Defs.’ Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (“DSUF”) 1, ECF No. 17-2.) 20 contends the bag dispenser and ticket dispenser are subject to the ADA’s reach range 21 requirements and must be mounted no more than forty-eight inches above the floor. 22 (PMSJ 6–7.) On or about October 23, 2018, Defendants installed a lower bag dispenser 23 in the meat department and lower ticket dispenser in the deli department. (PSUF 18.) 24 25 26 27 28 2 Estrada Estrada also submits the expert report of Janis Kent, who visited the Store on March 8, 2018. (Decl. of Janis Kent (“Kent Decl.”) Ex. 8, ECF No. 19-11.) Defendants object to Ms. Kent’s report in its entirety as inadmissible hearsay and also to the portions of her report that discuss architectural barriers outside the Complaint as irrelevant. (Defs.’ Obj. to Evid. 1–2, ECF No. 21-2.) The Court does not consider Kent’s report because (1) the only relevant alleged architectural barriers are those identified in the Complaint, Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2011), and (2) it is undisputed that Defendants remedied these subsequent to Kent’s report (PSUF 18; DSUF 2–3). 2 1 Bags in the meat department and tickets in the deli department are now located less than 2 forty-eight inches above the floor. (DSUF 2–3.) 3 The parties have both moved for summary judgment as to all claims. III. 4 LEGAL STANDARD 5 A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 6 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 7 of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Courts must view the facts and draw reasonable 8 inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 9 372, 378 (2007). A disputed fact is “material” where the resolution of that fact might 10 affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and the dispute is “genuine” 11 where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 12 nonmoving party.” 13 Conclusory or speculative testimony in affidavits is insufficient to raise genuine issues 14 of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 15 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Moreover, though a court may not weigh conflicting evidence 16 or make credibility determinations, there must be more than a mere scintilla of 17 contradictory evidence to survive summary judgment. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 18 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 19 Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party cannot simply 20 rest on the pleadings or argue that any disagreement or “metaphysical doubt” about a 21 material issue of fact precludes summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 22 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 23 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 24 Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987). Nor will uncorroborated allegations and 25 “self-serving testimony” create a genuine issue of material fact. Villiarimo v. Aloha 26 Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002). The court should grant summary 27 judgment against a party who fails to demonstrate facts sufficient to establish an element 28 3 1 essential to his case when that party will ultimately bear the burden of proof at trial. See 2 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 3 Pursuant to the Local Rules, parties moving for summary judgment must file a 4 proposed “Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law” that should set 5 out “the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine 6 dispute.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-1. A party opposing the motion must file a “Statement of 7 Genuine Disputes” setting forth all material facts as to which it contends there exists a 8 genuine dispute. C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-2. “[T]he Court may assume that the material facts 9 as claimed and adequately supported by the moving party are admitted to exist without 10 controversy except to the extent that such material facts are (a) included in the 11 ‘Statement of Genuine Disputes’ and (b) controverted by declaration or other written 12 evidence filed in opposition to the motion.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-3. IV. 13 DISCUSSION 14 Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis that the dispensers at issue 15 are not governed by the ADA’s reach range requirements and, even if they are, 16 Defendants have lowered the dispensers, mooting Estrada’s claim for injunctive relief. 17 (DMSJ 3–7.) Estrada cross-moves for summary judgment on the basis that the alleged 18 architectural barriers are governed by the ADA’s reach range requirements, and 19 although Defendants have lowered the dispensers to an ADA-compliant height, 20 Estrada’s claim for injunctive relief survives because he seeks a modification to 21 Defendants’ policy to maintain accessibility. (PMSJ 6–8.)3 22 A. ADA Claim 23 “Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in the 24 ‘full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 25 accommodations of any place of public accommodation.’” Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery 26 3 27 28 Defendants object to Estrada’s evidence submitted in support of his Motion primarily on relevance grounds. (See generally Defs.’ Obj. to Evid.) To the extent that the Court discusses or relies on Estrada’s evidence, Defendants’ objections are overruled because the Court finds the evidence relevant. See Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 4 1 Co., 654 F.3d 903, 904 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(b), 12182(a)). To 2 establish a prima facie case for discrimination under Title III of the ADA, a plaintiff 3 must show that “(1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant 4 is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation”; and 5 (3) the defendant denied public accommodation to the plaintiff because of her disability. 6 Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). For existing facilities 7 that are places of public accommodation, “discrimination includes ‘a failure to remove 8 architectural barriers . . . where such removal is readily achievable.’” Chapman v. Pier 9 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting 10 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)). Newly constructed facilities must be “readily 11 accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. 12 § 12183(a)(1)).4 The standards governing compliance with the ADA are set forth in the 13 ADA Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”), which is “essentially an encyclopedia of 14 design standards.” Oliver, 654 F.3d at 905. The ADAAG “lay[s] out the technical 15 structural requirements of places of public accommodation.” Fortyune v. Am. Multi- 16 Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2004). 17 Defendants argue that the bag dispenser in the meat department and the ticket 18 dispenser in the deli department fall within the ADAAG provision for “Self-Service 19 Shelving,” and are thus exempt from the ADA’s reach range requirements. (DMSJ 3– 20 5; see 1991 ADAAG § 4.1.3(12)(b) (“Requirements for accessible reach range do not 21 apply” to “shelves or display units allowing self-service by customers.”); 2010 ADAAG 22 § 225.2.2 (“Self-service shelving shall not be required to comply with 308 [Reach 23 Ranges]).) 24 In contrast, Estrada contends that the bag dispenser and ticket dispenser are 25 governed by the ADAAG for “Controls and Operating Mechanisms,” and thus subject 26 to the ADA’s reach range height requirements. (PMSJ 6; see 1991 ADAAG § 4.1.2(13) 27 28 4 Neither Estrada nor Defendants establish whether the Store is an existing facility or new construction, but Estrada applies the legal standard for existing facilities in his Motion. (See PMSJ 5.) 5 1 (“Controls and operating mechanisms in accessible spaces, along accessible routes, or 2 as parts of accessible elements (for example, light switches and dispenser controls) shall 3 comply with 4.27 [applying reach range height requirements]”); 2010 ADAAG § 308.3 4 (establishing a maximum high side reach of forty-eight inches).) Estrada argues that 5 the bag and ticket dispensers were previously located above ADA-permitted height in 6 violation of the ADA and Unruh, thus entitling him to injunctive relief and statutory 7 damages. (PMSJ 8, 9.) 8 However, the Court need not reach the question of whether the bag dispenser and 9 ticket dispenser are governed by the ADA’s reach range requirements or are exempt. 10 Estrada contends the dispensers must be no more than forty-eight inches above the floor 11 to comply with the ADA and concedes that Defendants installed lower bag and ticket 12 dispensers that comply. As these alleged architectural barriers provide the only basis 13 for injunctive relief asserted in Estrada’s Complaint, Estrada’s ADA claim is moot. 14 B. Mootness 15 “Damages are not recoverable under Title III of the ADA—only injunctive relief 16 is available for violations of Title III.” Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 17 2002). Plaintiffs “may obtain injunctive relief against public accommodations with 18 architectural barriers, including ‘an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily 19 accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.’” Molski, 481 F.3d at 730 20 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2)). Accordingly, “a defendant’s voluntary removal of 21 alleged barriers prior to trial can have the effect of mooting a plaintiff’s ADA claim.” 22 Oliver, 654 F.3d at 905; see also Grove v. De La Cruz, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1130–31 23 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 24 Estrada concedes that Defendants have lowered the bag and ticket dispensers to 25 no more than forty-eight inches above the floor, as required under the ADAAG. 26 (PMSJ 6–7; Pl.’s Resp. to DSUF 2–3, ECF No. 26.) Defendants affirm they will 27 maintain the dispensers at the current height. (Decl. of Evette McKinney in Supp. of 28 Defs.’ Opp’n to PMSJ ¶ 5, ECF No. 21-5.) Accordingly, Estrada’s claim for injunctive 6 1 relief under the ADA for architectural barriers is moot. See Pickern v. Best W. Timber 2 Cove Lodge Marina Resort, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (citing 3 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs, 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000)) (finding 4 the defendants’ remediation rendered the plaintiff’s ADA claim moot). 5 Estrada contends his claim for injunctive relief survives because he also seeks a 6 written policy modification from Defendants that they will maintain the dispensers at 7 the current height. (PMSJ 7–8; Pl.’s Opp’n to DMSJ 6–8, ECF No. 25.) This argument 8 is unavailing for several reasons. To begin, Estrada did not plead an ADA claim for a 9 written policy or policy modification in his Complaint, nor did he plead facts supporting 10 that Defendants had an existing policy to be modified. (See Compl. ¶¶ 10–25, 26–34.) 11 The Ninth Circuit has directed courts addressing ADA claims on summary judgment to 12 consider only issues raised in the Complaint so that defendants may receive fair notice 13 of the claims they face. See Oliver, 654 F.3d at 909. 14 Further, where “the complaint does not include the necessary factual allegations 15 to state a claim, raising such claim in a summary judgment motion is insufficient to 16 present the claim to the district court.” Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 17 1058, 1080 (9th Cir. 2008); Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968– 18 69 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that the complaint “gave the [defendants] no notice of the 19 specific factual allegations presented for the first time in [the plaintiff’s] opposition to 20 summary judgment.”). “[S]ummary judgment is not a procedural second chance to 21 flesh out inadequate pleadings.” Wasco Prods., Inc. v. Southwall Techs., Inc., 435 F.3d 22 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2006). For these reasons, the Court declines to consider claims raised 23 for the first time on summary judgment. 24 Finally, even were the Court to consider the merits of Estrada’s request for the 25 requested written policy, given Defendants’ undisputed declaration that the dispensers 26 will be maintained at the current height, the Court finds that injunctive relief is not 27 required to ensure accessibility. 28 7 As Estrada’s claim for injunctive relief under the ADA is moot, the Court 1 2 GRANTS Defendants’ Motion and DENIES Estrada’s Motion as to the ADA claim. 3 C. State Law Claim 4 Both parties also move for summary judgment on Estrada’s Unruh claim for 5 statutory damages. (PMSJ 9; DMSJ 7–8.) In the alternative, Defendants contend the 6 Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. 7 (DMSJ 8–13.) 8 A district court “‘may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ if it ‘has 9 dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” Sanford v. MemberWorks, 10 Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). “[I]n the usual 11 case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to 12 be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, 13 fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the 14 remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 15 (1988); Wade v. Reg’l Credit Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Where a 16 district court dismisses a federal claim, leaving only state claims for resolution, it should 17 decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without prejudice.”). 18 Estrada’s ADA claim provided the only basis for original jurisdiction. As 19 Estrada’s ADA claim has been fully adjudicated, the interests of comity and fairness 20 lead the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Estrada’s related 21 state law claim. See Molski v. Kahn Winery, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1211–12 (C.D. Cal. 22 2005) (discussing that “the principle of comity strongly favors dismissing the state law 23 claims” and that allowing state law claims to remain absent federal claims would 24 frustrate the goal of the ADA to quickly rectify structural barriers). 25 26 Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Estrada’s state law claim and this claim is DISMISSED without prejudice. 27 28 8 V. 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for 3 Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to 4 Plaintiff’s ADA claim. (ECF Nos. 17, 19.) The Court DECLINES to exercise 5 supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim and DISMISSES it 6 WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court will issue Judgment. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 June 10, 2019 11 12 13 14 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9

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