Doris Hayes v. The TJX Companies, Inc et al, No. 2:2017cv07182 - Document 23 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND 14 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II:. Case Remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court, No. BC 672200. MD JS-6. Case Terminated. (lc). Modified on 1/30/2018. (lc). Modified on 1/30/2018 (lc).
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Doris Hayes v. The TJX Companies, Inc et al Doc. 23 1 O 2 JS-6 3 4 5 6 United States District Court Central District of California 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Case No. 2:17-cv-07182-ODW-JC DORIS HAYES, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND [14] Plaintiff, v. THE TJX COMPANIES, INC., a Delaware Corporation; T.J. MAXX OF CA, LLC., a Delaware Corporation, MARIA ARIAS, an individual, and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive, 17 18 Defendants, 19 20 I. 21 INTRODUCTION 22 Plaintiff Doris Hayes (“Hayes”) moves to remand this case to Los Angeles 23 County Superior Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Mot., ECF No. 14.) 24 Hayes, a California citizen, argues that complete diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 25 does not exist because she has a plausible claim against non-diverse defendant, Maria 26 Arias. Defendants, the TJX Companies (“TJX”), T.J. Maxx of CA (“T.J. Maxx”), and 27 Arias, oppose the motion, claiming that there is no legitimate basis for the joinder of 28 Arias. (ECF No. 17.) Dockets.Justia.com For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that Arias is not a sham 1 2 defendant. 3 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Hayes’s Motion to Remand.1 No. 14.) II. 4 (ECF FACTUAL BACKGROUND 5 Hayes’s claims arise from the termination of her employment with T.J. Maxx. 6 (Comp. ¶ 7, ECF No. 14.) On August 11, 2017, Hayes filed this action in state court, 7 asserting twelve causes of action. (Not. of Removal Ex. A, ECF No. 1.) Hayes 8 pleaded two of those causes of action against Arias, the individual defendant at issue 9 here: (1) Hostile Work Environment, and (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional 10 Distress (“IIED”).2 (Id.) 11 12 13 14 Hayes is a citizen of California. (Comp. ¶ 1.) TJX and T.J. Maxx are Delaware corporations, with their principal place of business in Massachusetts. (Id. ¶ 2; Not. of Removal ¶¶ 18,22.) Arias is a citizen of California. (Comp. ¶ 3.) Hayes is a 60-year-old African-American woman who worked for T.J. Maxx 15 16 17 between June 2007, and June 2016. (Id. ¶ 7.) In April 2014, Hayes suffered severe abdominal pain and underwent surgery to treat her vaginal vault prolapse. (Id. ¶ 14– 18 15.) After taking disability leave, Hayes returned to work in October 2015. (Id. ¶ 20.) 19 Hayes alleges that she was required to stand, despite informing T.J. Maxx and Arias, 20 who at the time was the new General Store Manager, that she had difficulty bending, 21 standing, sitting, and reaching. (Id. ¶ 21.) After a subsequent surgery and additional 22 medical leave, Hayes’s doctor instructed her not to lift more than ten pounds or sit, 23 bend, or stand for more than one hour. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 34.) 24 25 26 27 28 1 After considering the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 2 The Court only provides factual background concerning Hayes’s claims against Arias, as those are the allegations pertinent to the Court’s remand analysis. 2 1 Hayes alleges that Arias discriminated and harassed her because: (1) Arias 2 made no job modifications to accommodate Hayes’s disability and medical condition 3 (Id. ¶ 21); (2) Arias displayed annoyance whenever Hayes would request time off (Id. 4 ¶ 22); and (3) Arias awarded younger, non-African-American employees—who had 5 less seniority than Hayes—more favorable shifts (Id. ¶ 24). Further, Hayes alleges 6 that employees and customers previously confronted Arias regarding Arias’s 7 discrimination. (Id. ¶ 24.) Hayes is unaware of any investigation that took place after 8 she complained to the Head Store Manager about Arias’s prejudicial conduct, 9 specifically towards African-Americans. (Id. ¶ 22–23.) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 On June 15, 2016, T.J. Maxx fired Hayes because she had “reach[ed] the allowed 6-month mark with medical documentation not warranting reasonable extension of [her] leave.” (Id. ¶ 35.) T.J. Maxx did not ask Hayes or communicate with her doctors about the potential for “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, adjustment of policies, [or] other similar accommodations.” (Id. ¶ 36.) On August 11, 2017, Hayes filed this action in state court. (Not. of Removal 17 18 Ex. A.) Defendants removed the action on September 28, 2017, claiming diversity 19 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants argue that Arias is a 20 fraudulently joined, sham defendant whose citizenship should not be considered in 21 determining diversity jurisdiction. (Id.) On October 23, 2017, Hayes moved to 22 remand. (ECF No. 14.) Defendants timely opposed. (ECF No. 17.) That Motion is 23 now before the Court for decision.3 24 25 26 27 28 3 This Order does not evaluate the merits of the claims against defendant Maria Arias. Rather, as discussed below, the purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the claims are plausible for jurisdictional purposes. See Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the district court should not step beyond the threshold jurisdictional issue under “the guise of deciding whether the joinder was fraudulent”). 3 III. 1 LEGAL STANDARD 2 A. Removal 3 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject-matter 4 jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See U.S. 5 Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 6 375, 377 (1994). A suit filed in state court may be removed to federal court if the 7 federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 8 Federal courts have original jurisdiction where an action presents a federal question 9 under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. To 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 exercise diversity jurisdiction, a federal court must find complete diversity of citizenship among the adverse parties and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000, usually exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). But, courts strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction, and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. 18 Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Gaus, 19 980 F.2d at 566). 20 B. Fraudulent Joinder 21 Removal based on a court’s diversity jurisdiction is proper, despite the presence 22 of a non-diverse defendant, where that defendant is fraudulently joined, also known as 23 a sham defendant. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). Defendants 24 urging fraudulent joinder must “have the opportunity prove that individuals joined in 25 the action cannot be liable on any theory.” See Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 26 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). “If the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against the 27 [non-diverse] defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the 28 state,” the joinder is considered fraudulent, and the party’s citizenship is disregarded 4 1 for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 2 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 3 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987)). 4 However, “[i]f there is a non-fanciful possibility that plaintiff can state a claim 5 under [state] law against the non-diverse defendant[,] the court must remand.” 6 Hamilton Materials, 494 F.3d at 1206; see also Good v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 5 7 F. Supp. 2d 804, 807 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“The defendant must demonstrate that there is 8 no possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action in State court 9 against the alleged sham defendant.”). Given this standard, “[t]here is a presumption 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 against finding fraudulent joinder, and defendants who assert that plaintiff has fraudulently joined a party carry a heavy burden of persuasion.” Plute v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2001). “Fraudulent joinder must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Hamilton Materials, Inc., 494 F.3d at 1206 (citing Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1998)). IV. DISCUSSION 18 Defendants argue that this Court should deny Hayes’s motion on both 19 procedural and substantive grounds; they contend Hayes violated Local Rule 7-3, and 20 fraudulently joined Arias to destroy diversity jurisdiction. 21 arguments unpersuasive and will address each in turn. 22 A. Hayes’s Violation of Local Rule 7-3 23 The Court declines to summarily decide this motion based on Hayes’s violation 24 of Local Rule 7-3. Local Rule 7-3 provides that “counsel contemplating the filing of 25 any motion shall first contact opposing counsel to discuss thoroughly, preferably in 26 person, the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential resolution . . . at 27 least seven (7) days prior to the filing of the motion.” L.R. 7-3. The moving party 28 The Court finds both may then file the motion if the parties are unable to reach a resolution. Id. 5 1 Defendants urge this Court to deny Hayes’s Motion because she did not comply 2 with Local Rule 7-3. (Opp’n 2, ECF No. 17.) The Court, however, retains the 3 discretion to choose whether to consider the motion. See Singer v. Live Nation 4 Worldwide, Inc., 2012 WL 123146, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2012). While Hayes’s 5 disregard for the Local Rules is careless and concerning, it does not merit denial of the 6 Motion. 7 B. Arias Was Not Fraudulently Joined 8 When assessing fraudulent joinder, a court may pierce the pleadings to 9 determine whether a plaintiff has a plausible claim against the non-diverse defendant. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir 2001). Here, reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to Hayes, this Court finds that Hayes has a legitimate claim against Arias. See Good, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 807. a. Hostile Work Environment Claim Under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), “[i]t is an unlawful employment practice . . . [f]or an employer . . . or any other person, because of race . . . physical disability, mental disability, [or] medical condition . . . to harass 18 an employee . . . .” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(1). A successful harassment claim 19 based on a hostile work environment “must demonstrate that the conduct complained 20 of was severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment 21 and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees.” 22 Miller v. Dep’t. of Corr., 36 Cal. 4th 446, 462 (2005). “[T]he objective severity of 23 harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the 24 plaintiff's position, considering ‘all the circumstances.’” Oncale v. Sundowner 25 Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 26 “[A]cts of harassment cannot be occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial[;] 27 rather the plaintiff must show a concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine 28 or generalized nature.” Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 6 1 610 (1989). Notably, “[a]n employee of an entity . . . is personally liable for any 2 harassment prohibited by this section that is perpetrated by the employee.” Cal. Gov’t 3 Code § 12940(j)(2). 4 According to Defendants, there can be no individual liability for Arias’s alleged 5 harassment because her conduct occurred within her job duties and because the 6 incidents were “single or isolated” events, not severe or pervasive. (Opp’n 9–10, ECF 7 No. 17.) Hayes asserts that she suffered harassment because of her age, disability—or 8 perceived disability—and medical condition, as well as because of her “requests for 9 disability leave and reasonable accommodations, and [her] complaints and objections 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.” (Comp. ¶ 67.) Specific examples of the harassment Hayes alleges include Arias favoring younger, non-African-American employees with less seniority, transferring Hayes to unfavorable shifts and positions, failing to accommodate Hayes’s medical condition after repeated protest and complaints, forcing Hayes to work in dangerous conditions and endure abdominal pain, and threatening to terminate Hayes’s employment benefits. (Id. ¶ 45.) Further, Hayes asserts that she was subject to disparaging 18 comments regarding her medical condition and that Arias frequently expressed 19 aggravation when Hayes asked for disability leave. (Id. ¶ ¶ 45, 23.) 20 Racial and disability discrimination may also support Hayes’s Hostile Work 21 Environment claim. 22 modified (Feb. 10, 2010) (“[T]he FEHA treats discrimination and harassment as 23 distinct categories, but nothing in the FEHA requires that the evidence in a case be 24 dedicated to one or the other claim but never to both.”). Construing the allegations in 25 Hayes’s Complaint in her favor, leads the Court to find that she has made out a 26 plausible claim for relief against Arias. 27 28 Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686, 710 (2009), as Furthermore, a defendant bears a heavy burden in establishing that a codefendant has been fraudulently joined. Even if Arias’s actions, as pleaded, could not 7 1 constitute severe or pervasive conduct outside the course of normal employment, it is 2 not inconceivable that Hayes could amend her complaint and assert more compelling 3 facts that would state a viable claim. See Revay v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:14- 4 CV-03391-RSWL, 2015 WL 1285287, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015) (“Merely 5 showing that an action is likely to be dismissed . . . does not demonstrate fraudulent 6 joinder. If there is any possibility that the state law might impose liability on a 7 resident defendant under the circumstances alleged in the complaint, or in a future 8 amended complaint, . . . remand is necessary.”) (emphasis added). Therefore, the 9 Court does not find that Arias is a sham defendant. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 b. IIED Claim Under a theory of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”), a plaintiff must prove: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) the plaintiff’s injuries were actually and proximately caused by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Cochran v. Cochran, 65 Cal. App. 4th 488, 494 (1988). To be 18 successful, the conduct of the defendant must be “so extreme as to exceed all bounds 19 of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.” Id. 20 First, Defendants argue that Hayes did not allege sufficient facts to state a claim 21 for IIED because Arias’s conduct was not “extreme or outrageous.” (Opp’n 14–15, 22 ECF No. 17.) The Court disagrees. Hayes alleges that she suffered severe emotional 23 distress as a result of Arias’s adverse employment actions. In addition to the facts that 24 support the Hostile Work Environment claim above, Hayes asserts that she was given 25 “ultimatums that made her choose between her job or her speedy recovery from her 26 sensitive surgery, which the Defendants had notice of.” (Opp’n 16, ECF No. 17; 27 Comp. ¶ 24–26); see Fisher, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 618 (noting that a properly pled 28 8 1 harassment claim may support the outrageous behavior element of an IIED cause of 2 action). 3 While liability for IIED “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, 4 annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities,” the allegations in the Complaint, 5 taken as true, rise to a sufficient level of indecency to state a claim for IIED. 6 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). While Hayes may have a marginal case 7 on the facts pleaded, she is not precluded from amending the complaint to assert 8 additional facts. See Birkhead v. Parker, No. C 12-2264 CW, 2012 WL 4902695, at 9 *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2012) (“Even if these allegations do not rise to the level of 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 outrageous conduct, Defendants cannot establish that Plaintiff would not be able to amend the complaint to allege a[] viable claim [for intentional infliction of emotional distress] against [his former supervisor] under California law.”). Therefore, Hayes has a plausible IIED claim against Arias, even if it is slight. Second, Defendants argue that Hayes’s IIED claim is barred by the California Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”) because Arias’s conduct occurred during the normal course of employment. (Opp’n 14–15, ECF No. 17); see Cal. Lab. Code §§ 18 3600(a), 3602(a); Miklosy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 44 Cal. 4th 876, 902 (2008) 19 (holding that when “alleged wrongful conduct . . . occur[s] at the worksite, in the 20 normal course of the employer-employee relationship . . . workers’ compensation is a 21 plaintiff[’s] exclusive remedy for any injury that may” result). 22 Nevertheless, in some “exceptional circumstances” an employee may bring a 23 separate civil action when an employer’s conduct falls outside the normal risk of 24 employment, also known as the “compensation bargain.” Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., 25 Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 24 Cal. 4th 800, 811–12 (2001). “To be within the 26 scope of employment, the incident giving rise to the injury must be an outgrowth of 27 the employment, the risk of injury must be inherent in the workplace, or typical of or 28 9 1 broadly incidental to the employer's enterprise.” Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Serv., Inc., 2 26 Cal. 4th 995, 1008 (2001). 3 Generally, allegations that an employer’s intentional, unfair or outrageous 4 conduct causes an employee emotional distress is not sufficient to bring an IIED claim 5 outside WCA’s exclusivity provision. See Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 6 744, 828 (1992) (“Intentional misconduct may constitute a normal part of the 7 employment relationship. Even if such conduct may be characterized as intentional, 8 unfair, or outrageous, it is nevertheless covered by the workers’ compensation 9 exclusivity-of-remedy provisions.”). However, it is clear that claims arising from 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 disability discrimination and discrimination on the basis of race, religion, age, or gender are not preempted by the exclusivity provision because they are not a normal part of the employment relationship. See Jones v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 198 Cal. App. 3d 794, 809 (1988); City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 4th 1143, 1154 (1998). Here, Hayes’s IIED claim is supported by evidence of harassment and discriminatory conduct based on her race, disability, and medical condition. See also 18 Accardi v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. App. 4th 341, 352 (1993), as modified on denial of 19 reh'g (Aug. 20, 1993) (“The Legislature . . . did not intend that an employer be 20 allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of 21 discriminatory practices.”). Therefore, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of 22 establishing that Hayes’s IIED claim is barred by the WCA’s exclusionary rule. 23 c. Managerial Privilege 24 Defendants also argue that Arias is protected by the managerial privilege 25 because Hayes’s claims are based on Arias’s non-actionable personnel decisions. 26 (Opp’n 6, ECF No. 17.) Under the doctrine of managerial privilege, “supervisors may 27 not be held personally liable for discriminatory personnel decisions under California’s 28 Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”).” Calero v. Unisys Corp., 271 F. Supp. 10 1 2d 1172, 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 2 personally liable for unlawful harassment, which does not constitute a “personnel 3 decision.” See Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640, 646 (1998) (“Making a personnel 4 decision is conduct of a type fundamentally different from the type of conduct that 5 constitutes harassment. Harassment claims are based on a type of conduct that is 6 avoidable and unnecessary to job performance.”). Here, both of Hayes’s claims 7 against Arias are based on allegations of harassment. Therefore, the managerial 8 privilege is not applicable and Arias may be held personally liable. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 However, individual managers may be held Hayes also argues that the managerial privilege is not a settled rule of California law and inapplicable because Arias did not intend to benefit her employer. (Mot. 22, ECF No. 14); see McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying the managerial privilege “if an advisor is motivated in part by a desire to benefit his principal”). Defendants disagree, arguing that Hayes relies on case law that does not evaluate the privilege in the context of fraudulent joinder. (Opp’n 7, ECF No. 17.) Even assuming the privilege is settled law and that it applies here, both of Hayes’s claims against Arias are based on allegations of harassment, and thus she is not protected by the managerial privilege. 19 Defendants argue that Arias acted with intent to benefit her employer. (Opp’n 20 9, ECF No. 17.) The allegations in Hayes’s Complaint make it difficult to decipher 21 normal personnel management decisions that benefitted her employer, and 22 harassment. However, Arias’s conduct can reasonably be construed as harassment 23 that is beyond personnel management decisions. See Calero v. Unisys Corp., 271 F. 24 Supp. 2d 1172, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“It is certainly questionable whether a 25 managerial privilege could be asserted where the employer’s or its agent’s or 26 employee’s conduct is sufficiently egregious so as to constitute outrageous conduct. 27 In addition to this question, it is far from clear under California law whether the 28 11 1 managerial privilege is an affirmative defense or part of the plaintiff’s cause of 2 action.”). 3 Finally, even if Hayes did not plead sufficient facts against Arias, Defendants 4 have failed to show that Hayes could not amend the complaint to state a feasible 5 claim. See Burris v. AT&T Wireless, Inc., No. C 06-02904 JSW, 2006 WL 2038040, 6 at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2006) (finding no fraudulent joinder despite the defective 7 complaint because defendants failed to establish that plaintiffs will not be granted 8 leave to amend). 9 jurisdiction and ‘the general presumption against fraudulent joinder.’” Hunter v. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Defendants face “both a strong presumption against removal Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Hamilton Materials, Inc., 494 F.3d at 1206). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Hayes’s Motion. See Macey v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2002). C. Attorney’s Fees to Plaintiff Hayes requests that this Court award her attorneys’ fees due to Defendants’ bad faith in removing this action. (Mot. 23–24.) Courts may award attorneys’ fees 18 following improper removal “only where the removing party lacked an objectively 19 reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 20 132, 141 (2005). Here, there is no dispute that the amount in controversy exceeds 21 $75,000, and removal is based solely on Defendants’ argument that Hayes does not 22 have any claim against Arias. As discussed above, while it may not be a strong claim, 23 Hayes presents sufficient allegations to preclude application of the fraudulent joinder 24 doctrine. 25 6670138, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2014) (The proper standard for fraudulent joinder 26 “is not whether there is a possibility that plaintiff will prevail on her harassment 27 claim; rather, the standard is whether defendants can demonstrate by clear and 28 See Rios v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 2:14-CV-07697-CAS, 2014 WL convincing evidence that there is no possibility that plaintiff will be able to state a[] 12 1 harassment claim”). The Court cannot find that Defendants lacked any objectively 2 reasonable basis for removal. Moreover, Hayes’s violation of Local Rule 7-3 does not 3 support awarding her attorneys’ fees. 4 attorneys’ fees. V. 5 Therefore, the Court declines to award CONCLUSION 6 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiff’s Motion for 7 Remand. (ECF No. 23.) Accordingly, the Court REMANDS this action to the 8 Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 672200. The 9 Clerk of the Court shall close this case. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 12 January 29, 2018 13 14 15 16 17 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
