Richard Villearreal v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 2:2017cv05912 - Document 24 (C.D. Cal. 2018)

Court Description: DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Victor E Bianchini. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: Judgment be entered AFFIRMING the Commissioner's decision. (See document for further details.) (sbou)

Download PDF
Richard Villearreal v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 24 O 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Case No. 2:17-CV-05912 (VEB) RICHARD VILLEARREAL, DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiff, vs. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. I. INTRODUCTION In July of 2003, Plaintiff Richard Villearreal applied for Supplemental Security Income Benefits under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner of Social Security granted the application. However, in October of 2014, the Commissioner determined that Plaintiff had experienced medical improvement and was no longer entitled to receive disability benefits. Plaintiff, represented by the 1 DECISION AND ORDER – VILLEARREAL v BERRYHILL 2:17-CV-05912-VEB Dockets.Justia.com 1 Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing, Cyrus Safa, Esq., of counsel, commenced 2 this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits pursuant 3 to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3). 4 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. 5 (Docket No. 11, 12, 19). On April 11, 2018, this case was referred to the 6 undersigned pursuant to General Order 05-07. (Docket No. 18). 7 8 II. BACKGROUND 9 Plaintiff applied for benefits on July 30, 2003, and was found to be disabled as 10 of July 1, 2003. (T at 60).1 The Commissioner terminated benefits on October 22, 11 2014, finding that Plaintiff was not longer disabled. (T at 63-65). Plaintiff requested 12 reconsideration, which was denied, and Plaintiff thereafter requested a hearing 13 before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). On July 1, 2015, a hearing was held 14 before ALJ Paul Coulter. (T at 35). The hearing was adjourned to allow Plaintiff to 15 obtain representation. (T at 40). A second hearing was held on February 4, 2016. 16 (T at 41). Plaintiff appeared with his attorney and testified. (T at 44-57). The ALJ 17 also received testimony from Susan Allison, a vocational expert (T at 57-59). 18 19 20 Citations to (“T”) refer to the transcript of the administrative record at Docket No. 16. 2 DECISION AND ORDER – VILLEARREAL v BERRYHILL 2:17-CV-05912-VEB 1 On February19, 2016, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that 2 Plaintiff’s disability ended on October 1, 2014. (T at 17-34). The ALJ’s decision 3 became the Commissioner’s final decision on June 13, 2017, when the Appeals 4 Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (T at 1-6). 5 On August 9, 2017, Plaintiff, acting by and through his counsel, filed this 6 action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. (Docket No. 1). The 7 Commissioner interposed an Answer on January 8, 2018. (Docket No. 15). The 8 parties filed a Joint Stipulation on April 9, 2018. (Docket No. 17). 9 After reviewing the pleadings, Joint Stipulation, and administrative record, 10 this Court finds that the Commissioner’s decision should be affirmed and this case 11 must be dismissed. 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 14 A. Cessation of Benefits 15 The Social Security Act (“the Act”) defines disability as the “inability to 16 engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 17 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has 18 lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 19 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act also provides that a 20 3 DECISION AND ORDER – VILLEARREAL v BERRYHILL 2:17-CV-05912-VEB 1 claimant shall be determined to be under a disability only if any impairments are of 2 such severity that he or she is not only unable to do previous work but cannot, 3 considering his or her age, education and work experience, engage in any other 4 substantial work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 5 1382c(a)(3)(B). Thus, the definition of disability consists of both medical and 6 vocational components. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). 7 Once a claimant is found disabled, there is a presumption of continuing 8 disability. See Bellamy v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 755 F.2d 1380, 9 1381 (9th Cir. 1985). While the claimant retains the burden of proof as to ongoing 10 disability, the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner to produce evidence 11 to rebut the presumption. Id. Disability benefits may be terminated if the 12 Commissioner presents substantial evidence demonstrating medical improvement 13 such that the claimant is able to engage in substantial gainful activity. See 42 U.S.C. 14 § 423(f); Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 500 (9th Cir. 1983). 15 When a benefit recipient challenges cessation, the issue is whether the 16 recipient’s medical impairments have improved to the point where he or she is able 17 to perform substantial gainful activity. This question is subjected to a two-part 18 evaluation process: (1) whether “there has been any medical improvement in [the 19 20 4 DECISION AND ORDER – VILLEARREAL v BERRYHILL 2:17-CV-05912-VEB 1 individual’s] impairment(s)” and, if so, (2) “whether this medical improvement is 2 related to [the individual's] ability to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b). 3 Under the first prong, the Regulations define “medical improvement” as “any 4 decrease in the medical severity of [the individual's] impairment(s) which was 5 present at the time of the most recent favorable medical decision that [the individual 6 was] disabled or continued to be disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(1)(i). 7 “A determination that there has been a decrease in medical severity must be 8 based on changes (improvement) in the symptoms, signs and/or laboratory findings 9 associated with [the individual's] impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(1)(i). 10 Moreover, “if there has been a decrease in the severity … of the impairment(s) 11 present at the time of the most recent favorable medical decision,” the medical 12 improvement is related to the individual's ability to work only if there has been a 13 corresponding “increase in [the claimant's] functional capacity to do basic work 14 activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(1)(ii). 15 B. Standard of Review 16 Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner’s 17 decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A Court must uphold a Commissioner’s decision, 18 made through an ALJ, when the determination is not based on legal error and is 19 20 5 DECISION AND ORDER – VILLEARREAL v BERRYHILL 2:17-CV-05912-VEB 1 supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 2 1985); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 3 “The [Commissioner’s] determination that a plaintiff is not disabled will be 4 upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” Delgado v. 5 Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial 6 evidence is more than a mere scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 7 n 10 (9th Cir. 1975), but less than a preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 8 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence “means such evidence as a 9 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. 10 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(citations omitted). “[S]uch inferences and 11 conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence” will 12 also be upheld. Mark v. Celebreeze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). On review, 13 the Court considers the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the 14 decision of the Commissioner. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 15 1989)(quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1980)). 16 It is the role of the Commissioner, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in 17 evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational 18 interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 19 Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th 20 6 DECISION AND ORDER – VILLEARREAL v BERRYHILL 2:17-CV-05912-VEB 1 Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be 2 set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and 3 making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 4 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, if there is substantial evidence to support the 5 administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding 6 of either disability or non-disability, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. 7 Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 8 C. Commissioner’s Decision 9 The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had been determined to be disabled under the 10 Social Security Act as of September 12, 2003, making that the comparison point 11 decision (“CPD”). (T at 21). The ALJ found that, as of the CPD, Plaintiff’s affective 12 disorder, anti-social personality disorder, and polysubstance dependence met 13 §§12.04 and 12.08 of the Listings, thereby supporting a finding of disability under 14 the Act. (T at 21). 15 The ALJ determined that, as of October 1, 2014, Plaintiff had the following 16 medically determinable impairments: anxiety disorder, adjustment disorder, major 17 depressive disorder, polysubstance abuse (in remission), history of post-traumatic 18 stress disorder, thoracolumbar strain, and obesity. (T at 22). The ALJ concluded 19 that, as of October 1, 2014, Plaintiff no longer had an impairment or combination of 20 7 DECISION AND ORDER – VILLEARREAL v BERRYHILL 2:17-CV-05912-VEB 1 impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments set forth in the 2 Listings. (T at 22). 3 The ALJ determined that medical improvement occurred as of October 1, 4 2014. (T at 223). The ALJ concluded that the improvement related to Plaintiff’s 5 ability to work because, as of October 1, 2014, Plaintiff’s impairments no longer met 6 or medically equaled any Listings-level impairment. (T at 23). 7 The ALJ found that Plaintiff did continue to have severe impairments as 8 defined under the Act. (T at 24). However, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 9 retained the residual functional capacity to perform medium work, as defined in 20 10 CFR § 416.967 (c), with the following limitations: lift, carry, push or pull 50 pounds 11 occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; stand and walk for about 6 hours out of 8; sit 12 for about 6 hours out of 8 hours in a workday; understand, remember, and carry out 13 simple job instructions (but unable to perform work requiring direction of others, 14 abstract thought, or planning); and maintain attention and concentration to perform 15 non-complex, routine tasks in a work environment free of fast-paced production 16 requirements. (T at 24). 17 The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (T at 28). Considering 18 Plaintiff’s age (45 as of the date of medical improvement), education (high school), 19 work experience, and residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that, as of October 20 8 DECISION AND ORDER – VILLEARREAL v BERRYHILL 2:17-CV-05912-VEB 1 1, 2014, a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy that Plaintiff 2 could perform. (T at 28). As such, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s disability 3 ended on October 1, 2014, and that he did not become disabled again between that 4 date and February 24, 2016 (the date of the ALJ’s decision). (T at 29). 5 D. Disputed Issue 6 As set forth in the parties’ Joint Stipulation (Docket No. 23), Plaintiff offers a 7 single argument in support of his claim that the Commissioner’s decision should be 8 reversed. He contends that the ALJ’s RFC determination was not supported by 9 substantial evidence. 10 11 IV. ANALYSIS 12 An ALJ’s assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 13 must be upheld if the ALJ has applied the proper legal standard and substantial 14 evidence in the record supports the decision. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 15 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ must consider all the medical evidence in the record 16 and “explain in [her] decision the weight given to . . . [the] opinions from treating 17 sources, nontreating sources, and other nonexamining sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 18 404.1527(e)(2)(ii); see also § 404.1545(a)(1). 19 20 9 DECISION AND ORDER – VILLEARREAL v BERRYHILL 2:17-CV-05912-VEB 1 In determining the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ considers those limitations for 2 which there is support in the record and need not consider properly rejected evidence 3 or subjective complaints. See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217. 4 In this case, Dr. Raymond Yee performed a consultative psychiatric 5 evaluation on August 9, 2014. Plaintiff told Dr. Yee that he had received psychiatric 6 outpatient treatment from 2002 to 2004 because it was court-ordered. (T at 255). 7 Plaintiff said he was not willing to take any psychiatric medications. (T at 257). Dr. 8 Yee diagnosed adjustment disorder, NOS, and assigned a Global Assessment of 9 Functioning (“GAF”) score2 of 55-60 (T at 257), which is indicative of moderate 10 symptoms or difficulty in social, occupational or educational functioning. Metcalfe 11 v. Astrue, No. EDCV 07-1039, 2008 US. Dist. LEXIS 83095, at *9 (Cal. CD Sep’t 12 29, 2008). Dr. Yee opined that Plaintiff could perform the demands of basic work 13 activity with no mental health limitations. (T at 257). 14 On September 2, 2014, Dr. S. Gold, a non-examining State Agency review 15 physician, opined that Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment. (T at 258- 16 68). Dr. Gold’s findings were affirmed on January 15, 2015, by Dr. G. Johnson, 17 another State Agency review physician. (T at 283-93). 18 “A GAF score is a rough estimate of an individual's psychological, social, and occupational 19 functioning used to reflect the individual's need for treatment." Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1164 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998). 20 10 DECISION AND ORDER – VILLEARREAL v BERRYHILL 2:17-CV-05912-VEB 1 The ALJ gave some weight to the findings of Dr. Yee and the State Agency 2 review physicians. (T at 27-28). However, the ALJ noted that none of these 3 physicians had an opportunity to review the full medical record. (T at 27). The ALJ 4 found that based on his assessment of the full record, and giving partial credit to 5 Plaintiff’s subjective claims, a finding of some work-related limitations arising from 6 Plaintiff’s mental health impairments was warranted. (T at 27-28). 7 Plaintiff challenges, in conclusory fashion, the ALJ’s assessment of the 8 medical evidence and also argues that additional medical records submitted to the 9 Appeals Council create doubt as to whether the ALJ’s conclusion is supported by 10 substantial evidence. 11 This Court finds the ALJ’s decision supported by substantial evidence. 12 The ALJ’s decision to give some weight to the assessment of Dr. Yee was 13 proper. Although Dr. Yee did not have access to the full medical record, his 14 assessment was based on his examination of Plaintiff in light of his experience and 15 expertise. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding 16 that examining physician’s “opinion alone constitutes substantial evidence, because 17 it rests on his own independent examination of [claimant]”). 18 The ALJ likewise properly gave weight to the assessments of the State 19 Agency review physicians. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996); 20 11 DECISION AND ORDER – VILLEARREAL v BERRYHILL 2:17-CV-05912-VEB 1 see also 20 CFR § 404.1527 (f)(2)(i)(“State agency medical and psychological 2 consultants and other program physicians, psychologists, and other medical 3 specialists are highly qualified physicians, psychologists, and other medical 4 specialists who are also experts in Social Security disability evaluation.”). 5 The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s subjective claims of continued disability 6 were not fully credible. (T at 25). In particular, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s poor work 7 history, inconsistent statements, and extended periods of adequate functioning 8 without mental health treatment. (T at 25-27). This assessment, which Plaintiff has 9 not challenged, provides further support for the RFC determination. 10 This Court acknowledges that Plaintiff submitted additional records pertaining 11 to mental health treatment he received while incarcerated between December 2014 12 and March of 2015. (T at 403-66). However, Plaintiff does not explain how this 13 evidence is even arguably sufficient to undermine the ALJ’s assessment. A remand 14 based on new evidence is not necessary unless that evidence creates a reasonable 15 possibility that it would change the outcome of the ALJ’s decision. Mayes v. 16 Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 462 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff has not established that the 17 evidence of treatment during the relatively brief period of incarceration creates a 18 reasonably possibility that it would change the outcome of the disability 19 determination. 20 12 DECISION AND ORDER – VILLEARREAL v BERRYHILL 2:17-CV-05912-VEB 1 Plaintiff was able to function for several years without any treatment for his 2 mental health impairments. (T at 23, 164-65, 254-55, 257, 378). Although he began 3 receiving court-mandated treatment in late 2014 and early 2015, during and after his 4 incarceration, treatment was relatively infrequent. (T at 329-43, 350-83). Moreover, 5 while the treatment records document some subjective symptoms (anxiety, pressured 6 speech, sad mood and affect, mild agitation, and biweekly panic attacks surrounding 7 law enforcement), Plaintiff’s mental status examinations were generally normal, 8 with no treating provider assessing limitations inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC 9 determination. (T at 329, 332-33, 335-38, 340-43, 350-53, 368-69, 372, 373, 378). 10 Moreover, as noted above, this is not a case where the ALJ discounted entirely 11 the evidence of ongoing mental health impairment. Rather, the ALJ carefully 12 weighed that evidence and incorporated several limitations in the RFC related to 13 Plaintiff’s apparent difficulties with job stress, complex job instructions, and 14 difficulties with authority. (T at 24). 15 Plaintiff’s suggestion that the evidence of record, including the new evidence, 16 creates doubt as to whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 17 is unavailing. Even to the extent there was arguably a conflict in the evidence, the 18 ALJ adequately resolved that conflict and the additional evidence submitted to the 19 Appeals Council creates no reasonable possibility of a different outcome. Molina v. 20 13 DECISION AND ORDER – VILLEARREAL v BERRYHILL 2:17-CV-05912-VEB 1 Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012)(“Even when the evidence is susceptible 2 to more than one rational interpretation, we must uphold the ALJ's findings if they 3 are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”). 4 V. 5 CONCLUSION 6 After carefully reviewing the administrative record, this Court finds 7 substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, including the objective 8 medical evidence and supported medical opinions. It is clear that the ALJ thoroughly 9 examined the record, afforded appropriate weight to the medical evidence, including 10 the assessments of the examining medical providers and the non-examining 11 consultants, and afforded the subjective claims of symptoms and limitations an 12 appropriate weight when rendering a decision that Plaintiff experienced medical 13 improvement as of October 1, 2014, and is no longer entitled to disability benefits. 14 This Court finds no reversible error and substantial evidence supports the 15 Commissioner’s decision. 16 17 VI. ORDERS 18 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 19 Judgment be entered AFFIRMING the Commissioner’s decision; and 20 14 DECISION AND ORDER – VILLEARREAL v BERRYHILL 2:17-CV-05912-VEB 1 2 3 4 5 The Clerk of the Court shall file this Decision and Order, serve copies upon counsel for the parties, and CLOSE this case. DATED this 25th day of September, 2018, /s/Victor E. Bianchini VICTOR E. BIANCHINI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 15 DECISION AND ORDER – VILLEARREAL v BERRYHILL 2:17-CV-05912-VEB

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.