Mauro Martinez v. Nancy Berryhill, No. 2:2017cv04914 - Document 21 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF COMMISSIONER by Magistrate Judge Alexander F. MacKinnon. It is Ordered that Judgment be entered affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and dismissing this action with prejudice. (sp)
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Mauro Martinez v. Nancy Berryhill Doc. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 MAURO MARTINEZ MUNOZ, Case No. CV 17-4914 AFM Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF COMMISSIONER v. 14 15 NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. 17 18 Plaintiff filed this action seeking review of the Commissioner’s final decision 19 denying his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security 20 income. In accordance with the Court’s case management order, the parties have filed 21 memorandum briefs addressing the merits of the disputed issues. This matter now is 22 ready for decision. BACKGROUND 23 24 On January 31, 2014 and February 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed applications for 25 disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) 26 alleging disability beginning November 30, 2012. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 27 247-64.) His applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (AR 129- 28 32, 137-41.) Dockets.Justia.com 1 Plaintiff appeared with counsel at hearings before an Administrative Law 2 Judge (“ALJ”) on March 18, 2016. (AR 55-90.) Plaintiff testified with the assistance 3 of an interpreter. A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified. 4 On April 25, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits and finding 5 Plaintiff not disabled. (AR 42-43.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 6 substantial gainful activity since November 30, 2012, and had the following severe 7 impairments: disc desiccation and degenerative changes of the lumbar spine, 8 meniscal tears of the left knee, status post arthroscopic surgery, and obesity. (AR 36- 9 37.) The ALJ further found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 10 impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed 11 impairments. (AR 37.) 12 After consideration of Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony and the 13 medical evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional 14 capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 15 416.967(b), except that he was limited to occasional climbing, kneeling, and 16 crawling, and frequent balancing, stooping, and crouching. (AR 38.) The ALJ 17 concluded, “the medical record does not reasonably support the imposition of greater 18 limitations.” Id. After finding that Plaintiff’s RFC did not permit him to perform his 19 past relevant work as a warehouse worker and forklift driver, the ALJ (based on the 20 VE’s testimony) found that Plaintiff could perform other work as a small parts 21 assembler, produce sorter, or housekeeping cleaner. (AR 41-42.) The ALJ concluded 22 that Plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act at 23 any time from November 30, 2012 through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AR 42.) 24 On May 15, 2017, the Appeals Council denied review, rendering the ALJ’s 25 decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (AR 1-6.) DISPUTED ISSUES 26 27 28 I. Whether the ALJ erred by finding plaintiff had the residual capacity to perform light work. 2 1 II. Whether the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating 2 physicians and accorded too much weight to the opinions of the state agency 3 medical consultants. 4 III. Whether the ALJ erred in not giving full weight to Plaintiff’s testimony. STANDARD OF REVIEW 5 6 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 7 determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial 8 evidence and whether the proper legal standards were applied. See Treichler v. 9 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). Substantial 10 evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a preponderance. See 11 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Substantial evidence is “such 12 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 13 conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The Court reviews the record as a whole, 14 weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 15 Commissioner’s conclusion. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 16 2014). Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, the 17 Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010; Ryan v. 18 Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 19 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Even when an ALJ’s decision contains error, it must be 20 affirmed if the error was harmless. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099. DISCUSSION 21 22 I. THE ALJ’S RFC FINDING 23 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to consider evidence that Plaintiff’s knee 24 issues were greater than de minimis and that the ALJ failed to consider the entirety 25 of the medical record. Plaintiff further argues that the RFC assessment is vague, 26 conclusory, and not supported by the medical record evidence. 27 An RFC assessment is an “administrative finding” that is reserved to the 28 Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2). RFC is a summary of what a 3 1 claimant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. See 20 2 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 3 (9th Cir. 2009). In determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must assess all the relevant 4 evidence to determine what capacity the claimant has for work despite his or her 5 impairment or impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In making the RFC 6 determination, the ALJ takes into account those limitations for which there is record 7 support that does not depend on claimant’s subjective complaints. See Batson v. 8 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004). An ALJ’s 9 conclusion must be upheld when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 10 interpretation. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). 11 In determining Plaintiff’s impairments, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s total 12 impairments did not qualify as completely disabling. (AR 36-40.) Regarding the 13 nature of Plaintiff’s knee issues, the ALJ considered the entire medical record, 14 including the inconsistent presentations, a lack of clinical support, and a shift of 15 complaints from Plaintiff’s right knee to his left. (AR 38.) The ALJ acknowledged 16 that imaging studies by Plaintiff’s treating physicians showed the presence of 17 effusion and evidence of a meniscal tear in the right knee. Plaintiff underwent 18 arthroscopic debridement surgery for his right knee, which resulted in limited and 19 contradicted medical reports of an antalgic gait, crepitus, positive McMurray tests, 20 motor weakness, swelling, and pain at first. Id. The ALJ noted eventual post-surgical 21 pain relief in Plaintiff’s right knee, an increase in reports of normal gait, and a lack 22 of significantly related clinical findings that support a more severe RFC. Id. The pain 23 then transferred to Plaintiff’s left knee, yet imaging studies of that knee found 24 unremarkable results. Id. 25 The ALJ also noted that imaging studies of Plaintiff’s back showed only mild 26 degenerative changes and no motor, sensory, or reflex loss. (AR 39.) The ALJ cited 27 the reported absence of an antalgic gait and the surgical consultant’s recommendation 28 against surgery based on the study. Id. The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s admissions to 4 1 treating sources that his back pains have been intermittent. Id. In all, Plaintiff’s back 2 issues were too limited to warrant more significant limitations in the RFC. 3 The evidence cited and considered in the ALJ’s decision constitutes specific 4 and substantial evidence in support of the RFC determination. Therefore, this Court 5 may not substitute its own judgment, and the ALJ’s RFC must be upheld. See Ryan, 6 528 F.3d at 1198 (“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 7 interpretation, the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.”) (citation and internal quotation 8 marks omitted); Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (“If 9 the evidence can support either affirming or reversing the ALJ’s conclusion, [the 10 reviewing court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ”). 11 II. 12 THE ALJ’S CONSIDERATION OF THE OPINIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S TREATING PHYSICIANS AND THE SAMCS 13 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erroneously rejected the opinions of treating 14 physicians Drs. Jill E. Gorze and Michael T. Nguyen. Plaintiff further contends that 15 the ALJ erroneously gave too much weight to the opinions of the nonexamining state 16 agency medical consultants (“SAMCs”). Id. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the 17 ALJ did not give legitimate reasons to reject Dr. Gorze’s opinion, the ALJ failed to 18 mention or consider Dr. Nguyen’s opinion, and the SAMCs’ opinions were accorded 19 too much weight. 20 “Although a treating physician’s opinion is generally afforded the greatest 21 weight in disability cases, it is not binding on an ALJ with respect to the existence of 22 an impairment or the ultimate determination of disability.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 23 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). An ALJ who sets forth sufficient specific and 24 legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence may give reduced weight to a 25 treating physician’s opinion where there is a conflict between that opinion and the 26 opinions of other physicians. See Id.; Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 553 27 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008), Valentine, 574 F.3d at 692. “The ALJ can meet this 28 burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting 5 1 clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” 2 Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F2.d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, an “ALJ need 3 not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion 4 is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Bray v. 5 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 6 marks and citation omitted.) 7 A. Dr. Gorze’s Opinion 8 In September, 2015, Dr. Gorze completed a medical questionnaire based on an 9 imaging study of Plaintiff’s back in which she diagnosed Plaintiff as having a “L3-4 10 minimal central protrusion without significant spinal canal or neural foraminal 11 narrowing. Otherwise, unremarkable.” (AR 1626.) Based on this study, she 12 concluded that it was a medical necessity for Plaintiff to perform his job from a seated 13 position for less than an hour and from a standing position for no more than two hours 14 in an eight-hour workday. (AR 1628.) She also opined that Plaintiff must stand from 15 a seated position every twenty minutes for five to ten minutes at a time before sitting 16 down again. (Id.) According to Dr. Gorze, Plaintiff could only be expected to 17 frequently lift or carry up to five pounds and occasionally lift or carry up to twenty 18 pounds. (Id.) Dr. Gorze further concluded the stress of a competitive work 19 environment would make Plaintiff’s symptoms worse, he would frequently 20 experience pain that would interfere with attention and concentration throughout a 21 workday, and he would need to take unexpected breaks throughout an eight workday 22 for ten to fifteen minutes at a time. (AR 1629.) Finally, Dr. Gorze opined Plaintiff 23 would be absent from work more than three times per month due to these issues. (AR 24 1630.) 25 The ALJ did not afford significant weight to Dr. Gorze’s opinion. (AR 40.) In 26 particular, the ALJ found that Dr. Gorze’s opinion exhibited a “fundamental 27 disconnect between her extremely limiting assessment and the objective findings 28 used in support of her conclusions.” (AR 40.) The ALJ pointed out that Dr. Gorze’s 6 1 conclusory opinion was based on a single imaging study, but was not supported by 2 any other diagnostic findings, clinical findings, or reasoning. (Id.) According to the 3 ALJ, Dr. Gorze’s de minimis findings were “not remotely consistent with the level 4 of functional limitations she claims.” (Id.) This finding is supported by substantial 5 evidence and is a legitimate reason for giving little weight to the opinion of 6 Dr. Gorze. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195 (“an ALJ may discredit treating physicians’ 7 opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole,… or 8 by objective medical findings”); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 9 2002) (“ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating 10 physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical 11 findings”); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (because a 12 treating physician’s “recommendations were so extreme as to be implausible and 13 were not supported by any findings made by any doctor,” the opinion was adequately 14 made non-controlling). As further developed below, Dr. Gorze’s findings also 15 conflicted with the SAMCs’ findings based on the same imaging study and other 16 relevant medical record evidence. See Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1148. (ALJ who sets 17 forth sufficient specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence may 18 give reduced weight to a treating physician’s opinion where there is a conflict 19 between that opinion and the opinions of other physicians.) 20 21 Because the ALJ provided sufficient specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence, he did not err in his assessment of Dr. Gorze’s opinion. 22 B. Dr. Nguyen’s Opinion 23 The ALJ also considered the opinion of another treating physician, 24 Dr. Nguyen. While the ALJ’s decision did not specifically name Dr. Nguyen in the 25 decision, the case law does “not require such an incantation,” because reviewing 26 courts may draw specific and legitimate inferences from the ALJ’s opinion. 27 Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 755. In this regard, the decision refers to “treating medical 28 sources” and discusses opinions offered in response to email requests by Plaintiff. 7 1 (AR 39.) In context, that is a clear reference to Dr. Nguyen’s opinion given shortly 2 after Plaintiff’s 2013 right knee surgery. Dr. Nguyen determined that Plaintiff’s 3 immediate post-surgery activities should be limited for one month as follows: never 4 stand, walk, climb stairs, or climb ladders. Dr. Nguyen also provided temporal 5 extensions on this limitation at Plaintiff’s request. (AR 1166, 1200-01.) 6 The ALJ rejected Dr. Nguyen’s opinion because it was given at the request of 7 Plaintiff without any clinical or diagnostic evidence to support it. (AR 39.) That was 8 proper and supported by substantial evidence. See Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149 9 (physician’s opinion may be properly discounted if it is based on the claimant’s 10 subjective complaints and testing within the complainant’s control). It was brief, 11 conclusory and clinically unsupported, and did not warrant a disability determination. 12 See Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228; Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195; Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. 13 Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Nguyen’s opinion. 14 C. The SAMC’s Opinions 15 Opinions of non-treating physicians may serve as substantial evidence when 16 consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record. See 17 Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59. An ALJ is required to evaluate the opinion of a non- 18 treating physician, reference specific evidence in the medical record, and explain the 19 weight to which it was entitled. See Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 20 1998). Thus, a nonexamining physician opinion “need not be discounted and may 21 serve as substantial evidence when they are supported by other evidence in the record 22 and are consistent with it.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). 23 The ALJ must give specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence for 24 rejecting the opinion of a treating physician based in part on the testimony of a 25 nonexamining medical advisor. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043; Magallanes, 881 F.2d 26 at 752-53. 27 Dr. Lizarraras analyzed medical record evidence of Plaintiff’s medical check- 28 ups, procedures, and clinical tests from February 2012 to March 2014. (AR 93-94, 8 1 101-102.) He reported that Plaintiff had severe disorders of muscle, ligament and 2 fascia, severe osteoarthrosis and allied disorders, and non-severe thyroid gland 3 disorders (except malignant neoplasm). (AR 94, 102.) He attributed partial credibility 4 to Plaintiff’s testimony and complaints and opined that Plaintiff could occasionally 5 kneel and lift up to twenty pounds; frequently crouch and lift ten pounds; and stand, 6 walk, and sit for six out of eight work hours. (AR 95, 96, 103, 104.) Based on these 7 factors, Dr. Lizarraras determined Plaintiff’s RFC should be light work and not 8 disabled. (AR 97-98, 105-06.) 9 The ALJ also afforded weight to Dr. Scott, in assessing Plaintiff’s claims. (AR 10 38, 109-116, 117-124.) Dr. Scott reviewed medical record evidence of Plaintiff’s 11 medical check-ups, procedures, and clinical tests from February 2014 through April 12 2014. (AR 111, 119.) He made the same assessments of Plaintiff’s condition, 13 credibility, physical abilities, recommended RFC, and disability status as 14 Dr. Lizarraras. (AR 109-124.) 15 The ALJ properly assessed the opinions of Dr. Lizarraras and Dr. Scott as 16 consistent with the medical record. As stated in the ALJ’s decision, the SAMC 17 opinions were “consistent with and well supported by the medical record, when 18 considered as a whole.” (AR 38.). The ALJ then reviewed the medical record in detail 19 and explained why that record did not reasonably support greater limitations than 20 those found in the SAMC opinions. These findings were supported by substantial 21 evidence, and it was within the prerogative of the ALJ to resolve any conflicts and 22 ambiguities in the record in this manner. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 23 169 F.3d 595, 601 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Where medical reports are inconclusive, 24 questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony are functions 25 solely of the [Commissioner].”). Thus, the SAMC’s opinions – with support from 26 other evidence in the record as cited in the decision – were properly relied on the ALJ 27 in his disability determination. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. 28 9 1 III. THE ALJ’S ADVERSE CREDIBILITY DETERMINATION 2 Where a claimant has presented evidence of an underlying impairment and the 3 record is devoid of affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for 4 rejecting the claimant’s subjective symptom statements must be “specific, clear and 5 convincing.” Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Molina 6 v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012)). “General findings [regarding a 7 claimant’s credibility] are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony 8 is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Burrell, 9 775 F.3d at 1138 (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834) (9th Cir. 1995)). The 10 ALJ’s findings “must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude 11 the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not 12 arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding pain.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 13 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 345-46 (9th 14 Cir. 1991) (en banc)). 15 Factors the ALJ may consider when making such determinations include the 16 objective medical evidence, the claimant’s treatment history, the claimant’s daily 17 activities, and inconsistencies in testimony. See Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 18 1163 (9th Cir. 2014); Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039; see generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 19 404.1529(a), 416.929(a) (explaining how pain and other symptoms are evaluated). 20 “When evidence reasonably supports either confirming or reversing the ALJ’s 21 decision, [the court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.” Batson, 22 359 F.3d at 1196. 23 Here, Plaintiff alleged that he was disabled because of bilateral cubital tunnel 24 syndrome, carpel tunnel syndrome, bilateral tendonitis, right hip joint pain, crepitus 25 of the right knee, osteoarthritis, and chronic lower back pain. (AR 62-63.) He also 26 claimed that these disabilities precluded him from working as he experienced 27 numbness, could not lift more than five pounds, could not walk for more than ten 28 minutes, sit for more than fifteen minutes, or stand for more than twenty minutes. 10 1 (AR 66-68.) Plaintiff further testified he could not crouch, kneel or climb up stairs. 2 (AR 69.) 3 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding pain and his ability to 4 work based were not entitled to full weight. (AR 40.) As support for that conclusion, 5 the ALJ relied on a number of instances of “inconsistencies in [Plaintiff’s] statements 6 and actions,” as well as the lack of supporting objective evidence. (ECF No. 40.) 7 First, in contrast to his claim of complete disability, Plaintiff reported, “feeling 8 well at times,” and “treating sources have repeatedly described the claimant as “well 9 appearing,” and noted that Plaintiff walked well. (AR 40.). In addition, the ALJ 10 pointed to portions of the record that showed Plaintiff “exercising on a regular basis 11 at a moderate level.” (AR 40.) That his doctors may have recommended this exercise 12 does not alter the fact that having an ability to exercise at a moderate level is 13 inconsistent with the severity of symptoms and limitations claimed by Plaintiff. See 14 Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010). 15 Second, the ALJ set out inconsistencies in the record regarding Plaintiff’s 16 statement of his work history. At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that he 17 had not worked at all since November 2012. (AR 59-60.) The ALJ, however, pointed 18 to record evidence that showed Plaintiff had earned $500 for work performed in the 19 third quarter of 2015. (AR 60, 274.) The ALJ further cited an October 2015 phone 20 conversation in which Plaintiff’s wife told his doctor that Plaintiff was at work. (AR 21 60, 1646.) 22 Third, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s language capabilities and determined that 23 Plaintiff was inconsistent in how he represented his ability to speak and understand 24 English. (AR 40-41.) Medical reports indicated Plaintiff “utilize[d] his English 25 language skills” without the aid of an interpreter to interact with his treating sources. 26 (AR 41.) On the other hand, Plaintiff expressed a need for an interpreter during legal 27 proceedings and claimed that he had failed a citizenship test due to lack of English 28 skills. (AR 40-41, 52 64-65, 1637.) 11 1 Although the above evidence could be subject to more than one interpretation, 2 substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings, and these multiple inconsistencies 3 are specific, clear and convincing reasons for the adverse credibility determination 4 that must be upheld. See Bray, 554 F.3d at 1227; Burch v Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 5 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005). 6 Finally, the ALJ referred to his discussion of the objective evidence and found 7 that “[t]here simply is not enough consistent medical evidence demonstrating the 8 intensity, persistence and limiting effects of the claimant’s alleged symptoms.” (AR 9 40.) So long as it was not the sole basis for her credibility determination, the ALJ 10 was entitled to rely upon the lack of objective medical evidence to discredit Plaintiff’s 11 subjective complaints. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 681 (“Although lack of medical 12 evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that 13 the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.”); Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857 (“While 14 subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully 15 corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant 16 factor in determining the severity of the claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.”); 17 Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600 (conflicts between a claimant’s testimony and the objective 18 medical evidence in the record can undermine a claimant’s credibility). Moreover, 19 given the other sufficient reasons given by the ALJ, any error in reliance on the lack 20 of supporting objective would be harmless to the adverse credibility determination. 21 See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (where one or more reasons supporting ALJ’s 22 credibility analysis are invalid, error is harmless if ALJ provided other valid reasons 23 supported by the record); Batson, 359 F.3d at 1197 (even if the record did not support 24 one of the ALJ’s stated reasons for disbelieving a claimant’s testimony, the error was 25 harmless where ALJ provided other valid bases for credibility determination). 26 27 * * * 28 12 * * 1 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered affirming the 2 decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and dismissing this action with 3 prejudice. 4 5 DATED: 7/16/2018 6 7 8 ____________________________________ ALEXANDER F. MacKINNON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13
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