Shayla N. Gibson v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 2:2017cv04692 - Document 21 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner. (See document for further details). (mr)
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Shayla N. Gibson v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHAYLA N. GIBSON, Plaintiff, 12 15 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER v. 13 14 CASE NO. CV 17-4692 SS NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. 16 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 21 Shayla N. Gibson (“Plaintiff”) brings this action seeking to 22 overturn the decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security 23 (the 24 Disability Insurance Benefits. 25 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United 26 States Magistrate Judge. 27 stated below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision. “Commissioner” or “Agency”) denying her application for The parties consented, pursuant to (Dkt. Nos. 11-13). For the reasons 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 II. 2 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 3 4 On November 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for 5 Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) pursuant to Title II of the 6 Social Security Act alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 7 2011. 8 application. 9 an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which took place on May 13, (AR 130-31). The (AR 69-82). (AR 89, 36-68). Commissioner Plaintiff’s denied Plaintiff requested a hearing before 10 2015. 11 7, 2016, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled because she was 12 capable of performing her past relevant work as a case worker, 13 receptionist, and secretary, and because there are also jobs in 14 the national economy that she can perform. 15 25, 16 review. 2017, the Appeals (AR 1-9). The ALJ issued an adverse decision on March Council denied (AR 10-20). Plaintiff’s On April request for This action followed on June 26, 2017. 17 18 III. 19 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 20 21 Plaintiff was born on July 25, 1977. (AR 130). She was thirty- 22 eight (38) years old when she appeared before the ALJ on February 23 3, 2017. 24 She is single and lives with her family. 25 last worked in 2010 as a case manager.1 (AR 40). Plaintiff is a college graduate. (AR 159). (AR 130, 165). (AR 42). Plaintiff She alleges 26 27 1 28 As discussed below, Plaintiff’s date last worked is in dispute. 2 1 disability due to bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and nerve damage 2 in her hands and neck. (AR 158). 3 4 Plaintiff’s Statements And Testimony A. 5 6 In a February 2014 Function Report, Plaintiff asserted that 7 her impairments restrict her ability to grab and grasp items. 8 165). 9 has pain in her finger tips, neck, and left arm. (AR Her hands cramp while writing, she drops things, and she (AR 165). She 10 is able to care for her children and her pets. (AR 166). Plaintiff 11 is 12 Nevertheless, she contends that her impairments limit her ability 13 to lift, stand, walk, sit, reach, finger, concentrate, and complete 14 tasks. 15 170). In October 2014, Plaintiff denied the use of any medications, 16 including over-the-counter medicines. able to drive (AR 170). and shop for household items. (AR She cannot lift more than five pounds. 168). (AR (AR 212). 17 18 At her February 2016 hearing, Plaintiff expressed confusion 19 about when she stopped working, acknowledging that she may have 20 worked in 2011 and 2012, despite claiming disability beginning in 21 January 2011. 22 due to carpal tunnel syndrome. 23 on both wrists, Plaintiff asserted that she has numbness and 24 tingling in her hands and wrists that has spread to her elbows and 25 up to her neck. 26 before developing numbness and tingling. 27 therapy and home exercises have not relieved her symptoms. 28 47). (AR 38, 40-42). (AR 46, 51). She testified being unable to work (AR 46). Despite having surgery She cannot sit or stand for long (AR 52). Physical (AR Despite continuing pain in her neck, right side, and both 3 1 hands and elbows, Plaintiff denied seeking any treatment during 2 2015, stating that she “didn’t know [she] could.” (AR 49-50, 58). 3 4 Plaintiff testified that she is able to care for her children, 5 ages eight, nine, ten and twelve, including driving them to school, 6 but relies on them to help prepare their meals, wash their clothes, 7 and shop for food. 8 personally handwrite the eight-page Function Report, stating that 9 it took her a while because her hand grew tired. 10 (AR 53-55). She acknowledged being able to is able to lift a case of water. (AR 55-56). She (AR 56). 11 12 B. Treatment History 13 14 On July 1, 2011, Plaintiff injured her hands, wrists, and 15 shoulders while working as a case manager for Maximus Cal Works. 16 (AR 416-17). 17 therapy sessions gave only minimal improvement, but she continued 18 to work. 19 bilateral hands, wrists, and shoulders that improves with rest. 20 (AR 21 tenosynovitis and bilateral shoulder strain, with a need to rule 22 out bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. 417). In November 2011, Plaintiff reported that physical (AR 417-18). She was still experiencing pain to her Plaintiff’s doctor diagnosed bilateral wrist (AR 425). 23 24 On November 14, 2011, electrodiagnostic testing indicated a 25 right mild compression of the median nerve at the carpal tunnel. 26 (AR 500). 27 carpal tunnel syndrome and early right carpal tunnel syndrome, as 28 well as possible right C6 radiculopathy. In January 2012, nerve conduction studies indicated left 4 (AR 636, 642). In July 1 and October 2013, Plaintiff underwent bilateral carpal tunnel 2 releases. (AR 745-46, 783, 786). 3 4 Plaintiff was evaluated on several occasions between November and December 2014 by Andre a workers’ (AR 790-807). In March 5 2012 Chaves, M.D. 6 compensation Qualified Medical Examiner. 7 2014, he diagnosed status post bilateral carpal tunnel releases 8 and questionable bilateral cubital tunnel syndrome. 9 examination, he found full, unimpeded range of motion in flexion 10 and extension of all digits, wrists and elbows without limitation. 11 (AR 791). 12 keyboard activities so long as they do not exceed thirty minutes 13 per hour. 14 motion, repetitive forceful gripping, and grasping with both hands. 15 (AR 792). 16 bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome based on clinical testing. 17 806). (AR 792). On Dr. Chaves opined that Plaintiff is able to perform (AR 792). He precluded Plaintiff from repetitive wrist In his December 2014 report, Dr. Chaves confirmed (AR 18 19 On March 31, 2014, John Sedgh, M.D., performed an Internal 20 Medicine Consultation examination, at the request of the Agency. 21 (AR 621-26). 22 but his neurological examination was unremarkable, and Plaintiff 23 exhibited a normal range of motion at her wrists. 24 Dr. Sedgh opined that Plaintiff can lift or carry twenty pounds 25 occasionally and ten pounds frequently; stand and walk or sit for 26 six hours during an eight-hour workday; occasionally kneel, crouch, 27 and stoop; and occasionally use gross and fine manipulation with 28 either hand. He noted a positive "Tinel’s sign" in both hands, (AR 625-26). 5 (AR 624-25). 1 C. State Agency Consultant 2 3 On April 17, 2014, Brett Alberty, M.D., a state agency 4 consultant, reviewed all the available evidence in the medical 5 file. 6 to occasionally lifting twenty pounds and frequently ten pounds; 7 standing and walking or sitting six hours in an eight-hour workday; 8 with no manipulative or kneeling limitations; and occasionally 9 stooping, crouching, and crawling. (AR 70-82). Dr. Alberty found that Plaintiff was limited (AR 78-79). 10 11 IV. 12 THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 13 14 To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must 15 demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 16 that prevents the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful 17 activity and that is expected to result in death or to last for a 18 continuous period of at least twelve months. 19 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). 20 The impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing 21 work 22 employment that exists in the national economy. 23 180 24 § 423(d)(2)(A)). previously F.3d 1094, performed 1098 or (9th any Cir. other 1999) Reddick v. Chater, substantial gainful Tackett v. Apfel, (citing 42 U.S.C. 25 26 To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ 27 conducts a five-step inquiry. 28 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. steps are: 6 The 1 (1) Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful 2 activity? 3 not, proceed to step two. 4 (2) Is the If so, the claimant is found not disabled. claimant’s impairment severe? 5 claimant is found not disabled. 6 If not, If the three. 7 (3) If so, proceed to step Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal one of the 8 specific impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 9 Subpart P, Appendix 1? 10 disabled. 11 (4) If so, the claimant is found If not, proceed to step four. Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If 12 so, the claimant is found not disabled. 13 to step five. 14 (5) If not, proceed Is the claimant able to do any other work? 15 claimant is found disabled. 16 If not, the If so, the claimant is found not disabled. 17 18 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 19 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)- 20 (g)(1), 416.920(b)-(g)(1). 21 The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four 22 23 and the Commissioner has the burden of 24 Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54. 25 affirmative duty to assist the claimant in developing the record 26 at every step of the inquiry. at step five. 27 claimant meets his or her burden of establishing an inability to 28 perform past work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant Additionally, the ALJ has an Id. at 954. 7 proof If, at step four, the 1 can perform some other work that exists in “significant numbers” 2 in 3 residual functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and work 4 experience. 5 721; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1). 6 may do so by the testimony of a VE or by reference to the Medical- 7 Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 8 Appendix 2 (commonly known as “the grids”). 9 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). the national economy, taking into account the claimant’s Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098, 1100; Reddick, 157 F.3d at The Commissioner Osenbrock v. Apfel, When a claimant has both 10 exertional (strength-related) and non-exertional limitations, the 11 Grids are inapplicable and the ALJ must take the testimony of a 12 vocational expert (“VE”). 13 Cir. 2000) (citing Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 14 1988)). Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th 15 16 V. 17 THE ALJ’S DECISION 18 19 The ALJ employed the five-step sequential evaluation process 20 and concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning 21 of the Social Security Act. (AR 20). At step one, the ALJ declined 22 to make a finding whether Plaintiff engaged in substantial gainful 23 activity since January 1, 2011, the alleged onset date.2 24 At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s history of bilateral (AR 12). 25 26 27 28 2 The record contains disputed evidence whether Plaintiff worked in 2011 or 2012. (AR 12). However, given the denial at both steps four and five, the ALJ “decline[d] to render a finding of substantial gainful activity at Step 1.” (AR 12). 8 1 carpal tunnel syndrome post bilateral carpal tunnel release in 2013 2 and bilateral cubital tunnel syndrome are severe impairments. 3 12-14). 4 have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or 5 medically equal the severity of any of the listings enumerated in 6 the regulations. (AR At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not (AR 14). 7 The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff’s RFC and concluded that she 8 9 can perform light work,3 with the following nonexertional 10 limitations: “[Plaintiff] can perform frequent handling, grasping, 11 gripping and fingering with the bilateral upper extremities; she 12 is unable to engage in keyboard use for more than 30 minutes in an 13 hour; and she is limited to occasional overhead reaching with the 14 bilateral upper extremities.” 15 found that Plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant work 16 as a case worker, receptionist, and secretary.4 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (AR 14). At step four, the ALJ (AR 18-19). “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). 3 4 The VE testified that Plaintiff was able to perform her past relevant work both as generally performed and as actually performed by Plaintiff. (AR 61). The ALJ, however, found that as a case worker, Plaintiff actually performed manipulative activities seven hours in an average workday, which exceeds the RFC. (AR 19). Therefore, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is capable of performing her past relevant work as a case worker, receptionist, 9 1 Alternatively, based on Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, work 2 experience and the VE’s testimony, the ALJ determined at step five 3 that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 4 national economy that Plaintiff can perform, including sorter, 5 inspector, and electronics worker. 6 ALJ found that Plaintiff was not under a disability, as defined by 7 the Social Security Act, from January 1, 2011, through the date of 8 the decision. (AR 19-20). Accordingly, the (AR 20). 9 10 VI. 11 STANDARD OF REVIEW 12 13 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 14 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The court may set aside 15 the Commissioner’s decision when the ALJ’s findings are based on 16 legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the 17 record as a whole. 18 2014) (citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 19 1052 (9th Cir. 2006)); Auckland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 20 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097); Smolen v. 21 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Fair v. Bowen, 22 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989)). Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 23 24 25 “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (citing Jamerson v. 26 27 28 and secretary as generally performed, receptionist work as actually performed. 10 and the (AR 19). secretary and 1 Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)). 2 evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to 3 support a conclusion.” 4 Smolen, 5 evidence supports a finding, the court must “‘consider the record 6 as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 7 detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.’” 8 F.3d at 1035 (citing Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 9 1993)). 80 F.3d at It is “relevant Id. (citing Jamerson, 112 F.3d at 1066; 1279). To determine whether substantial Auckland, 257 If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming 10 or reversing that conclusion, the court may not substitute its 11 judgment for that of the Commissioner. 12 21 (citing Flaten v. Sec’y, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)). Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720- 13 14 VII. 15 DISCUSSION 16 Plaintiff 17 asserted that she is unable to work due to 18 debilitating pain, numbness, and tingling in her bilateral hands 19 and wrists, which sometimes radiates from her elbows to her neck. 20 (AR 46, 51, 52, 165, 170). 21 cause difficulty gripping, reaching, and prolonged writing. 22 165, 170). 23 her four minor children for help with household chores. 24 55). Plaintiff testified that her symptoms (AR She limits her daily activities, relying heavily on (AR 53- 25 26 When assessing a claimant’s credibility regarding subjective 27 pain or intensity of symptoms, the ALJ must engage in a two-step 28 analysis. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). 11 1 First, the ALJ must determine if there is medical evidence of an 2 impairment that could reasonably produce the symptoms alleged. 3 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. 4 not required to show that her impairment could reasonably be 5 expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she 6 need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of 7 the symptom.” 8 must a claimant produce objective medical evidence of the pain or 9 fatigue itself, or the severity thereof.” “In this analysis, the claimant is Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). “Nor Id. (citation omitted). 10 11 If the claimant satisfies this first step, and there is no 12 evidence of malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and 13 convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony about 14 the symptom severity. 15 see also Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (“[T]he ALJ may reject the 16 claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms only 17 if he makes specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons 18 for doing so.”); Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 19 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering 20 based on affirmative evidence thereof, he or she may only find an 21 applicant 22 credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for each.”). 23 “This is not an easy requirement to meet: The clear and convincing 24 standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases.” 25 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 (citation omitted). not Trevizo, 874 F.3d at 678 (citation omitted); credible by making specific findings as to 26 27 28 In discrediting the claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, the ALJ may consider the following: 12 1 (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such 2 as 3 inconsistent 4 other testimony by the claimant that appears less than 5 candid; 6 failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed 7 course 8 activities. the claimant’s (2) of reputation statements concerning unexplained treatment; for or and (3) the lying, symptoms, inadequately the prior and explained claimant’s daily 9 10 Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation 11 omitted). 12 conduct, or internal contradictions in the claimant’s testimony, 13 also may be relevant. 14 Cir. 2014); Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 15 1997). 16 treating and examining physicians regarding, among other matters, 17 the functional restrictions caused by the claimant’s symptoms. 18 Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; accord Burrell, 775 F.3d at 1137. However, 19 it is improper for an ALJ to reject subjective testimony based 20 “solely” on its inconsistencies with the objective medical evidence 21 presented. 22 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Inconsistencies between a claimant’s testimony and Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th In addition, the ALJ may consider the observations of Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 23 24 Further, the ALJ must make a credibility determination with 25 findings that are “sufficiently specific to permit the court to 26 conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s 27 testimony.” 28 2008) (citation omitted); see Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 13 1 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A finding that a claimant’s testimony is not 2 credible must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court 3 to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on 4 permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s 5 testimony regarding pain.”) (citation omitted). 6 interpretation of a claimant’s testimony may not be the only 7 reasonable one, if it is supported by substantial evidence, “it is 8 not [the court’s] role to second-guess it.” 9 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). Although an ALJ’s Rollins v. Massanari, 10 The ALJ concluded that “the overall record fails to support 11 12 the severity of symptoms and limitations alleged.” (AR 15). He 13 provided several specific, clear, and convincing reasons to find 14 Plaintiff’s complaints of disabling pain, numbness, and tingling 15 in her bilateral hands and wrists not entirely credible. 16 18). 17 decision. (AR 14- These reasons are sufficient to support the Commissioner’s 18 The 19 ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms were 20 inconsistent with her conservative course of treatment. 21 “[E]vidence of conservative treatment is sufficient to discount a 22 claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment.” 23 v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007)) (citation omitted); 24 see Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999), as amended 25 (June 26 approaching the highest level imaginable was inconsistent with the 27 ‘minimal, conservative treatment’ that she received.”). 28 alleging debilitating symptoms, Plaintiff admitted that she had 22, 1999) (“Meanel’s claim 14 that she (AR 15). experienced Parra pain Although 1 not received any medical treatment since July 2015, after settling 2 her workers’ compensation claim. 3 October 2014, she reported using no medications, even over-the- 4 counter medicines. 5 effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of 6 determining eligibility for SSI benefits.” 7 Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). 8 Plaintiff used only home remedies, including exercises and heat. 9 (AR 49-50). (AR 212). (AR 47). Further, as early as “Impairments that can be controlled Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Instead, The lack of treatment records during the relevant 10 period suggests that Plaintiff’s symptoms were not as severe as 11 she alleged. 12 infer that claimant’s pain “was not as all-disabling as he reported 13 in light of the fact that he did not seek an aggressive treatment 14 program”). 15 seek additional treatment. 16 that 17 severity of symptoms alleged.” 18 find, 19 treatment 20 regarding her disabling pain were not entirely credible. See Tommasetti, 553 F.3d at 1039-40 (ALJ may properly Plaintiff testified that “she didn’t know [she] could” “[Plaintiff’s] after explanation considering history, (AR 58). that The ALJ concluded however, makes little (AR 15). Plaintiff’s Plaintiff’s sense given the The ALJ properly could sparse and testimony conservative and statements 21 22 The ALJ also found inconsistent. Plaintiff’s that 15). “[T]he ALJ may were consider 23 internally 24 inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or between the 25 testimony and the claimant’s conduct.” 26 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 27 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (“ALJ may engage in ordinary techniques of 28 credibility evaluation, (AR allegations such 15 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d as . . . inconsistencies in 1 claimant’s testimony”); 2 416.929(c)(4). 3 hand and wrist use, she acknowledged at the hearing that she wrote 4 the detailed, lengthy handwritten statements reflected in her 5 Function Report and is able to lift a case of water. 6 165, 170, with id. 55-56; see id. 15). 7 to her physician being able to take care of her four small children 8 alone and being able to "work out", meaning exercise at a gym. 9 246). accord 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), While Plaintiff claimed markedly limited bilateral (Compare AR Further, Plaintiff reported (AR However, at her hearing, Plaintiff testified that she relies 10 on her four minor children for significant help with household 11 chores. (AR 53-55). 12 13 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ ignored that while she is 14 “able to perform activities of daily living she is only able to do 15 so for short periods of time and with difficulty.” 16 at 8). 17 activities are inconsistent with testimony about pain, because 18 impairments that would unquestionably preclude work and all the 19 pressures of a workplace environment will often be consistent with 20 doing more than merely resting in bed all day.” 21 at 1016. 22 daily activities in weighing credibility. 23 1039. 24 claimant’s asserted limitations, it has a bearing on credibility. 25 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016. 26 Plaintiff’s 27 reaching, and prolonged writing, she acknowledged engaging in daily 28 activities, including caring for her four minor children, lifting (Dkt. No. 19 “ALJs must be especially cautious in concluding that daily Garrison, 759 F.3d Nevertheless, an ALJ properly may consider the claimant’s Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at If a claimant’s level of activity is inconsistent with the alleged Here, the ALJ determined that despite disabling 16 difficulties with gripping, 1 a case of water, and exercising at a gym that were inconsistent 2 with her alleged disabilities. 3 4 The ALJ also noted significant discrepancies among Plaintiff’s 5 statements regarding the temporal scope of her alleged disability. 6 (AR 15). While Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of January 7 1, 2011, she acknowledged at the hearing that she likely worked 8 until December 2011. 9 March 2011, she reported to her primary care physician being (Compare AR 130-31, with id. 38, 40-42). (AR 246). In 10 engaged in “stressful work.” In July 2011, Plaintiff 11 filed a workers’ compensation claim for a work-related injury to 12 her hands, wrists, and shoulders while working as a case manager 13 for Maximus Cal Works. 14 (upholding ALJ’s credibility finding because claimant “recently 15 worked as a personal caregiver for two years, and has sought out 16 other employment since then”). Moreover, earnings records indicate 17 2011 earnings of $36,619.60, earnings which would be inconsistent 18 with Plaintiff's claim of a disabling injury in 2011. 19 “Even if the work [the claimant has] done was not substantial 20 gainful activity, it may show that [the claimant is] able to do 21 more work that [she] actually did.” (AR 416-17); see Bray, 554 F.3d at 1227 (AR 153). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1571. 22 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to “consider [her] 23 24 credible testimony.” 25 ALJ 26 extending from her elbows to her neck.” 27 Plaintiff 28 fingering with the bilateral upper extremities; she is unable to “gave some to (Dkt. No. 19 at 9). credence only to “frequent [Plaintiff’s] handling, 17 To the contrary, the testimony (AR 18). of pain The ALJ limited grasping, gripping and 1 engage in keyboard use for more than 30 minutes in an hour; and 2 she is limited to occasional overhead reaching with the bilateral 3 upper extremities.” 4 clinical findings of Drs. Chaves, Sedgh, and Alberty (AR 70-82, 5 621-26, 790-807), which Plaintiff does not contest. 6 Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding 7 that the medical evidence, i.e., physicians’ opinions that the 8 claimant was able to perform a limited range of work, supported 9 the ALJ’s credibility determination). (AR 14). The RFC is consistent with the See Stubbs- 10 11 In sum, the ALJ offered clear and convincing reasons, 12 supported by substantial evidence in the record, for his adverse 13 credibility findings. 14 supports the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility, no remand 15 is required. Accordingly, because substantial evidence 16 17 VIII. 18 CONCLUSION 19 20 Consistent with the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be 21 entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner. 22 the Court shall serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on 23 counsel for both parties. The Clerk of 24 25 DATED: March 14, 2018 26 /S/ __________ SUZANNE H. SEGAL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27 28 18 1 2 3 THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION LEXIS/NEXIS OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 19 IN WESTLAW,
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