Angel Alfonso Canche v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 2:2017cv04380 - Document 24 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION by Magistrate Judge Alka Sagar. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. (See document for complete details) (afe)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Angel Alfonso Canche v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – WESTERN DIVISION 10 11 ANGEL ALFONSO CANCHE, Case No. CV 17-4380-AS Plaintiff, 12 MEMORANDUM OPINION 13 14 15 v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner Of Social Security, Defendant. 16 17 18 PROCEEDINGS 19 20 On June 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking review 21 of the denial of his application for Supplemental Security Income 22 (“SSI”). 23 before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. 24 Nos. 11, 12). 25 along with the Administrative Record (“AR”). 26 On June 13, 2018, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation (“Joint 27 Stip.”), 28 Plaintiff’s claim. (Dkt. No. 1). The parties have consented to proceed (Dkt. On November 13, 2017, Defendant filed an Answer setting forth their respective (Dkt. Nos. 15, 16). positions regarding (Dkt. No. 23). Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 The Court has taken this matter under submission without oral argument. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 3 4 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 5 6 On June 27, 2013, Plaintiff, a former truck driver, (see AR 7 225), filed his SSI application alleging an inability to work 8 because of a disability since April 20, 2010. 9 November 30, 2015, an Administrative Law Judge, Joel Martinez 10 (“ALJ”), 11 Brown-Ramos 12 counsel. 13 Plaintiff’s application on January 22, 2016. heard testimony (“VE”), (AR and 50-78). from a vocational Plaintiff, The ALJ (AR 196, 216). who expert, was issued a On Elizabeth represented decision by denying (AR 37-45). 14 15 The ALJ applied the five-step sequential process in 16 evaluating Plaintiff’s case. 17 that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 18 since June 27, 2013, the application date. 19 two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s lumbar spine degeneration is 20 a severe impairment.1 21 Plaintiff’s impairments do not meet or equal a listing found in 22 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.). At step one, the ALJ determined (AR 39). At step At step three, the ALJ found that (AR 40). Before 23 24 25 26 1 27 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s right inguinal hernia surgical repair to be non-severe. (AR 40). 28 2 1 proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the 2 following Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”)2: 3 4 [Plaintiff can] perform light work . . . except [he] 5 can 6 occasionally climb ramps and stairs, can never climb 7 ladders, 8 exposure to heights, hazards, or extreme temperatures. occasionally ropes, perform or postural scaffolds, and activities, should avoid can all 9 10 (Id.). 11 perform any past relevant work. 12 testimony at step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff, with his 13 age 14 experience, and RFC, can perform the following representative 15 jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy: 16 “basket 17 529.687-010) and “bagger garment” (DOT 920.687-018). 18 Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “has not been under 19 a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since June 20 27, 2013, the date the application was filed.” At step four, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff is unable to (forty-nine filler” on the (AR 43). application (Dictionary of Relying on the VE’s date), education, Occupational Titles work (“DOT”) (AR 44). (Id.). 21 22 The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of 23 the ALJ’s decision on April 14, 2017. 24 seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s decision which stands as the (AR 1-4). Plaintiff now 25 26 27 2 A Residual Functional Capacity is what a claimant can still do despite existing exertional and non-exertional limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). 28 3 1 final decision of the Commissioner. 2 1383(c). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 3 4 STANDARD OF REVIEW 5 6 This 7 determine 8 substantial evidence. 9 (9th Cir. 2012). Court if it reviews the is of free Administration’s legal error and decision to supported by See Brewes v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 “Substantial evidence” is more than a mere 10 scintilla, but less than a preponderance. 11 759 12 substantial evidence supports a finding, “a court must consider 13 the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and 14 evidence 15 Aukland 16 (internal quotation omitted). 17 can support either affirming or reversing the ALJ’s conclusion, 18 [a court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.” 19 Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). F.3d 995, that v. 1009 (9th detracts Massanari, Cir. from 257 2014). the F.3d Garrison v. Colvin, To determine [Commissioner’s] 1033, 1035 whether conclusion.” (9th Cir. 2001) As a result, “[i]f the evidence 20 21 DISCUSSION 22 23 Plaintiff’s one claim in this action is that the ALJ failed 24 to 25 After considering the record as a whole, the Court disagrees. properly consider his testimony. 26 27 28 4 (Joint Stip. at 4-14). As 1 set forth below, the Commissioner’s findings are supported by 2 substantial evidence and are free from material legal error.3 3 4 An ALJ’s assessment of a claimant’s credibility is entitled 5 to “great weight.” 6 (9th Cir. 1990); Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 7 1985). 8 disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be available 9 for See Anderson v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1121, 1124 “[T]he ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of the asking, a result plainly contrary to 10 423(d)(5)(A).” 11 2012). 12 credible, the ALJ engages in a two-step analysis. 13 42 U.S.C. § Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. In order to determine whether a claimant’s testimony is Garrison v. 14 15 First, the claimant “must produce objective medical evidence 16 of an underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected 17 to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” 18 Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 19 § 423(d)(5)(A)(1988)). 20 impairment, 21 evidence of the pain or fatigue itself, or the severity thereof.” 22 Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996), superseded 23 on other “the grounds, In producing evidence of the underlying claimant 20 Bunnell v. need C.F.R. § not produce objective 404.1529(c)(3). medical Instead, the 24 3 25 26 27 The harmless error rule applies to the review of administrative decisions regarding disability. See McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 886–88 (9th Cir. 2011); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (an ALJ’s decision will not be reversed for errors that are harmless). 28 5 1 claimant “need only show that [the impairment] could reasonably 2 have caused some degree of the symptom.” Id. 3 4 Second, once the claimant has produced the requisite 5 objective medical evidence, the “ALJ may reject the claimant’s 6 testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms.” 7 Absent affirmative evidence of malingering, however, the ALJ may 8 reject a plaintiff’s testimony only if the ALJ makes “specific 9 findings stating clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. at 1284. Id. 10 In assessing a claimant’s alleged symptoms, an ALJ may consider 11 the following: 12 13 (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such 14 as claimant’s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent 15 statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony 16 by the claimant that appears to be less than candid; 17 (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to 18 seek 19 treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities. treatment or to follow a prescribed course of 20 21 Id. 22 examining physicians and other third parties. An ALJ may also consider observations of treating and Id. 23 24 Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable 25 impairment 26 symptoms,” but Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, 27 persistence 28 entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision.” could and reasonably limiting be expected effects 6 of to these cause the symptoms alleged are not 1 (AR 41). 2 find 3 credible”: (1) inconsistency with the objective medical evidence; 4 (2) Plaintiff’s overall treatment history; and (3) Plaintiff’s 5 activities of daily living. The ALJ provided three clear and convincing reasons to Plaintiff’s statements about his symptoms “not entirely (AR 41-42). 6 7 Objective Medical Evidence 8 9 Reviewing the objective evidence, the ALJ pointed out, for 10 example, that an examination in August 2013 showed “normal muscle 11 bulk and tone without atrophy” and “5/5 motor strength.” 12 see 13 Plaintiff “noted that he had a painful gait, [but] there was no 14 evidence 15 September 2015 examination, moreover, showed “5/5 motor strength 16 in the lower extremities bilaterally.” 17 ALJ 18 “inconsistent with [Plaintiff’s] allegations that he is unable to 19 perform any work activity.” AR 358). of The the ALJ use reasonably of also a found remarked cane.” such (AR that 41; in (AR 41; January see AR 512). (AR 41; see AR 542). objective 2015, medical A The evidence (AR 41). 20 21 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ impermissibly considered the 22 objective evidence “because a rejection of a claimant’s testimony 23 based 24 insufficient.” 25 “may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely 26 on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the 27 claimant’s allegations,” 28 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009), the ALJ “must consider whether on a lack of objective evidence (Joint Stip. at 7-8). is always legally However, while the ALJ Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 7 1 an individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and 2 limiting effects of his or her symptoms are consistent with the 3 medical signs and laboratory findings of record,” SSR 16-3p, at 4 *5 (emphasis added). 5 record 6 subjective testimony.” 7 533 8 (“objective medical evidence is a useful indicator to help make 9 reasonable conclusions about the intensity and persistence of 10 symptoms, including the effects those symptoms may have on the 11 ability to perform work-related activities”). is F.3d a Indeed, “[c]ontradiction with the medical sufficient 1155, 1161 basis for rejecting the claimant’s Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., (9th Cir. 2008); see SSR 16-3p, at *5 12 13 Here, the ALJ did not reject Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms 14 solely 15 allegations. 16 Plaintiff’s statements because they are inconsistent with the 17 medical evidence in the record, along with other evidence such as 18 Plaintiff’s treatment history and activities of daily living. 19 Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s finding 20 that Plaintiff’s statements are inconsistent with the objective 21 medical evidence, and Plaintiff does not point to any evidence in 22 the record to show otherwise. 23 opined 24 consultative examiner Azizollah Karamlou, M.D., and state agency 25 reviewing physician S. Laiken, M.D. because that of a lack Instead, Plaintiff of the can evidence ALJ to support appropriately Plaintiff’s discredited Furthermore, multiple physicians perform 26 27 28 8 light work, (AR 96-97, 356-60). including 1 Thus, the ALJ properly discredited Plaintiff’s 2 testimony based on the contravening medical record. 3 symptom 533 F.3d at 1161. Carmickle, 4 5 Conservative Treatment 6 7 In concluding that Plaintiff’s treatment history 8 contradicted his allegations, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff 9 “was given conservative measures for treatment,” such as physical 10 therapy and pain medication. 11 basis for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. 12 Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ may properly 13 infer 14 reported in light of the fact that he did not seek an aggressive 15 treatment 16 treatment”); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) 17 (“[E]vidence of conservative treatment is sufficient to discount 18 a claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment.”). 19 Specifically, the ALJ remarked that Plaintiff’s “pain appears to 20 be managed with pain medications.” 21 example, that in September 2015, Plaintiff told his physician 22 that “he had pain but that it was managed with pain medications.” 23 (Id.; see AR 541). 24 medications, in contrast to 10/10 without medication. 25 Aside from medications, the ALJ pointed out that Plaintiff “was 26 referred for core strengthening” in September 2012, and he was 27 “advised 28 trigger point injection” in May 2015. that claimant’s program” to pain and (AR 41). “was not “responded This is an appropriate as See Tommasetti v. all-disabling favorably (AR 41). to as he conservative The ALJ noted, for Plaintiff stated that his pain was 3/10 with consider pool therapy, 9 and was (AR 541). scheduled for (AR 41; see AR 335, 489). a 1 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ was “wrong” in concluding 2 that Plaintiff’s treatment has been conservative because his use 3 of narcotic pain medications is not conservative treatment, and 4 no other non-conservative treatment options were available to 5 him. 6 ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s level of treatment conflicted with 7 his 8 medications substantially reduced his pain, (see AR 541), and his 9 physicians (Joint Stip. at 11-12). allegations of The record, however, supports the debilitating continued to pain. prescribe As this noted, treatment, Plaintiff’s along with 10 physical 11 rather than recommending surgery or other aggressive treatment. 12 (See, e.g., AR 498, 503, 519, 542, 583). 13 suggests that more aggressive treatments were unavailable, and it 14 is reasonable to infer from the lack of such treatment that 15 Plaintiff’s condition was adequately managed by the medications 16 and thus less severe than alleged. 17 reasonably 18 conflicted with his allegations of debilitating back pain. 19 Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 254 (9th Cir. 1996) (ALJ properly 20 considered evidence suggesting that claimant responded well to 21 treatment 22 Tommasetti, 533 23 Tommasetti responded 24 including 25 medication, a transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation unit, 26 and a lumbosacral corset.”). therapy and determined in an occasional that rejecting F.3d physical at and 27 28 10 injection, Based on this record, the ALJ claimant’s 1040 point Nothing in the record Plaintiff’s favorably therapy trigger the of testimony); (“The to course record of see reflects conservative use treatment See also that treatment anti-inflammatory 1 2 Accordingly, the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony on this ground. 3 4 Activities of Daily Living 5 6 Plaintiff’s ability to perform various everyday activities 7 is also a legitimate basis to discount his credibility. 8 Burch 9 (claimant’s allegations of disability properly discredited where 10 claimant was able to care for her own personal needs, cook, 11 clean, shop, interact with her boyfriend, and manage finances). 12 Here, among other observations, the ALJ noted that in September 13 2012, Plaintiff “was independent in activities of daily living 14 and ambulatory without an assistive device,” and Plaintiff also 15 reported in September 2015 that he could perform his activities 16 of daily living. 17 activities do not show that he was unimpaired, the ALJ reasonably 18 found these admitted activities to be inconsistent with the level 19 of impairment that Plaintiff alleged. 20 1113 (“Even where [claimant’s] activities suggest some difficulty 21 functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s 22 testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally 23 debilitating impairment.”). v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (AR 41; see AR 335, 541). (9th Cir. See 2005) Even if Plaintiff’s See Molina, 674 F.3d at 24 25 The ALJ also pointed to an inconsistency among Plaintiff’s 26 statements 27 November 2015 hearing, Plaintiff testified that he did not use a 28 cane, and he can walk for thirty minutes at a time, stand for that additionally eroded 11 his credibility. In the 1 twenty minutes, and sit for two hours. 2 ALJ contrasted this testimony with questionnaire responses in 3 July 2013 indicating that Plaintiff used a cane and could walk 4 about twenty feet and stand or sit for about ten minutes at a 5 time. 6 inconsistency in Plaintiff’s reports “tends to raise questions 7 about the reliability of [Plaintiff’s] statements.” (AR 42; see AR 231-32). (AR 42; see AR 67). The The ALJ found that this apparent (AR 42). 8 9 Thus, 10 statements 11 activities. the ALJ based on properly their discounted Plaintiff’s inconsistency with his symptom daily 12 13 ORDER 14 15 16 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. 17 18 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 19 20 Dated: July 19, 2018 21 ______________/s/_____________ ALKA SAGAR UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
