Michael White v. The Senior Leaders Severance Pay Plan of Danaher Corporation et al, No. 2:2017cv03476 - Document 45 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 34 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II . (lc). Modified on 10/24/2018 (lc).
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Michael White v. The Senior Leaders Severance Pay Plan of Danaher Corporation et al Doc. 45 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court Central District of California 8 9 10 10 11 11 MICHAEL WHITE, Plaintiff, 12 12 v. 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 Case No. 2:17-cv-03476-ODW (JCx) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES THE SENIOR LEADERS SEVERANCE AND COSTS [34] PAY PLAN OF DANAHER CORPORATION AND ITS AFFILIATED COMPANIES, an ERISA plan; DANAHER CORPORATION, a corporation; DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, 18 18 Defendants. 19 19 20 20 Plaintiff Michael White claimed he was improperly denied severance benefits 21 21 after his employer fired him. He sued his employer, Danaher Corporation, and The 22 22 Senior Leaders Severance Pay Plan of Danaher Corporation (collectively, “Danaher”). 23 23 (Compl., ECF No. 1.) On June 27, 2018, the Court granted Danaher’s Motion for 24 24 Summary Judgment. (Order Granting Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“MSJ Order”), ECF 25 25 No. 30.) Danaher now seeks its attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to ERISA’s1 civil 26 26 27 27 28 28 1 Employee Retirement Income Securities Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132. Dockets.Justia.com 1 enforcement provision. (Mot. for Attorney Fees and Costs (“Mot.”) 5, ECF No. 34.) 2 For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Danaher’s Motion.2 I. 3 BACKGROUND 4 The Court addressed the factual allegations and procedural history relevant to 5 this case in its MSJ Order and incorporates that discussion here by reference. (See 6 ECF No. 30.) After obtaining summary judgment in its favor, Danaher now seeks an 7 award of attorneys’ fees of $94,733.60 and costs of $507.37. (Notice of Mot. 2.)3 II. 8 LEGAL STANDARD 9 Under ERISA’s civil enforcement provision, “the court in its discretion may 10 allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.” 29 U.S.C. 11 § 1132(g)(1). A claimant is eligible to seek fees under section 1132(g)(1) if they have 12 achieved “some degree of success on the merits.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life 13 Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 245 (2010) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 14 694 (1983)). 15 Once a fee claimant is found eligible, district courts must apply the factors 16 articulated in Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1980), in 17 exercising their discretion to award fees. 18 Disability Plan, 608 F.3d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010). The “Hummell factors” include: 19 (1) the degree of the opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) the 20 ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether 21 an award of fees against the opposing parties would deter others from 22 acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties requesting 23 fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA 24 25 26 27 28 Simonia v. Glendale Nissan/Infiniti 2 After considering the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 3 Danaher also seeks judicial notice of several documents relevant to the reasonableness of Danaher’s submitted billing rates and hours. (Req. for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 34-4.) Because the Court does not find a fee award appropriate, it is unnecessary to reach Danaher’s Request for Judicial Notice. Accordingly, Danaher’s Request for Judicial Notice is DENIED as moot. (ECF No. 34-4.) 2 1 plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA; and 2 (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions. 3 Hummell, 634 F.2d at 453. No one factor is determinative, and some factors may be 4 irrelevant depending on the case. Carpenters S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. Russell, 726 5 F.2d 1410, 1416 (9th Cir. 1984). 6 “[A]pplication of the Hummell factors must recognize the remedial purpose of 7 ERISA in favor of participants and beneficiaries.” Honolulu Joint Apprenticeship & 8 Training Comm. of United Ass’n Local Union No. 675 v. Foster, 332 F.3d 1234, 1239 9 (9th Cir. 2003). “While some Ninth Circuit authority may advise caution prior to the 10 award of attorney’s fees against [an ERISA] plaintiff, such cases do not eliminate the 11 possibility of an award of fees to a defendant generally.” Reilly v. Charles M. Brewer 12 Ltd. Money Purchase Pension Plan & Tr., 349 F. App’x 155, 158 (9th Cir. 2009). 13 The Ninth Circuit has long made clear that “the playing field is level” and the 14 “analysis . . . must focus only on the Hummell factors, without favoring” either side. 15 Id. (quoting Estate of Shockley v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 130 F.3d 403, 408 (9th 16 Cir. 1997); see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 17 1236 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing the “level playing field” and affirming denial of 18 fees). III. 19 DISCUSSION 20 Having obtained summary judgment in their favor, no question exists that 21 Danaher succeeded on the merits. After considering the Hummell factors, however, 22 the Court finds that a fee award is not appropriate. 23 A. Bad Faith 24 “[T]o avoid a finding of bad faith under the Hummell factors, plaintiffs must 25 have a reasonable belief that they could prove an actionable ERISA claim.” Cline, 26 200 F.3d at 1236. White claimed that Danaher abused its discretion in finding he was 27 terminated for cause and consequently denying him severance benefits. The operative 28 question is then whether he had a reasonable belief that he could prove his claim. 3 1 White asserted several arguments in support of his claim. (See e.g., MSJ Order 11, 2 15–16 (including that Danaher reviewed improper summaries when reviewing his 3 claim, failed to provide specific reasons for denying his benefits, and operated under a 4 structural conflict of interest warranting increased scrutiny).) White’s claim may have 5 been marginal, but that does not make it unreasonable. 6 unsuccessful, after reviewing the record, the Court cannot find White’s claim to have 7 been brought in bad faith. Thus, this factor weighs against awarding fees. 8 B. Although ultimately Ability to Satisfy Fee Award 9 The second Hummell factor considers the ability of the opposing party to satisfy 10 the fee award. 634 F.2d at 453. Neither party disputes its ability to pay Defendants’ 11 fees. In such circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has found this factor to be neutral. See 12 Foster, 332 F.3d at 1239; see also Reilly, 349 F. App’x at 157. 13 C. Deterrence 14 Deterrence is more appropriately considered respecting a fee award to an 15 ERISA plaintiff, and thus is of less significance here. See Tingey v. Pixley-Richards 16 W., Inc., 958 F.2d 908, 910 (9th Cir. 1992). The interest in deterrence must be 17 “balanced against the interest in ensuring that plan participants are not overdeterred 18 from pursuing the prompt enforcement of their rights under a plan.” Black v. Greater 19 Bay Bancorp Exec. Supplemental Comp. Benefits Plan, No. 16-CV-00486-EDL, 2018 20 WL 1510084, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-1570 (9th Cir. 21 Apr. 26, 2018). The cost of litigation and unlikelihood of success generally deter 22 ERISA plaintiffs from frivolous litigation. Sanjiv Goel, M.D., Inc. v. Motion Picture 23 Indus. Pension & Health Plan, No. CV 14-2056 PSG (CWX), 2015 WL 13376563, at 24 *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2015). There is no need for additional deterrence where a fee 25 award would “tend to deter marginal but meritorious” claims. Corder v. Howard 26 Johnson & Co., 53 F.3d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 1994). Because the Court does not find 27 that White acted in bad faith, there is no need to further deter similar claims. 28 Accordingly, this factor weighs against awarding fees. 4 1 D. Benefit to All 2 “A lawsuit that benefits all plan participants or leads to the resolution of 3 important legal questions regarding ERISA can support the award of fees.” Goel, 4 2015 WL 13376563, at *4. As with deterrence, this factor is more appropriately 5 considered respecting a fee award to an ERISA plaintiff, not a defendant. See id. 6 (citing Tingey, 958 F.2d at 910). White sought to recover severance benefits for 7 himself, not to benefit other plan participants or resolve important legal questions. 8 However, neither is the Court convinced that Danaher’s motivation was anything 9 more than a desire to avoid a severance payment to White. Thus, this factor is neutral. 10 E. Relative Merits 11 The final Hummell factor is the “relative merits of the parties’ positions.” 634 12 F.2d at 453. There is no question that Danaher prevailed on all issues. Thus, this 13 factor favors a fee award. 14 Reviewing the Hummell factors, two factors weigh against, two factors are 15 neutral, and one factor favors a fee award. Only when a litigant has achieved some 16 success on the merits and the Hummell factors weigh in favor is a fee award 17 appropriate. Danaher obtained summary judgment in its favor, but the Hummell 18 factors do not favor a fee award. Accordingly, the Court denies Danaher’s motion for 19 attorneys’ fees and costs. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 IV. 1 2 3 CONCLUSION For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Danaher’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. (ECF No. 34.) 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 October 22, 2018 8 9 10 11 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
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