Sandie Jo Jones v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 2:2017cv01789 - Document 21 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm. The judgment of the Commissioner is affirmed. (sp)
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Sandie Jo Jones v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SANDIE JO JONES, Plaintiff, 12 13 14 15 16 v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. CV 17-1789 FFM MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 17 Plaintiff brings this action seeking to overturn the decision of the Commissioner 18 of the Social Security Administration denying her application for a period of disability 19 and Disability Insurance benefits (“DIB”). Plaintiff and defendant consented to the 20 jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 21 636(c). The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Court has 22 reviewed the administrative record (the “AR”) and the cross motions. For the reasons 23 stated below, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. 24 25 PRIOR PROCEEDINGS Plaintiff filed for a period of disability and DIB in March 2009, alleging an onset 26 of disability date of November 20, 2005. After a lengthy procedural history (including a 27 voluntary remand from this Court of the original decision in 2013, an Appeals Council 28 remand of a subsequent decision in 2014, and a denial of review by the Appeals Council 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 of a third decision in the matter in 2016), plaintiff commenced this action on March 6, 2 2017. CONTENTIONS 3 4 Plaintiff raises two contentions in this action: 5 1. Whether the ALJ properly determined that, despite her physical limitations, plaintiff was capable of sedentary work; and 6 2. 7 Whether the ALJ properly determined that, despite a mental limitation, plaintiff was capable of unskilled work. 8 STANDARD OF REVIEW 9 10 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Administration’s decisions to 11 determine if: (1) the Administration’s findings are supported by substantial evidence; 12 and (2) the Administration used proper legal standards. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 13 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). “Substantial evidence is more than a 14 scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 15 1998) (citation omitted). To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, 16 “a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and 17 evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.” Auckland v. Massanari, 18 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the evidence in the record can reasonably support either affirming or reversing 19 20 the ALJ’s conclusion, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. 21 Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Flaten v. Sec’y of 22 Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)). However, even if 23 substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s decision, the decision must 24 be reversed if the proper legal standard was not applied. Howard ex rel. Wolff v. 25 Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1279. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 2 DISCUSSION 1 2 3 A. Physical Limitations. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) determined that plaintiff was not 4 disabled as of her date last insured (“DLI”) of March 31, 2006. After the ALJ reviewed 5 the medical evidence in some detail, she accepted Dr. Rack’s testimony that although 6 plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis (first diagnosed in 2011) was disabling since 2012, there is 7 no evidence of neurological concerns as of the DLI. The ALJ noted that Dr. Rack did 8 not assess plaintiff’s claims of chronic pain and fibromyalgia. 9 The ALJ’s analysis of the pain and fibromyalgia complaints is less clear. 10 Essentially, the ALJ reviewed all the medical evidence and found no medical opinion 11 from before the DLI regarding limitations from pain or fibromyalgia. The symptoms 12 were mentioned in some treating records and in plaintiff’s testimony. However, the 13 ALJ discounted plaintiff’s testimony (which action is uncontested by plaintiff) and 14 rejected the opinions of doctors who, several years after the DLI, opined that plaintiff 15 would not have been able to work prior to the DLI. The ALJ also rejected testimony of 16 consulting physicians who opined that plaintiff suffered little to no limitations prior to 17 the DLI. The ALJ then crafted a residual functional capacity that was similar to, but 18 more restrictive than, that opined by the consulting physicians but less restrictive than 19 that opined by plaintiff’s physicians who treated her years after the DLI. Thus, the ALJ 20 seemingly rejected at least a portion of every opinion on the limitations (or lack 21 thereof) occasioned by pain and fibromyalgia. 22 To the extent the ALJ committed error by rejecting every opinion, the error was 23 harmless. The ALJ was entitled to reject the treating physicians’ opinions because they 24 were contradicted by the medical record (as testified to by the consulting physicians). 25 The ALJ provided a clear and specific reason for rejecting the treating physicians’ 26 opinions, i.e., these physicians first treated plaintiff years after her DLI and the medical 27 record did not support their conclusions as to the alleged longevity of plaintiff’s 28 condition. 3 Therefore, remand is not required with respect to this issue. 1 2 B. Mental Limitations The ALJ found that, prior to the DLI, plaintiff suffered from the severe 3 4 impairment of, among other things, depressive disorder. In evaluating whether plaintiff 5 satisfied a listing, the ALJ found that plaintiff had mild mentally based restrictions in 6 activities of daily living; mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning; and 7 moderate difficulties maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. (AR 703.) The 8 ALJ reviewed the medical record with respect to plaintiff’s mental impairment and 9 concluded that a limitation to “unskilled work (such as requiring simple and repetitive 10 tasks”) would accommodate plaintiff’s condition. (AR 707.) The ALJ also referred to 11 the Code of Federal Regulations § 404.1568, which defines “unskilled work” as “work 12 which needs little or no judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a 13 short period of time.” Plaintiff complains that the limitation to unskilled work does not capture the full 14 15 restrictions occasioned by “moderate difficulties maintaining concentration, 16 persistence, or pace.” However, an ability to perform simple, repetitive tasks is 17 consistent with having moderate difficulties maintaining concentration, persistence, or 18 pace. See, e.g., Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174-76 (Ninth Cir. 2008). 19 The consulting physicians who reviewed the medical records both concluded that 20 plaintiff’s depression before her DLI occasioned no functional limitations. Although 21 the ALJ nonetheless found moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, 22 persistence, or pace, he fashioned a residual functional capacity that took that condition 23 into consideration. Therefore, remand is not appropriate with respect to this issue. 24 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 4 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Commissioner is affirmed. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 5 DATED: December 29, 2017 /S/ FREDERICK F. MUMM FREDERICK F. MUMM United States Magistrate Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5
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