Debra A. Cowart v. Nancy A. Berryhill, No. 2:2017cv01553 - Document 29 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING this matter for further proceedings consistent with this decision. (See document for further details). (mr)
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Debra A. Cowart v. Nancy A. Berryhill Doc. 29 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DEBRA A. COWART, Plaintiff, 12 13 14 15 CASE NO. CV 17-1553 SS v. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. 16 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 21 Debra A. Cowart (“Plaintiff”) seeks review of the final 22 decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security (the 23 “Commissioner” or “Agency”) denying her applications for social 24 security benefits. 25 § 636(c), to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States 26 Magistrate Judge. 27 below, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this case The parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. (Dkt. Nos. 11, 13, 15). For the reasons stated 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings consistent with 2 this decision. 3 4 II. 5 THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 6 7 To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must 8 demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 9 that prevents the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful 10 activity and that is expected to result in death or to last for a 11 continuous period of at least twelve months. 12 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). 13 The impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing 14 work 15 employment that exists in the national economy. 16 180 17 § 423(d)(2)(A)). previously F.3d performed 1094, 1098 or (9th any Cir. other 1999) Reddick v. Chater, substantial gainful Tackett v. Apfel, (citing 42 U.S.C. 18 19 To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ 20 conducts a five-step inquiry. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 21 The steps are: 22 23 (1) Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful 24 activity? 25 not, proceed to step two. 26 (2) Is the If so, the claimant is found not disabled. claimant’s impairment 27 claimant is found not disabled. 28 three. 2 severe? If not, If the If so, proceed to step 1 (3) Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal one of the 2 specific impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 3 Subpart P, Appendix 1? 4 disabled. 5 (4) If so, the claimant is found If not, proceed to step four. Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If 6 so, the claimant is found not disabled. 7 to step five. 8 (5) 9 Is the claimant able to do any other work? claimant is found disabled. 10 If not, proceed If not, the If so, the claimant is found not disabled. 11 12 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 13 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)- 14 (g)(1), 416.920(b)-(g)(1). 15 The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four 16 17 and the 18 Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54. 19 affirmative duty to assist the claimant in developing the record 20 at every step of the inquiry. 21 claimant meets his or her burden of establishing an inability to 22 perform past work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant 23 can perform some other work that exists in “significant numbers” 24 in 25 residual functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and work 26 experience. 27 721; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1). 28 may do so by the testimony of a VE or by reference to the Medical- the Commissioner national has economy, the burden of at step five. Additionally, the ALJ has an Id. at 954. taking proof into If, at step four, the account the claimant’s Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098, 1100; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 3 The Commissioner 1 Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 2 Appendix 2 (commonly known as “the grids”). 3 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). 4 exertional (strength-related) and non-exertional limitations, the 5 Grids are inapplicable and the ALJ must take the testimony of a 6 vocational expert (“VE”). 7 Cir. 2000) (citing Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 8 1988)). Osenbrock v. Apfel, When a claimant has both Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th 9 10 III. 11 THE ALJ’S DECISION 12 13 The ALJ employed the five-step sequential evaluation process 14 in evaluating Plaintiff’s case. 15 Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 16 March 13, 2012, the alleged onset date. 17 the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease of the 18 lumbosacral spine, obesity, hypertension, and diabetes are severe 19 impairments. 20 Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments 21 that meet or medically equal the severity of any of the listings 22 enumerated in the regulations. (AR 28). At step one, the ALJ found that (AR 27). At step two, At step three, the ALJ determined that (AR 28). 23 The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff’s RFC and concluded that she 24 25 can “lift 26 occasionally; 27 restrictions; occasional stooping and crouching; no climbing ropes, 28 ladders, and scaffolds; and no working near unprotected heights.” and carry stand/walk 10 pounds for 6 4 frequently hours out of and 8; 20 sit pounds without 1 (AR 28). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of 2 performing past relevant work as a receptionist, administrative 3 clerk, and data entry operator. 4 found that Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the 5 Social Security Act since March 13, 2012, the alleged onset date. 6 (AR 32). (AR 32). Accordingly, the ALJ 7 8 IV. 9 STANDARD OF REVIEW 10 11 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 12 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. “[The] court may set 13 aside the Commissioner’s denial of benefits when the ALJ’s findings 14 are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial 15 evidence in the record as a whole.” 16 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097); see 17 also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 18 Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989)). Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 19 20 “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than 21 a preponderance.” 22 Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)). 23 evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to 24 support a conclusion.” 25 evidence supports a finding, the court must “ ‘consider the record 26 as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 27 detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.’ ” 28 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (citing Jamerson v. Id. It is “relevant To determine whether substantial 5 Aukland, 257 1 1993)). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming 2 or reversing that conclusion, the court may not substitute its 3 judgment for that of the Commissioner. 4 21 (citing Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 5 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)). Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720- 6 7 V. 8 DISCUSSION 9 10 A. New Evidence Is Part Of The Record Before This Court 11 12 Following her August 2015 hearing, Plaintiff submitted new 13 evidence that predated the ALJ’s September 2015 decision: (1) a 14 mental RFC from Carlos Jordan-Manzano, M.D., dated March 17, 2015; 15 and (2) medical records from Tyron C. Reece, M.D., dated December 16 14, 2014, through August 27, 2015. 17 acknowledged Dr. Jordan-Manzano’s report (AR 31), but did not 18 include it or Dr. Reece’s records in the list of documents reviewed 19 for his decision. (AR 665-94). The ALJ briefly (AR 33-38). 20 Plaintiff 21 contends that the Appeals Council “made no 22 indication that the new evidence was considered.” (Dkt. No. 22 at 23 6). 24 evidence 25 considered . . . the additional evidence listed on the enclosed 26 Order”); (see id. 4-5). 27 to alter the ALJ’s decision. 28 became part of the record and must be considered by this Court in To the contrary, the Appeals Council considered the new and made it a part of the record. (AR 2) (“we The Appeals Council nevertheless declined (AR 1-5). 6 Thus, the new evidence 1 reviewing the ALJ’s decision. Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2 682 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]hen the Appeals Council 3 considers new evidence in deciding whether to review a decision of 4 the ALJ, that evidence becomes part of the administrative record, 5 which reviewing the 6 Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence.”). In 7 other words, this Court must “determine whether the ALJ’s finding 8 of nondisability was supported by substantial evidence in the 9 entire record - including any new evidence in the administrative 10 record that the Appeals Council considered - not just the evidence 11 before the ALJ.” 12 2017). the district court must consider when Gardner v. Berryhill, 856 F.3d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 13 14 15 B. The ALJ Failed To Properly Weigh The Treating Physicians’ Opinions 16 17 An ALJ must afford the greatest weight to the opinions of the 18 claimant’s treating physicians. The opinions of treating 19 physicians are entitled to special weight because the treating 20 physician is hired to cure and has a better opportunity to know 21 and observe the claimant as an individual. 22 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 23 947, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2002); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 24 751 (9th Cir. 1989). 25 contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for “clear 26 and convincing” reasons. 27 Cir. 1995), as amended (Apr. 9, 1996). 28 physician’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may Connett v. Barnhart, Where the treating doctor’s opinion is not Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th 7 Even if the treating 1 not reject this opinion without providing specific, legitimate 2 reasons, supported by substantial evidence in the record. 3 830–31; see Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007); Ryan 4 v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). 5 a treating physician’s opinion is not given ‘controlling weight’ 6 because it is not ‘well-supported’ or because it is inconsistent 7 with other substantial evidence in the record,” the ALJ shall 8 consider “specified factors in determining the weight it will be 9 given[, including] . . . the length of the treatment relationship 10 and the frequency of examination by the treating physician[ ] and 11 the nature and extent of the treatment relationship between the 12 patient and the treating physician.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 631 (citation 13 omitted); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (listing factors to 14 consider), 416.927(d)(2) (same). Id. at “If 15 1. 16 Dr. Woodward 17 On June 14, 2013, Artis Woodward, M.D., Plaintiff’s family 18 19 practice physician, completed a Physical RFC Questionnaire. 20 599-602). He opined that while Plaintiff is capable of “low stress” 21 work, her lower back pain from sciatica and a lumbosacral sprain 22 would 23 cause frequent interference concentration necessary to 24 tasks. 599-600). 25 Plaintiff can sit or stand for only ten to fifteen minutes before 26 needing to change positions. (AR 600-01). During a normal workday, 27 Plaintiff can sit, stand or walk less than two hours, total, out 28 of an eight-hour workday. (AR sustain Dr. with simple, Woodward (AR 601). 8 the attention (AR repetitive further and workday concluded that She can rarely lift ten 1 pounds and frequently lift less than ten pounds. 2 Plaintiff can never twist, stoop/bend, crouch, climb ladders, or 3 climb stairs. 4 moderate limitations in doing repetitive reaching, handling or 5 fingering. 6 result of her impairments, Plaintiff would likely miss more than 7 four 8 “considered” 9 significant weight.” days (AR 601). (AR 601). of work Dr. (AR 601). Dr. Woodward opined that Plaintiff has Finally, Dr. Woodward concluded that as a per month. Woodward’s (AR 602). opinion, it Although was “not the ALJ accorded (AR 30). 10 11 The ALJ rejected Dr. Woodward’s opinion because Arthur 12 Brovender, M.D., a medical expert (“ME”) who testified at the 13 August 2015 hearing, found the opinion unsupported by the medical 14 record. 15 “examinations have all been essentially normal.” 16 ALJ further surmised that Plaintiff’s treating physicians “took 17 [Plaintiff’s] subjective allegations at face value and did not rely 18 on objective findings in 19 limitations.” (AR 31). The ALJ’s analysis is contrary to law and 20 not supported by substantial evidence. (AR 30-31). Dr. Brovender concluded that Plaintiff’s support of such (AR 31). limited The functional 21 22 First, to the extent that the ALJ relied on the opinion of 23 the ME to reject Dr. Woodward’s opinion, the ALJ erred. “The 24 opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute 25 substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion 26 of either an examining physician or a treating physician.” 27 81 F.3d at 831. 28 may serve as substantial evidence only when the opinions “are Lester, Instead, the opinions of a nonexamining physician 9 1 supported by other evidence in the record and are consistent with 2 it.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). 3 Defendant contends that the ME’s opinion was corroborated by 4 5 the 6 examiner. 7 are also nonexamining physicians, and the consultative examiner’s 8 functional assessment was more restrictive than the ME’s. (Compare 9 AR 50-51, with id. 400). opinions of state agency (Dkt. No. 27 at 5-6). physicians and the consultative However, the state agency doctors Indeed, the consultative examiner agreed 10 with Dr. Woodward that Plaintiff was limited to carrying ten pounds 11 occasionally and less than ten pounds frequently. 12 with id. 601). 13 Court that the ALJ’s reliance on the ME’s opinion was proper. (Compare AR 400, Thus, Defendants arguments fail to persuade the 14 15 Second, the ALJ’s vague and cursory explanations for rejecting 16 Dr. Woodward’s opinion are insufficient to meet the “specific, 17 legitimate 18 consistently mandated: reasons” standard. As the Ninth Circuit 19 20 To say that 21 sufficient objective findings or are contrary to the 22 preponderant 23 findings does not achieve the level of specificity our 24 prior 25 factors are listed seriatim. The ALJ must do more than 26 offer must 27 interpretations and explain why they, rather than the 28 doctors’, are correct. cases his medical opinions conclusions have mandated required, conclusions. are He 10 even not by when set supported the the forth by objective objective his own has 1 Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421–22 (9th Cir. 1988) (footnote 2 omitted); accord Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. 3 wishes to disregard the opinion of the treating physician, he or 4 she must make findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons 5 for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.” 6 Orn, 495 F.3d at 632 (citation omitted). 7 provide 8 substantial evidence in the record, for his conclusion that Dr. 9 Woodward’s opinion is contrary to the objective evidence. any specific and Therefore, “[i]f the ALJ legitimate Here, the ALJ fails to reasons, supported by (AR 31). 10 11 Finally, Dr. Woodward’s opinion is tests that consistent with the “A 12 treatment 13 physician’s opinion of disability premised to a large extent upon 14 the claimant’s own accounts of his symptoms and limitations may be 15 disregarded where those complaints have been properly discounted.” 16 Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 17 1999) (citation omitted). 18 credibility. 19 Plaintiff does not have a prescription for the cane she presented 20 with at the hearing (AR 29) and observing an apparent inconsistency 21 between Plaintiff’s contention that she has significantly limited 22 sitting 23 encouragement to exercise thirty minutes daily (AR 30), the ALJ 24 did not make an explicit credibility finding. 25 however, that the ALJ properly rejected Plaintiff’s credibility, 26 the record does not establish that Dr. Woodward based his opinion 27 largely on Plaintiff’s self-reports rather than the doctor’s own 28 clinical observations. notes and and (See clinical performed. Here, the ALJ did not assess Plaintiff’s generally standing he AR abilities 28-31). and her While treating noting that physician’s Even assuming, See Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1199-200 (error where 11 asserted that ALJ 2 [claimant’s] ‘subjective complaints’ ” but there was nothing in 3 record to suggest that physician relied more heavily on claimant’s 4 complaints 5 Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]here is no 6 inconsistency between Webb’s complaints and his doctors’ diagnoses 7 sufficient to doom his claim as groundless . . . . Webb’s clinical 8 records did not merely record the complaints he made to his 9 physicians, nor did his physicians dismiss Webb’s complaints as than examining the physician “too 1 doctor’s relied clinical heavily observations); Webb on v. 10 altogether unfounded. To the contrary, the doctors’ reports and 11 test corresponded 12 perceived . . . .”). 13 Plaintiff’s 14 Woodward’s clinical findings included moderate tenderness at L3-5, 15 with pain radiating to Plaintiff’s thighs, reduced grip strength, 16 and a positive Phalen’s Test.1 17 included L3-S1 pain and tenderness, decreased range of motion in 18 the lumbar spine, and muscle spasms at L1-5 bilaterally. 19 49). 20 sprain, low back pain, and lumbar sciatica. results usually Contrary examinations were to not with Dr. the afflictions Brovender’s “essentially (AR 599). Webb conclusion, normal.” Dr. Other clinical findings (AR 447- Dr. Woodward’s clinical diagnoses included lumbar spine (AR 445-49). 21 2. 22 Dr. Reece 23 On October 17, 2014, Tyron C. Reece, M.D., Plaintiff’s general 24 25 26 practice physician, completed a Physical RFC Questionnaire. “Phalen’s maneuver is a diagnostic test for carpal tunnel syndrome.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phalen_maneuver (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 1 27 28 (AR 12 He opined that Plaintiff’s mid to lower back pain with 1 590-93). 2 deep throbbing sensations would cause constant inference with the 3 attention and concentration necessary to sustain simple, repetitive 4 work tasks. 5 and difficulty with positioning, she is incapable of even low 6 stress work. 7 minutes or stand for more than five minutes without needing to 8 change positions. 9 Plaintiff can sit, stand or walk for less than two hours. Because of Plaintiff’s constant pain (AR 590-91). (AR 591). Plaintiff cannot sit for more than ten (AR 591-92). During an eight-hour workday, (AR 10 592). She is incapable of lifting any weight and should never 11 twist, stoop/bend, crouch, or climb. 12 has mild limitations in doing repetitive reaching, handling or 13 fingering. (AR 592). Dr. Reece opined that due to her impairments, 14 Plaintiff would likely miss more than four days of work per month. 15 (AR 593). 16 disability evaluation. 17 impairments preclude her from any lifting, bending, stretching, 18 pulling, squatting, stooping, climbing, or sitting or standing for 19 more than ten minutes at any one time. 20 Dr. Reece’s opinions for the same reasons that he rejected Dr. 21 Woodward’s opinion. (AR 592). Plaintiff also On December 29, 2014, Dr. Reece submitted a narrative (AR 604-11). He opined that Plaintiff’s (AR 611). The ALJ rejected (AR 30-31). 22 23 The ALJ’s analysis is contrary to law and not supported by 24 substantial evidence. 25 the opinion of the nonexamining ME by itself to reject Dr. Reece’s 26 opinions, the ALJ erred. 27 ALJ’s vague and cursory explanations for rejecting Dr. Reece’s 28 opinions are First, to the extent that the ALJ relied on insufficient Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. to meet 13 the “specific, Second, the legitimate 1 reasons” standard. 2 at 632. Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421–22; see Orn, 495 F.3d 3 Finally, 4 Dr. Reece’s opinions are consistent with the 5 treatment 6 assuming, that the ALJ properly rejected Plaintiff’s credibility, 7 the record does not establish that Dr. Reece based his opinions 8 largely on Plaintiff’s self-reports rather than the doctor’s own 9 clinical notes and clinical Dr. observations. tests that Reece’s he performed. examinations were Even not 10 “essentially normal.” 11 paraspinal hypertonicity, with decreased range of motion, and an 12 MRI “positive for L4-L5 disc.” 13 poor 14 nonproductive cough; indigestion, occasional vomiting, and upper 15 abdominal pain; and chronic back and left shoulder pain, with very 16 limited range of motion. 17 observations, Dr. Reece found that Plaintiff’s pain “has been [due 18 to] the lack of blood perfusion to the paraspinal muscle masses 19 and more recently the compromise of the nerve roots passing through 20 the neuroforamen.” 21 included chronic cervical-lumbar myofascial syndrome with tension 22 cephalgia, lumbar herniated disc L4-5, neuroforaminal stenosis, 23 radiculopathy left lower extremities, and left shoulder arthropathy 24 with left hand neuropathy. exercise Instead, his clinical findings included (AR 590, 607-08). (cardiovascular) tolerance; (AR 606, 673-94). (AR 610). He also observed persistent, Based on his clinical Dr. Reece’s clinical diagnoses (AR 608; see also id. 673-94). 25 26 27 28 14 3. 1 Dr. Jordan-Manzano 2 3 On March 15, 2015, Carlos Jordan-Manzano, M.D., completed a 4 Mental RFC Questionnaire. 5 depressive disorder, recurrent. 6 opined that Plaintiff’s mental impairments would cause her to be 7 off-task for up to twenty percent of the work day, would be absent 8 five or more days per month due to her conditions, and would 9 experience poor concentration and memory due to her conditions. 670-71). The 667-71). He (AR 667). Dr. Jordan-Manzano Jordan-Manzano’s opinion, 11 finding no objective support for the mental limitations. (AR 31). 12 The ALJ noted that Plaintiff neither testified to any mental 13 limitations 14 report. 15 impairments 16 diagnosis with appropriate treatment.” 17 that Plaintiff “has no more than “mild”, if any, limitations 18 in . . . mental functioning.” (AR 31). any Dr. major (AR listed rejected diagnosed 10 nor ALJ (AR mental symptoms in her disability The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s mental “improved shortly after her [major (AR 31). depression] The ALJ concluded (AR 31). 19 20 The ALJ’s analysis is not supported by substantial evidence. 21 First, Dr. Jordan-Manzano’s opinion is consistent with Dr. Reece’s 22 assessment. 23 depressive 24 Plaintiff’s “mental health issues are an intrical [sic] entity of 25 the 26 accompanying her long term lumbar disc and back conditions.” 27 673). 28 limitations, both she and her sister asserted in their disability In August 2015, Dr. Reece diagnosed PTSD and major disorder. primary cause (AR and 673). effect for Dr. the Reece concluded permanent that disability (AR Second, while Plaintiff did not testify to any mental 15 1 reports that Plaintiff has anxiety attacks when she is around a 2 lot of people. (AR 326, 342). 3 Further, Dr. Jordan-Manzano’s opinion is consistent with the 4 “[A]n ALJ 5 treatment notes and clinical tests that he performed. 6 may not pick and choose evidence unfavorable to the claimant while 7 ignoring evidence favorable to the claimant.” 8 F. App’x 476, 477 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 9 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014)). Cox v. Colvin, 639 Plaintiff was initially 10 diagnosed with major depressive disorder in October 2013. (AR 11 455). 12 continued to report depression and anxiety symptoms, despite being 13 compliant with her medications. 14 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[Psychiatric] [d]iagnoses will always 15 depend in part on the patient’s self-report, as well as on the 16 clinician’s observations of the patient. 17 of psychiatry. 18 based on self-reports does not apply in the same manner to opinions 19 regarding mental illness.”) (citation omitted). 20 Plaintiff reported depressed mood, with passive suicidal ideations, 21 isolation, PTSD, anhedonia, lethargy, irritability, and chronic 22 pain. 23 and exhibited suboptimal improvement of symptoms. 24 April 2014, she reported frequent episodes of depressed mood. 25 459). 26 still suboptimal. 27 continuing symptoms of depression and isolation. 28 December 2014, Plaintiff presented in a sad mood, complaining of Thereafter, while Plaintiff reported some improvements, she See Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d But such is the nature Thus, the rule allowing an ALJ to reject opinions (AR 462). In December 2013, In February 2014, Plaintiff reported insomnia, (AR 460). In (AR While her symptoms were “improving” by May 2014, they were (AR 457). In November 2014, Plaintiff reported 16 (AR 654). In 1 social isolation and lack of motivation. 2 Plaintiff presented in sad mood, spoke in a low tone, and complained 3 of social isolation. 4 sadness, isolation, insomnia, anorexia, and heart palpitations, 5 despite being compliant with her medications. 6 presented in a low mood and sad affect. 7 Plaintiff reported anxiety, depression, insomnia, and anorexia. 8 (AR 9 depressive and anxiety symptoms, despite being compliant with her 644). In June (AR 648). 2015, medications. (AR 641). 11 frustrated mood and sad affect. 12 and anxiety symptoms. In March 2015, By April 2015, Plaintiff reported Plaintiff 10 (AR 652). (AR 646). (AR 646). continued She In May 2015, to experience In July 2015, Plaintiff presented with (AR 639). She reported depressive (AR 639). 13 4. 14 Summary 15 16 In sum, the ALJ did not provide specific and legitimate 17 reasons for rejecting the opinions of Drs. Woodward, Reece, and 18 Jordan-Manzano. 19 be afforded these opinions, including the evidence submitted to 20 the Appeals Council. 21 giving the opinions controlling weight, the ALJ may not reject the 22 opinions 23 supported by substantial evidence in the record.2 On remand, the ALJ shall reevaluate the weight to without If the ALJ finds appropriate reasons for not providing specific and legitimate reasons 24 25 26 27 28 2 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in determining her RFC. (Dkt. No. 22 at 26-29). However, it is unnecessary to reach Plaintiff’s arguments on this ground, as the matter is remanded for the alternative reasons discussed at length in this Order. 17 1 VI. 2 CONCLUSION 3 4 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered REVERSING 5 the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING this matter for 6 further proceedings consistent with this decision. 7 ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this Order and 8 the Judgment on counsel for both parties. IT IS FURTHER 9 10 DATED: March 5, 2018 11 /S/ __________ SUZANNE H. SEGAL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN LEXIS/NEXIS, WESTLAW OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 18
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