Martha Angelinga Rosales v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 2:2016cv05873 - Document 22 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Rozella A. Oliver. IT IS ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits, and REMANDING the matter for further proceedings consistent with this Order. (dml)
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Martha Angelinga Rosales v. Carolyn W. Colvin Doc. 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARTHA ANGELINGA ROSALES, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 Case No. CV 16-05873-RAO v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Defendant. 16 17 18 I. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Martha Angelina Rosales (“Plaintiff”) challenges the Commissioner’s denial of her application for a period of disability and supplemental security income (“SSI”). For the reasons stated below, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED. II. PROCEEDINGS BELOW On January 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI, alleging disability beginning September 1, 2008. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 64-65, 76.) Her application was denied initially on June 22, 2012, and upon reconsideration on January 25, 2013. (AR 99, 107.) On March 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed a written 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 request for hearing, and a hearing was held on August 20, 2014.1 (AR 50, 113.) 2 Represented by counsel, Plaintiff appeared and testified, along with a medical 3 expert and an impartial vocational expert. (AR 52-63.) On September 25, 2014, 4 the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Plaintiff had not been under a 5 disability, pursuant to the Social Security Act,2 since January 27, 2012. (AR 33- 6 34.) The ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when the 7 Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-4.) Plaintiff filed this 8 action on August 5, 2016. (Dkt. No. 1.) 9 The ALJ followed a five-step sequential evaluation process to assess whether 10 Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security Act. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 11 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged 12 in substantial gainful activity since January 27, 2012, the application date. (AR 13 28.) 14 impairments: bipolar disorder and mood disorder. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ 15 found that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments 16 that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 17 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (Id.) Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual 18 19 functional capacity (“RFC”) to: 20 [P]erform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: she can stand and walk for no more than six of eight hours, cumulatively; can sit for no more than six of eight hours, cumulatively; can understand and remember tasks, sustain concentration and persistence for unskilled jobs with simple 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe 1 An initial hearing was held on May 6, 2014, where Plaintiff began testifying. (AR 39-49.) Because the medical expert did not receive all of the exhibits, the parties returned for another hearing at a later date. (AR 47-49.) 2 Persons are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment expected to result in death, or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 2 instructions; can socially interact with the general public; and can adapt to workplace changes in low-stress environments. 1 2 (AR 29.) 3 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (AR 4 32.) At step five, “[c]onsidering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 5 and residual functional capacity,” the ALJ found that “there are jobs that exist in 6 significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” (AR 7 33.) Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not been under a disability 8 since the application date. (Id.) 9 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 10 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner’s 11 decision to deny benefits. A court must affirm an ALJ’s findings of fact if they are 12 supported by substantial evidence, and if the proper legal standards were applied. 13 Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001). “‘Substantial evidence’ 14 means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant 15 evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 16 Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Robbins v. Soc. 17 Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). An ALJ can satisfy the substantial 18 evidence requirement “by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts 19 and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making 20 findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 21 “[T]he Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a 22 specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record 23 as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from 24 the Secretary’s conclusion.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 25 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 26 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,’ the ALJ’s decision should be 27 upheld.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 3 “‘Where evidence is 1 Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)); see Robbins, 466 F.3d at 2 882 (“If the evidence can support either affirming or reversing the ALJ’s 3 conclusion, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.”). The Court 4 may review only “the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination 5 and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn v. 6 Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 7 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)). 8 IV. DISCUSSION 9 Plaintiff raises four issues for review: (1) whether the Appeals Council failed 10 to evaluate new and material evidence submitted on appeal; (2) whether the ALJ 11 erred in evaluating physician opinions; (3) whether the ALJ erred in determining 12 severe impairments; and (4) whether the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff’s RFC. 13 (Joint Stipulation (“JS”) 3, Dkt. No. 21.) 14 Council failed to explain its rejection of the additional evidence, the ALJ failed to 15 properly consider and weigh physician opinion evidence, the ALJ failed to explain 16 why impairments were deemed non-severe, and the ALJ failed to consider all of 17 Plaintiff’s symptoms and limitations in formulating her RFC. (JS 3, 12, 37, 46.) 18 The Commissioner disagrees. (See JS 5-10, 26-35, 41-42, 47-49.) For the reasons 19 below, the Court agrees with Plaintiff regarding the opinion evidence and remands 20 on that ground. 21 A. 22 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly assign weight to opinion 23 evidence and failed to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinions of 24 treating physicians. 25 properly assessed the opinion evidence. (See JS 25-26.) 26 Plaintiff contends that the Appeals The ALJ Erred in Evaluating Physician Opinions 1. (See JS 12.) The Commissioner contends that the ALJ Applicable Legal Standard 27 Courts give varying degrees of deference to medical opinions based on the 28 provider: (1) treating physicians who examine and treat; (2) examining physicians 4 1 who examine, but do not treat; and (3) non-examining physicians who do not 2 examine or treat. Valentine v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th 3 Cir. 2009). Most often, the opinion of a treating physician is given greater weight 4 than the opinion of a non-treating physician, and the opinion of an examining 5 physician is given greater weight than the opinion of a non-examining physician. 6 See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014). 7 The ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons to reject the ultimate 8 conclusions of a treating or examining physician. Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 9 422 (9th Cir. 1988); Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. When a treating or examining 10 physician’s opinion is contradicted by another opinion, the ALJ may reject it only 11 by providing specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in 12 the record. Orn, 495 F.3d at 633; Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; Carmickle v. Comm’r, 13 Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). 14 physician’s opinion can constitute substantial evidence if it is supported by other 15 evidence in the record and is consistent with it. Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 16 Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). “An ALJ can satisfy the ‘substantial 17 evidence’ requirement by ‘setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts 18 and conflicting evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.’” 19 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (citation omitted). A non-examining 20 Other non-medical sources may also provide opinions and testimony 21 regarding a claimant’s symptoms or the effects of a claimant’s impairments on his 22 or her ability to work. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir.1987) 23 (citing Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996)). The ALJ must take 24 this evidence into account, unless the ALJ “expressly determines to disregard such 25 testimony, in which case ‘he must give reasons that are germane to each witness.’” 26 Id. (quoting Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993)); see Lewis v. 27 Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). Because such testimony is competent 28 /// 5 1 evidence, it “cannot be disregarded without comment.” Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1467 2 (emphasis in original). 3 2. Discussion 4 The ALJ gave “great evidentiary weight” to the testimony of medical expert 5 Margaret Nichols, Ph.D., and gave “[m]oderate evidentiary weight” to the 6 conclusions in the Disability Determination Explanations, finding the testimony and 7 conclusions consistent with the treatment records. (AR 31-32.) The ALJ assigned 8 “little evidentiary weight” to Plaintiff’s very low Global Assessment of Functioning 9 (“GAF”) score because it was “apparently chiefly based on the claimant’s self- 10 reported symptoms, and not the benign objective mental status examination 11 results.” (AR 31.) The ALJ also discussed other medical opinions and evidence in 12 the record without assigning them weight or expressly crediting or rejecting them. 13 (See AR 30-32.) 14 a. Medical Expert Margaret Nichols, Ph.D. 15 At the hearing, Dr. Nichols testified via telephone about whether Plaintiff’s 16 symptoms met a listed impairment. (See AR 55-59.) In considering Listing 12.04, 17 Dr. Nichols determined that Plaintiff met the listing’s criteria of decreased energy, 18 but not suicidal thoughts. (AR 56-57.) Dr. Nichols also concluded that Plaintiff’s 19 mood disorder could cause her to miss work, but “not at the level of severity that 20 [Dr. Nichols] saw documented in the record.” (AR 57.) Dr. Nichols did not see 21 any indication that there would be periods of time with fluctuations of days off, or 22 days on which Plaintiff would not call in for work. (Id.) The ALJ granted Dr. 23 Nichols’s testimony “great evidentiary weight,” finding it consistent with treatment 24 and examination evidence. (AR 31.) The ALJ is permitted to rely on a non- 25 examining physician’s opinion when it is supported by and consistent with other 26 evidence in the record. See Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600. 27 However, for the reasons discussed below, the ALJ nonetheless erred in 28 assigning Dr. Nichols’s opinion great evidentiary weight without first properly 6 1 rejecting the conflicting opinions of Plaintiff’s treating and examining physicians. 2 See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164 (a treating or examining 3 physician’s opinion may be rejected in favor of another contradictory opinion only 4 with specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence). 5 b. Treating Psychologist Ernest Rasyidi, M.D. 6 Dr. Rasyidi completed a Mental Disorder Questionnaire Form on October 29, 7 2012. (AR 466-70.) Dr. Rasyidi noted that Plaintiff reported nightmares, worries, 8 isolation, increased startle response, and hypervigilance. (AR 466.) Dr. Rasyidi 9 also noted Plaintiff’s reported “periods of depressed mood lasting up to 2wks at a 10 time with ‘hyper’ periods” that included restlessness, irritability, racing thoughts, 11 insomnia, mood swings, and impulsive manic episodes that include hitting walls 12 and breaking cups. 13 anxious/irritable with intense/constricted range of emotions,” and that Plaintiff has 14 racing thoughts that impair her concentration. (AR 467.) Dr. Rasyidi noted that 15 Plaintiff has “labile, aggressive, impulsive behaviors” and a “[h]ighly reactive and 16 labile mood with alternation between anger and crying.” (AR 468.) (Id.) Dr. Rasyidi noted that Plaintiff is “generally 17 Regarding Plaintiff’s level of functioning and daily activities, Dr. Rasyidi 18 stated that Plaintiff “requires intensive case management services” to help manage 19 her childcare and logistic planning, and Plaintiff has “poor attention to nutrition” to 20 the point that she was briefly hospitalized for dehydration. (AR 468.) Dr. Rasyidi 21 noted that Plaintiff had “limited socialization” and was “[h]ypervigilant and 22 mistrustful after trauma.” 23 “intermittently house bound” due to a fear of unfamiliar scenarios. (Id.) (AR 469.) Dr. Rasyidi noted that Plaintiff was 24 Dr. Rasyidi reported Plaintiff’s diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder 25 (“PTSD”) and bipolar NOS. (AR 470.) Dr. Rasyidi also reported a “guarded” 26 prognosis, noting that Plaintiff was “fairly refractory despite intensive therapy.” 27 (AR 470.) Dr. Rasyidi opined that no significant change was likely in the next 28 twelve months. (Id.) 7 1 The ALJ’s entire discussion of Dr. Rasyidi’s opinion is reduced to one 2 sentence in which the ALJ notes that Dr. Rasyidi “repeated the claimant’s 3 complaints and endorsements.”3 (AR 31.) An opinion that is based on a claimant’s 4 discredited subjective complaints may be rejected.4 See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 5 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th 6 Cir. 2001); Morgan v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999); 7 Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, to the extent that Dr. 8 Rasyidi did clearly “repeat[] the claimant’s complaints and endorsements,” it was in 9 response to the question, “What are the patient’s complaints and symptoms? How 10 and when did they begin? How does the patient describe complaints (verbatim 11 quotes)?” (AR 466.) The ALJ wholly fails to discuss any other part of Dr. 12 Rasyidi’s opinion. The degree to which the ALJ discredited Dr. Rasyidi’s opinion 13 is unclear, as the ALJ did not assign any weight to Dr. Rasyidi’s opinion, nor did he 14 expressly reject it. 15 The Commissioner contends that the ALJ properly dismissed Dr. Rasyidi’s 16 opinion because it was contradicted by state agency physicians and a medical 17 expert, and it was not supported by objective medical evidence. (JS 28-31.) But 18 those were not reasons that the ALJ provided, and the Court may not consider 19 grounds upon which the ALJ did not rely. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 630; Bray v. 20 Commissioner of Social Security Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) 21 (“Long-standing principles of administrative law require us to review the ALJ’s 22 decision based on the reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ—not post 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 The ALJ erroneously referred to Dr. Rasyidi as Dr. Rasslkjlij. The ALJ found that Plaintiff was “only partially credible.” (AR 32.) Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding, and thus that issue is not before this Court. See Guith v. Berryhill, No. 1:16-CV-00625 GSA, 2017 WL 4038105, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2017) (citing Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008)) (“Plaintiff has not contested the ALJ’s credibility determination and therefore, he has waived that argument.”). 4 8 1 hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have been 2 thinking.”). 3 The Court finds that the ALJ failed to properly consider and weigh Dr. 4 Rasyidi’s opinion. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012-13 (“Where an ALJ does not 5 explicitly reject a medical opinion or set forth specific, legitimate reasons for 6 crediting one medical opinion over another, he errs.” (internal citation omitted)). 7 c. Therapist Gina Louhisdon, MA, MFTI 8 Ms. Louhisdon wrote a letter on October 5, 2010 that documented her 9 treatment history with Plaintiff. (AR 335-36.) Ms. Louhisdon noted that Plaintiff 10 began treatment at the Santa Clarita Child and Family Center in August 2008, and 11 Ms. Louhisdon had met with Plaintiff for 82 therapy sessions. (AR 335.) Ms. 12 Louhisdon repeated Plaintiff’s reported symptoms and listed the primary focuses of 13 her treatment plan. 14 functioning at home and in social settings, Ms. Louhisdon suggested that “[t]his 15 could be due to her paranoid ideation.” (AR 336.) Ms. Louhisdon attributed 16 Plaintiff’s inability to become employed to Plaintiff’s anxiety symptoms and 17 paranoid ideation, which causes Plaintiff to be easily overwhelmed, and her 18 struggles with daily self-care. (Id.) Ms. Louhisdon noted that Plaintiff “doesn’t 19 cope well with stress and may become reactive in the workplace” if faced with too 20 much stress or too many demands. (Id.) Ms. Louhisdon also noted that Plaintiff 21 tends to procrastinate and has difficulty with follow-through. (Id.) Ms. Louhisdon 22 concluded that Plaintiff’s lack of work history is due to her functional impairments 23 and, despite consistent treatment, Plaintiff’s “prognosis is poor.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s 24 diagnosis was reported as bipolar and chronic post-traumatic stress disorder. (Id.) (Id.) After noting that Plaintiff reports difficulty with 25 Ms. Louhisdon submitted another letter on June 5, 2012 that noted that she 26 had then seen Plaintiff for 117 therapy sessions, but this letter was otherwise nearly 27 identical to the October 5, 2010 letter. (AR 463-64.) 28 9 1 A therapist is a nonmedical “other source,” and therefore a therapist’s 2 opinion may be discounted if the ALJ provides germane reasons for doing so. See 3 Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014). When discussing Ms. 4 Louhisdon’s opinions, the ALJ noted: 5 6 7 8 9 The claimant’s long-term counselor also endorsed the claimant’s assertions, and the form was cross-signed by a psychologist whose relationship with the claimant is unknown [citation]. The therapist states that she has seen claimant 117 times. Notes include only August 2012 through July 2013 and are minimal. (AR 31.) 10 An opinion or testimony that merely repeats a claimant’s discredited 11 complaints may be rejected. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th 12 Cir. 2008). 13 assertions, the letter provides additional opinions and conclusions, which the ALJ 14 did not acknowledge. 15 mischaracterizes Plaintiff’s treatment records. The records provided by Child and 16 Family Center are Plaintiff’s Annual Assessment Updates (AR 445-47, 448-50) and 17 Client Care Coordination Plans (AR 451-55, 456-62). These Updates and Plans, 18 which include records from July 2011, do not purport to document individual 19 treatment sessions (see AR 453-55). See Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 20 (9th Cir. 1984) (error for an ALJ to ignore or misstate the competent evidence in 21 the record in order to justify his conclusion). However, in addition to Ms. Louhisdon’s repetition of Plaintiff’s (See AR 336, 464.) Additionally, the ALJ seemingly 22 The ALJ erred in failing to consider Ms. Louhisdon’s opinion evidence 23 without “expressly determin[ing] to disregard” it and providing germane reasons 24 for doing so. Sprague, 812 F.2d at 1232; see Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1467. 25 d. Consultative Examiner William Goldsmith, M.D. 26 Dr. Goldsmith provided a psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff in May 2012. 27 (AR 438-42.) Dr. Goldsmith noted that Plaintiff’s post-traumatic stress disorder 28 was due to a year-long abusive relationship. (AR 438.) Plaintiff reported depressed 10 1 periods with suicidal thoughts and homicidal thoughts toward her children. (Id.) 2 Dr. Goldsmith observed that Plaintiff’s thought process was “organized and intact,” 3 and her thought content was “without gross delusional thinking.” (AR 440.) Dr. 4 Goldsmith assigned Plaintiff a GAF score of 60, noted that Plaintiff has symptoms 5 of PTSD, and opined that she may have a bipolar II disorder. (AR 441.) He also 6 noted that Plaintiff “seems to be doing better” than was reported in October 2010 7 records. (Id.) Dr. Goldsmith found that Plaintiff could understand, remember, and 8 carry out simple one- or two-step instructions; was slightly impaired in her ability 9 to follow detailed and complex instructions; was moderately impaired in her ability 10 to relate and interact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public; could maintain 11 concentration, attention, persistence, and pace; was moderately impaired in her 12 ability to associate with day-to-day work activity, including attendance and safety; 13 was slightly impaired in her ability to adapt to common work stresses; could 14 maintain regular attendance and consistently perform work activities; and was able 15 to perform work activities without special or additional supervision. (AR 442.) 16 The ALJ accurately summarized Dr. Goldsmith’s opinion; however, the ALJ 17 failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, 18 for seemingly rejecting Dr. Goldsmith’s opinion in favor of the non-examining 19 medical expert’s conflicting opinion. After summarizing Dr. Goldsmith’s report, 20 the ALJ provided no reasons for accepting or rejecting his opinion, and the ALJ did 21 not assign it any degree of weight. (See AR 30.) 22 The Court finds that the ALJ failed to properly consider and weigh Dr. 23 Goldsmith’s opinion. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164 (an examining physician’s 24 contradicted opinion may be rejected with “specific and legitimate reasons that are 25 supported by substantial evidence in the record”); Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012-13 26 (an ALJ errs when he fails to set forth specific, legitimate reasons for crediting one 27 medical opinion over another). 28 /// 11 e. Records from AV Wellness Center 1 2 The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was diagnosed with social phobia and PTSD 3 after an April 2013 assessment at AV Wellness Center. (AR 31; see AR 491.) The 4 ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s level of functioning continued at about the same 5 level through 2014. 6 addressed” the records from Alfred Mathew Fogarty, M.D., or AV Wellness Center 7 and “failed to afford any weight . . . [or] articulate any reasoning for rejecting these 8 opinion[s] and records.” (JS 18.) (Id.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “never specifically 9 The Court finds that the ALJ’s summary of the objective medical records is 10 accurate. Treatment notes indicate that Plaintiff’s diagnosis remained the same 11 from April 2013 to January 2014. (AR 518-22, 524-31.) Progress notes from 12 therapy sessions with Elizabeth Marsh, LCSW, are objective and repeat Plaintiff’s 13 assertions. (AR 499-517.) 14 However, the ALJ failed to acknowledge Dr. Fogarty’s August 14, 2014 15 opinion that Plaintiff has a medically verifiable impairment that limits her abilities 16 to perform tasks and affects her ability to work. (See AR 564.) Although the ALJ 17 read Dr. Fogarty’s statement at the hearing (AR 53-54), it does not appear that the 18 ALJ gave it any consideration in his opinion. As Dr. Fogarty was a treating 19 physician, the ALJ was required to provide specific and legitimate reasons 20 supported by substantial evidence when rejecting his opinion. See Lingenfelter, 21 504 F.3d at 1038 n.10 (an ALJ may not “avoid the [] requirements” of providing 22 specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting a doctor’s opinion “simply by not 23 mentioning the treating physician’s opinion”); see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012- 24 13 (citing Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1464) (“[A]n ALJ errs when he rejects a medical 25 opinion or assigns it little weight while doing nothing more than ignoring it, 26 asserting without explanation that another medical opinion is more persuasive, or 27 criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis for his 28 conclusion.”). 12 f. Records from Penny Lane Center 1 2 The ALJ noted that in a January 2014 assessment performed at a Penny Lane 3 Center, Plaintiff was assigned a GAF score of 32, “which is consistent with 4 custodial care.” (AR 31.) The ALJ set forth a summary of the findings from the 5 evaluation and determined that the GAF score “does not match the objective mental 6 testing of the same date.” (Id.) The ALJ also observed that Plaintiff “subjectively 7 endorsed a wide variety of severe symptoms.” 8 assessment’s conclusion of a very low GAF score “little evidentiary weight” 9 because it appeared to be “chiefly based on the claimant’s self-reported symptoms, 10 (Id.) The ALJ gave the and not the benign objective mental status examination results.” (Id.) 11 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to discuss the full report that accompanied 12 the GAF score. (JS 21.) However, the ALJ summarized the contents of the 13 assessment, which merely documented Plaintiff’s own reported symptoms and 14 contained no third-party opinions. (AR 31; see AR 549-51.) Plaintiff also argues 15 that the ALJ failed to discuss additional reports from March through April 2014 (JS 16 21), but the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “continued to be treated through the springtime 17 of 2014” (AR 31). 18 The ALJ properly considered this objective medical evidence, and the ALJ’s 19 assignment of “little evidentiary weight” to the assessment’s GAF conclusion is 20 supported by substantial evidence. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725 (an ALJ can 21 satisfy the substantial evidence requirement “by setting out a detailed and thorough 22 summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation 23 thereof, and making findings”). 24 Although the ALJ properly considered the disputed objective medical 25 evidence, it is unclear whether the ALJ properly considered the opinion evidence in 26 accordance with the appropriate legal standards. Remand is therefore warranted for 27 the ALJ to properly evaluate the opinion evidence and determine Plaintiff’s RFC. 28 /// 13 1 B. The Court Declines to Address Plaintiff’s Remaining Arguments 2 Having found that remand is warranted, the Court declines to address 3 Plaintiff’s remaining arguments that the Appeals Council failed to evaluate new 4 evidence, that the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff’s severe impairments, and that 5 the ALJ erred in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC. See Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 6 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because we remand the case to the ALJ for the reasons 7 stated, we decline to reach [plaintiff’s] alternative ground for remand.”); see also 8 Augustine ex rel. Ramirez v. Astrue, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1153 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 9 2008) (“[The] Court need not address the other claims plaintiff raises, none of 10 which would provide plaintiff with any further relief than granted, and all of which 11 can be addressed on remand.”). 12 C. Remand For Further Administrative Proceedings 13 Because further administrative review could remedy the ALJ’s errors, 14 remand for further administrative proceedings, rather than an award of benefits, is 15 warranted here. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2015) 16 (remanding for an award of benefits is appropriate in rare circumstances). Before 17 ordering remand for an award of benefits, three requirements must be met: (1) the 18 Court must conclude that the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 19 rejecting evidence; (2) the Court must conclude that the record has been fully 20 developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; 21 and (3) the Court must conclude that if the improperly discredited evidence were 22 credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on 23 remand. Id. (citations omitted). Even if all three requirements are met, the Court 24 retains flexibility to remand for further proceedings “when the record as a whole 25 creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the 26 meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. (citation omitted). 27 Here, remand for further administrative proceedings is appropriate. The 28 Court finds that the ALJ failed to provide legally adequate reasons to reject the 14 1 opinions of Dr. Rasyidi, Ms. Louhisdon, Dr. Goldsmith, and Dr. Fogarty. 2 On remand, the ALJ shall reassess the opinions Plaintiff’s treating and 3 examining physicians and other sources, and provide legally adequate reasons for 4 any portion of an opinion that the ALJ discounts or rejects. Further on remand, the 5 ALJ shall reassess Plaintiff’s subjective allegations in light of Social Security 6 Ruling 16-3p—Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, 2016 WL 1119029 7 (S.S.A. Mar. 16, 2016), which would apply on remand. If necessary, the ALJ shall 8 reassess Plaintiff’s RFC, and then proceed through steps four and five to determine 9 what work, if any, Plaintiff is capable of performing. 10 V. CONCLUSION 11 IT IS ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered REVERSING the decision 12 of the Commissioner denying benefits, and REMANDING the matter for further 13 proceedings consistent with this Order. 14 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties. 16 17 18 DATED: December 29, 2017 ROZELLA A. OLIVER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 21 NOTICE 22 THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN WESTLAW, LEXIS/NEXIS, OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE. 23 24 25 26 27 28 15
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