Rodney Dale Rafols v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 2:2016cv05827 - Document 25 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. (sp)
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Rodney Dale Rafols v. Carolyn W. Colvin Doc. 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 RODNEY DALE RAFOLS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________) NO. CV 16-5827-E MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 18 PROCEEDINGS 19 20 Plaintiff filed a complaint on August 4, 2016, seeking review of 21 the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. The parties consented to 22 proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on September 21, 2016. 23 Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on April 25, 2017. 24 Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on May 25, 2017. 25 Court has taken the motions under submission without oral argument. 26 See L.R. 7-15; “Order,” filed August 5, 2016. 27 /// 28 /// The Dockets.Justia.com 1 BACKGROUND 2 3 Plaintiff asserted disability based on several alleged 4 impairments (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 40-51, 54-62, 71-75, 78- 5 81, 214-17, 225). 6 functional restrictions (A.R. 49-51, 61-62, 72-81). Plaintiff testified to allegedly disabling 7 8 9 Following a previous administrative remand, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) examined the medical record and heard testimony from 10 Plaintiff and a vocational expert (A.R. 17-310, 314-618). The ALJ 11 found Plaintiff’s testimony “not entirely credible” (A.R. 26). 12 According to the ALJ, “[e]xaggeration of symptoms is repeatedly 13 suggested throughout the medical record. . . .” (A.R. 27). 14 also observed that Dr. Alexander White, a non-treating, non-examining 15 physician, had believed that all of Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms were 16 “significantly out of proportion to identifiable physical processes” 17 (A.R. 27, 443). The ALJ 18 19 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retains the residual functional 20 capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with certain restrictions (A.R. 21 23).1 22 the physicians of record (A.R. 327-30, 333-50, 362-66, 378-79, 403, 23 441-53, 486, 539, 545-50). 24 opinions in considerable detail, including the report and opinion of This RFC is largely consistent with the reports and opinions of The ALJ discussed these reports and 25 26 1 27 28 The ALJ found a capacity for light work not requiring more than “occasional bending/stooping . . . or simple route [sic] repetitive tasks with occasional public and coworker contact” (A.R. 23). 2 1 Dr. White (A.R. 24-27). The ALJ declined to incorporate into the RFC 2 every aspect of Dr. White’s opinion, omitting the aspect that would 3 have restricted Plaintiff to work not requiring more than occasional 4 reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling with the left hand (A.R. 5 23, 448). 6 or clinical findings” supporting an alleged restriction to occasional 7 use of the left hand, Dr. White wrote only “giving Pt. the benefit of 8 doubt of injury to the L. hand” (A.R. 448). When asked to identify in writing “the particular medical 9 10 The vocational expert testified that a person having the RFC 11 assessed by the ALJ could perform certain jobs existing in significant 12 numbers in the national economy (A.R. 83-84). 13 testimony, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled (A.R. 28-29). 14 Appeals Council considered additional evidence but denied review (A.R. 15 1-5, 311-13, 619-907). In reliance on this The 16 17 Plaintiff now argues a single alleged administrative error. 18 According to Plaintiff, the ALJ erred by assertedly failing to state 19 “specific and legitimate reasons” for not incorporating into the RFC 20 Dr. White’s opinion restricting Plaintiff to occasional use of the 21 left hand. 22 23 STANDARD OF REVIEW 24 25 Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the 26 Administration’s decision to determine if: (1) the Administration’s 27 findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the 28 Administration used correct legal standards. 3 See Carmickle v. 1 Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 2 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner, 3 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). 4 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 5 support a conclusion.” 6 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Widmark v. 7 Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). Substantial evidence is “such Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 8 9 If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may 10 not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the 11 Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by 12 isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. 13 Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, 14 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 15 detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. 16 17 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and 18 quotations omitted). 19 20 Where, as here, the Appeals Council considered additional 21 evidence but denied review, the additional evidence becomes part of 22 the record for purposes of the Court's analysis. 23 Commissioner, 682 F.3d at 1163 (“[W]hen the Appeals Council considers 24 new evidence in deciding whether to review a decision of the ALJ, that 25 evidence becomes part of the administrative record, which the district 26 court must consider when reviewing the Commissioner's final decision 27 for substantial evidence”; expressly adopting Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 28 F.3d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993)); Taylor v. Commissioner, 659 F.3d 4 See Brewes v. 1 1228, 1231 (2011) (courts may consider evidence presented for the 2 first time to the Appeals Council “to determine whether, in light of 3 the record as a whole, the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial 4 evidence and was free of legal error”); Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 5 957 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993) (“the Appeals Council considered this 6 information and it became part of the record we are required to review 7 as a whole”). 8 9 DISCUSSION 10 11 After consideration of the record as a whole, Defendant’s motion 12 is granted and Plaintiff’s motion is denied. The Administration’s 13 findings are supported by substantial evidence and are free from 14 material2 legal error. Plaintiff’s arguments are unavailing. 15 16 Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, the law did not require that 17 the ALJ state “specific and legitimate reasons” for failing to 18 incorporate into the RFC every aspect of Dr. White’s opinion. 19 Ninth Circuit’s “specific and legitimate reasons” requirement applies 20 only to the opinions of treating physicians, and, perhaps, to the 21 opinions of other examining physicians. 22 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995); but see Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 23 531 (9th Cir. 1986) (an ALJ need not explicitly detail the reasons for 24 rejecting the contradicted opinion of a non-treating, examining See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 25 26 2 27 28 The harmless error rule applies to the review of administrative decisions regarding disability. See Garcia v. Commissioner, 768 F.3d 925, 932-33 (9th Cir. 2014); McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 886-88 (9th Cir. 2011). 5 The 1 physician). Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s reference to “a treating 2 medical opinion” and Plaintiff’s urging of the “specific and 3 legitimate reasons” standard,3 Dr. White was neither a treating 4 physician nor an examining physician (A.R. 441). 5 6 An ALJ may reject the opinion of a non-treating, non-examining 7 physician merely “by reference to specific evidence in the medical 8 record.” 9 cf. Social Security Ruling 96-8p (“if the RFC assessment conflicts Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1998); 10 with an opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain 11 why the opinion was not adopted”). 12 referenced sufficiently specific evidence and explanation to justify 13 the RFC’s failure to incorporate a restriction to occasional use of 14 the left hand. 15 opinions of the physicians of record, including reports and opinions 16 of examining physicians who placed no restriction on Plaintiff’s use 17 of his left hand. In the present case, the ALJ The ALJ discussed in some detail the reports and 18 19 Additionally, the ALJ’s proper discounting of Plaintiff’s 20 credibility amply supports the refusal to incorporate a left hand 21 restriction into the RFC under the circumstances of this case. 22 admitted absence of any “medical or clinical findings” supporting a 23 left hand restriction, Dr. White conceded he was giving Plaintiff “the 24 benefit of doubt” by crediting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints 25 /// 26 /// 27 3 28 See Plaintiff’s “Motion for Summary Judgment or Remand,” filed April 25, 2017, at p. 4. 6 In the 1 regarding an alleged left hand restriction (A.R. 448).4 2 reject the opinion of even a treating physician when the opinion is 3 based on the claimant’s properly discounted subjective complaints. 4 See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001); Morgan 5 v. Commissioner, 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999); accord Fair v. 6 Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1989). An ALJ may 7 8 9 Almost all of the medical evidence of record in the present case supports the RFC assessed by the ALJ. To the extent any of the 10 medical evidence is in conflict, it was the prerogative of the ALJ to 11 resolve such conflicts. 12 Cir. 2001). 13 interpretation,” the Court must uphold the administrative decision. 14 See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995); accord 15 Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002); Sandgathe v. 16 Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). 17 ALJ’s rational interpretation of the evidence in the present case 18 notwithstanding any conflicts in the record. 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th When evidence “is susceptible to more than one rational The Court will uphold the 25 26 4 27 28 Curiously, Dr. White accorded Plaintiff this “benefit of doubt” notwithstanding Dr. White’s belief that all of Plaintiff’s symptoms were “significantly out of proportion to identifiable physical process” (A.R. 443). 7 1 CONCLUSION 2 3 For all of the foregoing reasons,5 Plaintiff’s motion for summary 4 judgment is denied and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 5 granted. 6 7 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 8 9 DATED: June 7, 2017. 10 11 /s/ CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 The Court has considered and rejected each of Plaintiff’s arguments. The Court has discussed Plaintiff’s principal arguments herein. 8
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