Maryjill Holt v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 2:2016cv04789 - Document 26 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Victor E Bianchini. (See Order for details.) IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: Judgment be entered AFFIRMING the Commissioner's decision and DISMISSING this action, and it is further ORDERED that The Clerk of the Court file this Decision and Order and serve copies upon counsel for the parties. (wr)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Maryjill Holt v. Carolyn W. Colvin Doc. 26 O 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 Case No. 2:16-CV-04789 (VEB) MARYJILL HOLT, 9 DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiff, 10 vs. 11 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 12 13 14 Defendant. I. INTRODUCTION 15 In July of 2012, Plaintiff Maryjill Holt applied for Disability Insurance 16 benefits and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits under the Social 17 Security Act. The Commissioner of Social Security denied the applications. 18 19 20 1 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB Dockets.Justia.com 1 Plaintiff, by and through her attorneys, Howard D. Olinsky, Esq. and 2 Lawrence Rohfling, Esq., commenced this action seeking judicial review of the 3 Commissioner’s denial of benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3). 4 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. 5 (Docket No. 13, 14). On November 8, 2016, this case was referred to the 6 undersigned pursuant to General Order 05-07. (Docket No. 23). 7 II. BACKGROUND 8 9 Plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance benefits and SSI benefits on July 10, 10 2012, and July 20, 2012, respectively, alleging disabling beginning September 1, 11 2010. (T at 210, 217, 236).1 12 reconsideration. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 13 (“ALJ”). The applications were denied initially and on 14 On November 19, 2014, a hearing was held before ALJ Dale Garwal. (T at 15 46). Plaintiff appeared with an attorney and testified. (T at 49-63). The ALJ also 16 received testimony from David Van Winkle, a vocational expert. (T at 64-68). 17 On December 23, 2014, the ALJ issued a written decision denying the 18 applications for benefits. 19 1 20 (T at 21-45). The ALJ’s decision became the Citations to (“T”) refer to the administrative record at Docket No. 22. 2 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 Commissioner’s final decision on April 26, 2016, when the Appeals Council denied 2 Plaintiff’s request for review. (T at 1-6). 3 On June 29, 2016, Plaintiff, acting by and through her counsel, filed this 4 action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. (Docket No. 5 1). The Commissioner interposed an Answer on October 11, 2016. (Docket No. 22). 6 Plaintiff filed a Brief on November 10, 2016. (Docket No. 24). The Commissioner 7 filed a Brief in support of a motion for summary judgment on December 1, 2016. 8 (Docket No. 25). After reviewing the pleadings, Briefs, and administrative record, this Court 9 10 finds that the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed and this case be dismissed. 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 13 A. Sequential Evaluation Process 14 The Social Security Act (“the Act”) defines disability as the “inability to 15 engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 16 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has 17 lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 18 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act also provides that a 19 claimant shall be determined to be under a disability only if any impairments are of 20 3 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 such severity that he or she is not only unable to do previous work but cannot, 2 considering his or her age, education and work experiences, engage in any other 3 substantial work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 4 1382c(a)(3)(B). Thus, the definition of disability consists of both medical and 5 vocational components. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). 6 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 7 for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step 8 one determines if the person is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If so, 9 benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404. 1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If not, the 10 decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether the claimant has a 11 medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 12 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). 13 If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of 14 impairments, the disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the 15 evaluation proceeds to the third step, which compares the claimant’s impairment(s) 16 with a number of listed impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so 17 severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 18 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P App. 1. If the impairment meets or 19 equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be 20 4 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 disabled. If the impairment is not one conclusively presumed to be disabling, the 2 evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the impairment 3 prevents the claimant from performing work which was performed in the past. If the 4 claimant is able to perform previous work, he or she is deemed not disabled. 20 5 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At this step, the claimant’s residual 6 functional capacity (RFC) is considered. If the claimant cannot perform past relevant 7 work, the fifth and final step in the process determines whether he or she is able to 8 perform other work in the national economy in view of his or her residual functional 9 capacity, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 10 416.920(a)(4)(v); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). 11 The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie 12 case of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th 13 Cir. 1971); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). The initial burden 14 is met once the claimant establishes that a mental or physical impairment prevents 15 the performance of previous work. The burden then shifts, at step five, to the 16 Commissioner to show that (1) plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful 17 activity and (2) a “significant number of jobs exist in the national economy” that the 18 claimant can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984). 19 B. 20 Standard of Review 5 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner’s 2 decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A Court must uphold a Commissioner’s decision, 3 made through an ALJ, when the determination is not based on legal error and is 4 supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 5 1985); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 6 “The [Commissioner’s] determination that a plaintiff is not disabled will be 7 upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” Delgado v. 8 Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial 9 evidence is more than a mere scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 10 n 10 (9th Cir. 1975), but less than a preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 11 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence “means such evidence as a 12 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. 13 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(citations omitted). “[S]uch inferences and 14 conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence” will 15 also be upheld. Mark v. Celebreeze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). On review, 16 the Court considers the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the 17 decision of the Commissioner. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 18 1989)(quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1980)). 19 20 It is the role of the Commissioner, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in 6 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational 2 interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 3 Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th 4 Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be 5 set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and 6 making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 7 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, if there is substantial evidence to support the 8 administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding 9 of either disability or non-disability, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. 10 Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 11 C. Commissioner’s Decision 12 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 13 activity since September 1, 2010, the alleged onset date, and met the insured status 14 requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2015 (the “date last 15 insured”). (T at 26). The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease of the 16 spine, arthralgias of the spine and knees, residuals of gunshot wound right thigh, 17 depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder were “severe” impairments under the Act. 18 (Tr. 26). 19 20 7 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 However, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 2 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments 3 set forth in the Listings. (T at 27). 4 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity 5 (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work, as defined in 20 CFR § 404.1567 (a) and 6 416.967 (a), except that she was limited to simple routine tasks with occasional 7 contact with the public and co-workers, lifting no more than 10 pounds frequently, 8 standing/walking 2 hours in an 8-hour workday, sitting 6 hours in an 8-hour 9 workday, occasional being or stooping, and she must avoid hazardous environments. 10 (T at 28). 11 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as 12 a caretaker, childcare worker, lead clerk, and/or telemarketer. (T at 37). Considering 13 Plaintiff’s age (44 years old on the application date), education (limited), work 14 experience, and residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that jobs exist in 15 significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (T at 38). 16 Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the 17 meaning of the Social Security Act between September 1, 2010 (the alleged onset 18 date) and December 23, 2014 (the date of the decision) and was therefore not 19 entitled to benefits. (T at 39). As noted above, the ALJ’s decision became the 20 8 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request 2 for review. (T at 1-6). 3 D. Disputed Issues 4 Plaintiff offers three (3) main arguments in support of her claim that the 5 Commissioner’s decision should be reversed. First, she challenges the ALJ’s RFC 6 determination with regard to her mental limitations. Second, Plaintiff argues that the 7 ALJ did not properly assess opinions provided by her treating physician. Third, she 8 contends that the ALJ erred in discounting her credibility. This Court will address 9 each argument in turn. 10 IV. ANALYSIS 11 12 A. Mental RFC 13 An ALJ’s assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 14 must be upheld if the ALJ has applied the proper legal standard and substantial 15 evidence in the record supports the decision. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 16 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ must consider all the medical evidence in the record 17 and “explain in [her] decision the weight given to . . . [the] opinions from treating 18 sources, nontreating sources, and other nonexamining sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 19 404.1527(e)(2)(ii); see also § 404.1545(a)(1). 20 9 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 In determining the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ considers those limitations for 2 which there is support in the record and need not consider properly rejected evidence 3 or subjective complaints. See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217; see also Batson v. Comm'r 4 of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the ALJ was 5 not required to incorporate into RFC findings from treating-physician opinions that 6 were “permissibly discounted”). 7 Here, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s mental health impairments caused 8 “moderate difficulties” with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace. (T at 27). 9 The ALJ nevertheless determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform the 10 mental demands of basic work activity, provided she was not required to perform 11 more than simple routine tasks with occasional contact with the public and co- 12 workers. (T at 28). 13 Plaintiff challenges this aspect of the RFC determination, arguing that the 14 limitation to “simple routine tasks” did not account for her moderate difficulties 15 concerning concentration, persistence, or pace. Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ 16 compounded the error by failing to include a limitation with regard to concentration, 17 persistence, or pace in the hypothetical presented to the vocational expert. 18 Plaintiff cites Brink v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 343 Fed. App'x 211, 212 (9th 19 Cir. 2009), in support of her argument. In Brink, the ALJ found that the claimant 20 10 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 had moderate difficulty maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, but, as in the 2 instant case, the hypothetical presented to the vocational expert referenced only 3 “simple, repetitive work.” Id. In an unpublished, non-precedential opinion, a panel 4 of the Ninth Circuit reversed and determined that the limitation to simple, 5 repetitive work did not adequately address the claimant’s limitations with regard to 6 concentration, persistence and pace. Id. 7 However, this case is distinguishable from Brink. In this case, the ALJ 8 carefully considered the evidence, including the evidence of limitation regarding 9 concentration, persistence, and pace, and found that an RFC limiting Plaintiff to 10 simple repetitive tasks adequately incorporated those limitations. This conclusion 11 was supported by substantial evidence. 12 Dr. Amy D’Ambrosio performed a consultative psychological evaluation in 13 December of 2012. Dr. D’Ambrosio diagnosed adjustment disorder with depressed 14 mood (chronic) and panic disorder without agoraphobia. (T at 576). She opined that 15 Plaintiff could understand and remember simple instructions given by an employer, 16 carry out simple instructions in the work setting, sustain basic standards of neatness 17 and cleanliness in the work environment, and relate to the general public. (T at 577). 18 Dr. Mary Downs, a non-examining State Agency review consultant, found minimal 19 restrictions related to anxiety and depressed mood and concluded that Plaintiff’s 20 11 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 mental impairments were non-severe. (T at 91). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s 2 mental health issues were addressed by her primary care provider and Plaintiff never 3 received specialized psychiatric care. (T at 35). 4 As such, consistent with the medical evidence, the ALJ properly translated 5 Plaintiff’s moderate limitations into the RFC by limiting her to simple, repetitive 6 work. This was sufficient under applicable case law in the Ninth Circuit. See 7 Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that RFC 8 limiting a claimant to simple, repetitive work “adequately captures restrictions 9 related to concentration, persistence, or pace where the assessment is consistent with 10 the restrictions identified in the medical testimony.”); see also Watkins v. Comm'r 11 SSA, No. 6:15-cv-01539, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112555, at *14 (D. Or. Aug. 22, 12 2016)(distinguishing Brink on this basis); Murray v. Colvin, No. C-13-01182 DMR, 13 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50586, 2014 WL 1396408, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2014) 14 (finding that Brink did not apply because “[h]ere, the medical evidence supports a 15 finding that Plaintiff is capable of performing one-to-two step instructions despite 16 any limitations in concentration, persistence or pace”); Maidlow v. Astrue, No. 17 EDCV 10-01970-MAN, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128050, 2011 WL 5295059, at *4 18 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011) (“However, in this case, unlike the cases cited by plaintiff, 19 and as detailed below, the medical expert, upon whom the ALJ relied both in 20 12 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 determining plaintiff's RFC and crafting her hypothetical to the vocational expert, 2 testified that plaintiff's deficiencies in CPP resulted in specific work restrictions—to 3 wit, a restriction to simple, repetitive work.”). 4 B. Treating Physician’s Assessment 5 In disability proceedings, a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight 6 than an examining physician’s opinion, and an examining physician’s opinion is 7 given more weight than that of a non:-examining physician. Benecke v. Barnhart, 8 379 F.3d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 2004); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 9 1995). If the treating or examining physician’s opinions are not contradicted, they 10 can be rejected only with clear and convincing reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. If 11 contradicted, the opinion can only be rejected for “specific” and “legitimate” reasons 12 that are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 13 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995). 14 The courts have recognized several types of evidence that may constitute a 15 specific, legitimate reason for discounting a treating or examining physician’s 16 medical opinion. For example, an opinion may be discounted if it is contradicted by 17 the medical evidence, inconsistent with a conservative treatment history, and/or is 18 based primarily upon the claimant’s subjective complaints, as opposed to clinical 19 20 13 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 findings and objective observations. See Flaten v. Secretary of Health and Human 2 Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1995). 3 An ALJ satisfies the “substantial evidence” requirement by “setting out a 4 detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating 5 his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 6 1012 (9th Cir. 2014)(quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998)). 7 “The ALJ must do more than state conclusions. He must set forth his own 8 interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.” Id. 9 In this case, Dr. Adam Sherman, Plaintiff’s primary care physician, completed 10 an assessment in July of 2014. Dr. Sherman diagnosed chronic lumbago and lumbar 11 degenerative disc disease and opined that Plaintiff could sit for 30 minutes at a time 12 and for 2 hours in an 8-hour workday; stand/walk 15 minutes at one time and for 1 13 hour in an 8-hour workday; would need to shift position at will and take unscheduled 14 breaks; could lift 10 pounds occasionally; was able to engage in fine motor 15 manipulation with her fingers 20-25 percent of a workday; and could reach with her 16 arms 15-20 percent of a workday. (T at 617-18). Dr. Sherman believed Plaintiff 17 would miss work more than 4 days per month due to her impairments or treatment. 18 (T at 617-18). 19 20 14 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 In October of 2014, Dr. Sherman completed another assessment and noted the 2 following limitations: sit for 20 minutes at a time and 2 hours in an 8-hour workday; 3 stand/walk for 15 minutes at a time and 3 hours in an 8-hour workday; stand/walk 4 for 15 minutes at a time and 3 hours in an 8-hour workday; shift positions at will; 5 need frequent breaks; occasionally lift 20 pounds; use her hands to grasp, twist, or 6 turn objects 20% of a workday; use her arms for reaching 5-10 percent of the 7 workday; and would miss work more than 4 times per month due to her impairments 8 or treatment. (T at 630-31). 9 The ALJ discounted Dr. Sherman’s assessments. (T at 34, 37). This aspect of 10 the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. First, the opinions were 11 not supported by detailed clinical or other objective findings. The ALJ is not 12 obliged to accept a treating source opinion that is “brief, conclusory and 13 inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 14 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 15 2002)). 16 Second, Dr. Sherman’s opinion is based, in large part, on Plaintiff’s subjective 17 complaints, which he credited (T at 617-19, 630-35), but the ALJ reasonably 18 discounted for the reasons stated below. 19 physician’s opinion based substantially on a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain 20 15 The lack of medical support for a DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 is a legitimate reason for disregarding a treating physician’s opinion. Flaten v. 2 Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1995). 3 Third, the ALJ provided a detailed review of the medical record (T at 28-37), 4 which he found inconsistent with the severe limitations assessed by Dr. Sherman. 5 Dr. Mikhail Bargan, a non-examining Sate Agency review consultant, reviewed the 6 record and opined that Plaintiff could perform light work. (T at 87). See Saelee v. 7 Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996); see also 20 CFR § 404.1527 (f)(2)(i)(“State 8 agency medical and psychological consultants and other program physicians, 9 psychologists, and other medical specialists are highly qualified physicians, 10 psychologists, and other medical specialists who are also experts in Social Security 11 disability evaluation.”). 12 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have weighed the evidence differently and 13 resolved the conflict in favor of Dr. Sherman’s opinions. However, it is the role of 14 the Commissioner, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. Magallanes v. 15 Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989); Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If the 16 evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, this Court may not 17 substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 18 579 (9th 1984). If there is substantial evidence to support the administrative 19 findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding of either 20 16 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 disability or nondisability, the Commissioner’s finding is conclusive. Sprague v. 2 Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, the ALJ’s decision was 3 supported by substantial evidence and must therefore be sustained. See Tackett v. 4 Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)(holding that if evidence reasonably 5 supports the Commissioner’s decision, the reviewing court must uphold the decision 6 and may not substitute its own judgment). 7 C. Credibility 8 A claimant’s subjective complaints concerning his or her limitations are an 9 important part of a disability claim. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 10 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004)(citation omitted). The ALJ’s findings with regard to the 11 claimant’s credibility must be supported by specific cogent reasons. Rashad v. 12 Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). Absent affirmative evidence of 13 malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be “clear 14 and convincing.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). “General 15 findings are insufficient: rather the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible 16 and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; 17 Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). 18 However, subjective symptomatology by itself cannot be the basis for a 19 finding of disability. A claimant must present medical evidence or findings that the 20 17 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 existence of an underlying condition could reasonably be expected to produce the 2 symptomatology alleged. See 42 U.S.C. §§423(d)(5)(A), 1382c (a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. 3 § 404.1529(b), 416.929; SSR 96-7p. 4 In this case, Plaintiff testified as follows: She completed 11th grade. She does 5 not drive due to money and health problems. She has not worked since 2010. (T at 6 50). She has numbness and shooting pain in her lower extremities, along with 7 swelling. Prolonged sitting or standing is difficult. (T at 52). She is in constant 8 pain. (T at 52). She has lower back pain, which has been treated with therapy. (T at 9 53). She takes medication for depression, but has never seen a psychiatrist or mental 10 health therapist. (T at 54). She prefers to be alone. (T at 54). Panic attacks are a 11 problem. (T at 55). She watches television, does some reading, and uses a computer. 12 (T at 55). Sometimes, she stays in her house for weeks at a time. (T at 56). The pain 13 causes sleep problems. (T at 57). Hygiene is occasionally an issue. (T at 58). She 14 has very few “good” days. (T at 59). She has difficulty sitting still. (T at 60). 15 Standing is limited to no more than 5 minutes; she could not walk more than a block. 16 (T at 62-63). Concentration and focus are difficult due to her pain and depression. 17 (T at 63-64). 18 The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 19 reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but that her statements 20 18 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms were not 2 fully credible. (T at 35). For the reasons that follow, this Court finds the ALJ’s 3 decision consistent with applicable law and supported by substantial evidence. 4 First, in a very through and detailed decision, the ALJ found that the objective 5 evidence, including the assessments of consultative examiners and State Agency 6 review consultants, along with the treatment history and contemporaneous medical 7 records, did not support the severe limitations claimed by Plaintiff. (T at 29-37). 8 Although lack of supporting medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for 9 discounting pain testimony, it is a factor the ALJ may consider when analyzing 10 credibility. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). In other words, an 11 ALJ may properly discount subjective complaints where, as here, they are 12 contradicted by medical records. Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 13 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 14 2002). 15 The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff made inconsistent statements, which 16 detracted from her credibility. 17 regard to substance abuse, the record contained evidence suggesting that this was not 18 the case: she was treated in the emergency room in May 2010 on suspicion of a 19 polysubstance overdose (T at 31, 412, 414); there was an indication that Plaintiff had 20 19 Although Plaintiff claimed to be in remission with DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 stolen prescription medication (T at 422); Dr. John Peachy, a consultative examiner, 2 reported that Plaintiff “appear[ed] to be drugged or somnolent” during his 3 examination (T at 33-34, 580); Plaintiff was responsible for a traffic accident in 4 January 2014, with alcohol apparently involved. (T at 35, 54, 654-51). 5 An ALJ may rely on “ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation” and 6 discount a claimant’s credibility if he or she “has made prior statements 7 inconsistent” with subjective complaints or “is found to have been less than candid 8 in other aspects of his [or her] testimony.” See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 n. 5 9 (9th Cir. 1989). 10 Plaintiff takes issue with some aspects of the ALJ’s credibility assessment 11 (regarding, for example, Plaintiff’s stated reasons for stopping work). However, the 12 overall credibility determination is support by substantial evidence and, for the 13 reasons outlined above, this Court finds no reversible error with regard to the ALJ’s 14 credibility determination. 15 V. CONCLUSION 16 After carefully reviewing the administrative record, this Court finds 17 substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, including the objective 18 medical evidence and supported medical opinions. It is clear that the ALJ thoroughly 19 examined the record, afforded appropriate weight to the medical evidence, including 20 20 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB 1 the assessments of the treating and examining medical providers and medical 2 experts, and afforded the subjective claims of symptoms and limitations an 3 appropriate weight when rendering a decision that Plaintiff is not disabled. This 4 Court finds no reversible error and because substantial evidence supports the 5 Commissioner’s decision, the Commissioner is GRANTED summary judgment and 6 that Plaintiff’s motion for judgment summary judgment is DENIED. 7 8 9 VI. ORDERS 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: Judgment be entered AFFIRMING the Commissioner’s decision and DISMISSING this action, and it is further ORDERED that The Clerk of the Court file this Decision and Order and serve copies upon counsel for the parties. DATED this 21st day of December, 2016. /s/Victor E. Bianchini VICTOR E. BIANCHINI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 21 DECISION AND ORDER – HOLT v COLVIN 2:16-CV-04789-VEB
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
