Mario Lafayette Bain v. Arnold, No. 2:2016cv00356 - Document 10 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS by Magistrate Judge Jean P. Rosenbluth. IT IS ORDERED that the Petition is denied and Judgment be entered dismissing this action with prejudice.(See Order for details) (bem)
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Mario Lafayette Bain v. Arnold Doc. 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARIO LAFAYETTE BAIN, Petitioner, 12 13 v. 14 WARDEN ARNOLD, 15 Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 16-0356-JPR MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 16 17 18 PROCEEDINGS On January 15, 2016, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of 19 Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. He also consented to 20 having a U.S. Magistrate Judge conduct all further proceedings in 21 his case, including entering final judgment. On March 3, 2016, 22 Respondent filed an Answer and consented to proceed before a 23 Magistrate Judge. 24 Petitioner did not file a reply. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies the 25 Petition and dismisses this action with prejudice. 26 BACKGROUND 27 On January 27, 2014, a Los Angeles County Superior Court 28 jury found Petitioner guilty of possession of cocaine base for 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 sale. (Lodged Doc. 1, Clerk’s Tr. at 133.) The jury acquitted 2 Petitioner of the charge of sale, transportation, or offer to 3 sell a controlled substance. (Id. at 132.) Petitioner admitted 4 that he had suffered two “strike” convictions under California’s 5 Three Strikes law, had served four prison terms, and had suffered 6 five felony convictions. (Id. at 31-32, 136, 163.) On March 25, 7 2014, the trial court struck one of Petitioner’s “strike” 8 convictions and sentenced him to 10 years in state prison. (Id. 9 at 162-64, 166.) 10 Petitioner appealed, raising only the sole claim in the 11 Petition. (Lodged Doc. 3.) On May 4, 2015, the California Court 12 of Appeal affirmed the judgment. (Lodged Doc. 6.) Petitioner 13 filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, 14 which summarily denied review on July 15, 2015. (Lodged Docs. 7, 15 8.) 16 17 PETITIONER’S CLAIM The trial court abused its discretion and violated 18 Petitioner’s 14th Amendment right to due process when it denied 19 his pretrial Pitchess motion.1 20 21 (Pet. Mem. at 4-16.) SUMMARY OF PERTINENT FACTS The factual summary in a state appellate-court opinion is 22 entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. 23 § 2254(e)(1). See Crittenden v. Chappell, 804 F.3d 998, 1010-11 24 (9th Cir. 2015). But see Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1001 25 26 27 28 1 Pitchess v. Super. Ct., 11 Cal. 3d 531 (1974) (allowing discovery of internal police files in certain circumstances), superseded by statute, Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8, Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1043-45, as recognized in People v. Mooc, 26 Cal. 4th 1216, 1219-20 (2001). 2 1 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing “state of confusion” in circuit’s law 2 concerning interplay of § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1)). The Court 3 adopts the following statement of facts from the California Court 4 of Appeal’s opinion as a fair and accurate summary of the 5 pertinent proceedings at trial. The Court has nonetheless 6 independently reviewed the state-court record. 7 Prior to trial, [Petitioner] brought a Pitchess 8 motion seeking information in the personnel records of 9 three police officers, [Alonzo] Williams, [Benjamin] 10 McCauley, and [Jose] Calderon, relating to any alleged 11 conduct amounting to excessive force or dishonesty. 12 Attached to the motion was a copy of the arrest report, 13 signed 14 Kanchanamongkol, in which Officer Williams reported that 15 on August 27, 2013, at about 8:15 p.m., he was working 16 undercover 17 Narcotics Task Force, near the intersection of Sixth 18 Street and San Julian Street in Los Angeles. 19 consisted of approximately 15 officers. 20 As by Officer in plain Officer Williams clothes Williams and with walked Detective the west [Vip] Department’s on The team the south 21 sidewalk of Sixth Street he encountered [Petitioner], who 22 walked toward him and said, “Cavi cavi,” which is street 23 vernacular for rock cocaine. 24 “I need a dub,” which is street vernacular for $20 worth 25 of narcotics. 26 to my ass for that amount,” as he reached into his rear 27 waistband area and sat down in a nearby wheelchair. 28 [Petitioner] produced a clear plastic bag containing Officer Williams replied, [Petitioner] replied, “Yeah, I have to go 3 1 numerous smaller bindles of off-white solids resembling 2 rock cocaine. 3 gave it to Officer Williams after the officer handed him 4 a prerecorded $20 bill. 5 gave the predetermined “buy” signal to other officers who 6 had observed the transaction, [Petitioner] was detained 7 by Officers Lozano and [Huy] Nguyen and then arrested. 8 From 9 recovered 111 plastic bindles containing off-white solids the He then extracted one of the bindles and seat of the Shortly after Officer Williams wheelchair Officer McCauley 10 resembling rock cocaine. 11 totaling 12 included two $20 bills, three $10 bills, seven $5 bills 13 and 69 one dollar bills, but the prerecorded $20 bill was 14 not found, despite a search of the area by the responding 15 officers. Detectives [Thomas] Mossman, Kanchanamongkol, 16 and 17 transmission throughout his interaction with [Petitioner] 18 via a one-way transmitter.2 19 $176 [Mariano] Defense on Officer Nguyen found currency [Petitioner]’s Garde counsel monitored supported person. The Officer the $176 Williams’s motion with her 20 declaration, which included the following paragraph: 21 “[Petitioner] was walking on the corner of Wall St. and 22 6th, in the city and county of Los Angeles. [Petitioner] 23 denies 24 [Petitioner] never heard anyone, including an undercover saying the words ‘Cavi, Cavi’ to anyone. 25 26 27 28 2 According to the arrest report, Officer Calderon observed the narcotics transaction between Petitioner and Officer Williams and directed “chase units” to detain Petitioner after the transaction was complete. (Lodged Doc. 1, Clerk’s Tr. at 66.) 4 1 officer, say to him ‘I need a dub.’ 2 ever having a conversation with anyone, which consisted 3 of him saying ‘yeah, I have to go to my ass for that 4 amount.’ 5 minding his own business, when the police stopped and 6 searched him. 7 on him during the search. 8 sitting in a wheelchair. [Petitioner] denies ever owning 9 or possessing a wheelchair, or having sat in one on the [Petitioner] denies [Petitioner] was walking down the street, The police did not find any illegal drugs [Petitioner] denies ever 10 day of his arrest. 11 waist band area with his right hand, and did not remove 12 a large clear plastic bag containing numerous off white 13 solids resembling rock cocaine. 14 denies ever giving anyone one [sic] a small clear plastic 15 bindle containing an off white solid resembling rock 16 cocaine in exchange for $20.00. 17 take 18 [Petitioner] did not sit in a wheelchair at any time. 19 [Petitioner] was walking on the street when officers 20 rushed 21 substances on his person, but arrested him anyway.” or accept him, a [Petitioner] did not reach into his twenty searched [Petitioner] adamantly [Petitioner] did not dollar him, failed bill to from find anyone. illegal 22 Counsel also stated on information and belief that 23 Officers Williams, McCauley, and Calderon all lied about 24 the events, that that [sic] this would be the defense 25 raised at trial. 26 The trial court denied the Pitchess motion. 27 court acknowledged the low threshold for showing good 28 cause, but found that [Petitioner]’s showing was merely 5 The 1 a denial. 2 (Lodged Doc. 6 at 3-4.) 3 4 STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and 5 Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: 6 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 7 a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 8 court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that 9 was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings 10 unless the adjudication of the claim — (1) resulted in a 11 decision 12 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 13 law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 14 States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on 15 an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 16 the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 17 Under AEDPA, the “clearly established Federal law” that that was contrary to, or involved an 18 controls federal habeas review consists of holdings of Supreme 19 Court cases “as of the time of the relevant state-court 20 decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). As the 21 Supreme Court has “repeatedly emphasized, . . . circuit precedent 22 does not constitute ‘clearly established Federal law, as 23 determined by the Supreme Court.’” Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 24 429, 431 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting § 2254(d)(1)). Further, 25 circuit precedent “cannot ‘refine or sharpen a general principle 26 of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that 27 [the] Court has not announced.’” Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 4 28 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 6 1 1446, 1450 (2013) (per curiam)). 2 Although a particular state-court decision may be both 3 “contrary to” and “an unreasonable application of” controlling 4 Supreme Court law, the two phrases have distinct meanings. 5 Williams, 529 U.S. at 391, 412-13. A state-court decision is 6 “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it either 7 applies a rule that contradicts governing Supreme Court law or 8 reaches a result that differs from the result the Supreme Court 9 reached on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Early v. 10 Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam) (citation omitted). A 11 state court need not cite or even be aware of the controlling 12 Supreme Court cases, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the 13 result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” 14 Id. State-court decisions that are not “contrary to” Supreme 15 Court law may be set aside on federal habeas review only “if they 16 are not merely erroneous, but ‘an unreasonable application’ of 17 clearly established federal law, or based on ‘an unreasonable 18 determination of the facts’ (emphasis added).” 19 (quoting § 2254(d)). Id. at 11 A state-court decision that correctly 20 identifies the governing legal rule may be rejected if it 21 unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. 22 Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08. To obtain federal habeas relief 23 for such an “unreasonable application,” however, a petitioner 24 must show that the state court’s application of Supreme Court law 25 was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409-10. In other words, 26 habeas relief is warranted only if the state court’s ruling was 27 “so lacking in justification that there was an error well 28 understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 7 1 possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 2 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). 3 Petitioner raised his claim on direct appeal (Lodged Doc. 4 3), resting it on federal law as well as state law (see infra 5 note 3), and the court of appeal rejected it in a reasoned 6 decision; it did not, however, specifically address the federal 7 aspect of the claim (see Lodged Doc. 6). 8 Court summarily denied review. The California Supreme (Lodged Docs. 7, 8.) The Court 9 “looks through” a state supreme court’s silent denial to the 10 court of appeal’s reasoned decision as the basis for the state 11 courts’ judgment. 12 (1991). See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 Because the state courts adjudicated the federal claim 13 on the merits, see Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1095-96 14 (2013) (Richter presumption applies to federal claim unaddressed 15 in state court’s reasoned decision), the Court’s review is 16 limited by AEDPA deference. 17 See Richter, 562 U.S. at 100-01. But because the state court did not expressly address the 18 federal aspect of the claim, the Court conducts an independent 19 review of the record to determine whether the state court was 20 objectively unreasonable in applying controlling federal law. 21 See Haney v. Adams, 641 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 2011) 22 (independent review “is not de novo review of the constitutional 23 issue, but only a means to determine whether the ‘state court 24 decision is objectively unreasonable’” (citation omitted)); see 25 also Richter, 562 U.S. at 98, 102 (holding that petitioner still 26 has burden of “showing there was no reasonable basis for the 27 state court to deny relief,” and reviewing court “must determine 28 what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have 8 1 supported[] the state court’s decision” and “whether it is 2 possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments 3 or theories are inconsistent with” Supreme Court precedent). 4 DISCUSSION 5 I. Applicable Law 6 Although a Pitchess motion is a creature of state law, it 7 implicates the due process right to receive exculpatory and 8 impeachment evidence. See Harrison v. Lockyer, 316 F.3d 1063, 9 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2003). But a Pitchess claim is cognizable on 10 federal habeas review only if it “resolves to a claim that the 11 trial court’s asserted error in connection with Petitioner’s 12 Pitchess motion violated Petitioner’s rights under the Brady 13 doctrine.” Lopez-Martinez v. Dovey, No. CV 06-1987-CJC (MAN), 14 2009 WL 863576, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2009). If a Brady 15 violation is not established, then a petitioner “has no federally 16 cognizable claim, regardless of whether the state court’s 17 handling of his Pitchess motion was erroneous under state law.” 18 Id. 19 Due process requires that a prosecutor disclose material 20 evidence favorable to the defense. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 21 83, 87 (1963); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) 22 (noting that evidence is “material” if “there is a reasonable 23 probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 24 the result of the proceeding would have been different”). Three 25 elements must be proved to establish a Brady violation: (1) the 26 evidence at issue was favorable to the defendant, either as 27 exculpatory evidence or impeachment material; (2) the evidence 28 was suppressed by the state, willfully or inadvertently; and (3) 9 1 prejudice resulted from the failure to disclose the evidence. 2 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82; see also United States v. Bagley, 3 473 U.S. 667, 675-78 (1985). Brady did not, however, create a 4 general constitutional right to discovery. 5 Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). Weatherford v. “[T]he Due Process Clause has 6 little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties 7 must be afforded.” Id. (citation omitted). 8 II. Court of Appeal’s Decision 9 On direct appeal, the court of appeal analyzed solely the 10 state-law aspect of Petitioner’s claim. (Lodged Doc. 6 at 4-10.) 11 It explained that under Pitchess, “on a showing of good cause, a 12 criminal defendant is entitled to discovery of relevant documents 13 or information in the confidential personnel records of a peace 14 officer accused of misconduct against the defendant.” 15 (citations and alteration omitted).) (Id. at 4 “If the defendant 16 establishes good cause, the court must review the requested 17 records in camera to determine what information, if any, should 18 be disclosed.” 19 (Id. at 5 (citations omitted).) The court of appeal analyzed counsel’s showing and “agree[d] 20 with the trial court that counsel’s declaration amounted to no 21 more than a denial of the facts stated in the police report.” 22 (Id. at 6.) Petitioner had not provided an alternative version 23 of the events, and although he contended that the failure to find 24 the “buy money” supported a possible defense based upon 25 fabrication by the police, counsel’s declaration “failed to 26 present any factual scenario that might help to explain the scope 27 of the alleged fabrication.” (Id. at 9.) Thus, Petitioner did 28 not show good cause, and the trial court did not abuse its 10 1 discretion by refusing to examine or order the disclosure of the 2 officers’ personnel records. (Id. at 10.) 3 III. Analysis 4 To the extent Petitioner contends the trial court abused its 5 discretion and misapplied state law when it denied his Pitchess 6 motion (Pet. Mem. at 14), his claim is not cognizable on federal 7 habeas review. See § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 8 67-68 (1991) (habeas relief will not lie to correct errors in 9 interpretation or application of state law); see also Williams v. 10 Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 1998) (federal habeas relief 11 available “only for constitutional violation, not for abuse of 12 discretion”). Petitioner’s sole cognizable federal claim is his 13 Brady claim.3 (Pet. Mem. at 5.) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 Respondent contends that Petitioner’s Brady claim is unexhausted. (Answer at 6-8.) But although Petitioner did not cite Brady in the state court, he argued in his court-of-appeal opening brief and in his petition for review that the trial court’s denial of his Pitchess motion violated his 14th Amendment right to due process because Pitchess was “based on the premise that evidence contained in a law enforcement officer’s personnel file may be relevant to an accused’s criminal defense and that to withhold such relevant evidence from the defendant would violate the accused’s due process right to a fair trial.” (Lodged Doc. 3 at 16; Lodged Doc. 7 at 13-14.) Petitioner supported his argument with a citation to People v. Mooc, 26 Cal. 4th 1216, 1225 (2001) (Lodged Doc. 3 at 16; Lodged Doc. 7 at 14), in which the California Supreme Court declared that the Pitchess procedure “must be viewed against the larger background of the prosecution’s constitutional obligation to disclose to a defendant material exculpatory evidence so as not to infringe the defendant’s right to a fair trial,” and cited Brady and Bagley. Petitioner, therefore, fairly presented his Brady claim to the state courts, and the claim is exhausted. In any event, the Court may deny an unexhausted claim on the merits if it finds, on de novo review, that it is not even (continued...) 11 1 The state court’s denial of Petitioner’s Brady claim was not 2 objectively unreasonable. Petitioner has not shown that the 3 personnel records of Officers Williams, McCauley, and Calderon 4 contained any information material to his defense. (See Lodged 5 Doc. 1, Clerk’s Tr. at 49-75; Lodged Doc. 2, Rep.’s Tr. at A26 A3.) Because Petitioner did not make a sufficient preliminary 7 showing of materiality under state law -- a finding this Court is 8 bound by, see Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per 9 curiam) -- the trial court never proceeded to the second step of 10 the Pitchess procedure, an in camera review of the records. 11 Consequently, the record does not contain any information about 12 whether the officers’ personnel files included exculpatory or 13 impeaching information. 14 Petitioner cannot base his Brady claim on mere speculation 15 that the files contained information giving rise to a reasonable 16 probability of a different result at trial had it been disclosed. 17 (See Pet. Mem. at 6, 15-16); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 18 769 (9th Cir. 2012) (“to state a Brady claim, [petitioner] is 19 required to do more than ‘merely speculate’ about” nature of 20 undisclosed evidence (citation omitted)); United States v. 21 Lopez–Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 598 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting Brady 22 claim when defendant’s assertion that allegedly withheld evidence 23 existed was “purely speculative”). Absence of evidence that the 24 25 26 3 (...continued) 27 colorable, as is the case here. 28 See § 2254(b)(2); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623-24 (9th Cir. 2005). 12 1 files contained Brady material is fatal to Petitioner’s claim.4 2 See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 n.15 (1987) 3 (criminal defendant “may not require the trial court to search 4 through” sensitive file “without first establishing a basis for 5 his claim that it contains material evidence”); Harrison, 316 6 F.3d at 1066 (affirming denial of Brady claim when petitioner 7 “made no showing that [officer]’s file contained complaints 8 material to his defense”; noting that Pitchess “good cause” 9 procedure complies with Brady as modified by Ritchie). 10 Accordingly, the court of appeal was not objectively 11 unreasonable in denying Petitioner’s claim. Alternatively, his 12 Brady claim fails on de novo review. 13 14 CONCLUSION IT IS ORDERED that the Petition is denied and Judgment be 15 entered dismissing this action with prejudice. 16 17 DATED: August 30, 2016 JEAN ROSENBLUTH U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 4 The California Supreme Court recently held that a 21 defendant is not required to show what information was in the 22 files to demonstrate good cause for in camera review under 23 24 25 26 27 28 Pitchess. See People v. Super. Ct. (Johnson), 61 Cal. 4th 696, 721 (2015) (“The required threshold showing [under Pitchess] does not place a defendant ‘in the Catch–22 position of having to allege with particularity the very information he is seeking.’” (citation omitted)). Petitioner cannot, however, establish a Brady violation without showing the existence of undisclosed information that would have given rise to a reasonable probability of a different result at trial. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82; see also Johnson, 61 Cal. 4th at 711-12 (noting that “Brady’s constitutional materiality standard is narrower than the Pitchess requirement”). 13
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