Cynthia Castaneda v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al, No. 2:2015cv08870 - Document 17 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 9 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 9.) Castaneda may amend her Complaint within 14 days with respect to the HBOR claims and the UCL's unlawful prong only. (jp)
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Cynthia Castaneda v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al Doc. 17 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court Central District of California 8 9 10 11 Case 2:15-cv-08870-ODW-KS CYNTHIA CASTANEDA Plaintiff, 12 v. 13 ORDER GRANTING 14 WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 15 CAL-WESTERN CORPORANTION DISMISS [9] 16 WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., and DOES 17 1 to 100, inclusive Defendants. 18 19 I. 20 INTRODUCTION 21 After falling behind on her mortgage payments, Plaintiff Cynthia Castaneda 22 attempted to modify her loan with Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells 23 Fargo”)—the ultimate successor of World Savings Bank, FSB (“World Savings 24 Bank”).1 Castaneda alleges that Wells Fargo recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale 25 prematurely; that it failed to provide her with a written denial of her third loan 26 1 27 28 National Bankruptcy Services, LLC, (“NBS”) was named as a defendant but is a nominal party to this lawsuit. NBS replaced Cal-Western Reconveyance Corporation as the trustee in the deed of trust encumbering the party at issue. Plaintiff fails to state any facts that materially tie NBS to any alleged wrongdoing. (ECF No. 1, p. 6.) Dockets.Justia.com 1 modification application; that it added unfair and duplicative fees for default-related 2 services; and that it was negligent. Castaneda also makes a claim for accounting. 3 Wells Fargo removed the case and now moves to dismiss. For the reasons stated 4 below, the Court GRANTS Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss. II. 5 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 6 In September 2004, Castaneda obtained a $223,300.00 loan from World 7 Savings Bank which was secured with a Deed of Trust against the real property at 8 8231 Quoit Street, Downey, California. (ECF No 10-1, Ex. A.)2 World Savings Bank 9 was a federal savings bank, regulated at the time by the Office of Thrift Supervision. 10 (Id., Ex. G.) After several mergers, Wells Fargo became the legal successor to World 11 Savings Bank. (ECF No. 9.) 12 Castaneda defaulted on her loan and on August 3, 2012, Wells Fargo recorded a 13 Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust. (ECF No. 1-1, Ex. A 14 (Compl.) ¶¶ 37-38.) 15 complete application for a loan modification, and in December 2013 she received two 16 letters from Wells Fargo indicating that she did not qualify. (Id. ¶¶ 39 41.) Around 17 July 2014, she submitted a second complete application for a loan modification, 18 naming her husband as a contributor. 19 Castaneda’s second complete loan application was under review, Wells Fargo 20 recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale. (Id. ¶ 43.) In October 2014, Wells Fargo sent 21 Castaneda a written denial of her second loan modification application and indicated 22 that she did not qualify for any modification program with $4,100 of monthly income. 23 (Id. ¶ 44.) Castaneda filed a timely appeal, which was denied. (Id.) On or around September 19, 2013, Castaneda submitted a (Id. ¶ 42.) On August 13, 2014, while 24 Castaneda soon retained counsel to assist her with the loan modification 25 process. Her counsel requested information from Wells Fargo relating to Castaneda’s 26 loss mitigation options and transaction history. (Id. ¶ 46.) Wells Fargo responded 27 28 2 The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice to the extent that the Court uses the documents adduced in this Order. (ECF No. 10.) 2 1 with a loan history statement, which included various charges such as, “Misc. 2 Application Pay,” “After NOD Exp,” “Late Charge Adjust,” and others. (Id. ¶ 47.) 3 Around April 13, 2015, Castaneda submitted a third loan modification 4 application, stating a material change in circumstances. (Id. ¶ 65.) Specifically, she 5 mentioned that her husband began working more overtime. (Id.) His monthly income 6 was now $5,200, a $1,100 difference from the monthly income contained in the 7 October 2014 denial letter. (Id.) Castaneda, through her counsel, contacted Wells 8 Fargo on April 17, 2015 to inquire about her pending application. (Id. ¶ 66.) A Wells 9 Fargo representative confirmed that a complete application was received, but it noted 10 that it would not be opening a modification review. (Id.) To date, Wells Fargo has 11 not provided Castaneda a written denial of the third complete loan modification 12 application. (Id.) 13 On October 18, 2015, Castaneda filed suit against Wells Fargo in Los Angeles 14 County Superior Court alleging several violations of California’s Homeowner Bill of 15 Rights (“HOBR”) and California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), negligence, and 16 a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Id.) Castaneda also makes a 17 demand for accounting. (Id.) On November 13, 2015, Wells Fargo removed the 18 action invoking diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.) 19 On November 20, 2015, Wells Fargo moved to dismiss Castaneda’s Complaint 20 for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 9.) The parties filed a timely opposition and 21 reply. (ECF Nos. 11, 14.) Wells Fargo’s Motion is now before the Court for decision. 22 III. LEGAL STANDARD 23 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable 24 legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal 25 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To 26 survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading 27 requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. 28 Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual “allegations must be enough to 3 1 raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 2 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, 3 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 4 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 5 The determination whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a 6 “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 7 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A court is generally limited to the 8 pleadings and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as 9 true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 10 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). But a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, 11 unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden 12 State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 13 As a general rule, a court should freely give leave to amend a complaint that has 14 been dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). But a court may deny leave to amend when 15 “the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged 16 pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well 17 Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir.1986); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 18 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). IV. 19 DISCUSSION Wells Fargo contends that Castaneda’s causes of action fail to state a claim on 20 21 their allegations. The Court will address each issue in turn. 22 A. HBOR Claims 23 Castaneda’s first cause of action asserts claims under the California 24 Homeowner Bill of Rights (“HBOR”). Specifically, she alleges that Wells Fargo 25 violated California Civil Code section 2923.6(c) while handling her second loan 26 modification application, section 2923.6(g) while handling her third loan modification 27 application, and, as a consequence, also violated sections 2923.6(d) and 2923.6(f). 28 a. Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(c) 4 1 Castaneda alleges that Wells Fargo violated California’s law against dual 2 tracking. The HBOR forbids a mortgage servicer from “dual tracking,” or 3 “record[ing] a notice of default or notice of sale . . . while the [borrower’s] complete 4 first lien loan modification is pending.” Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(c). 5 Her allegation of dual tracking under section 2923.6(c) occurred when: (1) 6 Castaneda submitted her second loan modification application to Wells Fargo in July 7 2014, and (2) Wells Fargo recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale on August 13, 2014 8 without providing Castaneda with a determination on her pending application. 9 Wells Fargo claims that Castaneda’s allegation of dual tracking is moot because 10 it subsequently provided her with written notice denying both her application and 11 appeal in October and November 2014, respectively, thus remedying the violations. 12 The Court agrees. If a mortgage servicer corrects and remedies a violation prior to the 13 recordation of a trustee’s deed upon sale, it is not liable for violating section 14 2923.6(c). Cal. Civ. Code § 2924.12(c). See Jerviss v. Select Portfolio Servicing, 15 Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01904-MCE-KJN, 2015 WL 7572130, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 16 2015) (holding a dual tracking claim was moot after defendant sent written denial of 17 plaintiff’s application before a sale was recorded); Diamos v. Specialized Loan 18 Servicing LLC, No. 13-CV-04997 NC, 2014 WL 3362259, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 19 2014) (holding that a cause of action for dual tracking is moot when defendant 20 rescinded notice of default); Jent v. N. Trust Corp., No. 13–cv–01684 WBS, 2014 WL 21 172542, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2014) (holding that liability was precluded when 22 defendants had rescinded the notice of default and no trustee’s deed upon sale had 23 been recorded); see also Pearson v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. 14-CV-04524- 24 JSC, 2015 WL 632457, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2015) (explaining that if the servicer 25 takes action to correct the HBOR violation before proceeding to foreclosure, no 26 liability results) (emphasis added). 27 Here, Castaneda does not allege that a trustee’s deed upon sale has been 28 recorded. Furthermore, the Complaint shows that Wells Fargo cured the alleged 5 1 violation of section 2923.6(c) by delivering a written denial to Castaneda’s second 2 loan application in October 2014. (Compl. ¶ 44.) Accepting Castaneda’s allegations 3 as true, Wells Fargo cured any purported violation of section 2923.6(c) by complying 4 with 2924.12(c). As such, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion as to section 5 2923.6(c). b. Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(g) 6 7 Castaneda next alleges that Wells Fargo violated section 2923.6(g), which 8 requires a mortgage servicer to evaluate applications from borrowers who have 9 already been evaluated for a first lien loan modification if “there has been a material 10 change in the circumstances since the date of the borrower’s previous application . . . 11 .” Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(g). Castaneda claims that her husband’s monthly income 12 at the time of her third loan modification application in April 2015 was $5,200—a 13 $1,100 increase from her second application in July 2014—and that Wells Fargo 14 failed to evaluate her application despite this material change. (Compl. ¶¶ 65, 66.) 15 Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiff’s second application included her husband’s 16 income; therefore it had already considered the change in circumstance Castaneda 17 argues is relevant here. (ECF No. 9, p. 5.) Additionally, Wells Fargo argues that 18 Castaneda has not provided the requisite documentation for her third application 19 showing a material change in circumstance.3 (Id. at p. 14.) 20 Indeed, Castaneda must do more than plausibly plead a material change in 21 circumstance to state a claim under section 2923.6(g). Castaneda must allege that she 22 provided documentation of her updated circumstances to Wells Fargo. Salazar v. U.S. 23 Bank Nat. Ass’n, No. ED CV 14-514-GHK (DTBx), 2015 WL 1542908, at *4 (C.D. 24 Cal. Apr. 6, 2015). Construing the facts in Plaintiff’s favor as is required at this stage, 25 the Court finds that Castaneda has not met her burden. In her Complaint, Castaneda 26 alleges that she faxed a loan modification application noting that her husband was 27 3 28 Plaintiff provides documentation for a fourth loan modification application filed in October 2015, but did not provide documentation for her third loan modification application. (ECF No. 11, Ex. A, pp. 14-64.) 6 1 working more overtime, resulting in the $1,100 increase in income from the second 2 loan modification application. (Compl. ¶ 65.) “[A]lthough the precise nature of the 3 documentation required under this code is not clear, the plaintiff must do more than 4 submit a new loan modification with different financial information.” 5 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 255700, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2014); see 6 also Salazar, 2015 WL 1542908, at *4. To find otherwise would be to defeat the 7 intent of subsection (g), which is to “relieve mortgage servicers from evaluating 8 multiple loan applications submitted for the purpose of delay.” Winterbower v. Wells 9 Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 1232997, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2013). Saber v. 10 As such, Castaneda must allege what, if any, proper documentation she 11 submitted to Wells Fargo to support her material change in circumstance for the third 12 loan modification application. 13 (documenting and submitting a material change in circumstance “means more than 14 simply stating one’s [income] has increased and then providing two numbers”). The 15 Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 2923.6(g) claim with leave 16 to amend. See Winterbower, 2013 WL 1232997 at *3 c. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2923.6(d), 2923.6(f) 17 18 Castaneda alleges other HBOR violations stemming from Wells Fargo’s 19 decision not to review her third loan modification application. She alleges a violation 20 of section 2923.6(f), which requires a servicer to provide written notice to the 21 borrower that includes the reason for denial, and a violation of 2923.6(d), which 22 grants the borrower thirty days after the written denial to file an appeal. Cal. Civ. 23 Code §§ 2923.6(d), 2923.6(f). 24 These claims are premised on the assumption that Wells Fargo had any 25 obligation to review Castaneda’s third application under section 2923.6(g). Because 26 Castaneda has not adequately stated a claim for relief under 2923.6(g), the Court 27 GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss these derivative claims with leave to 28 amend. 7 1 B. Negligence 2 Castaneda’s next cause of action is for negligence. Wells Fargo contends that 3 Castaneda failed to state a claim for negligence because lenders do not generally owe 4 their borrowers a duty of care. 5 Under California law, the “existence of a duty of care owed by a defendant to a 6 plaintiff is a prerequisite to establishing a claim for negligence.” Nymark v. Heart 7 Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1095 (1991). Generally, a financial 8 institution does not owe its borrower a duty of care “when the institution’s 9 involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional role 10 as a mere lender of money.” Id. at 1096. A lender exceeds its “conventional role” as 11 a money lender when it “actively participates” in the financed enterprise “beyond the 12 domain of the usual money lender.” Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 35 13 (1980) (quoting Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 864 (1968)). 14 Castaneda does not allege in her Complaint any facts suggesting that Wells 15 Fargo exceeded the normal role of a lender during the default/foreclosure process; she 16 simply reiterates that it failed to comply with the procedures set forth in section 17 2923.6, as stated above. (Compl. ¶¶ 75–77.) 18 While Castaneda’s allegations under section 2923.6 may make out statutory 19 violations if sufficiently pled, they still do not establish that Wells Fargo “actively 20 participate[d]” in Castaneda’s loan “beyond the domain of the usual money lender.” 21 See Wagner, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 35. Rather, these actions—or inactions such as they 22 are—fall squarely within the class of conduct a lender might take during the default 23 process. The Court thus GRANTS Defendant’s Motion on this claim. 24 C. 25 Unfair Competition Law Castaneda next brings a claim against Wells Fargo for violating the California 26 Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or 27 fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading 28 advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Wells Fargo contends that Castaneda 8 1 both lacks standing to bring a UCL claim and fails to adequately plead allegations of 2 unlawful, fraudulent, or unfair conduct. (ECF No. 9, pp. 19–20.) 3 1. UCL standing 4 To have standing to sue under the UCL, a plaintiff must have “suffered injury in 5 fact and [have] lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” Id. § 6 17204. 7 plaintiff must “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to 8 qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that the economic injury 9 was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that 10 is the gravamen of the claim.” Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 322 11 (2011). The California Supreme Court held that to satisfy this requirement, the 12 Wells Fargo argues that Castaneda has not alleged any injury or a loss of money 13 or property that was caused by its conduct because the foreclosure sale has not 14 occurred yet. (ECF No. 9, p. 19.) Instead, it contends that any of Castaneda’s injuries 15 would be due to her own failure to pay her mortgage as she promised. Id. 16 But Castaneda does allege that she suffered economic injury as a result of Wells 17 Fargo’s conduct, namely the loss of home equity. (Compl. ¶ 102.) Castaneda asserts 18 that Wells Fargo’s decision to charge marked up and excess fees caused her to lose 19 title to, and interest in, her home. (Id. ¶ 103.) These economic detriments easily 20 satisfy the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 17204. See Kwikset, 21 51 Cal. 4th at 323 (interpreting the phrase “lost money or property”). 22 The Court therefore finds that the Castaneda has standing to sue under the UCL. 23 2. 24 UCL’s “unlawful” prong “borrows” violations of other laws such that a 25 “defendant cannot be liable under § 17200 for committing unlawful business practices 26 without having violated another law.” Ingels v. Westwood One Broad. Servs., Inc., 27 129 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1060 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 28 Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 377, 383 (1992). “Unlawful” conduct 9 1 2 Wells Fargo attacks Castaneda’s allegations that it violated various provisions of section 2923.6 or was otherwise unlawful in its dealings with Plaintiff. a. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1962 3 4 Castaneda alleges, rather vaguely, that Wells Fargo’s decision to omit material 5 facts with respect to her third loan modification application constitutes “unlawful” 6 conduct because it violates 18 U.S.C. section 1341 (mail fraud), section 1343 (wire 7 fraud), and section 1962 (criminal racketeering). 8 Complaint with a fine-toothed comb, the Court cannot find enough facts to support 9 any cognizable violation under the aforementioned sections of Title 18. Even after sifting through the b. Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6 10 11 Further, because the Court has already found that Castaneda did not adequately 12 plead a violation of the HBOR, any alleged violations under section 2923.6 cannot 13 serve as a predicate for a UCL claim. See Martinez v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 14 598 F.3d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 2010). 15 3. “Fraudulent” conduct 16 A “fraudulent” business act or practice is one which is likely to deceive 17 members of the public. Weinstat v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 180 Cal. App. 4th 1213, 18 1223 (2010). UCL claims premised on fraudulent conduct trigger the heightened 19 pleading standard under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Kearns v. 20 Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009). 21 Here, the Complaint fails to meet the heightened pleading standard required for 22 fraud claims because Castaneda only vaguely alleges how members of the public are 23 likely to be deceived by Wells Fargo’s actions. She alleges that Wells Fargo instituted 24 improper or premature foreclosure proceedings to generate fees for default-related 25 services, all while concealing the true character, quality and nature of the fees—or 26 simply put, the fees themselves were marked-up and unwarranted. (E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 27 94, 99.) She jumps to the conclusion that these practices are likely to deceive the 28 10 1 public. However, these allegations are insufficient to meet the heightened pleading 2 standard required to plead a fraudulent business act. 3 4. 4 In interpreting the UCL’s “unfair” term, the California Supreme Court held that 5 “the word ‘unfair’ in that section means conduct that threatens an incipient violation 6 of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its 7 effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise 8 significantly threatens or harms competition.” 9 Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 187 (1999). Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Castaneda has not alleged how Defendant’s actions rose anywhere near the 10 11 “Unfair” conduct mandatory level of anticompetitive activity. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion as to the UCL claim 12 13 with leave to amend the unlawful prong only. 14 D. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 15 Castaneda alleges that Wells Fargo breached the implied covenant of good faith 16 and fair dealing by denying her request for a loan modification and by imposing 17 unnecessary and marked up fees in conjunction with its default-related services. This 18 allegation suggests that Castaneda’s loan agreement contained an implicit promise that 19 Wells Fargo would assist her as she attempts to obtain a loan modification or pursue 20 other loss mitigation alternatives. Castaneda tried with the section 2923.6 claim to 21 persuade the Court that Wells Fargo is legally obligated to accept her request for a 22 loan modification, and with the UCL claim to argue certain fees were imposed 23 incorrectly and inconsistently onto her. The implied covenant approach is different in 24 form, but not in substance. 25 The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied to protect the express 26 covenants of a contract, not a general public policy interest indirectly tied to the 27 contract’s purpose. Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Cal. Dep’t of Parks and Recreation, 11 28 Cal. App. 4th 1026, 1031 (1992). The covenant is implied as a supplement to the 11 1 express contractual covenants “to prevent a contracting party from engaging in 2 conduct” that does not technically breach the express covenants, but otherwise 3 “frustrates the other party’s rights to the benefits of the contract.” Id. at 1028. The obvious purpose of the mortgage loan is to memorialize the terms on which 4 5 Castaneda will pay back the money borrowed. There is no reason to believe that 6 somewhere in the agreement is an implicit promise to permit Plaintiff to change the 7 terms of repayment due to her default. Such an implied promise would directly 8 undermine, not protect, the contract’s express terms. Regarding the fees for Well 9 Fargo’s default-related services, Castaneda has failed to identify how they were 10 improperly assessed, or how the charges themselves undermine, rather than protect, the 11 terms of the loan agreement. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Wells Fargo’s Motion as 12 to this cause of action. 13 E. Accounting 14 Lastly, Castaneda makes a demand for accounting based on the fees alleged to 15 be improper and unnecessary. For her to be entitled to accounting, Castaneda must 16 demonstrate a relationship between the plaintiff and defendant exists that requires an 17 accounting, and that some balance is due to the plaintiff that can only be ascertained 18 by an accounting. See Teselle v. McLaughlin, 173 Cal. App. 4th 156, 179 (2009). 19 Other than merely concluding that Wells Fargo owes her a duty, Castaneda has 20 not demonstrated why that is the case. As stated once before, a mortgage lender or 21 trustee under a deed of trust generally does not owe a fiduciary duty to the borrower. 22 See Nymark, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1093 n. 1 (1991). Castaneda claims, however, 23 that a relationship for accounting exists because Wells Fargo collected money that it 24 actually did not have forthcoming. This notwithstanding, Castaneda has failed to 25 plead sufficient facts regarding these fees to survive a motion to dismiss. 26 Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. EDCV 13-02075 JVS (DTBx), 2014 WL 27 1568857, *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2014) (“The [c]omplaint is devoid of any factual 28 details regarding when these charges were assessed, the venders involved, or why 12 See 1 [Plaintiff] . . . concluded that these charges were excessive.”). 2 GRANTS Wells Fargo’s Motion on the demand for accounting. V. 3 Thus, the Court CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to 5 Dismiss. (ECF No. 9.) Castaneda may amend her Complaint within 14 days with 6 respect to the HBOR claims and the UCL’s unlawful prong only. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 February 26, 2016 10 11 12 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13
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