John Busker v. WABTEC Corporation et al, No. 2:2015cv08194 - Document 88 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 65 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II . (lc). Modified on 1/10/2017 (lc).
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John Busker v. WABTEC Corporation et al Doc. 88 O 1 2 3 4 5 United States District Court Central District of California 6 7 8 9 10 JOHN BUSKER, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, 11 12 13 14 15 Case No. 2:15-cv-08194-ODW-AFM Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT [65] WABTEC CORPORATION; MARK MARTIN; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants. 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 On September 11, 2015, Plaintiff John Busker filed this putative class action in 19 the Los Angeles Superior Court against Wabtec Corporation (“Wabtec”) and Mark 20 Martin (“Martin”) (collectively, “Defendants”). (Not. of Removal, Ex. A (“Compl.”), 21 ECF No. 1-1.) Then, on October 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in 22 state court alleging causes of action for: (1) failure to pay minimum and overtime 23 wages, (2) failure to pay prevailing wages on a public works project, (3) failure to 24 provide accurate wage statements, (4) waiting time penalties under California Labor 25 Code section 203, (5) unfair business competition, (6) declaratory relief, and (7) 26 penalties pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699. On October 19, 2015, 27 Defendants removed the action to federal court. (Not. of Removal ¶ 4, ECF No. 1.) 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing that Busker’s claims fail 2 as a matter of law because prevailing wage requirements are not applicable to his 3 work for Defendants. (ECF No. 65.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court 4 GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.1 II. 5 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 6 This is a putative class action lawsuit arising out of Busker’s and other putative 7 class members’ work on a public works project under the employment of Wabtec. On 8 October 13, 2010, the Southern California Regional Rail Authority (also known as 9 “Metrolink”) entered into a public works contract with Parsons Transportation Group, 10 Inc. (“Parsons”) to design, furnish, and install a Positive Train Control (“PTC”) 11 system on the Metrolink railway system. 12 (“SUF”) ¶ 2.) This contract involved two types of work: “On-Board Work,” involving 13 procuring and installing PTC systems on Metrolink’s trains; and “Field Installation 14 Work,” such as installing PTC in the field and along the wayside of the train tracks. 15 (Id. ¶ 3.) The Metrolink-Parsons contract contained a prevailing wage requirement, 16 but it explicitly pertained only to Field Installation Work and not to On-Board Work. 17 (Id. ¶ 7.) (Statement of Uncontroverted Facts 18 In November 2010, Parsons entered into a subcontract with Wabtec, under 19 which Wabtec took responsibility for designing, furnishing, installing, testing, and 20 certifying the on-board PTC components, equipment, and system on the trains. (Id. 21 ¶ 4.) Under the subcontract, Wabtec did not take responsibility for and did not 22 perform any Field Installation Work, such as working on buildings, realty, railroad 23 tracks, or the wayside of the tracks. (Id. ¶ 6.) 24 Busker worked for Wabtec as a vendor employee through Visron Technical 25 LLC. (Id. ¶ 11.) He worked as a PTC technician for Wabtec from April 22, 2013, 26 through March 18, 2015. (Id.) During this time, Busker worked exclusively on 27 1 28 After carefully considering the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion, this Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 715. 2 1 Metrolink trains installing and testing PTC systems. (Id. ¶ 12.) He did not do any 2 Field Installation Work. (Id. ¶ 13.) 3 After learning that a co-worker wanted to pursue prevailing wage claims against 4 Wabtec, Busker filed a prevailing wage complaint with the California Department of 5 Industrial Relations (“DIR”). (Id. ¶ 16.) DIR opened an investigation in June 2015 6 and solicited responses from Wabtec, Metrolink, and Wabtec workers. (Id. ¶ 17.) On 7 December 22, 2015, the DIR investigator issued a Civil Wage and Penalty 8 Assessment (“CWAPA”) for prevailing wages in the amount of $5,786,349, and 9 related penalties of $682,215. (Id. ¶ 18.) Thereafter, Wabtec and Parsons filed 10 requests for review of the CWAPA and submitted supporting documents. (Id. ¶ 19.) 11 The Assistant Chief of DIR then ordered the release of the assessment, meaning that 12 Wabtec no longer owed the amount described in the CWAPA. (See id. ¶¶ 19, 20.) 13 While the DIR investigation was ongoing and before the issuance of the 14 CWAPA, Busker initiated this civil suit. (See Compl.) Busker asserts that he and a 15 class of workers were not paid the minimum hourly wage rate required by California’s 16 Prevailing Wage Law. 17 III. LEGAL STANDARD 18 Summary judgment shall be entered in favor of the moving party when “the 19 pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 20 with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 21 and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 56(c). The moving party initially bears the burden of showing the non-existence of a 23 material factual dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). The 24 burden then shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific facts showing that 25 there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Rule 56(e)). To carry this burden, the 26 non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 27 doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio, 475 28 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury 3 1 could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 2 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 3 For the purposes of summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most 4 favorable to the non-moving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his 5 favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Sischo–Nownejad v. Merced Cmty. Coll. 6 Dist., 934 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1991). Moreover, “[c]redibility determinations, the 7 weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts, are 8 jury functions, not those of a judge [when] he is ruling on a motion for summary 9 judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. IV. 10 DISCUSSION 11 All of Busker’s claims asserted in this action are dependent on his prevailing 12 wage claims. (See SUF ¶ 15; Compl. ¶¶ 34–86.) Moreover, Busker has admitted that 13 he has no additional complaint or claims if he is not entitled to prevailing wages. 14 (SUF ¶ 15; Busker Dep. at 14:24–15:23, Ex. B, ECF No. 65-3; Compl. ¶¶ 34–86.) 15 The Court finds that as a matter of law Busker’s work for Wabtec does not entitle him 16 to prevailing wages, and as such, there is no need for discussion of his additional 17 claims. 18 A. Meaning of “Public Works” 19 California Labor Code section 1771 provides that the general prevailing wage 20 shall be paid to “all workers employed on public works.” Public works are further 21 defined as work paid for in whole or part with public funds consisting of 22 “construction, alteration, demolition, installation, or repair work,” “irrigation, utility, 23 reclamation, and improvement,” “street, sewer, or other improvement work,” “the 24 laying of carpet,” and “public transportation demonstration projects.” Cal. Lab. Code 25 § 1720. 26 Beyond the text of the statute itself, public works can be understood as 27 involving only fixed works and/or realty. Prior to 2000, the definition of public works 28 was more limited, including only work done as part of physically constructing a 4 1 building. See City of Long Beach v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 34 Cal. 4th 942, 948 2 (2004). In 2000, the definition was expanded to include “such activities as the design 3 and preconstruction phases of construction,” but the focus of the statute remained on 4 physical improvements to land. See id. at 946 (internal quotations omitted). An 5 opinion letter from the California Attorney General supports this interpretation: 6 Thus, public works contracts generally feature construction projects of substantial dimension-including such undertakings as the erection, alteration, improvements, repair, and demolition of structures. The operation of a system, on the other hand, embraces more routine activities; it connotes the day-to-day business of running the system. Accordingly, we conclude that public works contracts are distinguishable from contracts associated with the procurement of goods and services that are used for the regular operational needs of the Authority or its enterprises. 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Attorney General Opinion 11-304, 95 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 102 (Dec. 24, 2012) 15 (internal quotations omitted). 16 Thus, sections § 1771 and § 1720 have been interpreted to mean that in order 17 for workers to be entitled to prevailing wages, they must have been employed on 18 project involving fixed works or realty on land. 19 B. Defendants Have Met Their Burden in Showing Non-Existence of a 20 Material Factual Dispute 21 Because the prevailing wage requirement applies only to public works 22 involving fixed works or realty, all that is needed in order for Defendants to prevail on 23 summary judgment is to show that Busker was not involved in a public works project 24 of that kind. Here, Busker’s work for Wabtec was part of a contract Wabtec entered 25 into with Parsons to design, furnish, install, and test PTC equipment on Metrolink 26 trains. (SUF ¶¶ 4, 5, 11.) In that job, Busker worked exclusively as a technician 27 installing and testing PTC systems on board the trains. (Id. ¶ 12.) While the larger 28 Parsons contract did involve some work on the fixed areas of the Metrolink system 5 1 such as the wayside of the train tracks, the subcontract with Wabtec under which 2 Busker was employed did not include any of that work. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 6.) The contract 3 between Parsons and Wabtec for the on-board work did not include a prevailing wage 4 requirement, and neither are those wages required by law. (See id. ¶¶ 7–8); Cal. Lab. 5 Code §§ 1771, 1720. 6 C. Busker Has Failed to Designate Specific Facts Showing that There is a 7 Genuine Issue for Trial 8 Busker opposes Defendants’ motion and unsuccessfully attempts to assert the 9 existence of genuine issues of material fact. For example, Busker asserts that section 10 1720 applies to his work for Wabtec because the statute does not create an exception 11 disclaiming coverage for work on locomotives and “rolling stock.” (Opp’n 3–4, ECF 12 No. 68.) The question, however, is not whether an exception exists relevant to work 13 done on trains, but whether the statute would otherwise cover trains in the first place. 14 Based on the text of the statute and its subsequent interpretation, it does not. No 15 exception is necessary where the statute does not pertain to work done on trains to 16 begin with. 17 Additionally, Busker asserts that Wabtec disputes whether it ever employed 18 Busker. (Id. at 10.) This is unsupported, as Defendants have acknowledged that 19 Busker worked as a PTC installer technician for Wabtec (SUF ¶ 11) and provided 20 further confirmation that this fact is undisputed in their Reply. (Reply 1, ECF No. 21 79.) 22 Finally, Busker attempts to argue that California Labor Code section 1772 23 entitles him to a prevailing wage. Section 1772 states, “Workers employed by 24 contractors or subcontractors in the execution of any contract for public work are 25 deemed to be employed upon public work.” The plain text of this section does not 26 broaden the meaning of public work; rather, it ensures that workers who are involved 27 in a project on a contract for public work are covered by the prevailing wage 28 requirement. The requirement that the underlying contract be one for public work 6 1 remains, and as discussed, the Parsons-Wabtec contract for the on-board installation 2 of PTC does not meet that requirement. 3 Because Defendants have shown an absence of a genuine dispute of material 4 fact, and Busker has failed to rebut that showing, summary judgment is appropriate. 5 Without entitlement to prevailing wages, none of Busker’s claims can survive, and 6 thus summary judgment is granted as to all of Busker’s claims in this action. V. 7 8 9 CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk of Court shall close the case. 10 11 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 January 10, 2017 14 15 16 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7
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