Ivan Rene Moore v. Michelle Rosenblatt et al, No. 2:2015cv08021 - Document 25 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAININGORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 17 . This order is without prejudice to Moore filing a properly noticed and supported motion for a preliminary injunction that complies with this Courts standing orders, his duties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and the Local Civil Rules by Judge Otis D. Wright, II (lc)
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Ivan Rene Moore v. Michelle Rosenblatt et al Doc. 25 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court Central District of California 8 9 10 11 Plaintiff, 12 13 14 15 Case 2:15-cv-08021-ODW (GJS) IVAN RENE MOORE, v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MICHELLE ROSENBLATT, et al., Defendants. EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 16 ORDER AND PRELIMINARY 17 INJUNCTION [17] 18 19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 On December 15, 2015, Plaintiff Ivan Rene Moore (“Moore”) filed an ex parte 21 application seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against 22 “Defendants Kimberly Martin Bragg, and remaining Defendants, their agents and 23 attorneys from selling, transferring, destroying, [and] hypothecating Ivan Rene 24 Moore’s property, during the pendency of this action, specifically identified as 25 follows: Clothing, shoes, kitchen equipment, personal property, piano, SSLK console, 26 music/sound/recording equipment, musical instruments, master recordings, ’71 27 Camaro, personal legal documents, Motorcycle; auto parts, tools, paintings, jewelry, 28 certificates of deposits, deeds to real property, Barer [sic] Bonds, Coin Collections, Dockets.Justia.com 1 corporate notes and records. Legal exhibits work product for all cases.” [Dkt. 17 at 2 3.] 3 For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the request for a temporary 4 restraining order and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the request for a 5 preliminary injunction. 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 “The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to the 8 standard for issuing a preliminary injunction.” Lockheed Missile & Space Co. v. 9 Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). A court may only 10 grant such relief “upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” 11 Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). To prevail, the moving 12 party must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the 13 moving party will suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief; (3) that 14 the balance of equities tips in the moving party’s favor; and (4) that preliminary 15 injunctive relief is in the public interest (the “Winter factors”). Id. at 20. “Under 16 Winter, plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in 17 order to obtain a preliminary injunction.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 18 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011) (original emphasis). 19 “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance that tips sharply 20 toward the plaintiff can [also] support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other 21 two elements of the Winter test are also met.” Id. at 1132, 1135 (holding that the 22 “sliding scale” test remains viable “so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a 23 likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest”). III. 24 In the Ninth Circuit, DISCUSSION 25 Applying the above standard, the Court finds that Moore’s papers do not come 26 even close to establishing the necessary likelihood for success on the merits, or even 27 serious questions going to the merits. Accordingly, the Court does not address the 28 other prongs of the Winter test. 2 1 Moore relies solely on the fact that he “has been awarded this property 2 specifically” in a Los Angeles Superior Court action as proof that he is likely to 3 succeed on the merits in this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [See Dkt. 17 at 5.] 4 Moore’s reliance is misplaced because Moore must overcome significant procedural 5 hurdles to continue to prosecute his case. 6 First, absolute immunity likely bars Moore’s claims against state judges 7 predicated on their exercise of judicial authority by issuing orders and judgments. 8 “Absolute judicial immunity ‘insulates judges from charges of erroneous acts or 9 irregular action.’” Burton v. Infinity Capital Mgmt., 753 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 2014) 10 (quoting In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002)); see Mireles v. Waco, 502 11 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (per curiam) (“It is well settled that judges are generally immune 12 from suit for money damages.”). That protection from suit exists “even when it is 13 alleged that [a judge’s] action was driven by malicious or corrupt motives[.]” In re 14 Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 15 225 (1988)). And judicial immunity extends to all “civil suits arising out of their 16 judicial functions,” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, which means it applies not only to suits 17 for damages, but also “to actions for declaratory, injunctive and other equitable 18 relief.” Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996) (superseded by statute 19 on other grounds). This includes federal civil rights actions and ADA claims. E.g., 20 Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial 21 of reh'g (Oct. 11, 2001); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en 22 banc). To determine what constitutes a “judicial act,” a court considers whether “(1) 23 the precise act is a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s 24 chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge; 25 and (4) the events at issue arose directly and immediately out of a confrontation with 26 the judge in his or her official capacity.” New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 27 F.2d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted) (cited in Salessi v. Commonwealth 28 Land Title Ins. Co., No. SA CV 08-01274-DOC, 2013 WL 5676209 at *9 (C.D. Cal. 3 1 Oct. 16, 2013)). Issuing orders and judgments plainly fall within the prototypical 2 scope of judicial action. 3 Similarly, certain other defendants working for the courts—such as court 4 clerks—may also be protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Castillo, 297 5 F.3d at 948 (“[I]ndividuals, when performing functions that are judicial in nature, or 6 who have a sufficiently close nexus to the adjudicative process, are entitled to a grant 7 of absolute quasi-judicial immunity[.]”). 8 Second, a substantial portion of this suit, if not the entire suit, may be barred by 9 the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prevents lower federal 10 courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’ 11 challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 12 commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting 13 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Here, 14 much of Moore’s suit is predicated on a challenge to the non-enforcement of 15 judgments upon jury verdicts and other judicial orders in state court proceedings. 16 Accordingly, the Court is unlikely to be able to assert jurisdiction over a substantial 17 portion of Moore’s claims. 18 Third, regardless of judicial immunity, the Eleventh Amendment likely bars a 19 damages award against the judges and other state court employees in their official 20 capacities. It is well settled that “a suit against a state official in his official capacity is 21 no different from a suit against the State itself.” Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l 22 Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 23 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars section 1983 24 actions against state officials, just as it does for suits against states, because neither are 25 “persons” covered by section 1983. Id. 26 27 28 1 District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 4 1 The judicial defendants here are judges of the Superior Courts of the State of 2 California. Those courts are state courts, and thus the judges and other Superior Court 3 employees are state employees. See Saunders v. Law Offices of Elaine Van Beveren, 4 520 Fed. App’x 548, 549 (9th Cir. 2013); Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. 5 Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir.1987) (“The official name of the court is the 6 Superior Court of the State of California; its geographical location within any 7 particular county cannot change the fact that the court derives its power from the State 8 and is ultimately regulated by the State. Judges are appointed by California’s 9 governor, and their salaries are established and paid by the State.”). Therefore, suits 10 against the judges and judicial employees are suits against the State, likely barred by 11 the Eleventh Amendment. 12 These are but a tip of the iceberg. And even putting aside the underlying 13 procedural issues, Moore makes no attempt in his moving papers to demonstrate that 14 he is likely to prove the elements of Section 1983 against any defendant, namely that 15 “(1) the action complained of occurred ‘under color of law,’ and (2) the action 16 resulted in a deprivation of a constitutional right or a federal statutory right.” 17 Mangum v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 575 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 18 Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2002)). Indeed, for the private defendant 19 Kimberly Martin-Bragg, Moore is unlikely to show the requisite state action. 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 5 IV. 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Moore’s Ex Parte 3 Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. [ECF No. 4 17.] This order is without prejudice to Moore filing a properly noticed and supported 5 motion for a preliminary injunction that complies with this Court’s standing orders, 6 his duties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and the Local Civil Rules. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 December 21, 2015 10 11 12 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
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