Curtis J. Richardson v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 2:2015cv07779 - Document 22 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Victor E Bianchini. (See Order for complete details.) IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: Judgment be entered REVERSING the Commissioner's decision; and REMANDING this case for further proceedings consistent wi th this Decision and Order, which proceedings shall be expedited by the Commissioner. The Clerk of the Court shall file this Decision and Order, serve copies upon counsel for the parties, and CLOSE this case, without prejudice to a timely application for attorneys' fees. (wr)
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Curtis J. Richardson v. Carolyn W. Colvin Doc. 22 O 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Case No. 2:15-CV-07779 (VEB) CURTIS J. RICHARDSON, DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiff, vs. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. I. INTRODUCTION In September of 2009, Plaintiff Curtis J. Richardson applied for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner of Social Security denied the application. Plaintiff, represented by the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing, Vijay Patel, Esq., of counsel, commenced this action 1 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB Dockets.Justia.com 1 seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits pursuant to 42 2 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3). 3 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. 4 (Docket No. 11, 12, 21). On July 6, 2016, this case was referred to the undersigned 5 pursuant to General Order 05-07. (Docket No. 20). 6 II. BACKGROUND 7 8 9 Plaintiff applied for SSI benefits on September 12, 2009, alleging disability beginning April 28, 2009, due to various impairments. (T at 132-39).1 The 10 application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Plaintiff requested a hearing 11 before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). A hearing was held on September 29, 12 2010, before ALJ Sally Reason. Plaintiff appeared with his attorney and testified. (T 13 at 70-84). The ALJ also received testimony from June Hagen, a vocational expert. 14 (T at 84-88). 15 16 On January 27, 2011, the ALJ issued a written decision denying the application for benefits. (T at 32-45). The ALJ’s decision became the 17 18 19 20 Citations to (“T”) refer to the administrative record at Docket No. 15. 2 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB 1 Commissioner’s final decision on August 10, 2015, when the Appeals Council 2 denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (T at 1-6).2 3 On October 5, 2015, Plaintiff, acting by and through his counsel, filed this 4 action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. (Docket No. 1). The 5 Commissioner interposed an Answer on February 19, 2016. (Docket No. 14). 6 Plaintiff filed a supporting Brief on April 7, 2016 (Docket No. 18); the 7 Commissioner filed an opposing Brief on May 9, 2016. (Docket No. 19). 8 After reviewing the pleadings, briefs, and administrative record, this Court 9 finds that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed and this case remanded 10 for further proceedings. III. DISCUSSION 11 12 A. Sequential Evaluation Process 13 The Social Security Act (“the Act”) defines disability as the “inability to 14 engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 15 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has 16 lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 17 18 19 20 The record indicates that Plaintiff submitted supplemental briefing to the Appeals Council in 2012. (T at 14). Although Plaintiff’s counsel wrote several letters to the Appeals Council requesting a decision (T at 7, 9, 11, 12), a decision was not rendered by the Appeals Council until August of 2015. (T at 1-6). 3 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB 1 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act also provides that a 2 claimant shall be determined to be under a disability only if any impairments are of 3 such severity that he or she is not only unable to do previous work but cannot, 4 considering his or her age, education and work experiences, engage in any other 5 substantial work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 6 1382c(a)(3)(B). Thus, the definition of disability consists of both medical and 7 vocational components. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). 8 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 9 for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step 10 one determines if the person is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If so, 11 benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404. 1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If not, the 12 decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether the claimant has a 13 medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 14 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). 20 C.F.R. §§ 15 If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of 16 impairments, the disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the 17 evaluation proceeds to the third step, which compares the claimant’s impairment(s) 18 with a number of listed impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so 19 severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 20 4 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB 1 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P App. 1. If the impairment meets or 2 equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be 3 disabled. If the impairment is not one conclusively presumed to be disabling, the 4 evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the impairment 5 prevents the claimant from performing work which was performed in the past. If the 6 claimant is able to perform previous work, he or she is deemed not disabled. 20 7 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At this step, the claimant’s residual 8 functional capacity (RFC) is considered. If the claimant cannot perform past relevant 9 work, the fifth and final step in the process determines whether he or she is able to 10 perform other work in the national economy in view of his or her residual functional 11 capacity, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 12 416.920(a)(4)(v); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). 13 The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie 14 case of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th 15 Cir. 1971); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). The initial burden 16 is met once the claimant establishes that a mental or physical impairment prevents 17 the performance of previous work. The burden then shifts, at step five, to the 18 Commissioner to show that (1) plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful 19 20 5 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB 1 activity and (2) a “significant number of jobs exist in the national economy” that the 2 claimant can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984). 3 B. Standard of Review 4 Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner’s 5 decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A Court must uphold a Commissioner’s decision, 6 made through an ALJ, when the determination is not based on legal error and is 7 supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 8 1985); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 9 “The [Commissioner’s] determination that a plaintiff is not disabled will be 10 upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” Delgado v. 11 Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial 12 evidence is more than a mere scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 13 n 10 (9th Cir. 1975), but less than a preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 14 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence “means such evidence as a 15 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. 16 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(citations omitted). “[S]uch inferences and 17 conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence” will 18 also be upheld. Mark v. Celebreeze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). On review, 19 the Court considers the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the 20 6 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB 1 decision of the Commissioner. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 2 1989)(quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1980)). 3 of the Commissioner, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. Richardson, 4 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the Court 5 may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 6 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision 7 supported by substantial evidence will still be set aside if the proper legal standards 8 were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. 9 Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, if 10 there is substantial evidence to support the administrative findings, or if there is 11 conflicting evidence that will support a finding of either disability or non-disability, 12 the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 13 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 14 C. It is the role Commissioner’s Decision 15 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 16 activity since April 28, 2009 (the alleged onset date). (T at 36). The ALJ found that 17 Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder NOS, intermittent explosive disorder, personality 18 disorder NOS, and rule-out anti-social personality were “severe” impairments under 19 the Act. (Tr. 36). 20 7 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB 1 However, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 2 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments 3 set forth in the Listings. (T at 36). 4 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no exertional limitations, but was 5 limited to simple routine tasks and limited contact with co-workers and the public. 6 (T at 37). 7 The ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a store 8 laborer. (T at 41). In the alternative, considering Plaintiff’s age (50 on the alleged 9 onset date), education (high school), work experience, and residual functional 10 capacity, the ALJ determined that there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in 11 the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (T at 41-42). 12 As such, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under the 13 Social Security Act through January 27, 2011 (the date of the ALJ’s decision). (T at 14 43). As noted above, the ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision 15 when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (T at 1-6). 16 D. 17 18 Disputed Issues Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s assessment of the medical opinion evidence. This Court will address this argument below. 19 20 8 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB IV. ANALYSIS 1 2 In disability proceedings, a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight 3 than an examining physician’s opinion, and an examining physician’s opinion is 4 given more weight than that of a non-examining physician. Benecke v. Barnhart, 5 379 F.3d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 2004); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 6 1995). If the treating or examining physician’s opinions are not contradicted, they 7 can be rejected only with clear and convincing reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. If 8 contradicted, the opinion can only be rejected for “specific” and “legitimate” reasons 9 that are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 10 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995). 11 Historically, the courts have recognized conflicting medical evidence, and/or 12 the absence of regular medical treatment during the alleged period of disability, 13 and/or the lack of medical support for doctors’ reports based substantially on a 14 claimant’s subjective complaints of pain, as specific, legitimate reasons for 15 disregarding a treating or examining physician’s opinion. Flaten v. Secretary of 16 Health and Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1995). 17 An ALJ satisfies the “substantial evidence” requirement by “setting out a 18 detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating 19 his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 20 9 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB 1 1012 (9th Cir. 2014)(quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998)). 2 “The ALJ must do more than state conclusions. He must set forth his own 3 interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors,’ are correct.” Id. 4 A. Dr. Kolpe 5 Dr. Manasi Kolpe, a treating physician, completed a mental work capacity 6 evaluation on June 1, 2010. Dr. Kolpe assessed slight limitations with regard to 7 Plaintiff’s abilities to: remember locations and work-like procedures; understand and 8 remember very short and simple instructions; carry out very short and simple 9 instructions; maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; sustain an 10 ordinary routine without special supervisions; make simple work-related decisions; 11 ask simple questions or request assistance; maintain socially appropriate behavior 12 and adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness; respond appropriately to 13 changes in the work setting; and set realistic goals or make plans independently of 14 others. (T at 220-21). 15 However, Dr. Kolpe opined that Plaintiff had marked limitations with respect 16 to performing activities within a schedule, maintaining regular attendance, and being 17 punctual within customary tolerances; accepting instructions and responding 18 appropriately to criticism from supervisors. (T at 220-21). Dr. Kolpe assessed 19 extreme limitation as to Plaintiff’s capacity to work in coordination with or in 20 10 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB 1 proximity to others without being unduly distracted by them and interacting 2 appropriately with the general public. (T at 220). Dr. Kolpe believed Plaintiff would 3 likely be absent from work 3 days or more per month due to his impairments or 4 treatment. (T at 221). 5 The ALJ did not accept Dr. Kolpe’s marked and extreme findings. (T at 40). 6 This Court finds this aspect of the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 7 evidence. 8 First, Dr. Kolpe’s findings were conclusory and not accompanied by detailed 9 clinical findings. The ALJ is not obliged to accept a treating source opinion that is 10 “brief, conclusory and inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Lingenfelter v. 11 Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 12 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002)). 13 Second, the ALJ reasonably concluded that the marked and extreme findings 14 were contradicted by the contemporaneous treatment notes, which indicated that 15 Plaintiff was frequently pleasant and generally able to control his emotions. (T at 40- 16 41, 197, 200-202, 227-28, 232-33, 237, 239-41, 244-49, 266, 344). See Bayliss v. 17 Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005)(finding that “discrepancy” between 18 treatment notes and opinion was “a clear and convincing reason for not relying on 19 the doctor's opinion regarding” the claimant’s limitations). 20 11 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB 1 Third, the ALJ reasonably relied on the opinion of Dr. Roger Izzi, a 2 consultative examiner, whose opinion is discussed in further detailed below. Dr. 3 Izzi performed detailed testing, conducted a thorough examination, and did not 4 assess any marked or extreme limitations. (T at 253-56). Dr. Izzi’s assessment 5 supports the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Kolpe’s highly restrictive opinion. See 6 Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002)(“The opinions of non-treating 7 or non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when the 8 opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the 9 record.”); see also see also 20 CFR § 404.1527 (f)(2)(i)(“State agency medical and 10 psychological consultants and other program physicians, psychologists, and other 11 medical specialists are highly qualified physicians, psychologists, and other medical 12 specialists who are also experts in Social Security disability evaluation.”). 13 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have weighed the evidence differently and 14 resolved the conflict in favor of the more restrictive aspects of Dr. Kolpe’s opinion. 15 However, it is the role of the Commissioner, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in 16 evidence. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989); Richardson, 402 17 U.S. at 400. If the evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, this 18 Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Allen v. 19 Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th 1984). If there is substantial evidence to support the 20 12 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB 1 administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding 2 of either disability or nondisability, the Commissioner’s finding is conclusive. 3 Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 4 In sum, although treating provider opinions are entitled to deference, the ALJ 5 may reject such opinions where, as here, the ALJ provided a detailed and thorough 6 summary of the record, reasonably resolved conflicting medical opinions, and 7 interpreted the evidence in a manner that a “reasonable mind might accept as 8 adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (1971). For the 9 reasons outlined above, this Court finds that the reasons provided by the ALJ for 10 rejecting the marked and extreme limitations assessed by Dr. Kolpe were sufficient. 11 B. Dr. Izzi & The RFC 12 Dr. Roger Izzi performed a consultative examination in November of 2010. 13 Dr. Izzi described Plaintiff as “hostile” and “irritable.” (T at 254). He assessed 14 Plaintiff’s level of intellectual functioning as within the Low Average to Average 15 range. (T at 255). Testing indicated good perceptual motor integration functioning 16 and no impairment with regard to visual scanning, tracking, or progressing in 17 sequence. (T at 256). Dr. Izzi assessed no limitation with regard to Plaintiff’s ability 18 to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions or make judgments on 19 simple work-related decisions. (T at 259). He found moderate limitations as to 20 13 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB 1 Plaintiff’s ability to understand, remember, and carry out complex instructions or 2 make judgments on complex work-related decisions. (T at 259). 3 Dr. Izzi opined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations with regard to his 4 ability to interact with the public, supervisors, and co-workers; and moderate 5 limitation as to responding appropriately to usual work situations and changes in a 6 routine work setting. (T at 260). 7 The ALJ accepted Dr. Izzi’s assessment. (T at 40). However, the ALJ did 8 not incorporate all of the limitations assessed by Dr. Izzi into Plaintiff’s RFC. The 9 ALJ’s RFC determination includes a restriction to simple, routine tasks and limited 10 contact with co-workers and the public (consistent with Dr. Izzi’s findings), but 11 contains no limitations regarding Plaintiff’s ability to respond to supervision or 12 respond appropriately to usual work situations and changes in a routine work setting. 13 As discussed above, Dr. Izzi assessed moderate limitations in this regard. 14 The ALJ erred by accepting Dr. Izzi’s opinion, but then failing to explain why 15 she did not accept or incorporate important aspects of that opinion into Plaintiff’s 16 RFC. A remand is appropriate where, as here, the ALJ finds a physician’s opinion 17 credible, but then fails to include or address material aspects of that opinion in the 18 RFC determination. See Le v. Colvin, No. CV 14-9759, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19 54944, at *4-8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2016); Gentry v. Colvin, No. 1:12-cv-01825, 20 14 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB 1 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168342, at *45-48 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013); Dennis v. 2 Colvin, No. 06:14-CV-00822-HZ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80937, at *8 (D. Or. June 3 20, 2015); see also Bagby v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 606 Fed. Appx. 888, 890 (9th Cir. 4 Or. 2015)(finding that ALJ’s RFC assessment limiting claimant to “simple, 5 repetitive tasks, no contact with the public, and occasional interaction with 6 coworkers” failed to incorporate physician’s conclusion that claimant was limited in 7 her ability to “[r]espond appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a 8 routine work setting”). 9 On remand, the ALJ should either explain why the additional limitations 10 assessed by Dr. Izzi do not need to be incorporated into the RFC or, if they are 11 incorporated, whether those additional limitations either preclude performance of 12 Plaintiff’s past relevant work or, in the alternative, preclude work that exists in 13 significant numbers in the national economy. Vocational expert testimony would 14 likely be required in the latter eventuality. 15 C. Remand 16 In a case where the ALJ's determination is not supported by substantial 17 evidence or is tainted by legal error, the court may remand the matter for additional 18 proceedings or an immediate award of benefits. Remand for additional proceedings 19 is proper where (1) outstanding issues must be resolved, and (2) it is not clear from 20 15 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB 1 the record before the court that a claimant is disabled. See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 2 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). 3 Here, this Court finds that remand for further proceedings is warranted. As 4 noted above, the ALJ erred by accepting Dr. Izzi’s opinion and then either failing to 5 incorporate all of the limitations he assessed or explain why those limitations were 6 not included in the RFC determination. With that said, it is not clear from the record 7 that Plaintiff is disabled. The Commissioner points to evidence of improvement in 8 Plaintiff’s symptoms with treatment and he was generally described as pleasant by 9 his treating physician. In addition, the Commissioner speculates that Plaintiff would 10 not necessarily be precluded from performing the jobs identified by the vocational 11 expert even if the additional moderate limitations identified by Dr. Izzi were 12 incorporated into the RFC determination. While these post-hoc rationalizations 13 cannot serve to sustain the ALJ’s decision,3 they do create a question as to whether 14 Plaintiff is disabled. As such, a remand for further proceedings is the appropriate 15 remedy here. 16 This Court is mindful of the significant delay in this case, which concerns an 17 application for benefits filed nearly seven (7) years ago. A large portion of this 18 3 19 20 “Long-standing principles of administrative law require us to review the ALJ's decision based on the reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ — not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have been thinking.” Bray v. Comm'r, 554 F.3d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 2009). 16 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB 1 delay was the result of the Appeals Council’s apparent failure to take timely action 2 with regard to Plaintiff’s request for review. This Court recognizes that a significant 3 delay, however harmful to the claimant and however inexcusable on the part of the 4 Commissioner, is not a basis for remanding for calculation of benefits. See, e.g., 5 Garcia v. Astrue, 472 F. App'x 614, 615 (9th Cir. 2012) (“While the length of the 6 proceedings here is regrettable, there are outstanding issues to be determined on 7 remand before a finding can be made that [claimant] was disabled for the relevant 8 period.”). 9 However, this Court directs the Commissioner to give expedited consideration 10 to this matter on remand and orders that follow-up proceedings be conducted within 11 a reasonable period of time. See Stone v. Astrue, 804 F. Supp. 2d 975, 987 (D. Ariz. 12 2011)(remanding with direction that decision be expedited); Daniels v. Colvin, No. 13 CV 13-654, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29261, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2014)(same); 14 see also Luce v. Astrue, No. C08-5421RBL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116155, at *3- 15 *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 2, 2008); Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 387 (2d Cir. 2004). 16 17 18 19 20 17 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB V. ORDERS 1 2 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 3 Judgment be entered REVERSING the Commissioner’s decision; and 4 REMANDING this case for further proceedings consistent with this Decision and 5 Order, which proceedings shall be expedited by the Commissioner. 6 The Clerk of the Court shall file this Decision and Order, serve copies upon 7 counsel for the parties, and CLOSE this case, without prejudice to a timely 8 application for attorneys’ fees. 9 10 11 DATED this 23rd day of August, 2016, /s/Victor E. Bianchini VICTOR E. BIANCHINI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 18 DECISION AND ORDER – RICHARDSON v COLVIN 2:15-CV-07779-VEB
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