Kathy Mason v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 2:2015cv05712 - Document 20 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. (sp)
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Kathy Mason v. Carolyn W. Colvin Doc. 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 KATHY M. MASON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________) NO. CV 15-5712-E MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 18 PROCEEDINGS 19 20 Plaintiff filed a Complaint on July 28, 2015, seeking review of 21 the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. The parties filed a consent to 22 proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on August 28, 2015. 23 24 Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on February 12, 25 2016. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on March 4, 2016. 26 The Court has taken both motions under submission without oral 27 argument. 28 /// See L.R. 7-15; “Order,” filed July 30, 2015. Dockets.Justia.com 1 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 2 3 Plaintiff asserted disability based on alleged mental and 4 physical impairments (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 52-64, 157-63, 5 183, 203-206, 213-15, 218-19, 226). 6 (“ALJ”) examined the medical record and heard testimony from Plaintiff 7 and a vocational expert (A.R. 29-244, 251-358). An Administrative Law Judge 8 9 The ALJ found Plaintiff has “degenerative disc disease and 10 degenerative arthritis of the lumbar spine . . . bilateral carpal 11 tunnel syndrome . . . and hypertension,” impairments that are “severe 12 in combination” (A.R. 31). 13 residual functional capacity to perform a reduced range of light work 14 (A.R. 35).1 15 capacity could perform certain identified jobs existing in significant 16 numbers in the national economy (A.R. 66-68). 17 testimony in deeming Plaintiff not disabled (A.R. 40-42). 18 Council denied review (A.R. 1-4). The ALJ determined Plaintiff retains the The vocational expert testified that a person with this The ALJ relied on this The Appeals 19 20 STANDARD OF REVIEW 21 22 Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the 23 Administration’s decision to determine if: (1) the Administration’s 24 findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the 25 26 27 28 1 According to the ALJ, Plaintiff’s capacity for light work is reduced by the following additional limitations: “She can occasionally push and pull bilaterally. She can occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. She can frequently handle and finger” (A.R. 35). 2 1 Administration used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. 2 Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 3 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner 4 of Social Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). 5 Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 6 might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 7 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); 8 see Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). Richardson v. 9 10 If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may 11 not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. 12 Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by 13 isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. 14 Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, 15 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 16 detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. But the 17 18 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and 19 quotations omitted). 20 21 DISCUSSION 22 23 After consideration of the record as a whole, Defendant’s motion 24 is granted and Plaintiff’s motion is denied. 25 findings are supported by substantial evidence and are free from 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 3 The Administration’s 1 material2 legal error. Plaintiff’s contrary arguments are unavailing. 2 3 I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conclusion Plaintiff Can Work. 4 5 Substantial medical evidence supports the conclusion Plaintiff is 6 not disabled. Dr. Robin Alleyne, an examining internist, opined 7 Plaintiff retains a physical residual functional capacity greater than 8 the capacity the ALJ found to exist (A.R. 285). 9 an examining psychiatrist, opined Plaintiff has an unlimited mental Dr. Nina Kapitanski, 10 residual functional capacity (A.R. 280). Non-examining state agency 11 physicians essentially concurred with the opinions of the examining 12 physicians (A.R. 80-83, 92-95). 13 examining physicians do not contradict “all other evidence in the 14 record,” the opinions may furnish substantial evidence to support the 15 administrative decision. 16 (9th Cir. 1995). 17 ever been disabled from all employment for a continuous twelve month 18 period. 19 upholding the Administration’s decision, the Court emphasized: “None 20 of the doctors who examined [claimant] expressed the opinion that he 21 was totally disabled.”); accord Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 22 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991). 23 /// 24 /// Where, as here, the opinions of non- See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 Significantly, no physician has opined Plaintiff has See Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (in 25 26 27 28 2 The harmless error rule applies to the review of administrative decisions regarding disability. See Garcia v. Commissioner, 768 F.3d 925, 932-33 (9th Cir. 2014); McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 886-88 (9th Cir. 2011); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 4 1 The vocational expert testified that a person with the residual 2 functional capacity the ALJ found to exist could perform certain jobs 3 existing in significant numbers in the national economy (A.R. 66-68). 4 The ALJ properly relied on this testimony in denying disability 5 benefits. 6 1989); Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 774-75 (9th Cir. 1986). See Barker v. Secretary, 882 F.2d 1474, 1478-80 (9th Cir. 7 8 9 To the extent any of the medical evidence is in conflict, it is the prerogative of the ALJ to resolve such conflicts. See Lewis v. 10 Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001). When evidence “is 11 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,” the Court must 12 uphold the administrative decision. 13 at 1039-40; accord Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 14 2002); Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). 15 Court will uphold the ALJ’s rational interpretation of the evidence in 16 the present case notwithstanding any conflicts in the record. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d The 17 18 II. The ALJ Did Not Err in Discounting Plaintiff’s Credibility. 19 20 Plaintiff subjectively complained of allegedly disabling pain and 21 other symptomatology (A.R. 52-64). The ALJ found Plaintiff’s 22 subjective complaints regarding the severity of her symptomatolgy “not 23 entirely credible” (A.R. 37). 24 thereby err. As discussed below, the ALJ did not 25 26 An ALJ’s assessment of a claimant’s credibility is entitled to 27 “great weight.” Anderson v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 28 1990); Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985). 5 Where, as 1 here, the ALJ finds that the claimant’s medically determinable 2 impairments reasonably could be expected to cause some degree of the 3 alleged symptoms of which the claimant subjectively complains, any 4 discounting of the claimant’s complaints must be supported by 5 specific, cogent findings. 6 (9th Cir. 2010); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995); 7 but see Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282-84 (9th Cir. 1996) 8 (indicating that ALJ must offer “specific, clear and convincing” 9 reasons to reject a claimant’s testimony where there is no evidence of See Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 10 malingering).3 11 specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the ALJ rejected the 12 claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily 13 discredit the claimant’s testimony.” 14 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted); 15 see also Social Security Ruling 96-7p. 16 stated sufficient reasons for deeming Plaintiff’s subjective 17 complaints not entirely credible. An ALJ’s credibility findings “must be sufficiently See Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d As discussed below, the ALJ 18 19 The ALJ accurately characterized Plaintiff’s past work as 20 “sporadic,” inferring that Plaintiff “has not demonstrated a 21 commitment to work, even when she was admittedly not disabled” (A.R. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 In the absence of an ALJ’s reliance on evidence of “malingering,” most recent Ninth Circuit cases have applied the “clear and convincing” standard. See, e.g., Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2014); Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 670, 672 n.10 (9th Cir. 2012); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Ballard v. Apfel, 2000 WL 1899797, at *2 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2000) (collecting earlier cases). In the present case, the ALJ’s findings are sufficient under either standard, so the distinction between the two standards (if any) is academic. 6 1 37, 166-70). A claimant’s sporadic work history can be a sufficient 2 reason to discount the claimant’s credibility. 3 80 F.3d at 1284 (ALJ may consider claimant’s “work record” in 4 determining claimant’s credibility); see also Deck v. Colvin, 588 Fed. 5 App’x 747, 748 (9th Cir. 2014) (sporadic work history is a specific, 6 clear and convincing reason for discrediting claimant’s pain 7 testimony). See Smolen v. Chater, 8 9 10 The ALJ also accurately pointed out that Plaintiff sometimes exaggerated her alleged problems: 11 12 The claimant has alleged a number of conditions not 13 supported with medical evidence. 14 that she has a protruding muscle in her leg, but I find no 15 evidence that this was ever observed by a healthcare 16 professional. 17 p. 1), and when she requested a hearing, Ms. Mason stated 18 that a bone in her left hand pops out (Exhibit 13E, p. 1). 19 However, neither of these conditions is medically 20 documented. 21 radiation of her back symptoms to her right leg, her 22 treating physician, Dr. Cohen, documented negative straight- 23 leg raising both seated and supine, and no neurological 24 abnormalities (Exhibit 3F, p. 1). For example, she testified She also alleges osteoporosis (Exhibit 11E, Moreover, while the claimant testified to 25 26 Such misrepresentations or exaggerations can justify the rejection of 27 a claimant’s credibility. 28 1148 (9th Cir. 2001) (claimant’s tendency to exaggerate is an adequate See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 7 1 reason for rejecting claimant’s testimony); Bickell v. Astrue, 343 2 Fed. App’x 275, 277-78 (9th Cir. 2009) (same); Brawner v. Secretary, 3 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987) (misrepresentations made by claimant 4 in the course of pursuing disability benefits justifies rejection of 5 claimant’s credibility); Madrigal v. Sullivan, 777 F. Supp. 1503, 1507 6 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (claimant's complaints of excess pain properly 7 disregarded where complaints found to be exaggerated); see also 8 Copeland v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1988) (claimant’s 9 credibility may be suspect where the claimant alleges a limitation 10 “disparate from that observed by the consultative examiner”). 11 12 The ALJ also emphasized significant inconsistencies in 13 Plaintiff’s various statements. For example, on June 28, 2012, 14 Plaintiff stated that she used a walker and a cane (A.R. 38, 214-15). 15 Approximately two weeks later, however, Plaintiff appeared for a 16 consultative examination without a walker or a cane (A.R. 38, 277-86). 17 Plaintiff later testified she does not require any assistive device 18 whatsoever (A.R. 38, 54). 19 claimed, but sometimes denied, that her prescription medications 20 caused significant side effects (A.R. 36-37, 62, 204, 220). 21 Inconsistencies in a claimant’s statements may impact adversely on the 22 claimant’s credibility. 23 (9th Cir. 1999); Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1995); 24 Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). For further example, Plaintiff sometimes See Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 25 26 The ALJ also pointed out that, despite Plaintiff’s allegedly 27 disabling pain and other symptomatology, Plaintiff once declined the 28 replacement of her pain medication and, more than once, failed to 8 1 follow up on medical referrals (A.R. 38-39, 259, 299, 312, 330). 2 Inadequately explained gaps in treatment or failures to comply with 3 recommended treatment can justify the discounting of a claimant’s 4 credibility. 5 inadequately explained failure to follow prescribed course of 6 treatment can cast doubt on claimant’s credibility); see also Meanel 7 v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (Administration properly 8 may consider the claimant’s failure to follow treatment advice). See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d at 603 (unexplained or 9 10 Accordingly, the ALJ stated sufficient reasons to allow this 11 Court to conclude that the Administration discounted Plaintiff’s 12 credibility on permissible grounds.4 13 at 885. 14 credibility determination. 15 825 (9th Cir. 2007) (court will defer to Administration’s credibility 16 determination when the proper process is used and proper reasons for 17 the decision are provided); accord Flaten v. Secretary of Health & 18 Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995).5 19 /// 20 /// See Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d The Court therefore defers to the Administration’s See Lasich v. Astrue, 252 Fed. App’x 823, 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 Furthermore, even if one or two of the ALJ’s stated reasons were to be deemed legally infirm, the Court still could uphold the Administration’s credibility determination. See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2008). 5 In this discussion section, the Court does not determine whether Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are credible. Some evidence suggests that those complaints may be credible. However, it is for the Administration, and not this Court, to evaluate witnesses’ credibility. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1989). 9 1 CONCLUSION 2 3 For all of the foregoing reasons,6 Plaintiff’s motion for summary 4 judgment is denied and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 5 granted. 6 7 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 8 9 DATED: March 16, 2016. 10 11 /s/ CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 The Court has considered and rejected each of Plaintiff’s arguments. Neither Plaintiff’s arguments nor the circumstances of this case show any “substantial likelihood of prejudice” resulting from any error allegedly committed by the Administration. See generally McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 887-88 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the standards applicable to evaluating prejudice). 10
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