Karen Trjo Howard v. Carolyn W. Colvin, No. 2:2015cv04641 - Document 23 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER REVERSING COMMISSIONER by Magistrate Judge Jean P. Rosenbluth. IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner, GRANTING Plaintiff's request for remand, and REMANDING this action for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Decision. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties. (See Order for details) (bem)
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Karen Trjo Howard v. Carolyn W. Colvin Doc. 23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KAREN TREJO HOWARD, Plaintiff, 12 13 v. 14 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 ) Case No. CV 15-4641-JPR ) ) ) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ) REVERSING COMMISSIONER ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 17 18 19 I. PROCEEDINGS Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner’s final decision 20 denying her application for supplemental security income benefits 21 (“SSI”). 22 undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 23 matter is before the Court on the parties’ Joint Stipulation, 24 filed May 26, 2016, which the Court has taken under submission 25 without oral argument. 26 Commissioner’s decision is reversed and this action is remanded 27 for further proceedings. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the The For the reasons stated below, the 28 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 II. 2 BACKGROUND Plaintiff was born in 1981 and moved to the United States 3 from Honduras around 1990. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 118, 4 251.) 5 a nurse’s assistant or caregiver from March 2009 until September 6 2011. She graduated high school in 2000 and worked part time as (AR 135-36.) 7 On November 18, 2011, Plaintiff applied for SSI, alleging 8 that she had been unable to work full time since July 1, 2004, 9 because of chronic cocci meningitis.1 (AR 118, 135; see AR 29.) 10 After her applications were denied initially and on 11 reconsideration (AR 75, 80; see also AR 54, 65), she requested a 12 hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (AR 85). 13 was held on August 29, 2013, at which Plaintiff appeared without 14 representation and testified through a Spanish-language 15 interpreter. 16 appeared at the hearing (see AR 38-39); instead, the ALJ 17 propounded posthearing interrogatories to a VE (AR 190), who 18 responded (AR 209-15). 19 to object or propound cross-interrogatories (AR 199, 218), which 20 she did not do. 21 November 5, 2013, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled as of 22 her filing date, November 18, 2011.2 (AR 38-40, 42-43, 115-17.) A hearing No vocational expert The ALJ allowed Plaintiff the opportunity The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on (AR 20, 27.) After 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Cocci meningitis is a form of “disseminated” coccidioidomycosis, in which a fungal infection becomes widespread throughout the body. See Edison v. United States, 822 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2016). 2 Because SSI payments may not be retroactively awarded, Plaintiff’s effective onset date is her filing date. See SSR 83(continued...) 2 1 retaining counsel, Plaintiff requested review from the Appeals 2 Council (AR 15-16), which denied review on April 23, 2015 (AR 1). 3 This action followed. 4 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 5 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 6 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The ALJ’s findings and 7 decision should be upheld if they are free of legal error and 8 supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. 9 See id.; Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Parra 10 v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). 11 evidence means such evidence as a reasonable person might accept 12 as adequate to support a conclusion. 13 401; Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). 14 It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. 15 Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035 (citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. 16 Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). 17 substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court 18 “must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both 19 the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from 20 the Commissioner’s conclusion.” 21 720 (9th Cir. 1998). 22 either affirming or reversing,” the reviewing court “may not 23 substitute its judgment” for the Commissioner’s. Richardson, 402 U.S. at To determine whether Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, “If the evidence can reasonably support 24 25 26 27 2 28 Substantial (...continued) 20, 1983 WL 31249, at *1 (1983). 3 Id. at 720-21. 1 2 IV. THE EVALUATION OF DISABILITY Claimants are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social 3 Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial 4 gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is 5 expected to result in death or has lasted, or is expected to 6 last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 7 § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 8 1992). 9 10 A. 42 U.S.C. The Five-Step Evaluation Process The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to 11 assess whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. 12 § 416.920(a)(4); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 13 1995) (as amended Apr. 9, 1996). 14 Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently 15 engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is 16 not disabled and the claim must be denied. In the first step, the § 416.920(a)(4)(i). 17 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful 18 activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine 19 whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of 20 impairments significantly limiting her ability to do basic work 21 activities; if not, the claimant is not disabled and her claim 22 must be denied. 23 § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of 24 impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to 25 determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments 26 meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments 27 (“Listing”) set forth at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 28 1; if so, disability is conclusively presumed. 4 1 § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). 2 If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments 3 does not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth 4 step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant 5 has sufficient residual functional capacity (“RFC”)3 to perform 6 her past work; if so, she is not disabled and the claim must be 7 denied. 8 proving she is unable to perform past relevant work. 9 F.2d at 1257. 10 11 § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). The claimant has the burden of Drouin, 966 If the claimant meets that burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. Id. The Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing that 12 the claimant is not disabled because she can perform other 13 substantial gainful work available in the national economy. 14 § 416.920(a)(4)(v); Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. 15 comprises the fifth and final step in the sequential analysis. 16 § 416.920(a)(4)(v); Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n.5; Drouin, 966 F.2d 17 at 1257. That determination 18 B. The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Process 19 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 20 substantial gainful activity since November 18, 2011. (AR 29.) 21 At step two, he found that Plaintiff had a severe impairment 22 based on her conditions of “history of meningitis, status post 23 ventricular peritoneal shunt” and “hydrocephalus.”4 (Id.) The 24 3 25 26 27 28 RFC is what a claimant can do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. § 416.945; see Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). 4 Hydrocephalus results from an excessive accumulation of cerebrospinal fluid (“CSF”) in the brain, causing abnormal (continued...) 5 1 ALJ explained that Plaintiff contracted “meningitis in 2004, with 2 subsequent complications of swelling in her head, after which she 3 had to have a shunt placed in October 2011.” 4 three, he determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or 5 equal a listing, noting in particular that her meningitis failed 6 to satisfy Listing 14.07(A)(2) (in order to be presumptively 7 disabling, meningitis infection must either be “resistant to 8 treatment” or require “hospitalization or intravenous treatment 9 three or more times in a 12-month period”). 10 (AR 30.) At step (AR 29-30.) At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to 11 perform a “reduced range of light work,” with limitations as 12 follows: (1) lifting and carrying up to 20 pounds occasionally 13 and 10 pounds frequently; (2) standing and walking for up to six 14 hours and sitting for eight hours in an eight-hour workday; 15 (3) occasionally climbing, bending, kneeling, and stooping, but 16 no crawling; (4) less than occasionally pushing, pulling, and 17 reaching above shoulder level on left and right; and (5) no 18 climbing of ladders, working at dangerous heights, operating 19 dangerous machinery, driving a motor vehicle, or ambulating over 20 uneven terrain. 21 specifically reduced Plaintiff’s capacity for “pushing, pulling, (AR 30-31.) The ALJ explained that he 22 23 4 24 25 26 27 (...continued) widening of spaces in brain ventricles and potentially harmful pressure on brain tissues. Hydrocephalus Fact Sheet, Nat’l Inst. Neuro. Disorders & Stroke, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/ disorders/hydrocephalus/detail_hydrocephalus.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2016). “Hydrocephalus is most often treated by surgically inserting a shunt system. . . . [to] divert[] the flow of CSF.” Id. 28 6 1 and reaching above the shoulder” based on objective evidence in 2 the record. 3 (AR 30.) In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ relied “primarily” 4 on a consulting examiner’s February 2012 report assessing 5 Plaintiff with “general limitations for light work,” which was 6 “consistent” with the agency medical consultants’ RFC findings of 7 “reduced range of light work.”5 8 Plaintiff’s allegations of subjective symptoms as “not entirely 9 credible” to the extent they conflicted with the RFC. 10 (Id.) The ALJ rejected (AR 31- 32.) 11 Based on Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found that she could 12 perform her past relevant work as a “Nurse’s Assistant/Home 13 Attendant,” apparently combining the VE’s descriptions of her 14 past jobs as “Nurse’s Assistant,” DOT 355.674-014, 1991 WL 15 672944, and “Home Attendant,” DOT 354.377-014, 1991 WL 672933 – 16 both of which, according to the VE, were “medium, semi-skilled 17 work” in the DOT but specifically “performed in the light 18 exertional range” by Plaintiff.6 19 VE’s findings, the ALJ explained that “an individual with 20 [Plaintiff’s] vocational profile and [RFC] could perform both of 21 these jobs, as [she] performed them, but not as they are (AR 32.) Again referencing the 22 23 24 5 25 26 27 28 Those agency medical consultants actually found Plaintiff capable of performing a full range of light work. (See AR 62, 72-73.) 6 It is unclear whether the VE found Plaintiff’s past job to resemble each of those two occupations or to be a “composite” of them with no counterpart in the DOT. 7 1 generally performed in the national economy.”7 2 Accordingly, the ALJ found her not disabled, ending the 3 sequential evaluation process without reaching step five. 4 V. 5 (AR 33.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff argues that the ALJ (1) failed his heightened duty 6 to fully and fairly develop the record and safeguard her 7 interests as an unrepresented claimant; (2) improperly discounted 8 her subjective allegations as not fully credible; and (3) erred 9 in finding her capable of performing her past relevant work as a 10 11 nurse’s assistant. (See J. Stip. at 2.) Because the record was insufficient to support the ALJ’s 12 finding that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work, the 13 matter must be remanded for further analysis and findings. 14 Court therefore does not reach the other issues. 15 A. The The ALJ’s Finding that Plaintiff Could Perform Her Past 16 Relevant Work Was Not Supported by Substantial Evidence 17 1. 18 Relevant background Plaintiff referenced her past job in two reports, an initial 19 disability report dated November 21, 2011 (AR 134-40), and a 20 work-history report dated January 18, 2012 (AR 144-55). 21 stated that from March 2009 to September 2011, she worked part 22 time as a certified nurse’s assistant or “caregiver in the 23 private home,” “tak[ing] care of senior.” 24 worked six hours a day and four days a week for $360 weekly. She (AR 136, 144.) She (AR 25 26 27 28 7 The ALJ also explained that Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a nurse’s assistant/home attendant constituted substantial gainful activity because she had worked 24 hours a week and made $360 each week. (AR 33.) 8 1 136, 145.) 2 [she] became unable to work.” 3 It was her “only one job in the last 15 years before (AR 136.) In the initial disability report, she listed the following 4 daily functional demands of her past job, some of which were 5 inconsistent with each other: no carrying or lifting, lifting up 6 to 10 pounds frequently, standing for three hours, walking for 7 one hour, sitting for one hour, a half hour of stooping, a half 8 hour of kneeling, and two hours of reaching.8 9 the work-history report, she gave the daily functional breakdown (AR 136-37.) In 10 as follows: lifting and carrying up to 10 to 15 pounds “when 11 going to groceries,” lifting up to 10 pounds frequently, standing 12 for two hours, walking for one hour, sitting for two hours, “n/a” 13 stooping and climbing, one hour of kneeling, a half hour of 14 handling large objects, and a half hour of reaching. 15 (AR 145.) At the August 29, 2013 hearing, Plaintiff testified that she 16 had worked as a CNA for “two years” before her shunt surgery and 17 that her CNA license had recently expired. 18 asked her to list any current physical or mental impairments that 19 would prevent her from performing that work, to which Plaintiff 20 responded, (AR 49.) The ALJ 21 Well, I get dizzy a lot and that’s why I can’t be sitting 22 down or standing up for long periods of time. 23 medication, [INAUDIBLE], and I get nauseous and dizzy 24 with that and I’ve also gotten blotches on my skin and I took 25 26 27 28 8 Although Plaintiff says she worked up to six hours a day, these time periods add up to eight hours. Some functions, however, are capable of being performed at the same time, perhaps explaining the discrepancy. 9 1 after the surgery, that’s why I couldn’t – I mean two 2 years for the surgery – I mean I haven’t been able – I 3 get really dizzy. If I bend over – 4 (AR 50.) 5 restating the same question. 6 suffered from blurred vision and headaches. 7 believed her conditions had “gotten worse” overall since 8 September 2011 in that she got “very nauseous at times” and her 9 dizziness “sometimes” kept her bedridden. 10 11 The ALJ asked whether she had “anything else” to add, (Id.) She then added that she (AR 51.) (Id.) she had to go see her doctor “every two weeks.” She She stated that (Id.) The VE described Plaintiff’s past relevant work as “nurse 12 assistant,” DOT 355.674-014, and “home attendant,” DOT 13 354.377.014 – both of which were medium, semiskilled work in the 14 DOT but light work “as performed by” Plaintiff. 15 (referencing “Exh 4E,” Plaintiff’s work-history report).) 16 found that a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff’s RFC could 17 perform her past relevant work of “nurse assistant/home 18 attendant” as she actually performed it but not as it is 19 “performed generally” in the national economy or “according to 20 the DOT.” (AR 211 The VE (AR 212.) 21 In support of his testimony, the VE noted that he had 22 reviewed all relevant exhibits, but he “could not open media to 23 listen to [Plaintiff’s] audio testimony,” which kept him from 24 responding to hypotheticals assuming an individual “possess[ing] 25 the same capabilities and limitations as described by [Plaintiff] 26 in her testimony.” (AR 210, 214.) 27 28 10 1 2. 2 Applicable law At step four of the five-step disability analysis, a 3 claimant has the burden of proving that she cannot return to her 4 past relevant work, as either actually or generally performed in 5 the national economy. 6 Cir. 2001); § 416.920(f). 7 the claimant at step four, the ALJ still has a duty to make 8 factual findings to support his conclusion. 9 844. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Although the burden of proof lies with Pinto, 249 F.3d at In particular, the ALJ must make “specific findings of 10 fact” as to “the individual’s RFC” and “the physical and mental 11 demands of the past job/occupation” and whether “the individual’s 12 RFC would permit a return to his or her past job or occupation.” 13 Ocegueda v. Colvin, 630 F. App’x 676, 677 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 14 SSR 82–62, 1982 WL 31386, at *4 (1982)). 15 Although the claimant is the “primary source for vocational 16 documentation,” the ALJ may use the VE to assist in the step-four 17 determination as to whether the claimant is able to perform her 18 past relevant work. 19 § 416.960(b)(2) (at step four, VE’s testimony “may be helpful in 20 supplementing or evaluating the accuracy of the claimant’s 21 description of his past work”). 22 work includes factual information about those work demands,” and 23 “[d]etailed information about strength, endurance, manipulative 24 ability, mental demands and other job requirements must be 25 obtained . . . . from the claimant, employer, or other informed 26 source.” 27 28 Ocegueda, 630 F. App’x at 677; see “Adequate documentation of past SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, at *3. Lastly, the ALJ can properly discharge his responsibility by comparing the specific physical and mental demands of the 11 1 claimant’s past relevant work with her actual RFC. 2 F.3d at 844-45; see SSR 82–62, 1982 WL 31386, at *2 (step four 3 “requires careful consideration of the interaction of the 4 limiting effects of the person’s impairment(s) and the physical 5 and mental demands of his or her [past relevant work] to 6 determine whether the individual can still do that work”). 3. 7 8 9 Pinto, 249 Discussion The ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was “capable of performing” her actual past work is not supported by substantial evidence. 10 (AR 32.) 11 regarding the specific demands of Plaintiff’s past relevant work 12 – in particular, the type and degree of “reaching”9 required, as 13 further explained below – to “assure that the available facts 14 support a conclusion regarding the claimant’s ability or 15 inability to perform the functional activities required in this 16 work.” 17 Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2010) (as amended May 19, 18 2011) (ALJ’s duty to fully and fairly develop record is 19 heightened when claimant is not represented by counsel). 20 the record remained relatively undeveloped as to Plaintiff’s past 21 relevant work and its specific functional demands and 22 requirements, it was insufficient to support the ALJ’s step-four 23 findings. 24 25 The ALJ failed to make required factual findings See SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, at *3; see also McLeod v. Because Specifically, her past work required some unspecified type of reaching for up to two and a half hours each day (see AR 137, 26 27 28 9 Reaching involves “extending the hands and arms in any direction” and is an activity “required in almost all jobs.” SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *7 (1985). 12 1 145),10 and yet the ALJ expressly limited Plaintiff to “less than 2 occasionally . . . reach[ing] above shoulder level on the left 3 and right” (AR 30). 4 the reaching Plaintiff’s past work required was above the 5 shoulder. 6 little up to one-third of the time, see DOT 355.674-014, 1991 WL 7 672944, the ALJ said Plaintiff could reach above her shoulders 8 only less than occasionally, and Plaintiff reached for up to two 9 and a half hours in a full workday, the ALJ’s finding that Nothing in the record described how much of Given that “occasionally” means occurring from very 10 Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as performed is 11 not supported by the record. 12 findings were fully supported by the record, insufficient 13 evidence showed that Plaintiff could perform her past work as she 14 performed it. 15 Thus, even assuming the ALJ’s RFC The ALJ’s error was not harmless. Not only was Plaintiff 16 possibly unable to perform her actual past work, the ALJ 17 expressly found that she could not perform it as generally 18 performed. 19 base is likely significantly eroded by the ALJ’s reaching limits. 20 See SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *7 (1985) (noting that because 21 “reaching” is “required in almost all jobs,” “[s]ignificant 22 limitations of reaching . . . may eliminate a large number of 23 occupations a person could otherwise do”); Caster v. Colvin, No. 24 6:14-cv-01006-JE, 2016 WL 2940512, at *8 (D. Or. Apr. 27, 2016) The ALJ did not reach step five, and Plaintiff’s job 25 26 27 28 10 Because Plaintiff’s past work was part time for six hours a day, her self-described requirement of up to two hours of reaching presumably would be about two and a half hours in a standard eight-hour workday. 13 1 (finding remand appropriate because ALJ “did not proceed beyond 2 step four of the sequential evaluation process, thus making it 3 impossible for this court to determine whether Plaintiff retained 4 the capacity to perform other work”), accepted by 2016 WL 2905416 5 (D. Or. May 18, 2016). 6 Plaintiff’s past relevant work was not harmless and warrants 7 remand. 8 B. 9 When, as here, an ALJ errs, the Court generally has Thus, the ALJ’s error regarding Remand for Further Proceedings Is Appropriate 10 discretion to remand for further proceedings. 11 Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000) (as amended). 12 no useful purpose would be served by further administrative 13 proceedings, however, or when the record has been fully 14 developed, it is appropriate under the “credit as true” rule to 15 direct an immediate award of benefits. 16 that “the decision of whether to remand for further proceedings 17 turns upon the likely utility of such proceedings”); Garrison v. 18 Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2014). 19 See Harman v. When See id. at 1179 (noting When the ALJ’s findings are so “insufficient” that a court 20 cannot determine whether the rejected testimony should be 21 credited as true, the court has “some flexibility” in applying 22 the credit-as-true rule. 23 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 (noting that 24 Connett established that credit-as-true rule may not be 25 dispositive in all cases). 26 Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 Here, further administrative proceedings would serve the 27 useful purpose of allowing the ALJ to develop the record as to 28 whether Plaintiff can perform her past relevant work or any other 14 1 work. 2 1020 n.26. 3 Thus, remand is appropriate. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at On remand, the ALJ should inquire in greater detail into the 4 demands of Plaintiff’s past relevant work and her capability to 5 do it, including resolving the inconsistencies between 6 Plaintiff’s two reports of her job’s functional requirements. 7 (See, e.g., AR 136-37, 145.)11 8 and consider Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ should conduct a new 9 hearing at which both Plaintiff and a VE testify. Because the VE was unable to hear Because the 10 ALJ will necessarily reassess Plaintiff’s credibility based at 11 least in part on that testimony, the Court does not address 12 whether the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff only partially 13 credible.12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 11 The ALJ may further develop the record and address any additional unresolved factual discrepancies on remand. (Compare, e.g., AR 47-48, 51 (Plaintiff’s description of living only with aunt) with AR 290 (“claimant lives with her family”), 251 (“lives with her husband in NoHo, 3 dogs, no children”), 166 (Plaintiff’s disability report listing her mother at same North Hollywood address).) 23 12 24 25 26 27 28 But in fact, Plaintiff’s meningitis appears to have been “well controlled” by medication (see AR 319 (Nov. 8, 2012 clinical note, describing patient’s history of cocci meningitis as “well controlled on Voriconazole”), and to the extent she remained compliant with medication, she “continue[d] to feel well,” with no fevers, chills, stiff neck, headaches, night sweats, nausea, dizziness, or vomiting (AR 315; see, e.g., AR 330, 323, 320, 315). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims to the contrary were likely not fully credible. 15 1 2 VI. CONCLUSION Consistent with the foregoing and under sentence four of 42 3 U.S.C. § 405(g),13 IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered 4 REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner, GRANTING Plaintiff’s 5 request for remand, and REMANDING this action for further 6 proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Decision. 7 FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve copies of this Order and the 8 Judgment on counsel for both parties. IT IS 9 10 11 DATED: September 27, 2016 12 ______________________________ JEAN ROSENBLUTH U.S. Magistrate Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13 That sentence provides: “The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 16
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