Cynthia Denise Silva v. Carolyn W Colvin, No. 2:2015cv04041 - Document 20 (C.D. Cal. 2016)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY by Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be entered affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and dismissing this case with prejudice. (See Order for Further Details) (kl)

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Cynthia Denise Silva v. Carolyn W Colvin Doc. 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 12 CYNTHIA DENISE SILVA, Plaintiff, 13 14 v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 15 Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. 17 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 15-4041-JEM MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 18 PROCEEDINGS 19 On May 29, 2015, Cynthia Denise Silva (“Plaintiff” or “Claimant”) filed a complaint 20 seeking review of the decision by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) 21 denying Plaintiff’s applications for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and 22 Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. The Commissioner filed an Answer on 23 September 1, 2015. On December 15, 2015, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation (“JS”). The 24 matter is now ready for decision. 25 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties consented to proceed bef ore this 26 Magistrate Judge. After reviewing the pleadings, transcripts, and administrative record (“AR”), 27 the Court concludes that the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed and this case 28 dismissed with prejudice. Dockets.Justia.com 1 BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff is a 48-year-old female who applied for Social Security Disability Insurance 3 benefits and for Supplemental Security Income benefits on August 24, 2012, alleging disability 4 beginning November 1, 2008. (AR 12.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in 5 substantial gainful activity since November 1, 2008, the alleged onset date. (AR 14.) 6 Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially on February 19, 2013. (AR 12.) Plaintiff filed a 7 timely request for hearing, which was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Evelyn M. 8 Gunn on September 6, 2013, in West Los Angeles, California. (AR 12.) Plaintiff appeared and 9 testified at the hearing and was represented by counsel. (AR 12.) Vocational expert (“VE”) 10 Gail L. Maron also appeared and testified at the hearing. (AR 12.) 11 The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on October 17, 2013. (AR 12-23.) T he 12 Appeals Council denied review on April 28, 2015. (AR 1-3.) 13 DISPUTED ISSUES 14 As reflected in the Joint Stipulation, Plaintiff raises the following disputed issues as 15 grounds for reversal and remand: 16 1. Whether the ALJ erred in the assessment of Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity. 17 18 2. Whether the ALJ erred in the credibility findings. 19 3. Whether the ALJ erred in relying on the vocational expert’s response to an 20 21 22 incomplete hypothetical question. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine whether 23 the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. Smolen v. 24 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273 , 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); see also DeLorm e v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 25 (9th Cir. 1991) (ALJ’s disability determination must be supported by substantial evidence and 26 based on the proper legal standards). 27 Substantial evidence means “‘more than a mere scintilla,’ but less than a 28 preponderance.” Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. 2 1 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a 2 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 3 401 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 4 This Court must review the record as a whole and consider adverse as well as 5 supporting evidence. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). W here 6 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision m ust be 7 upheld. Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). 8 “However, a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 9 simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 10 (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Orn v . Astrue, 495 11 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION 12 13 The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial 14 gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which 15 can be expected to result in death or . . . can be expected to last for a continuous period of not 16 less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner has 17 established a five-step sequential process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 18 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 19 The first step is to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial 20 gainful activity. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). If the claimant is engaging 21 in substantial gainful activity, disability benefits will be denied. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 22 140 (1987). Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or 23 combination of impairments. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. An impairment is not severe if it does not 24 significantly limit the claimant’s ability to work. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290. Third, the ALJ must 25 determine whether the impairment is listed, or equivalent to an impairment listed, in 20 C.F.R. 26 Pt. 404, Subpt. P, Appendix I of the regulations. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. If the impairment 27 meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is presumptively disabled. Bowen, 28 482 U.S. at 141. Fourth, the ALJ must determine whether the impairment prevents the 3 1 claimant from doing past relevant work. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844-45 (9th Cir. 2 2001). Before making the step four determination, the ALJ first must determine the claimant’s 3 residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The RFC is “the most [one] can 4 still do despite [his or her] limitations” and represents an assessment “based on all the relevant 5 evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). T he RFC must consider all of the 6 claimant’s impairments, including those that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 7 416.945(a)(2); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p. 8 If the claimant cannot perform his or her past relevant work or has no past relevant work, 9 the ALJ proceeds to the fifth step and must determine whether the impairment prevents the 10 claimant from performing any other substantial gainful activity. Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 11 869 (9th Cir. 2000). The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four, 12 consistent with the general rule that at all times the burden is on the claimant to establish his or 13 her entitlement to benefits. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. Once this prima facie case is established 14 by the claimant, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant may perform 15 other gainful activity. Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). T o support 16 a finding that a claimant is not disabled at step five, the Commissioner must provide evidence 17 demonstrating that other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the 18 claimant can do, given his or her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. 19 § 416.912(g). If the Commissioner cannot meet this burden, then the claimant is disabled and 20 entitled to benefits. Id. THE ALJ DECISION 21 22 In this case, the ALJ determined at step one of the sequential process that Plaintiff has 23 not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 1, 2008, the alleged onset date. 24 (AR 14.) 25 At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following medically determinable 26 severe impairments: affective mood disorder; borderline personality disorder; and a history of 27 substance abuse. (AR 14-16.) 28 4 1 At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 2 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 3 impairments. (AR 16-18.) 4 The ALJ then found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform a full range of work at all 5 exertional levels with the following non-exertional limitations: 6 Claimant can understand and remember simple instructions, in order to 7 complete simple, repetitive tasks; she would work better with things than 8 with people; and she is precluded from interaction with the public. 9 (AR 18-21.) In determining the above RFC, the ALJ made an adverse credibility determination. 10 (AR 19.) 11 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform her past relevant work as a 12 bookkeeper, data entry, and as a cash supervisor. (AR 21.) The ALJ, however, also found 13 that, considering Claimant’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that 14 exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Claimant can perform, including the 15 jobs of machine cleaner, laundry worker and hospital cleaner. (AR 21-22.) 16 Consequently, the ALJ found that Claimant was not disabled, within the meaning of the 17 Social Security Act. (AR 22-23.) DISCUSSION 18 19 The ALJ decision must be affirmed. The ALJ properly considered the medical evidence 20 and properly discounted Plaintiff’s alleged subjective symptoms. The ALJ’s RFC is supported 21 by substantial evidence. 22 The ALJ’s hypothetical question to the VE was not incomplete. It contains all the 23 limitations supported by substantial evidence and set forth in the ALJ’s RFC. 24 The ALJ’s nondisability determination is supported by substantial evidence and free of 25 legal error. 26 I. THE ALJ’S MENTAL RFC IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 27 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of her treating psychiatrist, 28 Dr. Ashima Sharma. The Court disagrees. 5 1 A. Relevant Federal Law 2 The ALJ’s RFC is not a medical determination but an administrative finding or legal 3 decision reserved to the Commissioner based on consideration of all the relevant evidence, 4 including medical evidence, lay witnesses, and subjective symptoms. See SSR 96-5p; 20 5 C.F.R. § 1527(e). In determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence 6 in the record, including medical records, lay evidence, and the effects of symptoms, including 7 pain reasonably attributable to the medical condition. Robbins, 446 F.3d at 883. 8 In evaluating medical opinions, the case law and regulations distinguish among the 9 opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) 10 those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who 11 neither examine nor treat the claimant (non-examining, or consulting, physicians). See 20 12 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927; see also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). In 13 general, an ALJ must accord special weight to a treating physician’s opinion because a treating 14 physician “is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient 15 as an individual.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation om itted). If 16 a treating source’s opinion on the issues of the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments 17 is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and is 18 not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record, the ALJ must give it 19 “controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). 20 Where a treating doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be 21 rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. However, if the 22 treating physician’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, such as an examining physician, 23 the ALJ may reject the treating physician’s opinion by providing specific, legitimate reasons, 24 supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31; see also Orn, 495 25 F.3d at 632; Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). W here a treating 26 physician's opinion is contradicted by an examining professional’s opinion, the Commissioner 27 may resolve the conflict by relying on the examining physician’s opinion if the examining 28 physician’s opinion is supported by different, independent clinical findings. See Andrews v. 6 1 Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995); Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. Sim ilarly, to reject an 2 uncontradicted opinion of an examining physician, an ALJ must provide clear and convincing 3 reasons. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). If an examining physician’s 4 opinion is contradicted by another physician’s opinion, an ALJ must provide specific and 5 legitimate reasons to reject it. Id. However, “[t]he opinion of a non-examining physician cannot 6 by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an 7 examining physician or a treating physician”; such an opinion may serve as substantial 8 evidence only when it is consistent with and supported by other independent evidence in the 9 record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31; Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600. 10 B. 11 The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the medically determinable severe impairments of Analysis 12 affective mood disorder, borderline personality disorder, and a history of substance abuse. (AR 13 14.) She has not worked since 2006 (AR 18) and alleges she has not been able to function at 14 all since April 2012. (AR 19.) The ALJ, however, assessed Plaintiff with a residual functional 15 capacity assessment for a full range of work with some mental limitations, including a limitation 16 to simple, repetitive tasks. (AR 18.) 17 Critical to Plaintiff’s case is the opinion of Dr. Sharma, her treating psychiatrist, who in 18 October 2012 diagnosed bipolar disorder, ADHD, anxiety disorder, and amphetamine 19 dependence in partial remission. (AR 198.) Dr. Sharma documented that Plaintiff was on and 20 off medication and had poor compliance with treatment. (AR 15, 19, 193-194.) Her case at 21 Child and Family Guidance Center (“CFGC”) had been closed repeatedly due to poor 22 attendance. (AR 15.) There were relapses of substance abuse in 2012. (AR 15, 19.) Dr. 23 Sharma and CFGC reported global assessment of functioning (“GAF”) scores in the 30-40 24 range1, which indicates “serious symptoms.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1002 n.4. As the ALJ 25 1 26 27 28 A GAF score is a rough estimate of an individual’s psychological, social, and occupational functioning. Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1164 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998). Although GAF scores, standing alone, do not control determinations of whether a person’s mental impairments are disabling, they may be a “useful measurement.” Garrison v. Colvin, 795 F.3d 995, 1002 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 594-96 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing GAF scores 7 1 noted, however, some of these assessments are unsigned and undated or occur during times 2 of substance abuse relapse. (AR 15, 154, 166-167, 172, 173.) On Aug ust 29, 2013, 3 Dr. Sharma submitted a check box medical source statement indicating extreme limitations in 4 the ability to carry out even simple instructions, to interact appropriately with the public, 5 supervisors or co-workers and to respond appropriately to work pressures and change in 6 routine in a work setting. (AR 230-231.) 7 The ALJ discounted the opinion of Dr. Sharma for specific, legitimate reasons supported 8 by substantial evidence. First, the ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Sharma’s check box extreme 9 limitation assessments because they are not documented in her clinical notes. (AR 21.) An 10 ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion to the extent it is not supported by his or her 11 treatment notes and consists of check box opinions without explanation. Batson v. Comm’r, 12 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2004); Bay liss, 427 F.3d at 1216. Nowhere in Dr. 13 Sharma’s treatment notes do there appear any extreme RFC assessments. The ALJ, 14 moreover, found that Dr. Sharma’s July 17, 2013, assessment did not include a function by 15 function analysis. (AR 20.) Plaintiff responds by asserting that Dr. Sharma’s August 29, 2013, 16 check box medical source statement provides such an analysis. The ALJ, however, properly 17 gave Dr. Sharma’s statement little weight because it was unsupported in her clinical notes. (AR 18 20-21.) Plaintiff also contends that Dr. Sharma took into account Plaintiff’s admissions of 19 substance relapses and treatment compliance (AR 20) but her August 29, 2013, check box 20 medical source statement contains no assessment of whether Plaintiff’s functioning would 21 improve with treatment compliance. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ should have recontacted 22 Dr. Sharma, but the ALJ’s duty to develop the record only is triggered when there is ambiguous 23 evidence or the record is inadequate to permit a proper evaluation of disability. Mayes v. 24 Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the m edical treatment records and Dr. 25 Kapitanski’s evaluation were sufficient to reach a decision. 26 27 28 in analyzing mental impairments). 8 1 Second, the ALJ found that Dr. Sharma’s opinions are unsupported by the clinical 2 evidence. An ALJ may reject a physician’s opinion that is contradicted by other assessments 3 of a claimant’s medical condition. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195. Here, the CFGC records do not 4 support Dr. Sharma’s extreme limitations. (AR 14-15, 21.) Also, the ALJ relied on the January 5 30, 2013, opinion of consulting psychiatrist Dr. Nina Kapitanski who diagnosed mild limitations 6 in social functioning, attention and concentration, no difficulty in sustaining work without special 7 supervision, mild limitations in sustaining work without special supervision, mild limitations 8 accepting instructions from supervisors and interacting with others, and moderate limitations in 9 completing a normal work day and handling the stresses of work. (AR 20.) She also assessed 10 a GAF score of 60, which indicates only moderate impairment in functioning. Garrison, 759 11 F.3d at 1002 n.4. She indicated Plaintif f’s limitations would improve with therapy and 12 abstinence from substance abuse. (AR 205-206.) The contradictory opinions of other 13 physicians provide specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting a physician’s opinion. Tonapetyan 14 v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintif f asserts that the ALJ failed to account 15 for Dr. Kapitanski’s moderate limitations, but the ALJ’s RFC adopts the same limitations to 16 simple, repetitive tasks with no public interaction as opined by Dr. Kapitanski. (AR 205.) 17 Third, the ALJ found Dr. Sharma’s extreme limitations to be inconsistent with Claimant’s 18 own admissions that she can take public transportation by herself, run errands, shop for 19 groceries, do chores, maintain independent self-care and functioning, take care of two children 20 and manage her money. (AR 21, 19.) An ALJ may reject a physician’s opinion that is 21 contradicted by a claimant’s own admitted or observed abilities. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. 22 Fourth, the ALJ discounted Dr. Sharma’s opinions because they rely on Claimant’s self- 23 reports which have been discounted as discussed below. (AR 20, 21.) A treating physician’s 24 opinion based on subjective complaints of a claimant whose credibility has been discounted 25 can be properly disregarded. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149. Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s 26 finding is not supported by the record but one need only look at Dr. Sharma’s October 17, 2012 27 Psychiatric Evaluation which makes repeated references to Plaintiff’s self-reports. (AR 19328 195.) 9 Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence, but it is the ALJ’s 1 2 responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. W here the ALJ’s 3 interpretation of the record is reasonable as it is here, it should not be second-g uessed. 4 Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d at 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). 5 II. THE ALJ PROPERLY DISCOUNTED PLAINTIFF’S SUBJECTIVE SYMPTOMS. 6 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in discounting her subjective symptoms. The Court 7 disagrees. 8 A. Relevant Federal Law 9 The test for deciding whether to accept a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony turns 10 on whether the claimant produces medical evidence of an impairment that reasonably could be 11 expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 12 346 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998); Sm olen, 80 13 F.3d at 1281-82 esp. n.2. The Commissioner may not discredit a claimant’s testimony on the 14 severity of symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence. 15 Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722; Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 343, 345. If the ALJ finds the claimant’s pain 16 testimony not credible, the ALJ “must specifically make findings which support this conclusion.” 17 Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345. The ALJ must set forth “findings sufficiently specific to permit the 18 court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s testimony.” Thomas, 278 19 F.3d at 958; see also Rollins, 261 F.3d at 856-57; Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-46. Unless there is 20 evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of a 21 claimant’s symptoms only by offering “specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” 22 Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283-84; see also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722. The ALJ must identify what 23 testimony is not credible and what evidence discredits the testimony. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 24 722; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. 25 B. Analysis 26 In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s medically determinable 27 impairments reasonably could be expected to cause her alleged symptoms. (AR 19.) The 28 ALJ, however, also found that Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence and 10 1 limiting effects of her alleged symptoms were “not entirely credible.” (AR 19.) Because the 2 ALJ did not make any findings of malingering, she was required to provide clear and convincing 3 reasons supported by substantial evidence for discounting Plaintiff’s credibility. Smolen, 80 4 F.3d at 1283-84; Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d at 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2008). T he ALJ 5 did so. 6 First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s subjective symptom allegations are not substantiated 7 by the clinical evidence. (AR 19-21.) An ALJ is permitted to consider whether there is a lack of 8 medical evidence to corroborate a claimant’s alleged symptoms so long as it is not the only 9 reason for discounting a claimant’s credibility. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th 10 Cir. 2005). Here, the ALJ found that the extreme limitations asserted by Plaintiff do not appear 11 in the clinical notes of treating medical providers. (AR 21.) 12 Second, Plaintiff admitted to improvement when compliant with medication and therapy. 13 (AR 19.) Impairments that can be controlled effectively with treatment are not disabling. Warre 14 v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). 15 Third, the ALJ cited evidence in the record of poor compliance with medication and with 16 clinical treatment. (AR 19, 15.) She refused to cooperate with sobriety programs. (AR 20.) 17 Her case was repeatedly closed due to poor attendance and she always had poor compliance 18 with medication. (AR 15.) The ALJ made a specific finding that Plaintiff’s noncompliance was 19 not caused by her mental impairments. (AR 19.) Thus, the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff’s 20 repeated noncompliance with treatment is “a significant and adverse credibility factor.” (AR 21 19.) An ALJ may discount the subjective symptom allegations of a claimant who fails or 22 refuses to follow a prescribed treatment regimen. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 23 1989.) 24 Fourth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s admitted daily activities are inconsistent with the 25 extreme limitations she asserts (AR 21), which is a legitimate consideration in evaluating 26 credibility. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-46. Despite her claim s she cannot function at all, her 27 functioning remains independent. (AR 17.) She can take public transportation, shop f or 28 groceries, run errands, do chores, and take care of two children. (AR 17, 21.) 11 1 Plaintiff disputes the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination, but again it is the ALJ who 2 has the responsibility to resolve ambiguities in the record. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. W here 3 the ALJ’s interpretation of the record is reasonable, as it is here, it should not be second4 guessed. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857. 5 The ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony for clear and convincing 6 reasons supported by substantial evidence. *** 7 8 The ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence. 9 III. THE ALJ’S HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION TO THE VE WAS NOT INCOMPLETE. 10 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly relied on the VE’s response to an incomplete 11 hypothetical question that did not include the work-related mental limitations of Dr. Sharma and 12 Dr. Kapitanski and the limitations asserted by Plaintiff at the hearing. The ALJ, however, had 13 no obligation to include limitations that Plaintiff claimed but failed to prove. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 14 863. See also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 756-67 (proper for ALJ to limit a hypothetical to 15 limitations supported by substantial evidence). Here, the ALJ included in her hypothetical all of 16 the limitations imposed by the RFC she assessed. These limitations included those assessed 17 by Dr. Kapitanski. She did not include, and had no obligation to include, the extreme limitations 18 asserted by Dr. Sharma and Plaintiff that the ALJ properly rejected because they were 19 unsupported by substantial evidence. Because the ALJ’s hypothetical contained all the 20 limitations the ALJ found credible and supported by substantial evidence in the record, the 21 ALJ’s reliance on the testimony given by the VE in response to the hypothetical question posed 22 was entirely proper. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217. *** 23 24 The ALJ’s nondisability determination was supported by substantial evidence and free of 25 legal error. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 12 1 ORDER 2 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be entered affirming the decision of the 3 Commissioner of Social Security and dismissing this case with prejudice. 4 5 DATED: February 10, 2015 6 /s/ John E. McDermott JOHN E. MCDERMOTT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13

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