N.I.A. et al v. County of Los Angeles et al, No. 2:2015cv02431 - Document 58 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISQUALIFY OPPOSING COUNSEL 45 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. (lc) .Modified on 9/29/2016 (lc).
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N.I.A. et al v. County of Los Angeles et al Doc. 58 1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 N.L.A, a minor by and through her guardian, MARICRUZ HERRERA, individually and as heir at law successor in interest to NOEL AGUILAR, deceased; and ELVIA AGUILARL, individually, 15 Plaintiff, 16 v. 17 18 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; ALBERT MURAD, an individual; JOSE RUIZ, an individual, 19 Defendants. 20 ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 15-02431 DDP (GJSx) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISQUALIFY [Dkt. 45] 21 22 Presently before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Disqualify 23 Opposing Counsel. 24 parties, the court denies the motion and adopts the following 25 Order. 26 I. Background 27 28 Having considered the submissions of the Ariana Gebauer was an associate at the Law Offices of John Burton and represented Plaintiff C.M.G., a minor, in the present Dockets.Justia.com 1 case. (Declaration of Ariana Gebauer, ¶ 1.) Between May 2014 and 2 November 2014, Ms. Gebauer was employed by Collins Collins Muir + 3 Stewart LLP (CCMS), a firm that represented Defendant County of Los 4 Angeles (“the County”). 5 firm structure in which a partner, a senior associate, and a junior 6 associate were usually assigned to a case. 7 Gebauer was typically assigned to cases as the junior associate. 8 (Id.) 9 the County in N.G. (Id. at ¶ 2.) CCMS employed a hierarchal (Id. at ¶ 5.) Ms. During the time of her employment at CCMS, CCMS represented v. County of Los Angeles, No. 13-cv-008312-SVW 10 (“N.G. v. County”), a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging unreasonable 11 use of force by the County and two individual Los Angeles County 12 Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) deputies. 13 Mathers, ¶ 4.) 14 the case officially and never met with county representatives 15 outside of their capacity as witnesses. 16 Furthermore, she maintains that she did no significant work on any 17 LASD civil shooting cases. 18 (Declaration of Catherine Ms. Gebauer maintains that she was not assigned to (Id. at ¶¶ 6,7.) (Id. at ¶ 8.) Ms. Gebauer’s supervisor at CCMS, Ms. Mathers, the lead trial 19 attorney on the N.G. v. County case, alleges that Ms. Gebauer 20 worked closely with her on the case and drafted page line summaries 21 of the two individual defendants’ testimonies. 22 5.) 23 information regarding the County’s evaluation and defense of § 1983 24 claims while Ms. Gebauer was assisting her. 25 working with Ms. Mathers, Ms. Gebauer also had access to the entire 26 N.G. v. County case file. 27 While at CCMS, Ms, Gebauer also worked on three civil service (Decl. Mathers, ¶ Ms. Mathers claims that she told Ms. Gebauer confidential (Id. at ¶ 6.) While (Declaration of Thomas Guterres, ¶ 7.) 28 2 1 matters filed by deputies against the County. 2 Decl. Mathers, ¶ 7.) 3 (Decl. Gebauer, ¶ 8; Upon leaving CCMS in November 2014, Ms. Gebauer joined Kessel 4 & Associates and worked there for approximately three months. 5 (Decl. Gebauer, ¶ 14.) 6 cases in which the firm defended the County, neither of which 7 involved an excessive force allegation. 8 9 While at Kessel, Ms. Gebauer worked on two (Id.) In May 2015, Ms. Gebauer joined the Law Offices of John Burton. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Before hiring Ms. Gebauer, Mr. Burton 10 vetted her for any conflicts of interest. 11 Burton, ¶ 3.) 12 Gebauer began working on the cases in his office, including this 13 case. 14 attorneys of record in this case, informing them that Ms. Gebauer 15 would be handing discovery. 16 2016, during a teleconference with defense counsel, Ms. Gebauer 17 stated that she “knew the type and nature of confidential LASD 18 documents referenced within the Stipulation for Protective Order’s 19 paragraph five, ‘Good Cause Statement and Confidential Materials,’ 20 because of her prior representation of Defendant County.” 21 (Declaration Carmen Aguado, ¶ 3.) 22 (Declaration of John Once Mr. Burton determined no conflict existed, Ms. (Id. at ¶ 5.) On January 6, 2016, Mr. Burton emailed all (Id. at ¶ 8, Ex. A.) On January 26, Following this disclosure, defense counsel, Carmen Aguado, 23 began researching Ms. Gebauer’s prior employment. 24 On March 25, 2016, Aguado sent Ms. Gebauer and Mr. Burton a meet 25 and confer letter outlining the grounds for this motion. 26 (Id. at ¶ 8.) 27 Gebauer and Mr. Burton continued to work on this case, including 28 responding to seventy-six requests for production of documents, one (Id. at ¶ 4.) During this time, and up until March 28, 2016, Ms. 3 1 hundred and three requests for admission, and twenty-fixe 2 interrogatories. (Decl. Burton, ¶ 15.) 3 In July 2016, Ms. Gebauer accepted employment at the Riverside 4 County Public Defender’s Office and has withdrawn as an attorney of 5 record on this case. 6 Defendants now move to disqualify Ms. Gebauer’s former employer, 7 the Law offices of John Burton, pursuant to California Rule of 8 Professional Conduct, 3-310 (E). 9 II. 10 (Supplemental Decl. Ariana Gebauer, ¶¶ 2,3.) LEGAL STANDARD Motions to disqualify counsel are governed by state law. W. 11 Sugar Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 98 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 12 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 13 attorney derives from the power inherent in every court to control 14 in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial 15 officers.” 16 Change Sys., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 1135, 1145 (1999). 17 Rule of Professional Conduct 3-310 (E), 18 19 20 A trial court’s power “to disqualify an People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Under California “A member shall not, without the informed written consent of the client or former client, accept employment adverse to the client or former client where, by reason of the representation of the client or former client, the member has obtained confidential information material to the employment.” 21 Courts have recognized that conflicts arising from successive 22 representation of clients with potentially adverse interests 23 jeopardize the former client’s confidentiality. See Flatt v. 24 Superior Court, 9 Cal. 4th 275, 282 (1995). In reviewing a motion 25 to disqualify, a court should consider “a client’s right to chosen 26 counsel, an attorney’s interest in representing a client, the 27 financial burden on a client to replace disqualified counsel, and 28 4 1 the possibility that tactical abuse underlies the disqualification 2 motion.” 3 Supp. 3d at 1080. 4 attorney who successively represents a new client in a matter that 5 is adverse to the former client, a “substantial relationship” must 6 exist between the subject of the current litigation and prior 7 litigation. 8 Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc., 38 Cal. 4th 839, 847 (2006). 9 The substantial relationship test balances the new client’s right SpeeDee Oil, 20 Cal. 4th at 1145; W. Sugar Coop., 98 F. Where a former client seeks to disqualify an Flatt, 9 Cal. 4th at 283; City and County of San 10 to counsel of choice and the former client’s right to 11 confidentiality. 12 Flatt, 9 Cal. 4th at 283. To determine whether a substantial relationship exists, the 13 court first determines whether there was a direct professional 14 relationship between the former client and the attorney. 15 Solutions, 38 Cal. 4th at 847. 16 where ‘the attorney had a direct professional relationship with the 17 former client in which the attorney personally provided legal 18 advice and services on a legal issue that is closely related to the 19 legal issue in the present representation.’” 20 Company, 215 Cal. App. 4th 916, 920 (2013) (citing Jessen v. 21 Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. 111 Cal. App. 4th 698, 710-711 (2003)). 22 Where there is no direct professional relationship, “then the court 23 examines both the attorney’s relationship to the prior client and 24 the relationship between the prior and the present representation.” 25 Cobra Solutions, 38 Cal. 4th at 847. 26 Cobra “A substantial relationship exists Khani v. Ford Motor In order for a substantial relationship to exist, information 27 “material to the evaluation, prosecution, settlement or 28 accomplishment of the former representation given its factual and 5 1 legal issues” must also be material to the present representation. 2 Khani, 215 Cal. App. 4th at 921. 3 former client’s practices, including the client’s litigation 4 philosophy, that is not of critical importance does not warrant 5 disqualification. 6 (“[F]or example, the attorney’s acquisition during the first 7 representation of general information about the first client’s 8 ‘overall structure and practices’ would not of itself require 9 disqualification unless it were found to be ‘material’ –i.e., General information about a Id.; See also Farris, 119 Cal. App. 4th at 680 10 directly in issue of critical importance–in the second 11 representation.”). 12 If a substantial relationship exists, the attorney is 13 disqualified from representing the second client. 14 38 Cal. 4th at 847 (Citing Flatt, 9 Cal. 4th at 283); SpeeDee Oil, 15 20 Cal. 4th at 1146. 16 presumed to have confidential information and is therefore 17 vicariously disqualified from representing the second client. 18 III. Discussion 19 Cobra Solutions, Additionally, the attorney’s law firm is also Id. As Ms. Gebauer is no longer employed by the Law Offices of 20 John Burton (LOJB), the only question before the court is whether 21 LOJB should be disqualified from the case due to Ms. Gebauer’s 22 prior work on the matter. 23 court must determine whether dismissing Ms. Gebauer would have been 24 warranted had she continued her employment at the firm. 25 In order to address this issue, the First, Defendants contend that, during her time at CCMS, Ms. 26 Gebauer represented the County in matters that involved factual 27 scenarios and legal issues similiar to those presented in the 28 instant case. (Motion at 9:4-6.) Defendants argue that Ms. 6 1 Gebauer’s involvement in N.G. v. County gave her access to the 2 County’s litigation strategy and budget in defending §1983 cases. 3 (Id. at 9:20-21.) 4 was never officially assigned to the case, and that her only role 5 in N.G. v. County was to summarize a few witness depositions, which 6 gave her no access to confidential information. 7 3:6-17). 8 9 Plaintiffs, however, contend that Ms. Gebauer (Opposition at The court agrees with Plaintiffs’ contention that in her capacity on the case, Ms. Gebauer would not have encountered the 10 type of confidential information that would disqualify her from 11 representing Plaintiffs in this matter. 12 never assigned to N.G. v. County, her relationship with the 13 Defendant County in that case was tangential. 14 Gebauer’s experience conducting initial client interviews with LASD 15 deputies in another matter related to a different section 1983 16 lawsuit (Zulma Trana v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC534547 17 (Gutteres Decl. ¶ 8)) constitute a “direct professional 18 relationship” with the County. 19 the relationship between the prior and present representations. 20 Khani, 215 Cal. App. 4th at 920. 21 Because Ms. Gebauer was Nor does Ms. Therefore, the court must assess While Ms. Gebauer might have been exposed to some general 22 information about the County’s approach to section 1983 cases 23 during her employment at CCMS, such general strategy is not of 24 critical importance and does not warrant dismissal. 25 Cal. App. 4th at 921; Farris, 119 Cal. App. 4th at 680. 26 N.G. v. County, like this case, was a § 1983 claim, the first case 27 was dissimilar, insofar as it involved different named-defendant 28 deputies from a different LASD substation and, significantly, 7 Khani, 215 Although 1 involved the shooting of a decedent who was already in custody. 2 (Decl. Gebauer, ¶ 7.) 3 Apart from arguments regarding Ms. Gebauer’s work on N.G. v. 4 County, Defendants contend that Ms. Gebauer’s representation of the 5 County in civil service matters involving LASD deputies, exposed 6 her to confidential information relating to LASD training on the 7 use of force. 8 these cases were brought against the County by LASD deputies for 9 disciplinary actions taken against them for their use of excessive (Mot. at 10:5-8; Gutteres Decl. ¶ 9). However, 10 force. 11 strategies, and facts of those cases are not related to the present 12 case. 13 (Guterres Decl. ¶ 10.) As such, the legal issues, Given the loose relationship between the cases Ms. Gebauer 14 worked on and the present case, it does not appear that Ms. 15 Gebauer’s employment prior to working at LOJB made her privy to 16 information material to the disposition or settlement of this case. 17 Therefore, no substantial relationship exists between this case and 18 previous ones. 19 The lack of a substantial relationship between this case and 20 previous ones would not warrant the disqualification of Ms. 21 Gebauer. 22 disqualified from this case if she were still an employee with 23 LOJB, the court also finds that disqualification of the firm is 24 inappropriate. 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // Having determined that Ms. Gebauer would not be 8 1 2 3 IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Disqualify is DENIED. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 8 Dated: September 29, 2016 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9
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